

出國報告（出國類別：進修）

美國大西洋理事會智庫受訓返國報告

服務機關：陸軍司令部計畫處

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摘要

當前全球局勢，美國已經進入全新大國競爭的新時代。冷戰結束以來，美國享受的“歷史的終結”甜美時刻即將結束。雖然俄羅斯和中華人民共和國同為美國競爭對手，但中國對美國領導秩序體系構成了主要威脅，在各領域和美國的競爭也互有輸贏。在政治體制上完全相反的邏輯和敘事，也正在互相比較。

中國實現“統一”的願望以及改變台海現狀的意圖是明確的，它在這個問題上考驗臺灣和美國及其盟友決心的努力也會越來越大膽，因此臺灣會是未來中美衝突最有可能的爆發點，未能阻止中國對台的侵略可能會迅速升級為世界大戰。因此，拜登政府會如何決定對美中台政策，便是國人亟欲所知的真相，也成為了本人研究計劃的主題。

在本人於 2021 年到智庫報到時，澳英美聯盟剛剛成立，美國剛放棄了其在阿富汗的盟友，美國的信譽正面臨受損，拜登政府的威信也一落千丈，飽受批評。加上疫情再次出現變種新冠病毒，再次打擊原本就脆弱的供應鏈，造成通貨膨脹。其中對美國人民生活甚鉅的二手車價更是高漲不下，因此也越來越多人知道半導體供應鏈的脆弱性和臺灣在半導體代工製造的獨佔優勢，對於半導體供應鏈和地緣政治安全的擔憂，也催生了美國晶片法案，本人便針對供應鏈最為關鍵的半導體領域研究，並投稿一篇「台灣展示了贏得半導體競賽不能只砸錢」，藉由分享台灣的成功經驗來暗示美國晶片國內生產即將面臨的挑戰，並非人人可以隨意複製。

接下來在美國大西洋理事會日子裡，見證了烏克蘭戰爭、前國防部長的訪台、民主黨眾議員佩洛西的訪台，真正體會到了何謂站在巨人肩膀看世界，尤其大西洋理事會斯考克羅夫戰略與安全中心在佩洛西訪台前也致電了佩洛西辦公室提供意見，也見證了智庫在美國參與決策過程如何發揮影響力，為了致敬史考克羅夫戰略與安全中心，本人在返國的研究報告裡便採用戰略報告(Strategy Paper)的格式撰寫，在史考克羅夫戰略與安全中心成立的主要目的，便是以戰略報告方式產出給政府機關的政策建議，最後送至國會送審，期望相關的模式也能在國內複製。

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前言

目的:

智庫是一種公共組織，依各智庫成立目的以及其財政主要來源來決定其性質，對於世界各國的經濟、安全與社會議題的評論與研究報告，有時能在大眾媒體與公民社會形成新的輿論或觀點，讓社會專注於討論影響大眾的重要事項，或是影響政府的施政決策；議題可能與國家安全、外交政策、經濟發展等重大議題有關，也可能是會是環保問題、社會福利政策或是個人價值觀等。

過程:

本人在 2017 年美國陸軍指參學院受訓時，當時川普總統當選總統，美國對中國關係政治定調為對手，整個學院因為國家戰略方向的改變，學院上下都在研究主題轉向中國和台灣，引起了本人對國際現勢極大的研究興趣，對智庫的第一印象，來自於課程內容的選擇閱讀資料引用智庫報告。因此對智庫是什麼樣的機構，產生極大好奇心，對於智庫在學術的權威性和專業度產生了景仰，並期待在將來一天能有機會了解更多有關於智庫的一切。

智庫過去對國軍軍事人員來說，相較於美國戰爭學院、指參學院學歷，知名度較為不足，但智庫派遣人員在智庫能為國家爭取能見度、發聲、發揮影響力、甚至影響美國決策的機會，其實大於上述軍事學院，原因除了智庫資訊流通程度極高外，在華府比較接近權力核心，有機會遇見或者看見左右國家政策的人事物的機會，相關領域的人才聚落也都在華府，因此長期在這環境耳濡目染下，會對戰略階層事務、安全研究相關議題的的敏感度和素養提升。歷來許多重要的政府官員亦多由智庫中借調任用，華府智庫是美國政治權力中心人才與政策的重要供輸中心。

大西洋理事會是一個跨黨派的智庫，與中華民國有長期合作關係，有別於其他的政黨智庫，大西洋理事會不具政黨包袱，常常在華府決策圈提出具非主流但具有創意的政策評論為名，並數次為本國安排關鍵性的拜會或者參訪行程。

本人很榮幸通過甄選並指派至大西洋理事會「史考克羅夫戰略與安全中心(Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security)」下設之「亞洲安全倡議(Asia Security Initiative)」擔任訪問研究員，因緣際會下更有幸成為第一位派至「前瞻國防(Forward Defense)」台灣研究員。得以近距離觀察美國政治、軍事決策背後運作過程，此外，台美雙方軍文職人員在學術上的交流互動，除了可以為本國的經濟和國軍的建軍備戰成果推介，更可進一步獲取美方更為深入的政策觀點，據以進行適切之戰略研析，提供具體有效的區域安全合作政策建議。

組織介紹

大西洋理事會是美國國際事務領域的智庫，於 1961 年成立，傾向大西洋主義，大西洋主義（Atlanticism）是一個西歐和北美國家（特別是美國和加拿大），在政治、經濟、軍事防衛等議題上互相合作的國際關係哲學。其宗旨是維護相關國家的安全，及保衛「民主、個人自由與法治」的價值。其名稱是來自於將西歐與北美相隔開來的大西洋。與大西洋主義立場相對的是親歐洲主義，即親歐盟。因此大西洋理事會也具有「純西方觀點」的傳統和風評，在學術研究上比較著重傳統歐洲舊大陸及其殖民地，可以從針對中國的研究中心 Global China Hub 始至 2021 年才籌備成立可見，大西洋理事會的重歐輕亞風格。


大西洋理事會的成立，其使命是鼓勵北美和歐洲在二戰後繼續開展合作。早年，它的工作主要包括發表政策文件和調查歐洲和美國人對跨大西洋和國際合作的態度。在最初幾年，它的主要關注點是經濟問題(主要是鼓勵兩大洲之間的自由貿易，在較小程度上鼓勵世界其他地區)但它也在政治和環境問題上努力。

大西洋理事會也標榜著跨黨派，不為特定政黨服務的中立性質，就筆者的觀察，大西洋理事會在選人派事上會特別著重政治立場的平衡，注重多樣性、公平性及包容性，這在華府的政黨色彩濃厚的智庫較難做到，因為智庫的財政獨立性向來是智庫最難解決的問題，因此若想長期維持此平衡並不容易，所以大西洋理事會也曾被紐約時報評較善於傾聽外國政府聲音，但很難評論這樣的特質優劣，對於政治立場較為保守的人說，有可能是大西洋理事會的缺陷，但就學術研究或者對維繫友邦關係角度來說卻反而是優點，因為這樣的聲音確實是該國政府的訴求。

大西洋理事會位於華盛頓特區，原是大西洋公約協會的成員，現有 16 個與國際安全和全球經濟繁榮相關的區域中心和職能專案辦公室，該組織列表如下：

一、 Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 斯考克羅夫特戰略與安全中心：

研究美國與盟友和對手的關係，以努力就有助於建立一個更穩定、安全和治理良好的世界的政策達成共識，致力於



製定預算可執行的、無黨派的戰略建議，以應對美國及其盟國和合作夥伴面臨的最重要的安全挑戰，該中心為大西洋理事會最大部門，其下轄組織有：

1. Scowcroft Strategy Initiative 斯考克羅夫特戰略倡議：

負責產製大西洋理事會戰略文件、大西洋理事會戰略聯盟年度會議、大國競爭有關研究；[The Longer Telegram : Toward a new American China strategy](#) (更長的電報：邁向新的美國對華戰略)是前幾年最有知名度的文章，該標題取名方是來自於更有名的「長電報」(The Long Telegram)某種程度主導了美國對蘇聯政策的報告，相當具有影響力。



Scowcroft Strategy Initiative
The Scowcroft Strategy Initiative exists to directly advance the Scowcroft Center's core mission by developing sustainable, bipartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. Its competencies in long-range foresight and strategy development are vital assets to government and business leaders as they navigate a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative serves to revolutionize, refine, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

至於最近的文章出版則是針對[北約戰略構想評分](#)(Scowcroft strategy scorecard: NATO's Strategic Concept clear on threats, but will require sustained commitment from Alliance)

2. Transatlantic Security Initiative 跨大西洋安全倡議：

形塑並影響了關於北大西洋聯盟及其主要合作夥伴面臨的最大安全挑戰的討論，特別著重在北約及歐洲安全，及泛大西洋地區，如北極、北約在美洲盟友、地中海、黑海，中國對此地區的影響力像是一帶一路等。



Transatlantic Security Initiative
The Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) brings together senior officials and experts from Europe and North America to share insights, strengthen cooperation, and develop innovative approaches to the key challenges facing NATO and the transatlantic community. Through high-profile public convenings, off-the-record strategy sessions, war-gaming, digital engagement, and counter-espionage operations, the initiative directly advances the Council's core mission of informing the transatlantic community.

3. Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (Asia Security Initiative)印太安全倡議(原亞洲安全倡議)：

透過基於關鍵的傳統和非傳統安全問題的雙重分析方法來促進跨大西洋太平洋共同體，以便為美國製定新的戰略和政策、它的盟友和它的合作夥伴。即為筆者所在的單位，近期最有名的活動便是主導前國防部長艾斯培訪台行程，訪台成果傾參考文章 [Dispatches from Taiwan: Follow an Atlantic Council delegation as it visits the island](#)。此團隊於 2022 年配合印太戰略更名。



Asia Security Initiative
The Asia Security Initiative (ASI) develops purposeful programming designed to create an Atlantic-Pacific Community that can adapt, revitalize, and defend the rules-based international order in Asia. The effort is grounded in a dual approach of providing fresh perspectives on traditional issues (regional security and political-economic architecture) while assessing a new agenda of non-traditional topics (cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things) to develop new strategies and policies.

該團隊主要負責亞洲國家官方或非官方組織定期交流，近幾年最常見的議題都圍繞在亞洲供應鏈上。

4. Forward Defense 前瞻國防：

針對圍繞美國及其盟國面臨的最大軍事挑戰分析並討論，並針對未來戰爭的定義、趨勢、科技和作戰概念進行前瞻性的評估。該團隊同時也負責美軍軍事研究員的管理和協同研究發表文章舉辦活動並產製戰略報告，筆者有幸今年與這團隊有不少的互動，認為前瞻國防團隊在成立以來持續的成長，其所參與的議題和活動都容易在華府軍工企業、軍事單位、聯邦機關等獲得回響，今年便舉辦了「[核心 22](#)：國防、國家安全和自主系統交叉口論壇」



Forward Defense

Forward Defense (FD) helps the United States and its allies and partners contend with great-power competitors and maintain favorable balances of power. This new practice area in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security produces forward-looking analyses of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare, and the alliances needed for the 21st century. Through the futures we forecast, the scenarios we envisage, and the analyses we produce, FD develops actionable strategies and policies for deterrence and defense, while shaping US and allied operational concepts and the role of defense industry in addressing the most significant military challenges at the heart of great-power competition.

NEXUS 22: A symposium at the intersection of defense, national

security, and autonomy；其在今年針對俄烏戰爭的研究也相當出眾，歸功於該組織較能善用美國國防部派任之軍職研究員，有效運用其軍事專業及人脈，來協助文人學者在軍事領域上的議題有更多貢獻，也同時使軍職人員學習更多學術素養，訓練思維邏輯、研究能力或者文筆，甚至學習主導學術研討活動，可謂軍文合作良好的模範，可為其他智庫部門所參考。例如：部內便常常運用擔任過建案等計畫軍官的軍職研究員來教導其員工美軍的建案武獲程序，或者情報專業軍官來產製專業戰事分析，文人出身的員工邀稿或者鼓勵軍職人員撰寫觀點或者出版文章，相輔相成完成任務，彼此互相學習成長。

因為智庫學術風氣自由，軍職研究員在智庫裡的討論較能「說實話」，並誕生不少具參考價值且對國防上具建設性但具批評性的意見或者報告，例如這篇「為何美國國防武獲正在落後?怪罪談判真相法問題」[Why is US defense acquisition falling behind? Blame the TINA paradox](#).探討現有的法規對國防建軍如何產生負面影響，或者這篇質疑「尖端軍事科技是否真的比人力便宜?」[Is cutting-edge military tech really cheaper than manpower?](#)的文章，探討全自動化作戰系統是否真的比傳統人力便宜等，最後則是學者與軍職人員合著的「美國全球國防軍力部署全新戰略建議」[A new strategy for US global defense posture](#)，依筆者淺見，上述都是非常不錯的範例，讓現役軍人針對議題和現有政策進行批判性思考。

前瞻國防探討議題的著眼其實也相當符合建軍武獲邏輯，提前探討區域性的安全議題，前瞻討論技術或者科技實用性及其應用性，同時與各軍工企業保持聯繫和合作關係，配合國防部的預算編列，檢討美國的國防軍力全球佈署，故在斯考克羅夫特戰略與安全中心屬於相當核心的部門，處於華盛頓軍事工業聚落地理位置實在恰到好處。筆者認為可長期派遣一員長期國防研究員在此部門中配合研究，協助其發展出更適合亞太軍事戰略，或者長期培養軍方與其合作關係，有別於印太安全倡議部門(原亞洲安全倡議)的政治、安全著眼，此部門更傾向軍事、科技、軍購性質，可讓我國防部在華府具備更多影響力，也可幫助美國的「綜合嚇阻」戰略規劃更加精準。

FD issues in focus



Defense foresight

Identifying the most important long-term developments, trends, and technologies that are shaping the future geopolitical and military environment.



Defense strategy & policy

Crafting sustainable, nonpartisan strategies with our allies and partners to counter, deter, and overcome the diverse military challenges posed by great-power competitors and other potential adversaries.



Operational concepts, capabilities & posture

Designing novel operational concepts which leverage both emerging defense technologies and traditional capabilities to deter and, if necessary, conduct future wars.



Defense industry & acquisitions

Realigning US and allied defense-industrial bases to ensure collaboration in pursuit of national defense strategies.



The art of war

Applying innovative methodologies such as wargaming, narrative fiction, and the creative arts to tomorrow's military and defense challenges.

5. Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative 斯考克羅夫特中東安全倡議：

著眼在中東地區建立新的安全架構，涉及全方位的安全威脅和挑戰，包括國家間戰爭的危險、恐怖組織和其他非國家行為者的作用，以及該地區國家面臨的潛在安全威脅。

探討議題主要著眼中東地區的邦交及大國競爭，具體的說也主要針對伊朗、伊拉克、波斯灣地區安全議題，或者恐怖主義、叛亂分子、穆斯林極端主義及其他不穩定的因子分析，或者歐洲各國於中東的勢力的變化，並向政府提供政策建議，最近出版的文章如下圖。



Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

The Atlantic Council's work on Middle East security honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region.

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Middle East North Africa



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A tale of two greetings: Decoding Biden's hand-to-hand diplomacy in the Middle East

By Jonathan Panikoff

The Biden-MBS fist bump reveals a frosty but functional relationship, while a handshake with Netanyahu reflects a long relationship—and political reality.

Politics & Diplomacy Saudi Arabia

二、Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs [拉菲克哈里里中心和其他中東研究](#)

拉菲克哈里里是黎巴嫩前總理，也是一位億萬富翁，為該中心主要捐助者之一。它旨在分析改變該地區的力量，並為美國和歐洲就如何促進與該地區更緊密、更富有成效的關係提出政策建議。該工作團隊也包括斯考克羅夫特中東安全倡議團隊。

三、Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center [拉丁美洲中心](#)

在共同價值觀和共同戰略利益的基礎上促進拉丁美洲、美國和歐洲之間更牢固的伙伴關係，並與其政治、商業和非政府組織企業家網絡合作，為尋求政策和商業領袖的政策和商業領袖制定想法區域和全球挑戰的解決方案。

四、Adrienne Arsht – Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center [洛克菲勒基金會復原中心](#)

是理事會成立於 2017 年 4 月的中心。該中心致力於社會和系統中建立復原力(準備、吸收和從潛在挑戰中恢復的能力，並提出付諸實踐的務實建議)，幫助政府、城市、企業和其他領導者在挑戰變成危機之前辨識和應對挑戰。

五、Africa Center [非洲中心](#)

成立於 2009 年 9 月，其使命是通過強調與非洲國家建立牢固的地緣政治夥伴關係以及加強非洲大陸的經濟增長和繁榮，幫助轉變美國和歐洲對非洲的政策方法。

六、Eurasia Center [歐亞中心](#)

促進東歐和土耳其到東方的高加索、俄羅斯和中亞區域領導人以及主要鄰國的同行和全球領導人之間的對話。該中心將歐亞大陸的歷史與政治、經濟和能源知識相結合，為政府和企業提供研究和建議。旨在促進基於共同價值觀和共同利益的區域合作和一體化議程，以實現自由、繁榮與和平的未來。

七、Europe Center [歐洲中心](#)

提供專業知識和建立共同體，以在動盪時期促進跨大西洋國家的團結和強大的歐洲。更多是以美國立場來詮釋與歐洲關係。

FEATURED COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS

The Europe Center uses real-time commentary and analysis to explain to key audiences in America current developments in Europe and how they affect the transatlantic relationship.



Experts react | Oct 7, 2022

The data privacy deal driving the future of the US-EU commercial relationship

By Atlantic Council experts

Biden's executive order is the next step toward establishing a new EU-US Data Privacy Framework; but will the new agreement be viable? Our experts break down the details.

Digital Policy Economy & Business



New Atlanticist | Sep 22, 2022

Could Italy become Europe's newest problem child?

By Ilva Tare, Akshat Dhankher

How a new right-wing coalition could shake up Europe's third-largest economy.

Elections European Union



New Atlanticist | Sep 23, 2022

The EU's Russia visa ban debate reveals the bloc's new power center

By Petr Tůma

The consensus on visa policy toward Russia is yet another sign of Central and Eastern Europe's rise to political prominence.

European Union International Norms

八、GeoEconomics Center [地緣經濟中心](#)

該中心號稱是外交政策、金融和經濟交叉領域的翻譯中心，旨在幫助塑造更美好的全球經濟未來。在該中心內，經濟治國倡議部門主要研究經濟、金融和監管在美國及其合作夥伴的國家安全中所起的作用，以及政府如何與私營部門合作。

由於該部門研究主題性質也常常橫跨亞洲供應鏈，因此也常常與亞洲安全倡議部門交流或者從事亞洲經濟相關領域研究，由於台積電在半導體產業地位的關係，該部門也較重視台灣經濟議題和安全議題，此部門也值得由企業機構或者政府其他經濟相關部門派遣訪問學者前往，可望新增一個管道和平台來增加我企業等私營部門在華府的聲量。

OUR PILLARS OF WORK



Future of capitalism



Future of money



Economic statecraft

Past flagship events



A special address by US Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen

The US secretary of the treasury joined the Atlantic Council ahead of the spring meetings at the IMF and World Bank to address Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the economic fallout for the developing world.



The future of UK banking and finance

The conference launched new research on UK financial competitiveness and the impact on the global economy featuring senior British, US, and European leaders across government, academia, and the private sector.

該中心研究主要探討資本主義未來、貨幣的未來趨勢、國家經濟政策，近期重量級活動為專訪美國財政部長。


九、Digital Forensic Research Lab [數字取證研究實驗室](#)


數字取證研究實驗室成立於 2016 年，有點類似我國的事實查核中心，研究公開資訊環境中的虛假信息並報告民主進程，通過揭露虛假信息和假新聞、記錄侵犯人權行為以及在全球範圍內建立數位復原力。據聞該項目的[主要捐助者](#)為臉書 Facebook 以及英國政府。

十、Global Energy Center [全球能源中心](#)

全球能源中心通過與政府、行業、民間社會和公共利益相關者合作，為不斷變化的全球能源格局帶來的地緣政治、可持續性和經濟挑戰制定務實的解決方案，從而促進能源安全。


HIGHLIGHTS



- 


Report | **Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world**

Pressure on oil and gas producers to adapt their operations to fit into a net-zero world has grown, from both policymakers and the investment community. This report examines the best ways to use policy and investment levers to set the sector up for success.

[READ REPORT](#)
- 

Report | **The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge**

Demand for minerals is projected to skyrocket over the coming years, with supply chains largely unprepared to scale up accordingly. The onus now falls on policymakers in the United States and Canada to develop resilient, sustainable, and transparent mineral supply chains.

[READ REPORT](#)
- 

Report | **European energy security and the critical role of transatlantic energy cooperation**

The Global Energy Center recommends that the US and the EU focus their energy cooperation in several areas that will benefit the EU's efforts to meet climate targets and bolster energy security.

[READ REPORT](#)

研究報告主要也是以美洲及歐洲能源安全為主，活動則以論壇方式進行，最有名的是一年一度的全球能源論壇。

十一、Millennium Leadership Program [千禧年領導者計畫](#)

千禧年領導力計劃於 2015 年啟動，旨在將塑造二十一世紀的下一代世界革新者聯繫起來並增強他們權力。該計劃由三個部分組成：千禧年獎學金、千禧年線上領導強化課程和全球青年專業人士計劃，全球青年專業人士計劃即是指大西洋理事會的實習計畫。



Flagship event

2022 Global Energy Forum

The Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum is the premier international gathering of government, industry, and thought leaders to set the energy agenda for the year. The 2022 Forum focused on meeting short-term energy demand while not losing sight of crucial net-zero goals, and examine the geopolitical, energy market, and climate crises shaping the energy system.

[LEARN MORE](#)

十二、Atlantic Council in Turkey [土耳其大西洋理事會](#)

位於土耳其的大西洋理事會分部，旨在通過研究、規劃和高階層討論論壇來促進對話並加強與該地區的跨大西洋接觸，以解決圍繞能源、經濟、移民和安全的關鍵問題。

十三、South Asia Center [南亞中心](#)

南亞中心是大西洋理事會在該地區的工作以及這些國家、鄰近地區、歐洲和美國之間關係的聯絡點。以南亞及其地緣政治的交叉點為 SAC 願景的中心，我們致力於為南亞最重要的挑戰尋找多邊解決方案。

十四、GeoTech Center [地緣科技中心](#)

以考慮新科技和新興技術的更廣泛的社會、經濟和地緣政治影響，利用科技解決全球挑戰，並制定可行的技術政策、合作夥伴關係和計畫。地緣科技中心的觀點立足於對技術目前和未來可能如何運作的現實評估、特別是公共和私營部門之間的協作方法的需求、務實的政策解決方案以及對複雜權衡的承認。

該中心主要負責議題主要有：數據、人工智慧、太空、生化科技與生化相關安全議題，如下圖：

PRIORITY AREAS

Data

The global Big Data market will hit \$450 billion by 2026, yet the global data divide continues to widen, leaving developing economies and traditionally marginalized communities behind. Prioritizing equitable, open access to secure data is vital to bridging the global data gap and establishing a more effective, trust-centered economy.

[LEARN MORE](#)

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) are deeply intertwined with nearly all aspects of modern life and multiple sectors, yet international unanimity on AI/ML regulations remain a work in progress.

[LEARN MORE](#)

Space

The satellite technology industry is rapidly evolving, and, with it, there is an increasing need for new global space governance strategies and standards that encourage humanitarian-focused satellite programs and aim to preserve orbital clarity.

[LEARN MORE](#)

Biotechnology and security

Scientific and technological advancements such as CRISPR are changing the nature of human security, health, and well-being. As a result, these technologies are becoming increasingly relevant to addressing important issues such as pandemic prevent and response, public health, and agriculture and require new policy approaches to manage effectively.

[LEARN MORE](#)

EVENTS

Event recap | Technology and pandemics: Challenges and opportunities

By Corina L.J. Dulbin

On April 16, 2020, His Excellency Omer Sultan Al Otaibi, Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, United Arab Emirates, shared his perspectives in an event titled "Technology and pandemics: Challenges and opportunities" as part of a live video discussion moderated by Mr. Francesca Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council.

[Watch Video](#) | [Download](#)

Event | Technologies for rebuilding after COVID-19

By the GeoTech Center

On April 16, 2020, Dr. David Brin and Dr. Kallian Newcomer shared perspectives on what technologies, models, tools, and policy actions could help rebuild from COVID-19 on a global scale as part of a live video discussion.

[Read More](#) | [Technology & Innovation](#)

十五、Global China Hub [全球中國中心](#)

全球中國中心針對中國崛起帶來的全球挑戰研究並製定相關解決方案，利用、擴大大西洋理事會在其他 15 個專案和中心的中國研究。此部門為 2021 年新成立部門，是大西洋理事會第一個針對中國研究的部門，此部門也非常適合本國派遣人員訪問研究。

THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS

What to watch during China's 20th Party Congress

The National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which happens once every five years, is likely to see Xi Jinping continue to try to undermine the rules-based order and push back against US global power, Atlantic Council experts explain.

Online Event | Fri, October 14, 2022 - 11:00 am EDT

What Xi Jinping's third term means for the world


What does Xi Jinping's third term mean for China's continued development as a global power and its relationships with the United States and the rest of the world?

China

Coronavirus

Economy & Business

Nationalism



New Atlanticist | Oct 11, 2022

Your expert guide to China's 20th Party Congress

By Atlantic Council experts

The once-in-five-years event is slated not only to further cement Xi Jinping's rule but also to have impact on a number of policy areas, from China's economy to its relationship with the Global South.

China

Climate Change & Climate Action



Issue Brief | Oct 7, 2022

What Xi Jinping's third term means for the world

By Michael Schuman

It has been widely believed for some time, both inside and outside of China, that current Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping will break with modern precedent and extend his reign into a third, five-year term. Xi, who also serves as the country's president, has been working toward this outcome for years.

China

Coronavirus



New Atlanticist | Oct 3, 2022

Why China's leadership must respond to the country's property crisis

By Jeremy Mark

The country's rapidly metastasizing property downturn threatens to engulf heavily indebted developers, homeowners, financial institutions, and local governments.

China

Economy & Business

另外該中心因為議題性質也避免不了討論台海安全或者兩岸關係，因此也多了一個平台讓本國相關議題曝光。

Online Event | Tue, July 26, 2022 - 12:00 pm EDT

A conversation about Taiwan with the 27th US Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – Former US Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper shares his insights following the four-day Atlantic Council transatlantic delegation trip to Taiwan.

Indo-Pacific Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society Security & Defense



Online Event | Thu, July 14, 2022 - 1:00 pm EDT

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, one month later: Implementation and impact on human rights, supply chains, and accountability

An assessment of the current state of implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) since it entered into force last month and its future impact across numerous domains.

China Human Rights Technology & Innovation



CROSS-COUNCIL CHINA SPOTLIGHT



Fast Thinking | Aug 3, 2022

The coming aftershocks from Pelosi's Taiwan trip

By Atlantic Council

With Pelosi now wheels-up from Taipei, what's coming next in the US-China showdown? And how will the trip shake up life in Taiwan?


China Crisis Management

十六、Freedom and Prosperity Center [自由繁榮中心](#)

自由與繁榮中心旨在促進發展中國家貧困和邊緣化人群的繁榮，並探討自由與繁榮之間關係的本質。該中心最有名的即是[自由繁榮指標報告](#)。

另外值得一提的是台灣在亞洲排名第一，所以在自由指數排名第 18 位，繁榮指數排名第 27 位，此數據在蔡總統接於 2022 年 7 月 19 日接見前國防部長艾斯培[致詞](#)時引用此中心的報告，該中心也特別提了一下。

NEWS



President Tsai mentions the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes in Opening Remarks

President Tsai met on July 19, 2022, with an Atlantic Council delegation led by Michael Esper, former Secretary of the Department of Defense. In her remarks, President Tsai referred to the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes where Taiwan ranks first in Asia and 18th overall in the Freedom Index, and 27th overall in the Prosperity Index.

LEARN MORE

大西洋理事會門口及國際現勢新聞跑馬燈



大西洋理事會媒體製作中心



核心 22：國防、國家安全和自主系統交叉口論壇



專訪洛克希德馬丁公司執行長：訪問中提及為何標槍飛彈等武器未擴產原因

專訪主題：了解美國與盟友國防升級的挑戰



智庫針對新進員工講解如何使用媒體製作中心



人工智慧在國家安全與國防的未來線上論壇



線上專訪美國陸軍部長，研討美國陸軍在國防戰略裡的角色



個人研究主題及投稿著作

筆者在這次智庫中投稿著作有 [Taiwan shows how winning the semiconductor race takes more than money](#)(台灣展示贏得半導體不只需要錢)，針對美國半導體國內生產政策提供建議全文翻譯如下：

台灣展示贏得半導體競賽不只需要錢

白宮週五決定對向中國出售半導體和晶片製造設備施加更多限制——此舉旨在減緩北京經濟和軍事技術的升級能力——這一舉措說明了問題。它再次顯示美國正面臨越來越大的壓力，要在中國擴大半導體產業之前保持領先同時減少美國軍事和商業需求對台灣的單一依賴。拜登政府的新出口管制緊隨國會批准數十億美元支持尖端晶片製造之後。然而，單靠金錢上的挹助並不能保證美國本土半導體產業的成功。美國公司還應該從韓國和台灣等這種盟國和夥伴國家的成功老牌企業那裡汲取重要經驗教訓。

中國最近在使用 7 奈米 (nm) 工藝技術生產半導體方面取得突破——美國最大的晶片製造商英特爾公司卻無法實現這一水平的生產能力——突顯了美國政府支持國內晶片製造商確保最精密半導體生產能力的必要性。晶片和科學法案撥出 520 億美元的補貼和稅收減免以支持晶片製造，另外 2000 億美元用於研究和其他投資。該法律旨在為英特爾和其他美國半導體製造商增加對製造設施的資本投資提供補貼和其他幫助。這筆資金也將幫助台積電 (TSMC) 和韓國三星電子公司分別在亞利桑那州和德克薩斯州建立晶圓廠。

這些最近的發展凸顯了美國複製身為全球半導體供應鏈核心的東亞晶片製造商嚴格的生產標準所面臨的挑戰。美國正在尋求趕上台灣和韓國同業領導者的能力，同時也企圖保持領先中國發展半導體自主發展。北京正在為此投入數千億美元，最近取得了成果，其領先的晶片製造商中芯國際 (SMIC) 成功生產了只有台積電和三星能夠製造的 7 奈米晶片——儘管美國嚴格管控中國公司關鍵晶片製造技術的輸出。

這場競爭有一個重要的戰略層面考量，聲量超越了製造技術上的競爭。一些分析師對中國是否會入侵台灣以奪取其珍貴的半導體產業（包括台積電最先進的晶圓廠）表示擔憂。然而，由於多種原因，這並不是一個實際的前景，因為這樣的攻擊最終可能會摧毀台灣的晶圓廠，並將該產業最大的資源——其經驗豐富的工程師和技術人員——分散到全球各地。

更不用說這一結果將對全球經濟造成災難性影響，尤其是對於一個需要與它的供應鏈承包商緊密合作的產業，半導體自身原料供應鏈包括日本、美國、荷蘭、韓國、中國和台灣供應商。

此外，解放軍入侵場景完全沒有顧慮到過去 40 年中台灣和中國經濟之間建立的相互依賴，這主要是因為半導體貿易所建立起來的羈絆。這種相互依賴創造了台灣民眾常說的“矽盾”。

但對台灣產業的威脅——以及半導體供應鏈的脆弱性——也讓美國政界人士和行業高管停下腳步，促使政策更加關注提高美國晶片製造能力。美國目前佔全球半導體製造業的 12%，低於 1990 年的 37%。與此同時，台積電生產 90% 以上的最先進晶片，並將很快開始在 3 奈米“製程”或生產線上進行商業生產，如果成功商業量產，這個製程生產的晶片將是世界上最小的。

複製台灣和韓國成功故事的技術障礙令人生畏。最先進的晶片代工廠成本超過 100 億美元。即使它們一旦建成，實現完美設備的大規模生產也絕非易事。看看英特爾近年來在試圖將其製程推進到製造 7 奈米時所面臨的困難。目前，英特爾領先的晶片是外包其亞洲競爭對手的工廠中生產的。此外，生產過程需要在世界各地採購數百個複雜的輸入和設備，其中最重要的是僅由荷蘭公司 ASML 艾斯摩爾生產的價值 3.4 億美元的機器，該機器使用極紫外光刻技術蝕刻電路。

但生產最先進的晶片不僅僅是掌握技術。真正的挑戰在於在生產數百萬個半導體的工廠中實現無瑕疵晶片的高產量。想像一下，在僅相距幾十億分之一米的電子電路上發現一個由實際上太小而無法檢測到的隨機光粒子引起的缺陷。晶片內的電路越密集，就越難達到能為晶片製造商提供利潤所需的完美水準。

台積電以其工廠高達 95% 的良率而聞名——這意味著 20 個晶片中有 19 個是完美的。經過 4 年開發和完善突破性晶片技術，這家台灣公司擁有比任何其他公司都更經驗豐富的工程師和技術人員，以及對高度自動化產業面臨的實際需求有更深入了解。這反映了一種企業文化，這種文化塑造了成千上萬的技術人員，他們願意執行確保高良率所需的苛刻工作。

這種成功還需要像台灣這樣的教育體系，它可以提供電機工程的基本培訓，以不斷培養出新的技術人員，這些技術人員將為台積電和該國其他晶片製造商運營的數十家晶片工廠提供工作人員。最近批准的美國法案承認訓練有素的勞動力對於振興半導體產業的重要性，因此呼籲增加大學裡以新晶圓廠相關產學結合項目的補助。

美國在生產層級也可以從台積電和三星等領先公司那裡學到東西，例如巨量生產、材料採購、品質管理、機器學習反饋、故障排除和成本控制的經驗，並納入其半導體生產線。甚至，這些公司研發部門以每天 24 小時的輪班不間斷工作來保持領先地位。

台灣方面有些擔心台積電在美國的投資會削弱國內的公司。但現實情況是，競爭的加劇將繼續產生創新，加強台灣的半導體產業並惠及所有國家。

最終，美國半導體行業的最佳技能和經驗來源將來自該行業的亞洲領導者，尤其是在台積電和三星尋求擴大其在美國的製造基地的情況下。他們在美國土地上的存在——以及將轉移到新運營基地的供應商和分包商——將培育一個生態系統，推動半導體行業的有效發展，從而增強美國的國家安全。CHIPS 和科學法案等美國立法可以支持這一進程，並且隨著技術向英特爾和其他美國公司傳播，跨太平洋半導體供應鏈的整合將增強民主國家保持競爭優勢的能力中國和加強印太夥伴關係的支柱。


中華民國陸軍中校林群超為 2021 年至 2022 年擔任大西洋理事會斯考克羅夫特戰略與安全中心的訪問國防資深研究員。

本文並不一定代表中華民國陸軍或國防部的立場。

筆者智庫研究主題為拜登政府的政策評析，因此不只半導體研究，在俄烏戰爭爆發後，俄烏戰爭的軍事研究主題也變成我的研究主要方向，由於這是發生在擁核大國的戰爭，因此核恫嚇也變成我的研究領域之一，這些研究主軸；包括半導體供應鏈、俄烏戰爭、佩洛西訪台、核恫嚇，都是和台海息息相關的議題，都是大國競爭的必要考量因素。其中晶片又是經濟產業升級(或維持)及軍事科技升級(或維持)的重要關鍵資源，針對台灣的或者東亞的安全研究在未來只會越來越多關於半導體供應鏈的討論。

Taiwan shows how winning the semiconductor race takes more than money

By Chuan-Chao Lin



The White House's decision on Friday to [impose more restrictions](#) on selling semiconductors and chip-making equipment to China—a move designed to slow Beijing's ability to upgrade its economy and military—was telling. It shows once again how the United States is under increasing pressure to stay ahead of China's efforts to expand its semiconductor industry and reduce reliance on Taiwan as the sole supplier of advanced electronics essential to US [military](#) and commercial needs. The Biden administration's new export controls come on the heels of Congress [approving](#) billions of dollars to support cutting-edge chips manufacturing. However, money alone will not guarantee the success of the US-based semiconductor industry. US firms should also glean critical lessons from successful incumbents in allied and partner countries like South Korea and Taiwan.

China's recent [breakthrough](#) in producing semiconductors using seven nanometer (nm) process technology—a level of production prowess that has eluded the top US chip maker, Intel Corporation—underlined the need for US government support to ensure domestic chip makers maintain the capacity to produce the most sophisticated semiconductors. The [CHIPS and Science Act](#) allocates fifty-two billion dollars in subsidies and tax relief to support chip manufacturing along with another two hundred billion dollars dedicated to research and other investments. The law is intended to provide subsidies and other assistance to Intel and other US semiconductor makers as they ramp up capital investment in manufacturing facilities. The funding also will benefit the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and South Korea's Samsung Electronics Corporation as they build chip factories in Arizona and Texas, respectively.

These recent developments highlight the challenge of duplicating the exacting production standards of East Asian chip makers whose factories are central to globe-spanning semiconductor supply chains. The United States is seeking to catch up with the capabilities of established industry leaders in Taiwan and South Korea while also striving to stay ahead of China's efforts to develop semiconductor self-sufficiency. Beijing is devoting hundreds of billions of dollars to this effort, one that most recently bore fruit when its leading chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), managed to produce the seven nm chips—which only TSMC and Samsung had been capable of manufacturing—despite strict US [controls](#) on sales of key chip-making technology to Chinese companies.

There is an important strategic dimension to this competition that transcends the race for technological breakthroughs. Some analysts have raised concerns about whether China would [invade](#) Taiwan in order to seize its prized semiconductor industry, including TSMC's most advanced factories. However, this is not an immediately realistic prospect for a number of reasons, including that such an attack would likely end up destroying Taiwan's factories and scattering the industry's greatest resource—its deeply experienced engineers and technicians—around the globe. Not to mention the disastrous impact that this outcome would have on the global economy, especially for an industry that is based on a tightly integrated supply chain that includes Japanese, American, Dutch, South Korean, Chinese, and Taiwanese suppliers.

Moreover, the invasion scenario gives short shrift to the mutual [dependence](#) that has built up between the Taiwanese and Chinese economies over the past four decades, largely because of the [bonds](#) created by trade in semiconductors. This interdependence has created what the Taiwanese populace often refers to as the "[silicon shield](#)."

But the threat to Taiwan's industry—and the vulnerability of semiconductor supply chains—has also given pause to US politicians and industry executives, contributing to an increased policy focus on ramping up American chip-making capabilities. The United States currently [accounts](#) for 12 percent of global semiconductor manufacturing, down from 37 percent in 1990. TSMC, meanwhile, produces over 90 percent of the most advanced chips and will soon begin commercial production on a three nm "node," or production line. If successfully commercialized, chips produced from this node would be the world's smallest.

The technical hurdles to duplicating the Taiwanese and South Korean success stories are daunting. State-of-the-art chip foundries cost more than ten billion dollars. Even once they are built, achieving mass production of flawless devices is no easy task. Witness the [difficulties](#) Intel has faced in recent years while trying to advance its production to the point where it can make seven nm semiconductors. Currently, Intel's leading chips are produced under contract in its Asian competitors' factories. Furthermore, the production process requires hundreds of sophisticated inputs and devices procured around the world, none more important than the [\\$340 million](#) machines produced only by the Dutch company ASML. Holding that etch circuitry using extreme ultraviolet lithography.

But producing the most advanced chips involves much more than simply mastering the technology. The real challenge lies in attaining high [yields](#) of flawless chips in factories that produce millions of semiconductors. Imagine finding a flaw caused by a random light particle that is virtually too small to detect, on electronic circuits separated by only a few billionths of a meter. The more densely packed circuits are within a chip, the harder it is to attain the level of perfection necessary to provide chip makers with their profit margins.

TSMC has become renowned for achieving up to 95 percent yields at its factories—meaning nineteen out of twenty chips are perfect. After four decades of developing and perfecting groundbreaking chip technology, the Taiwanese company has more experienced engineers and technicians and a greater understanding of the demands facing an intensely [automated](#) industry than any other company. This reflects a corporate culture that molds a workforce of thousands of technicians willing to execute the demanding work required to ensure high yields.

Such success also requires an educational system like [Taiwan's](#) that can provide the basic training in electrical engineering to continuously churn out new technicians who will staff the dozens of chip factories operated by TSMC and the country's other chip makers. The recently approved US legislation recognizes the importance of a trained workforce in building a revitalized semiconductor industry and thus calls for increased funding of university programs centered around new chip-making hubs.

The United States can also learn much from leading companies like TSMC and Samsung at the factory level. For instance, US factories should incorporate high-volume manufacturing, material procurement, quality control, [machine-learning](#) feedback, troubleshooting, and cost containment into their semiconductor [production lines](#). In essence, these companies stay at the top of their game by running research and development [twenty-four](#) hours a day.

There is some [concern](#) in Taiwan that TSMC's [investments in the United States](#) will weaken the company at home. But the reality is that the growth of competition will continue to generate innovation, strengthening the semiconductor industry in Taiwan and benefiting all countries.

Ultimately, the best source of skills and experience for the US semiconductor industry will come from the industry's Asian leaders, particularly as TSMC and Samsung seek to expand their manufacturing bases in the United States. Their presence on US soil—along with the [suppliers](#) and subcontractors that will move to their new base of operations—will foster an ecosystem that will fuel the efficient development of a semiconductor industry that can bolster US national security. US legislation such as the CHIPS and Science Act can support this process, and, as know-how spreads to Intel and other US companies, the integration of semiconductor supply chains across the Pacific will enhance the ability of democratic countries to maintain a competitive advantage against China and [strengthen](#) the backbone of the Indo-Pacific partnership.

Chun-Chao Lin, a lieutenant colonel in the Taiwan army, was the visiting military senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security from 2021-2022.

心得與建議

除了投稿的文章以外，筆者在研究報告即採大西洋理事會戰略報告的格式來撰寫，題目為「拜登政府政策評析戰略報告-台灣如何擔任印太戰略要角」，戰略報告為斯考科羅夫戰略中心的主要核心業務之一，即是以戰略報告的方式將複雜的政策建議，會辦政府各部會意見後，上呈至國會通過，變成國家或軍事戰略指導方針的工具，格式為前大西洋理事會董事暨副主席史蒂芬哈德利所設計，他是布希總統政府時期國家安全顧問。

所有在大西洋理事會的美軍國防現役人員，都必須完成一篇戰略報告的撰寫，除了訓練戰略層級軍官具備將宏觀戰略視野，化為國家政策文件的能力，也是大西洋理事會更有效利用國防專業人員的軍事專業，來完備原本文人學術領域普遍較缺乏的國防領域經驗和專業，因此筆者建議在未來國內有國防專業人員涉入的任何智庫專案，可採取同樣戰略報告模式，使我國家戰略能更多軍事專業色彩，並確保智庫學員能在智庫期間所研究之學術成果，能回饋到國家戰略決策。

另外比這在投稿智庫網站文章過程，其實學到很多英文研究思維邏輯，以及英文寫作的鍛鍊，甚至被迫閱讀大量的英文文章，像這樣的過程是在一般的陸戰院無法獲得，因為國內外的陸戰院都有一個共同點，就是時間常被課業壓縮到沒有自行閱讀和研究的空間。而美智庫幾乎沒有須盡義務的行程或者課業，因此筆者建議像這樣的模式可以讓現有的任何軍事教育參考，多多鼓勵投稿外文媒體網站文章，除了可以在華府政治圈領域替國家發聲，以及替我方國防政策說明，也可以同時訓練學員個人英文思維、英文寫作和英文研究能力，其實這是更好的訓練成果，也是更吸引人的訓練目標，同時使國家、國軍、學員、智庫都是受益者。

最後也建議，國軍負責對美軍售的業管單位，能長期每年至少有一位薦訓，或者派駐在重要智庫的台灣軍方研究員，甚至精準派駐到像大西洋理事會「前瞻國防」部門這種直接和美國國防部與軍工企業有緊密關聯的智庫，除了能更靈活的替我國在華府各項軍售案的政策說明，也能第一時間掌握最新的華府政治決策核心動態，以確保能更精準地獲得我方需要的軍售。



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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Template

I. Foreword

II. Executive Summary

III. Strategic Context

What is the problem or problems that the strategy is meant to address? What are the major trends, factors, and considerations that need to be taken into account when developing the strategy?

IV. Goals

What are the top-level goals of the strategy? What is the state of the world that you seek to bring about with the strategy?

V. Major Elements of the Strategy

What are three to five major elements, or lines of effort, that will be needed to bring about the goals? Describe specific activities within each major element.

VI. Assumptions

What are the core assumptions that underlie the strategy? If these assumptions are violated, how might the strategy need to change?

VII. Guidelines for Implementation

What are the guidelines for how the strategy should be implemented and resourced? If there are other overarching points that need to be made that do not fit well into other categories, include them here.

VIII. Risks, Criticisms, and Alternatives

What are the major downside risks of this strategy, and how might those be mitigated? What are possible criticisms of the strategy, and what are the responses to these criticisms? What are possible alternative strategies, and why is the defined strategy superior?

IX. Conclusion

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X. Appendices (Optional)

a. Implementation Plan

What is the detailed plan for implementing the above strategy? What specific steps should be taken by specific actors (e.g., government agencies and departments)?

b. Implementing Executive Order

Draft an executive order that could be adopted by the administration and issued by the President in order to direct the executive branch to implement the above strategy.

c. Implementing Legislation

Draft any legislation that the U.S. Congress will need to pass in order to implement the above strategy.

d. Plan for “whole-of-society” engagement

Will nongovernmental actors, including nongovernmental organizations, corporations, the media, or others, have a role in implementing the strategy? What is the plan for engaging with these actors and persuading them to do their part?