

出國報告（出國類別：進修）

斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院 客座研究心得報告

服務機關：空軍防空暨飛彈指揮部

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摘 要

筆者於2019年9月1日起前往斯德哥爾摩和平研究院（Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI）擔任為期一年的客座研究員。斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院是一個致力於傳統既非傳統安全議題的國際獨立機構，SIPRI的發展目標的核心為中立性，使得它在國際關係、軍事及外交領域具有非常大的影響力。期間經歷了數起重大世界變局，包含香港反送中事件及港版國安法、新疆人權議題、南海軍事對峙等，英國脫歐、新冠肺炎病毒爆發、美中貿易戰、一帶一路的影響等，在研討會及訓練課程中反覆討論不同的觀點，對於自身思維能力提升、國家安全的理解與涉外溝通能力具有極大助益。本報告附錄二到六包含了部分發表成果、受訪稿等，歡迎閱讀。

雖然中共在歐洲各研究機構挹注大筆經費進行大外宣，但也有部分學者注意到台灣影響力，並認知台灣為「中等強國」（Middle Power）。尤其新冠肺炎在歐洲爆發後，歐盟各國對中國的看法急遽下降，尤其瑞典對中國態度更是反感。針對歐盟及瑞典對中國態度轉變，本報告以「歐洲情勢概觀」、「瑞典對中國看法」及「新冠肺炎影響」等3段有較詳細的敘述。

關鍵字：斯德哥爾摩和平研究院、歐盟、新冠肺炎

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壹.目的

筆者有幸獲選於2019年9月1日至2020年8月31日期間前往瑞典斯德哥爾摩和平研究院（Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI）擔任為期一年的客座研究員。（附錄一）

本次受訓主要目的在於增進筆者在語言及國家安全思維的核心能力，進而投入國軍研究或領導工作，以擴大派訓的力量。筆者在SIPRI期間藉由參加研討會、訓練課程及研究提報等方式進行交流與訓練，對於自身思維能力提升、國家安全的理解與涉外溝通能力具有極大助益。瑞典面對蘇俄的威脅，在客觀條件上與台灣具有相似的地緣政治限制與多元人口結構，瑞典國際關係學者對於「台灣如何應對大國威脅」的策略運作具有相當大興趣，筆者也能就軍事專業的部分提供意見，以深化交流內容。

貳.過程

一. 智庫介紹

斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院（Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI）於1966年冷戰期間創立，原先在傳統安全面向上致力於衝突、和平與安全議題（Conflict, Peace, Security; CPS）的研究議程，直到2020年已加入了人權治理、氣候與環保、核武威嚇、人工智能武器等各大議題，是一個致力於傳統既非傳統安全議題的國際獨立機構。

斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院的研究項目、數據及政策分析對決策者、研究人員、媒體以及感興趣的公眾人士提供對衝突根源的理解，預防或解決衝突並藉以維持世界和平狀態。其宗旨為：

- 進行有關安全、衝突與和平的研究和活動；
- 提供政策分析和建議；
- 促進對話和能力建設；
- 促進透明度和問責制；
- 向全球受眾傳遞權威信息。

斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院的研究議程在不斷發展，能貼近世界政治脈動，並且其對研究品質及中立性的高度自身要求。研究院所產出的研究內容常常受到國內外學者及媒體的引用，傳播管道包括主流網路媒體（Twitter、Facebook、Youtube等）、國際大型研討會、座談會議，並具有為數眾多的出版品（包含獨立研究及年鑑），使得它在國際關係、軍事及外交領域具有非常大的影響力。

依據2019年全球智庫指數報告（2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report），SIPRI在全球智庫（泛含經濟分析、環境政策、國家安全等類型智庫）排名為27名，並依所內研究主任Luc de van Goor所稱，SIPRI的發展目標的核心為中立性，而不以發展成大型組織為目標，與動輒上百人的智庫相比，SIPRI常駐研究員及員工僅不到50員，可謂是小而精美的智庫。

二. 交流內容

筆者在前往斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院交流期間經歷了數起重大世界變局，在亞洲地區有香港反送中事件及港版國安法、新疆人權議題、南北韓緊張情勢、南海軍事對峙等，在歐洲熱門議題有英國脫歐、中東難民安置、俄國入侵克里米亞等，世界性議題包含了新冠肺炎病毒爆發、美中貿易戰、一帶一路的影響等。

在2020年初新冠肺炎在中國爆發，傳播至歐洲後歐盟各國及瑞典也紛紛實施管制作為。瑞典雖然沒有實施強制性措施，但在研究院配合健康局建議採取居家工作措施，並沒有中斷，反而藉由視訊會議研討更為活絡。如筆者藉由視訊方

式與李柱銘、黃之鋒等香港民運人士交流，與參加其他研究單位如IISS、SIDA等研討，就是很好的例子。

這段期間對於這些重大事件的討論與交流，除了成為個人研究的養分外，研究院同仁也相當重視來自台灣的觀點，筆者經常就上述議題進行交流。尤其筆者作戰管制體系經歷具有台海、南海空中動態的觀察經驗，兼具有防空武器系統的操作與管理經歷。此兩段經歷受到研究院同仁重視，故在研究院公開及內部座談會議中，筆者曾接受訪談、進行專案簡報、或作為諮詢人員。筆者赴瑞典斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院主要進行的交流有：

(一) 進行專案簡報：

- 共軍在南海執行「反介入、區域拒止」能力分析及其可能衝突場景分析 (附錄二)
- 西太平洋衝突熱點及其衝擊研究報告 (附錄三)

(二) 接受訪問

- 後疫情時代兩岸情勢與南海局勢 (附錄四)

(三) 接受諮詢：

- 香港反送中事件與港版國安法
- 人工智能武器政策

三. 智庫對台交流事務

中共大外宣在歐洲各智庫、大學等研究機構都挹注大筆研究及宣傳經費，使得各研究機構與我國交流都會顧忌到中共大使館的態度。歷經桂民海被捕、香港反送中及國安法、中國駐瑞典大使戰狼式外交、新冠病毒爆發等事件，瑞典官方及民眾對中國觀感急遽向下。相對的，台灣在經濟、醫療、科技等產業領域所發

揮的影響力，軍事力量也達全球21強，部分學者認知台灣為「中等強國」

(Middle Power)，在國際上具有相當影響力，筆者身為中華民國國防部代表，長期監視台灣海峽周邊空防狀況，發言時都更加受到重視。

筆者在2019年12月，與駐瑞典辦事處及前駐英武官原力強上校等合作，辦理資深研究員Mr. Siemon Wiezman訪台，以及台方對斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院、瑞典國防大學 (Swedish Defense University, SDU)、瑞典國際開發合作署 (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA) 的訪問交流。

在筆者返台前，與駐歐盟暨比利時武官周自強上校共同邀請斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院院長Mr. Dan Smith及研究主任Mr. Luc de van Goor等重要成員組團訪台，已先期獲得首肯，在歐盟旅遊政策、台灣防疫政策都能配合下，來台進行官方訪問。期盼雙方後續能深化交流，勿因疫情而中斷得來不易的交流成就。

參.心得

一. 歐洲情勢概觀

國防部與國際間智庫交流行之有年，主要都是以美、日為主，在形塑國防政策時會偏向美系思維。但在本次歐洲智庫的交流，讓筆者感到非常大的思維轉換。歐盟要與中美兩國不同，走出自己的第三條道路，尤其是在英國脫歐及中國引發新冠病毒的大爆發之後。

歐盟成立後，美國一直都藉由英國發揮它在歐盟議會的影響力。雖在歐盟議會中，德、法話語權一樣高於英國，但歐盟採「共識決」不忽視小國意見，卻產生了英美利益與歐陸利益之間的扞格，英國脫歐正是歐盟擺脫美國介入的管道。

而新冠肺炎在武漢爆發之後，藉由義大利傳至歐洲各大都市，再深入到二、三線都市及偏遠地區，導致歐洲對中國的考量從「經濟依賴」漸漸轉變到「經濟與國安並重」的思維。歐盟也在中國對世界影響力大幅下降的同時，頗有趁勢自主的味道，在許多場合表達對中國的合作意願及顧慮。

值得一提的，民眾也從往年的「崇中」漸漸轉成「厭中」。但值得慶幸的，台灣並不在這股「厭中」情緒中受害，歐洲人對台灣的觀感大體上無變化，少部分人觀感趨正面，但可以很明顯感受到歐洲人不把中國人與台灣人劃上等號。筆者過境機場時被誤認為中國國籍遭到刁難，但隨後表示自己為台灣人時，態度明顯轉變為善意。

二. 瑞典對中國看法

瑞典在2007年時對中國喜好-厭惡感比例為43%比40%，到了2020年此數據產生極大變化，來到了14%比85%，明顯看到瑞典與中國之間關係生變。尤其在2018-2020之間變化最大。瑞典對中國的看法急遽下降主要有3個事件。

第一是源自於2015年中國逮捕香港銅鑼灣書店商桂民海（瑞典籍華裔），並在2017年10月桂民海獲釋不到3個月又被捕入獄，中國駐瑞典大使館更威脅瑞典政府不得頒發人權獎項給桂民海，並發聲批評，企圖干預瑞典內政[註1]。

第二個重要事件是在2018年9月2日中國籍遊客在斯德哥爾摩市旅館大鬧引發兩國之間的外交緊張關係[註2]。某瑞典政府外交官員私下對筆者表示，從此事件中，感受到中國駐瑞典大使館之不友善；一般民眾也感受到中國網民常以網路霸凌的形式表達不滿。這跟瑞典人從小以來的教育完全不同，使得瑞典民眾重新評估他們對中國的看法。

第三個關鍵則是從香港反送中事件、港版國安法延續到新冠肺炎疫情爆發，除了民眾觀感外，政府態度也在這段期間完全轉向。由港版國安法引發出的效應證據包含2019年的喬建軍判決案[註3]以表達對中國司法體系的不信任，以及2019

瑞典政府對華政策公開信[註4]，以及2020年瑞典加入「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」(Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, IPAC)，公開表示支持台灣加入WHO[註5]，以及多個城市結束姐妹市關係並關閉孔子學院[註6]等。

綜上事件，筆者與當地民眾談話時，可感受到瑞典對中觀感不佳，甚至也有不少中國籍或華裔瑞典籍的民眾對戰狼外交不苟同。畢竟在瑞典，人與人的談話中瀰漫著對自由、尊重、扶助弱勢及少數族裔的氣息，在情感及理性上對中國的不認同，逐漸已經在政治氛圍及社會氛圍顯現出來了。

三. 新冠肺炎

新冠肺炎疫情在109年1月底由中國傳播至義大利，而在2月底時因歐盟各國都有春假或體育週，許多歐洲居民都規劃了滑雪等渡假活動，因此在短短一個月之內傳播到歐盟其他國家，其中以大型都市如倫敦、巴黎、布魯塞爾、蘇黎世等疫情爆發最為猛烈。而瑞典備受周遭國家所批評的防疫政策，後來也是受到關注的重點。

從全球開始新冠病毒疫情至今，瑞典並沒有採取任何封城、封國手段，也是世界防疫的另一個注目焦點。台灣防疫機制是採取「邊境隔離」的方式，在他們的政策決定者看來，僅能應對前期威脅，以長遠角度來看，經濟緩復甦及維持國民心理健康是更重要的事。SIPRI人事經理 Helena Berger（瑞典籍）表示防疫是長期的管理作為，必須避免強迫性手段造成的負面效果，因為防疫管理的主體不是病毒而是「人」；公關主任 Stephanie Blenckner 也表示人類的未來是與病毒共處，防疫政策必須考慮到封鎖政策所帶來的經濟損害、糧食危機及醫療資源分配等公眾政策問題。SIPRI疫情期間舉辦了數次線上研討會，針對新冠疫情所造成各類危機表達看法，其中不乏有人提出警告，表示新冠疫情恐升高仇中情緒，導致區域對峙的升高，而這些研討內容實際上也預言了部分國家鷹派思維的興起，並直擊了後來急遽下滑的中美關係、西太平洋戰略衝突的核心。

肆.建議

一. 人員經管

建議智庫訓練返國人員由國防部人事管理業管單位主動掌握人員經管與派職，優先調派國安院智庫或是國防大學，或者能調派情報專長等，為用而訓、訓用合一，作育軍官養成，並能在國際情勢分析或涉外事務等面向貢獻所學。

二. 歐系的國家安全思維可供借鑑

國防部已與歐洲部分智庫、北約組織等建立聯繫與交流，但整體而言我國的國家安全思維仍舊是偏美系思維為主。美系國安思維偏重在攻勢現實主義、邊緣戰略等的述說，歐系智庫的思維偏重在集體安全、守勢現實主義等，我國的各項條件與美國不同，反而與歐洲各中小型國家相似，從與歐系國安思維的交流，對國家安全考量而言，更是拓廣思考層面。

三. 深化交流

當與國外智庫聯繫能達到更深更廣的層面時，產生的益處可歸類到四個大面向，並形塑國際性思維的軍隊：

- 對外提升在國際上的話語權，以及相互理解程度
- 對內提升民眾對於國軍的專業認知
- 對上切合總統府與國安機構的戰略思維
- 對下提高軍官養成素質。

建議智庫人員於返國後，與先前所建立的人脈關係持續保持聯繫，對於後續政府間或研究機構之間的關係有良好助益。

註 釋

[註1]：請參見維基百科「桂民海」條目

<https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/桂民海>

[註2]：請參見維基百科「中國遊客瑞典旅舍事件」條目

<https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/中国游客瑞典旅舍事件>

[註3]：請參見網路新聞「反送中發酵 瑞典法院釋放中國第3號通緝犯」

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/2832448>

[註4]：請參見瑞典外交部 2019年9月26日政府會議紀要

<https://www.government.se/4adb19/contentassets/e597d50630fa4eaba140d28fb252c29f/government-communication-approach-to-matters-relating-to-china.pdf>

[註5]：請參見網路新聞「對華政策跨國議會聯盟 力挺台灣參與WHO」

<https://today.line.me/tw/v2/article/VKKvPJ>

[註6]：請參見網路新聞「與中國關係惡化 瑞典關閉所有孔子學院」

<https://today.line.me/tw/v2/article/與中國關係惡化%E3%80%80瑞典關閉所有孔子學院、第二大城斷交上海-y9kyak>

附 錄

附錄一、客座研究員任職資料

The screenshot shows the SIPRI website profile for Yaojen Kuo. At the top left is the SIPRI logo (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE) and the tagline "The independent resource on global security". A search bar is located at the top right. Below the navigation menu, the profile for Yaojen Kuo is displayed. It includes a small circular portrait of him, his name "Yaojen Kuo", and his position "GUEST RESEARCHER". A short biography states he is a Guest Researcher and representative in Taiwan with the China and Asia Security Programme, focusing on conflict and confidence-building among the US, Taiwan, and China. He holds a master's degree from National Cheng Kung University. Below this, sections for "SUBJECT EXPERTISE" (Relations among the US, China, and Taiwan; Risk management on air force conflict; Defensive air force/artillery strategy) and "REGIONAL EXPERTISE" (China, Taiwan, Western Pacific Region) are listed. On the right side of the profile, there are links for "EMAIL NEWSLETTER" and "CONNECT" with social media icons for Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

圖1、筆者在SIPRI官方網站之介紹頁面



SIPRI's annual staff photo taken on the occasion of the meeting of the Governing Board, 14 November


圖2、筆者與SIPRI董事會成員、研究同仁之年度合影

附錄二、簡報（一）：

- 簡報主題：共軍在南海執行「反介入、區域拒止」能力分析及可能衝突場景分析（摘錄）
- 報告日期：2020.3.11

2. No war in the Cross Strait

- High-density of air defense missile systems
- High-density-of-air/shipping traffic
- Industrial dependence between China and Taiwan
- Unstable consensus
- Strategy MEMS industries



CSBA Guerrilla Sea Denial

The ROC should:


- Accelerate development of long-range, precision SSICs
- Field smaller submarines to provide asymmetric strike and targeting to land-based missile systems
- Field 1,000+ anti-air missiles (AAMs) with distributed launchers
- Field a large inventory of anti-airship missiles and precision conventional munitions capable of destroying them

Objective is to hold at risk PLA amphibious ships and/or close-in blockade ships for as long as possible with focus on denial—not control—of Taiwan's western approaches

3. Traditional weapon used only

4. A2/AD

(Anti-Access / Area Denial) is a military term. In short, once an emergency occurs, one of the parties quickly delimits the area in the incident area to prevent armed interference by third parties.



HOW U.S. FORCES COULD RESPOND TO A CONFLICT

Naval Bases in Pacific: Allow forces would increase the number of forward-deployed aircraft carriers and bring in more support ships to the strategic area.


Coastal long-range attacks: Identify bombers and surveillance assets to target "hunting containers," "sea-basing" long-range Chinese surveillance and missile systems and clearing up the denied area to U.S. fighter jets and ships.

Dispersed Forces: Allow commanders would need their assets to provide effects on the Pacific Island Trust and other islands, completing the ongoing process for the Chinese.

AIRCRAFTS

#AIR SUPERIORITY NEEDED

- C&C: KJ-500
- ATA
- J-20, J-31
- ATS
- J-15, J-16
- H-6N




KEH MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE

Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea

Legend:

- China: J-20, J-31, J-15, J-16, H-6N, KJ-500, Y-20, Y-31, Y-32, Y-33, Y-34, Y-35, Y-36, Y-37, Y-38, Y-39, Y-40, Y-41, Y-42, Y-43, Y-44, Y-45, Y-46, Y-47, Y-48, Y-49, Y-50, Y-51, Y-52, Y-53, Y-54, Y-55, Y-56, Y-57, Y-58, Y-59, Y-60, Y-61, Y-62, Y-63, Y-64, Y-65, Y-66, Y-67, Y-68, Y-69, Y-70, Y-71, Y-72, Y-73, Y-74, Y-75, Y-76, Y-77, Y-78, Y-79, Y-80, Y-81, Y-82, Y-83, Y-84, Y-85, Y-86, Y-87, Y-88, Y-89, Y-90, Y-91, Y-92, Y-93, Y-94, Y-95, Y-96, Y-97, Y-98, Y-99, Y-100
- US: F-22, F-35, F-36, F-37, F-38, F-39, F-40, F-41, F-42, F-43, F-44, F-45, F-46, F-47, F-48, F-49, F-50, F-51, F-52, F-53, F-54, F-55, F-56, F-57, F-58, F-59, F-60, F-61, F-62, F-63, F-64, F-65, F-66, F-67, F-68, F-69, F-70, F-71, F-72, F-73, F-74, F-75, F-76, F-77, F-78, F-79, F-80, F-81, F-82, F-83, F-84, F-85, F-86, F-87, F-88, F-89, F-90, F-91, F-92, F-93, F-94, F-95, F-96, F-97, F-98, F-99, F-100

ATS: AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE



AIR SUPERIORITY

IDENTIFICATION

LOGISTIC

RUNWAY

C4ISR

CONTROL

COMMAND

COMMUNICATION

COMPUTING


INFORMATION

SURVEILLANCE

RECONNAISSANCE

衝突螺旋 (conflict spiral) 是指發生衝突中的高漲，容易因為彼此處於高漲的對峙情緒，一方面對另一方當行為產生知覺與誤解，越發敏感，二來也容易在雙方行動上顯得過激。

螺旋衝突的主因：知覺與誤解、過度反應（非理性）



the spiral effect of conflict

Peace making

Peacekeeping

Peace building

Duration

Global nuclear war

Regional nuclear war

Regional conventional war

Regional moderate war


Armed limited conflict

Armed confrontation

Armed patrol

DEFENSIVE FORCE VS OFFENSIVE FORCE

BASHI CHANNEL



IMPACT: HIGH

LIKELIHOOD: LOW

DURATION: LONG

STRENGTH: SEVERE

SPECTRUM: THEATRE CONVENTIONAL WAR

CHINA BLOCKADE CAPABILITY: HIGH

- 地點：斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院

附錄三、簡報 (二)

- 題目：西太平洋可能衝突熱點及其衝擊研究報告 (摘錄)
- 報告日期：2020.6.4


Introducing and Abstract

- paper review,
- research method (my analysis model), and tactical prospect.

The four cases and indicative findings about losses, costs, and other effects are as follows:

- *Brief, severe:*
- *Long, severe:*
- *Brief, mild:*
- *Long, mild:*

War with China, RAND, 2016



Preventative Properties Survey, CFR, 2012-2020

Part I. The PLA's capability and limits in military to engage war in SCS.

- logistics
- air stripe
- command & control, tactical usage.

sub-conclusion.


- A2AD: an offensive strategy
- fragile militarized islands

The US and China are trying to avoid the war.

Three levels to find a strategic equilibrium point.

- prepare for the war
- explore the strategic bottom line
- expand military-strategic advantages

The term "**tactical squeeze**" is used here, defined as the process of squeezing in tactical space to the opponent when seeking a strategic equilibrium point.



Part II. The scenarios/hotspots in conflicts in SCS.


Analysis model

- Strength
- Impact
- Likelihood
- Duration

Scenarios

- Bashi Channel (Pratas Island included)
- Sulu Sea
- Spratly Islands – Parcel Islands :capability to blockade SCS
- Scarborough Shoal (Non-typical conflict)


Impact:



Strength

	China PLA		The US Indo-Pacific Command	
	Southern theatre	Eastern Theatre	7th fleet	3rd fleet
Carrier	1		1	4
destroyer	12	12		*
frigate, DDG	33	50		
submarine	17*	19		
Deployed	Nanning	Sanya		

Statistic study ongoing



- 地點：斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究院

附錄四、受訪紀要（原文）：

- 主題：後疫情（COVID-19）時代兩岸及南海情勢觀點
- 受訪日期：2020.7.15
- 地點：網路受訪
- 提報對象：公開參加

BBL Q&A 1

How have the views in Taiwan on cross-strait relations been affected due to COVID-19? What signals and messages have been sent from the recent China's National People's Congress? Are there any significant changes of China's policy on Taiwan?

由於COVID-19，台灣對兩岸關係的看法如何受到影響？最近的中國全國人民代表大會發送了哪些信號和消息？中國對台灣政策是否有重大變化？

opening

Thank you for organizing the panel and the question. I am glad that we can discuss the dilemma which Taiwan faces.

Two phrases in the frame of cross-strait

I think, COVID-19 doesn't play a key role in the cross-strait, but the US does. The US is now the most affected country by COVID-19. And we all know that, in the cross-strait, three main actors in the game are China, Taiwan, and the US.

So, I think this question could be understood as a frame with the two phrases. The inner-phrase is about the interaction between China and Taiwan, and the outer is mainly about the US under the COVID-19.

inner-phrase: the interaction between China and Taiwan

dialog indirectly

After 2016, the winning election of the Tsai Ing-wen administration, CCP ended up the official dialog among the cross-strait. Instead, CCP turned into a non-official political dialog with KMT, which is a pro- China party in Taiwan.

And, CCP is used to publish its messages by using media and political speeches. So it is essential for the Taiwan government to find out the signals and "GUESS" the intention which CCP wants

to talk about. CCP as well judges Taiwan's intention by some other events, e.g., the result of the presidential election and the recall of the Mayor with pro-China attitude.

China's National People Congress reports from 2013 to 2019

So, when looking at the keywords in China's National People Congress speeches since 2013, we can find the trajectory that CCP wants to talk about. since 2013-2016: peacefully develop in the cross strait

since 2017-2019: peacefully promote to the cross- strait reunification together

2020: promoting the cross-strait reunification

Three messages from CCP this year

The congress report no longer mentioned about "one country, two systems," and not mention about the "92 consensus". It uses fewer words to address the policy to Taiwan. That sends three messages to Taiwan.

- 92 consensus is the basis of dialog between two governments. CCP regards the 92 consensus as a concessional indistinct-strategy to Taiwan. However, neither DPP even nor KMT doesn't acknowledge the 92 consensus now, CCP doesn't need to mention it again.
- Due to the difficult situation in economy and diplomacy, CCP kind of thinks about stopping the raising of the hostility spiral.(deterioration)
- But also, China tends to be unilateral in the cross-strait affair. That gives a reason/excuse for CCP to consider the option of reunifying by using the military.

outer-phrase: the US under the COVID-19

When talking about the US far-eastern policy, I think we are mainly talking about the US's Island Chain Strategy.

- The Pacific Rebalancing Strategy by Barack Obama, Indo-Pacific Strategy by Donald Trump, are all included in the Island Chain Strategy.
- So the problem we need to face is, how it will be to the Far-Eastern Policy by the US under various inner-problems? The COVID 19, the protests, after the US presidential election, not only Taiwan but also the whole world are waiting for the answer.
- National emotion of anti-China

Conclusion

To be concluded, although Taiwan is regarded as a bandwagon to the US, it also adopts the policy to hedge in the cross-strait affairs. China seems to cool down this issue and turn into economy affairs, but it will have stronger messages in military and politics in these years.

BBL Q&A 2

How might the increasing US-China tensions affect the situation in the South China Sea? Do you see a greater level of risk or is it business as normal in the region?

中美之間日益緊張的局勢將如何影響南海的局勢？您認為該地區的風險水平更高還是在正常運作？

Opening

When talking about the situation in the South China Sea, most people would forget that the whole South China Sea also belongs to Taiwan, ROC.

China, PRC, claims that it inherits the legitimacy of ROC and the sovereignty of the dash-line. Ok, Taiwan as well claims the same thing.

Four Scenarios

Back to this question, I would say, it depends. In my opinion, the launching of war is the result of a series of evaluations. Rationally speaking, when the interests gained from participating in the war will not exceed the losses, this warfare will not happen.

So we need to see the interests and the losses of launching war by the both side. There are four main actors within the conflictual spiral in the South China Sea - China, the US, Taiwan, and Vietnam. I mentioned about Taiwan and Vietnam are two actors in the South China Sea because these two countries have stronger hostile consciousness and modernized military, and are also worried about being forced to engage in proxy warfare.

Military [Globalfirepower.com] and GDP [IMF(besides EU)] Ranking among the claimants of the South China Sea.

- Taiwan (modernized military)
 - Air force(14)
 - Naval force(22)
 - GDP(20)
- Vietnam (modernized military)
 - Air force(35)
 - Naval force(35)
 - GDP(43)
- Indonesia
 - Air force(28)
 - Naval force(10)
 - GDP(16)

- Philippine
 - Air force(52)
 - Naval(25)
 - GDP(36)
- Malaysia
 - Air force(53)
 - Naval(39)
 - GDP(32)

For both China and the US, the confrontation in the South China Sea means the two strategies impact - Anti-Access / Area Denial, aka A2AD by China, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy by the US. In the last question, I talked about the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is under the structure of the Island Chain Strategy. But in precise, the Indo-Pacific Strategy extends and connects to the Indian Ocean via the South China Sea. In the meantime, China adopts offensive measures and tries to cover the whole South China Sea within the A2AD frame. I say "try" because China is still developing the capability in the South China Sea. For example, the construction and the militarization of the Scarborough Shoal is one of the leading indexes.

In my study, there could be four scenarios in the South China Sea, which are Bashi Channel, Scarborough Shoal, Sulu Sea, and the conflict with Vietnam. Because of the time limits, I would briefly talk about one of these.

Scenarios in the South China Sea: Bashi Channel

Effect: Within this area, China has 14 harbors of the world's top 50, with over 2 billions cargos per year, and 65% of oil shipping to China nearby this channel.

Strength :For the US, Bashi Channel is within the power range of the Guam and Okinawa Naval Base. Fighters, bombers are all able to engage in this area with the using of aerial gas stations; Taiwan will be involved in this warfare; For China side, two PLA theaters have the capability to engage in the war. Including

Duration: Short. Both China and the US are not willing to launch war here. That effects too much and is too highly risky making it bigger. If there is any unexpected conflict, the best option is turning into diplomacy dialog.

Possibility: Low, but this is a good option for the US to launch a small size warfare.

Code Of Conduct in the South China Sea after COVID-19 outbreaking

I mentioned that COVID-19 doesn't play a key role in the cross-strait, but the US does. Furthermore, China and Taiwan are two typical countries to deal with COVID-19, and the US struggles within this two types.

- China is the happening origin state of COVID-19, and it controls and eases down the outbreak by using high-pressure measures.

- Taiwan is the country with highly performance in blocking COVID-19 out of the boarder - especially the cases from China, and the measures are mainly performed by public self-restriction.
- The US seemed to be like Taiwan type but failed, and then is suffering from the following problems. Compared with previous attitudes, many of Trump's policies and emotional criticisms stem from his hatred toward China.

In this era during COVID-19, I concerned about either how China and the US will act, and how much resources they can use to conflict with each other.

I would like to quote an article published by IISS. Which is, "Will COVID-19 change the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific?"

sharpen the geopolitics

This is not the end of geopolitics as we know it, but a sharpening of its edge.

<https://www.notion.so/BBL-Q-A-d7d50fcaddba41f9bb2cf673170e12c1#2dc6a23296a645ee8c358e5768b7f188>

Lynn Kuoh mentioned about there would be a trend that " A great role for middle powers to maintain the balance of power."

We would think of Code of Conduct when talking about the power balance in the South China Sea, but there's a big gap to achieve it.

Carl Thayer, an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia, mentioned four reasons that COC is hard to implement. I think the biggest problem are "the undefined geographic scope of the South China Sea" and "the undefined legal status of the COC." If these two problems cannot be solved, COC will face the challenge from the US even more.

附錄五、瑞典兵役制度自主研究摘要：

題 目:瑞典恢復徵兵制度對社會影響之研究

研 究 者:少校 郭耀仁 **指 導 單 位:**國防部;國防大學

台灣與瑞典有高度相似處，都具有相當成熟的民主社會，在複雜的地緣政治關係同樣都面臨不對稱作戰的戰略現實，社會結構面臨人口老化，兵役制度也經歷數次政策性的轉變。2018年1月1日起瑞典政府採「非全面性」實施徵兵，並將女性從軍納入兵役政策，依人員意願、對軍隊認同度實施徵兵，其執行作法可與我國募兵制比較異同並分析得失。

當前募兵制為我國重要政策之一，在我國基層兵員的徵募政策走向亦受到廣泛討論，本文旨在研究者獲選赴瑞典乙年研究期間，觀察瑞典社會各階層對於兵役制度的轉變及現行概況，研究瑞典徵兵制度經驗，藉以對比我國募兵制度，以為後續兵役政策研修參考。

關鍵詞:瑞典、兵役徵募制度、社會結構、女性從軍

Preparing for the Uncertainties:

An Analysis to Military Capability and Limits in The South China Sea

Author: Yao-Jen Kuo

Abstract

China's "forward defense" strategy is to use the "Long-Distance Training over Water" in the air and sea areas around Taiwan to extend the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) force. The force reaches the east part of Taiwan and creates a strategic security space within the first island chain to counter the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US. On the contrary, the US Navy uses the Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) to conduct military voyages on the high seas over the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. The opposite point between these two countries is located at the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Taiwan does not play the third role beside the US and China games but at the center. The political power, economic power, and military power of the Taiwan authorities cannot be compared with the US and China. This research will try to find out the mechanism of reducing the risk in regional conflict by observing the military interaction within the US, China, and Taiwan.

Introduction

The US military tried to build a two-sea strategic safety net system that extends from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. This area covers the Miyako Strait in Northeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait, the Bus Strait, the South China Sea, and the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia. Douglas MacArthur proposed the West Pacific Island Chain strategic structure in the 1950s,

which evolved into the Asian rebalancing proposed by Obama in 2011 and the Indo-Pacific strategy proposed by Trump in 2017. Even if the target actors are different, the island chain's strategic framework has the same positioning in the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era—maintaining US regional security and interests in the Western Pacific. The island chain strategy structures two phrases in the Western Pacific security issue: One is the deployment of the Indian Pacific Command's armaments in the Western Pacific, including the Seventh Fleet, the Third Fleet, the overseas garrisons and military bases on Guam, Yokosuka, Okinawa, Incheon, and the reopening Subic Bay Naval Base. The other is to implement arms sales, military and intelligence cooperation with the First Island Chain countries. Including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Australia are within the Indo-Pacific strategic accompanies to support operation or even in the accompanying combat system.

China is actively building naval, air, and missile forces compared with the reorganization of the global deployment of the United States. PLA has begun the militarization of the South China Sea islands and reefs since 2012 and has constructed the "Anti Access, Area Denial" strategic force to cope with the United States regional Naval advantage in the Asia-Pacific.

The A2AD strategy has created a strategic depth for China in the South China Sea, among which Woody Island, Mischief Reef, Fiery Reef, and Subi Reef located at the forefront of the South China Sea geopolitical strategy. In addition to using these artificial islands to declare the Sea right and territorial claims, China also uses the militarized islands as a fulcrum for Seapower. Of course, these militarized islands/reefs indeed enlarged China's volume of claiming Sea right and Sea power to the South China Sea, but the maintenance of these islands and reefs is also costly. It has also raised doubts internationally about regional conflicts and energy/economic security.

The first half of this article is based on a military tactical perspective by reading and analyzing public information. In this part, the author will address the viewpoint and explore the capabilities of militarized islands in the South China Sea, to understand how highly the garrisons on these islands rely on domestic supply. The second half of the research focused on the scenarios and hotspots that are likely to happen in armed conflict in the South China Sea. It borrowed the analysis models of the two masterpieces "War with China" by RAND and "Preventive Priorities Survey" by Council on Foreign Relations, and applied them to the South China Sea scenarios.

This article focuses on two key considerations. The first is capability, which mainly helps us understand the capabilities and limitations of the PLA deployed in the South China Sea. In particular, China's militarized islands in the South China Sea; we will discuss whether the runway and radar control can meet the strategic needs at the tactical level. The second key thinking point is the militant tendency. The launching of war is the result of a series of evaluations. When the interests gained from participating in the war will not exceed the losses, this warfare will not happen.