

出國報告(出國類別：智庫進修)

美國大西洋理事會 智庫受訓心得報告

服務機關：國防大學 戰略與國際事務研究所

姓名職稱：中校助理教授 杜長青

派赴國家：美國 華盛頓特區

出國期間：2019/10/01-2020/8/31

報告日期：2020/10/26

摘要

長期以來，我國國際生存空間在中共蠻橫無理打壓下受到嚴重壓縮，加上臺灣與美國缺乏正式邦交關係，必需仰賴更多元的管道建立溝通機制，提供美國民間、政府部門與決策單位正確、客觀的資訊，短期之內可形成友我之輿論與氛圍，長期可催化有利我國家之政策制定，而智庫就是可以達成這個目標的重要途徑，也是目前外交部在華府積極推動的「二軌外交(Second-track Diplomacy)」的工作重點；而大西洋理事會經評比為 2019 年全美影響力排名第 8 的重要智庫，在全球的「外交政策與國際事務(Foreign Policy and International Affairs)」影響力排名第 15 名，具有相當大的國際影響力。

由於國內在甄選過程除須撰擬研究計劃書，亦需檢附合格托福成績並通過臺美雙方一連串中英文面試，本人很榮幸通過甄選並指派至大西洋理事會「斯科克羅夫戰略與安全中心(Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security)」下設之「亞洲安全倡議(Asia Security Initiative)」擔任訪問研究員，該智庫與中華民國國防部已有超過 16 年的合作經驗，雙方互動良好，因此本人格外珍惜此次出國研究機會，此期間除參與各項學術活動，藉對話、訪談來了解美方人士決策思維模式，另積極透過投稿文章的方式來進行時事議題分析，分享我國的戰略安全觀點，總計於智庫研究一年的研究期間，共計獲大西洋理事會刊出五篇議題式分析文章於網站上，直/間接推介我中華民國民主自由發展的成果與軟實力，其中本人於四月份所撰寫的「臺灣的防疫傳播學：幾點經驗的分享(Lessons from Taiwan's experience with COVID-19)」一文受到美國閱聽大眾的青睞，三週內點閱次數超過 23,000 次，榮獲大西洋理事會全智庫當月超過 250 篇文章中點閱次數第一名，成功對外宣揚臺灣的防疫經驗，也為我國防疫外交工作適時做了有效國際宣傳。

目次

前言

壹、目的

- 一、任務與願景
- 二、組織介紹(美國大西洋理事會 Atlantic Council of United States)

貳、過程

- 一、個人研究主題
- 二、各項研討會參與
- 三、審查通過發表 5 篇分析文章
- 四、殊榮與成就

參、心得及建議事項

前言

在美國，智庫(think tank)扮演了許多不同的角色，經常透過政府、媒體、公眾與企業關係的關係經營，向政策制定者提供資訊，或建構社會輿論框架，直接、間接將知識轉化成政策的共同想法，它們也企圖建構政策支持，盡可能協助創造共識，框架出重要議題與觀點，引導官員進行外交政策的選擇¹。由於智庫在美國國家政策網路中扮演著相當重要的議題倡導及政策方案供給的角色，歷來許多重要的政府官員亦多由智庫中借調任用，形成人才與政策的重要供輸中心。

我國國防部每年均會選派國軍中高階軍官赴美國智庫進行研究，希望能透過交流合作的方式，近距離觀察美國政治運作流程，使國軍軍官了解美國政治文化脈絡下的決策思維，掌握美國國會最新議程議案；此外，台美雙方軍文職人員在學術上的交流互動，除了可以推介我國民主政治及建軍備戰的成效，更可進一步獲取美方更為深入的政策觀點，據以進行適切之戰略研析，提供具體有效的區域安全合作政策建議。

壹、目的

一、任務與願景

美國社會的自由、繁榮與和諧，得益於其遵循了美國《獨立宣言》所確立的原則，以及美國憲法所體現的規則，蓬勃發展而成熟的公民社會力量，美國公民以各種形式參與公共事務，並透過各種管道來監督、影響、改變政府決策，實踐美國憲政體制所確立的「權力制衡」原則。美國聯邦憲法在政府立法、行政和司法的三個分支、國會兩院、州和聯邦政府間清楚劃分權利，限制了授予政府的權利，也確保個人自由與權利神聖不可侵犯的地位。為了避免某一勝選的政治團體壟斷一國的政治經濟決策，造成過度擴權或制定不切時宜的政策，美國政府相關部會為廣徵各界意見、提升決策品質，多以自行編列預算支持或重點贊助政策智庫，具半官方色彩的智庫部分，如藍德公司(RAND Corporation) 及美國海軍部所屬之海軍分析中心(Center for Naval Analyses, CNA)，均具有「聯邦贊助之研發中心」(federally-funded research and development center, FFRDC)身分，可直接受政府委託進行研究計劃；而強調非營利的民間智庫更是蓬勃發展，其研究議題從兩性平權、全球暖化、社會福利、軍事戰略等等議題無所不包，目的主要在於藉由學術與政策之研究，進而誘導、影響或改正政府之特定政策²，前美國駐北約大使杭特(Robert E. Hunter)曾為文提到「智庫在美國外交與國家安全政策上扮演日趨重要的角色...美國智庫已結合各界菁英領袖，以專業的方法協助美國領導人了解各種

¹ 杭特(Robert E. Hunter)，〈智庫：有助形塑美國外交與安全政策(Think Tank: helping to Shape U.S. foreign and security policy)〉，2000年3月3日，網址<http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/E-JOURNAL/EJ_FPMaking/pj51hunt.htm>。

² 黃介正，〈美國政策研究智庫之特質與我應有之認識〉，《國政評論(NPF Commentary)》，2001年12月5日，<http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/NS/090/NS-C-090-308.htm>。

與公共政策有關的議題，不僅結合國會力量形成未來政策，並且教育了美國百姓」³，因此，美國智庫對於其政府政策制定的影響力可見一般。

根據美國賓夕法尼亞大學(University of Pennsylvania)2020 年 3 月間公佈的《2019 全球智庫報告(2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, GGTII)》，2019 年全球共有智庫 45,969 家，其中美國排名全球單一國家中擁有最多數量的智庫，共計 2,881 家。其篩選與排名指標中，不論是區域研究的影響力、與政府及大學的從屬或依附關係(Affiliated)、與其他智庫的連結互動、政策報告與研究產出、國際會議數量、外部媒體或公眾參與計畫(Public Engagement Programs)、媒體使用、公共政策影響力...等等指標，美國布魯金斯學會(Brookings Institution)仍蟬聯全球智庫影響力第一名，入選全球頂尖智庫評鑑(2019 TOP THINK TANKS WORLDWIDE)前廿名的名單中，美國智庫就囊括 8 席⁴，顯示美國知識社群成熟的運作機制已經形成了全球的政策分析與理念倡議中心⁵。

鑒於中共長年對我施以武力威脅與政治打壓，致使我國國際生存空間受到一定的侷限，在無法與各國建立正式外交關係的狀況下，現階段積極採取軟性、多元、非官方的二軌對話(Track-II Dialogue)外交管道，是與其他國家政府及民間建立關係、促進交流與認識的最佳途徑。我國因具有穩定的民主政治制度，加上近年已發展出成熟的公民社會(civil society)環境，非常適合透過民間智庫或非政府組織等學術研究機構的交流，建構跨國倡議或相關政策網絡，而國防部每年均編列預算，甄選國軍中高階幹部赴國外相關智庫進行研修，目的即在於以人員交流及研習方式，針對雙方國防政策、軍事思維及建軍概念與學者專家交換意見，分享中華民國的民主價值與區域安全合作理念，期能有效爭取對我區域安全角色之認同與支持，並進一步推動雙邊軍事各層面的二軌交流合作。

本人於 108 年通過國防部公費甄選，奉派至美國大西洋理事會(Atlantic Council of United States, ACUS)進行為期一年的智庫研究，並於 109 年 9 月結訓返國，以下為研究期間的各項內容說明。

³ 郭壽旺，《華府智庫對美國臺海兩岸政策制定之影響》（臺北：秀威資訊科技，2006 年），頁 10。

⁴ 該份年度全球評比報告中，位於華盛頓 DC 的「卡內基國際和平基金會(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)」為全球智庫第一名，「戰略與國際問題研究中心(Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS)」則排名第四，顯示美國智庫的研究能量與影響力處於全球領先地位。詳細報告請參閱 James G. McGann, “2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report,” Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania, April, 2019. <https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=think_tanks>.

⁵ 部分學界人士認為，美國智庫之所以興盛，植基於兩種層面的需求，一是思想需求，二是人才需求。所謂思想需求又分為三個層面的意義，第一個層面是指美國政府面臨複雜的國內國際局勢，需要智庫提供的思想支持；第二個層面是指美國媒體需要智庫以輿論領袖和輿論精英的身份提供政策解讀和創新觀點，而智庫需要借助媒體傳播影響力；第三個層面是指廣大社會公眾對智庫的需求，智庫在公眾與政府之間開闢了一個政策交流的平台，從某種意義上承擔了哈貝馬斯所追求的“公共空間”的功能；第四個層面是人才需求，係是指四年一度的美國大選對政治人才的需求很大，而智庫承擔了為下一屆政府培養人才、輸送人才的作用。王莉麗，〈美國智庫影響力形成機制及面臨挑戰〉，《人民網》，2013 年 1 月 28 日，<<http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0128/c49157-20347745-3.html>>。

二、組織介紹(美國大西洋理事會 Atlantic Council of United States, ACUS)

美國智庫係由若干專家、學者、顧問組成之團體，主要功能在提供政府各項政策所需資訊及服務，並且為新任政府提供相關專家和幕僚人員。根據研究，美國每任新總統(或白宮辦公廳主任)在當選後必須延聘約 3,000 位官員、幕僚或顧問人員，而其中將近 800 人需要獲得參議院批准⁶；而卸任的前政府官員則因為經驗豐富，幾乎成為所有智庫延聘的目標，有的擔任單位主管或者顧問職務，部分智庫甚至設有政府關係辦公室，專門負責促進智庫與政府官員的關係，在政策研究上，智庫亦會定期向國會各委員會提供專家證詞或外交政策諮詢，形成許多政策專家在政府部門和政策研究機構之間來回穿梭，在美國部分學者則將智庫比喻成「候任政府」，亦可證明智庫在美國政治中扮演的重要角色。

目前美國的許多智庫每年均設有訪問學者名額，鼓勵美國國內或海外其他國家具有相關議題研究能力之學者或政府官員申請交流，促進多方互動。而位於華府的著名智庫大西洋理事會定期偕同美國商界及政府高層赴台拜訪我國歷任總統，與我國有深厚的情誼，在立場上相當支持我方，長期以來以各種研究報告、研討會及各項交流方式，針對兩岸政策進行研究，並透過適當管道，定期提供美國政府決策機構參考，1993 年我國前總統李登輝能突破中共打壓，順利至美國康乃爾大學演講，以及後續推動美國學術界對於我國加入聯合國一案之注意與討論，當時的「大西洋理事會」與其他華府智庫的大力鼓吹就扮演關鍵角色，因此與相關智庫保持密切聯繫與良好互動，是目前我國政府(外交部)與美國相互溝通的重要管道之一。

美國大西洋理事會(Atlantic Council)創立於 1961 年，其成立的初衷是於二戰後透過與北約組織的合作與交流，促進美國與歐洲的安全合作，屬於「大西洋公約協會(Atlantic Treaty Association)」在美國的分支機構，是一個跨黨派的政策智庫，冷戰結束後，逐漸將政策研究的重心轉向大西洋與太平洋。根據《2019 全球智庫影響指數報告(2019 Global Go To Think Thank Index Report)》，大西洋理事會是 2019 年全美影響力排名第 8 的重要智庫，在全球評比部分，該智庫在全世界「外交政策與國際事務(Foreign Policy and International Affairs)」影響力排名第 15 名⁷。該智庫董事會成員與研究員、專家、學者均為美國政界及學界具有聲望之人士，曾積極推動我加入聯合國一案，近年對於臺美關係交流的推動不遺餘力；在安全研究部分，目前該智庫研究領域包含歐、亞、非、美洲，並致力於中國崛起

⁶ 例如美國前副國務卿史坦伯格(Jim Steinberg)曾擔任布魯金斯研究院副院長、前國務院亞太助卿坎博(Kurt Campbell)曾擔任 CSIS 副會長及新美國安全中心(CNAS)執行長、國務院前政策計畫處首席副處長 Derek Chollet 曾擔任 CSIS 資深研究員；白宮國安會東亞事務前資深主任貝德(Jeff Bader)曾擔任布魯金斯研究院桑頓中國研究中心主任、前國防部主管亞太安全首席助理部長米德偉(Derek Mitchell)曾擔任 CSIS 資深研究員等等。馬博元(2011)，「智庫在華府」，外交部通訊，29 卷第 2 期。


⁷ James G. McGann(2020), "2019 Global Go To Think Thank Index Report," TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports, University of Pennsylvania.

後對美國的威脅研究，定期產出的研究報告與政策建議對美國政府的國家安全及外交決策扮演重要角色。



資料來源：大西洋理事會網站截圖

該智庫目前設有 14 個研究中心，每個研究中心之下另有若干個研究部門，以「斯科克羅夫戰略與安全中心(Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security)」部門為例，其下另分設「亞洲安全倡議(Asia Security Initiative)」、「跨大西洋安全倡議(Transatlantic Security Initiative)」、「中東安全倡議(Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative)」、「前瞻戰略和風險倡議(Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative)」、「網絡治理倡議(Cyber Statecraft Initiative)」等 5 個部門，而國防部每年派訓的訪問學者就於「亞洲安全倡議」編制之下，從事亞太地區各種傳統與非傳統安全的政策研究，以便為美國及其盟國制定新的戰略與政策。



資料來源：筆者自行繪製

貳、過程

一、個人研究主題

自美國總統川普於 2018 年 3 月簽署備忘錄，宣布以「中國偷竊美國智慧財產權和商業秘密」為由，指示美國貿易代表依據 1974 年貿易法第 301 條，開始對從中國進口的商品徵收關稅，雙方以關稅報復為手段的貿易戰開始，也造成世界經濟局勢的重大波動。川普對於中國經濟威脅的論述，主軸圍繞於「中國近年經濟快速成長是來自於竊取美國商業機密，並以不公平的手段從美國獲取利潤」，因此，這樣的做法已形成對美國造成重大國家安全影響。哥本哈根學派學者 Buzan 在其著作《Security: A New Framework for Analysis》中，提出了「安全化」

理論(Securitization Theory)，認為安全是物質、主觀的概念，可透過主體間的互動而建構出來，具體的操作是安全化行為者(Securitizing Actors，一般指國家和政府)透過言語-行為(Speech-act，指一些具體的官方論述、宣傳或行動)指涉某一對象或社群(Referent Objectives)具有存在性威脅，因此政權得到了公眾的認可，利用特權去任意動用社會資源解決這「安全問題」如清算異己。而學者 Collins 認為哥本哈根學派在國內層次的安全化分析模型，著重於特定議題如何由非政治化、政治化到安全化的階段過程分析，而安全行為體通常是國家及其政治菁英⁸。雖然哥本哈根學派擴大了安全的概念，但其理論偏重於處理相互主體間威脅的建構，而明顯忽略安全化前緣「文化、認同的根源」、過程中「安全話語內容架構的分析」，以及最後成效上關於「系統本身與安全化行為體、受眾如何互動」等問題，若不補足這樣的缺陷，安全化分析只能詮釋「歷史當中發生了哪些事情？」無法進一步解釋「這些事情如何及為何發生？」

為了解決這樣的困境，本人藉由此次獲得公費赴美國大西洋理事會進行研究的機會，結合本身研究領域，試圖以哥本哈根學派安全化理論為基底，在認識論的取徑上，借鑒批判建構主義(Critical Constructivism)安全研究中關注的文化、認同、語言等因素，納入「安全化行動」分析過程，以深入探究特定族群或政治菁英的文化背景，如何建構指涉對象的安全論述；在研究個案上，選定 2018 年 3 月間美國總統川普指示美國貿易代表處(Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR)依據 1974 年貿易法第 301 條，對從中國進口商品徵收關稅而揭開的「美中貿易戰」做為案例進行探討⁹；在研究方法上，則規劃採用半結構式「深度訪談」，確認中美貿易戰安全化過程中各環節可能影響因素及權重，另輔以文字探勘(Text mining)的方法，擷取美國官方相關文本(包含總統聲明、白宮文件、參眾兩院紀錄、公部門政策白皮書與報告等)進行語言內容架構的量化關聯性分析，試圖以新的分析框架，來比對與檢證美中貿易戰過程中「言論-行動」的話語路徑及實際成效，相關研究成果已投稿研討會及學術期刊審查中。

二、各項研討會參與

美國數量眾多的智庫主要是以議題倡導、理念推介、政策建議以及人才供給為主，在議題與領域上相當多元，目前華府著名的智庫中，布魯金斯基會(Brookings Institution)屬美國民主黨政務官人才庫、美國企業研究院(American Enterprise Institute)及傳統基金會(The Heritage Foundation)是共和黨執政人才

⁸ Collins, A. 2005, "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education", *Pacific Review*, 18(4), pp.565-586.

⁹ 美國紐約時報(The New York Times)於 2019 年 6 月專文提到，川普總統就任後的兩年裡，許多貿易制裁手段已經使美國國家安全與經濟安全之間的界線越來越模糊，近期川普政府手段愈加激進，將國家安全無限上綱的結果，使得美國動輒以各種手段制裁其他國家，不但改變中國、歐洲、日本、墨西哥等國家關係，也使美國陷入與幾乎所有貿易夥伴(包括長期盟友)的經濟戰爭中。Ana Swanson and Paul Mozur, "Trump Mixes Economic and National Security, Plunging the U.S. Into Multiple Fights," *The New York Times*, June. 2019, < <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/business/trump-economy-national-security.html> > (Retrieved Sept. 3, 2019) .

庫、戰略暨國際研究中心（Center for Strategic and International Studies）則是與共和、民主兩黨熟稔，並與美國行政部門關係密切，承攬國防部、國務院、能源部、中情局等單位的重大議題研究案，大西洋理事會（The Atlantic Council）與位在紐約的外交關係委員會（Council on Foreign Relations）是資深卸任政務官的跨黨派智庫，而且智庫內多位成員擁有可以直接與美國總統或部長通話的特殊背景¹⁰。



美國華府為全世界重要的政治經濟中心之一，因此各類型智庫每年度辦理的研討會數以千計，本人所處的大西洋理事會目前研究領域包含歐、亞、非、美洲等地區，定期產出的研究報告與政策建議對美國政府的國家安全及外交決策扮演重要角色，其推介方式就是辦理各種不同的研討會、論壇，並出版相關刊物來影響政府部門的政策制訂，若以美國學者 Simon 所定義的第二軌對話管道，智庫經常性辦理的這些活動，通常可以扮演 1. 提出新概念和建議，獲得決策者關注；2. 運用媒體在國際上引起公眾注意¹¹等功能，惟今年受到新型冠狀病毒(COVID-19)全球肆虐的影響，美國自 3 月初便宣布全國進入緊急狀態，各州公私部門、營業場所皆停止營運或運作，大西洋理事會亦於 2 月底正式宣布所有員工居家辦公(Working from home)，依據規定所有民眾非必要不得外出，因此各智庫例行研討會均無限期推延，本人所處的大西洋理事會往年所辦理的各類型研討會議將近有百場之譜，但自 2020 年 3 月之後亦多數取消，致使與其他學者交流或獲取新觀點的機會大為減少，甚為可惜。

三、審查通過發表 5 篇分析文章

長期以來，我國國際生存空間在中共無理蠻橫的打壓下受到嚴重壓縮，加上臺灣與美國缺乏正式邦交關係，必需仰賴更多元的管道建立溝通機制，提供美國民間、政府部門與決策單位正確、客觀的資訊，短期之內可形成友我之輿論與氛圍，長期可催化有利我國家之政策制定，而智庫就是可以達成這個目標的重要途徑，也是目前外交部在華府積極推動的「二軌外交(Second-track Diplomacy)」的工作重點，而大西洋理事會經評比為 2019 年全美影響力排名第 8 的重要智庫，在全球的「外交政策與國際事務(Foreign Policy and International Affairs)」影響力排名第 15 名，具有相當大的國際影響力；因此，本人於智庫研究期間除參與各項學術活動，藉對話、拜訪與交流期間了解美方人士決策思維模式，另積極透過投稿文章的方式來進行時事議題分析，分享臺灣的戰略安全觀點，總計於智庫一年的研究期間，共撰寫並投稿了《After the 2020 Taiwan election: Strengthening defense and security cooperation》等七篇文章，而經審查及多次編輯修正後，最後獲大西洋理事會通過刊出五篇於網站上，以下為各篇分析文章的內容與重點摘要：




¹⁰ 曾復生，〈時論－中美智庫 腦力比一比〉，《中時電子報》，2014 年 11 月 5 日，〈網址 <https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20141105000715-260109?chdtv>〉（檢索日期：2019 年 9 月 28 日）。

¹¹ Simon, "Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: the CSCAP Experience," Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001, p.81.

篇次	日期	題目	內容摘要	備考
一	2020.2.12	<i><After the 2020 Taiwan election: Strengthening defense and security cooperation></i>	<p>中華民國總統及國會大選於 2020 年 1 月 11 日落幕，此次超過 1450 萬人參與投票，總投票率為 74.9%，而蔡英文得票率超過 57%，以創歷史新高的 817 萬票連任第 15 任總統，同時也再次率領民進黨取得國會 113 席中，61 席的過半席次。同一時間，美國國務卿龐畢歐、日本外務大臣茂木敏充等 60 多個國家與國際組織的政要及友人透過致函、賀電及在社群平台貼文表達祝賀之意。</p> <p>本文由台灣國內政治及國際政治角度(對美國及中共的影響)進行分析說明，文末並提出臺美之間應深化國防與各項安全合作的理由及利基。</p>	 <p>WED, FEB 12, 2020</p> <h2>After the 2020 Taiwan election: Strengthening defense and security cooperation</h2> <p>New Atlanticist by Chang-Ching Tu</p> <p>China Elections Nationalism Security & Defense Taiwan</p>  <p>Tsai Ing-wen, current president of the Republic of China, declares her election victory after being sworn-in for the Taiwanese Presidential Election in front of her supporters in Taipei City, Taiwan on January 11, 2020. (The Yonhap Shimbun via REUTERS)</p> <p>The presidential and congressional elections of the Republic of China (Taiwan) have come to an end, with more than 14.5 million people participating in the vote and a total turnout rate of 74.9 percent—9 percent more than the 2016 election. President Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected for a second term with 57 percent of the total vote and a record high 8.17 million votes. President Tsai also led the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to obtain sixty-one seats out of the 113 seats in Congress.</p> <p>(略)</p> <p>will not be changed unilaterally.</p> <p>Voters in the 2020 election voted in support of the DPP's "anti-China" policy, which has brought cross-strait relations to another period of chilly relations and will affect the next four years of Taiwan's foreign, national defense, cross-strait, and economic policies. After the election, President Tsai presented the four principles of "Peace, Reciprocity, Democracy, and Dialogue (和平、對等、民主、對話)" as the guiding parts of future cross-strait relations. According to a poll on January 15, this approach was supported by seventy-eight percent of the people and about sixty percent of people believed that the CCP should restart dialogue with the DPP government.</p> <p>Nevertheless, even though President Tsai, who was reelected with huge public support, called for a rational dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan, it will be difficult for Tsai to control the majority of the legislature in the future and properly adapt the party's growing voice to Taiwan's independence. But how can President Tsai properly deal with the situation in which the "DPP has been elected as the majority in the Legislative Yuan and the growing number of Taiwanese independence forces within the party?" This will be a potential problem.</p> <p>After the amendment to the PRC's constitution to abolish term limits, President Xi Jinping would like to seek a higher historical legacy for himself. Whether the CCP will compromise with the Tsai government, which reflects Taiwan's overwhelming public opinion, or whether it will take tougher measures, will be another major challenge to future interactions between Taiwan, the United States, and China for years to come.</p> <p>Chang-Ching Tu is the Taiwan senior fellow in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and assistant professor at the ROC (Taiwan) National Defense University.</p> <p>Further reading</p> 
	文章網址	https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/after-the-2020-taiwan-election-strengthening-defense-and-security-cooperation/		

二	2020.3.31	<p><China's ineffective coronavirus response could create its own Black Swan></p>	<p>2020 年是中共計劃「全面建成小康社會」和「十三五規劃(第 13 個 5 年期經濟社會發展規劃)」驗收之年，因此，2020 年對中國十分重要，肩負重要的象徵使命。隨著開春以來新型冠狀病毒(武漢肺炎)疫情持續蔓延，這波疫情嚴重衝擊中國內需與金融體系，對外又有美中貿易戰第二階段談判，中國經濟前景雪上加霜。除此之外，中共目前面臨更加嚴峻的考驗，就是避免武漢肺炎成為影響中共政治安全上的「黑天鵝」。</p> <p>對中共而言，經濟上，不久前才遭遇逢美中貿易戰的衝擊以及未來可能的經濟發展遲緩；政治上，高度集權的黨中央竟然無法有效處理國內疫情，引起部分反對勢力對習近平領導能力的質疑；而社會上，封城隔離的生活與嚴重擴散的疫情破壞人與人的互信基礎，更直接挑戰席近平倡導的「維護國家安全和社會穩定(維穩)」。</p> <p>在這些內外因素相互加乘之下，已可預期，持續擴散的疫情將是未來席近平執政時期的黑天鵝。中共未來如何在後續處理中，盡力降低死亡率、穩定民心，不僅考驗中共國家的醫療基礎工程與政府的治理能力，也是習近平的政治挑戰。</p>	<div data-bbox="948 192 1538 524"> <p>TUE, MAR 31, 2020</p> <h2>China's ineffective coronavirus response could create its own Black Swan</h2> <p>New Atlanticist by Chang-Ching Tu</p> <p>China Coronavirus</p> </div> <div data-bbox="948 524 1538 837">  <p>Shanghai, China. REUTERS/Aly Song/File Photo</p> </div> <div data-bbox="948 837 1538 1061"> <p>For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2020 is a symbolic year. President Xi Jinping has referred to 2020, the final year in the country's thirteenth Five-Year Plan, as a "crucial year for building a moderately prosperous society" (全面建成小康社會). At the same time, 2020 has also seen the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) in China's Hubei Province. Internally, this epidemic has severely impacted China's financial system and domestic economy. This comes at a time when external pressures, including the second phase of US-China trade negotiations, have further worsened China's economic prospects. At this time of increasing uncertainty, the CCP is facing a severe test of its ability to prevent coronavirus from becoming a "black swan" that severely impacts its political stability and security.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="948 1061 1538 1554"> <p>(略)</p> <p>the future. The rigid Chinese bureaucracy has blocked effective notification and control of the epidemic in the early stages, which has had a huge impact on China's healthcare, society, and economy, and impacted other countries around the world. Everything is like what Xi Jinping described: "this is a people's war(這是一場人民戰爭)," but the extreme lockdowns and temporarily-held epidemic prevention front in China could not stop the virus from spreading around the world. In order to regain the hearts of its people, the CCP not only continues to take economic measures to ensure stability in the short term, but to strengthen its dominance of public opinion. It also is trying to tighten the control of the media and the Internet.</p> <p>Economically, the CCP will continue to face obstacles from the US-China trade war, as well as a global economic crash, which will likely lead to sluggish China economic growth. Politically, the highly centralized party could not effectively handle the spread of the domestic epidemic, causing potential opposition forces to question Xi's leadership. Socially, segregated life has undermined the foundations of mutual trust between people, and more and more people have begun to realize the importance of the free flow of information.</p> <p>With these internal and external factors influencing each other, the spreading epidemic may have aggravated unrest and turmoil in Chinese society and partly damaged the CCP's legitimacy. During the post COVID-19 era for China, these repercussions will be a political "black swan" for Xi's administration in the near future.</p> <p><i>Dr. Chang-Ching Tu is the Taiwan senior fellow in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and assistant professor at the ROC (Taiwan) National Defense University.</i></p> </div> <div data-bbox="948 1554 1538 1644"> <p>Further reading:</p>  </div>	<p>文章網址 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/chinas-ineffective-coronavirus-response-could-create-its-own-black-swan/</p>
---	-----------	--	---	--	---

三	2020.4.7	<p><Lessons from Taiwan's experience with COVID-19></p>	<p>新型冠狀病毒(COVID-19)疫情已於全球肆虐，美國亦無法倖免於難，美國國內近期所採取的隔離和封鎖措施，已大規模阻斷人員交流。自3月份起多個州紛紛頒布「居家令(shelter-in-place)」，要求民眾非必要不要離開家門，許多聚眾的店家如餐廳、酒吧也被勒令暫時停業。由於消費者支出減少，大型活動和消費行為也因此急劇下滑，連帶使商業經營與企業投資推遲，對美國整體經濟造成重大影響。</p> <p>臺灣擁有99.9%的全民健保覆蓋率，被全球「健保指數(Health Care Index)」評鑑為世界第一，透過早期介入、靈活的指揮架構、熟練的防疫戰略、整合的醫療大數據，以及主動的資訊揭露等措施，讓距離中國只有81英里(約130公里)且人口密度極高(2300萬人口多居住於西半部)的臺灣在近幾個月來只出現極少的確診病例，疫情至今並未失控，臺灣政府在防疫資訊傳播的許多措施可以分享，本文提出四個重要經驗提供美國執政當局參考。</p>	<div data-bbox="954 192 1533 472"> <p>TUE, APR 7, 2020</p> <h2>Lessons from Taiwan's experience with COVID-19</h2> <p>New Atlanticist by Chang-Ching Tu</p> <p>Conservative Taiwan</p> </div> <div data-bbox="954 472 1533 831">  <p>A staff wears a face mask with a Taiwanese flag design, as protection due to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, at a factory for non-woven filter fabric used to make surgical face masks, in Taoyuan, Taiwan, March 30, 2020. REUTERS/Ann Wang</p> </div> <p>As governments and citizens in the United States and around the world struggle to cope with the novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), the experience of Taiwan can help illustrate some potential paths forward to combat the spread of the disease.</p> <p>Taiwan was well positioned to react quickly and effectively to the COVID-19 outbreak. Taiwan's experience with SARS in 2003 helped drive the government to react immediately to the emerging crisis, classifying the unknown disease as "Severe Special Infectious Pneumonia" as early as January 15, before later adopting the name COVID-19. Additionally, Taiwan has a 99.9% national health insurance coverage rate and has been evaluated as the world's best system by the Global Health Care Index. Early intervention, a flexible command structure, a comprehensive epidemic prevention strategy, integrated medical big data, and proactive information disclosure allowed Taiwan—which at its closest point is only eighty-one miles (130 kilometers) away from China and has a very high population density—to record only a few confirmed cases in recent months. There are a number of lessons to be learned from the Taiwanese government's effective response to COVID-19 that should be shared with other parts of the world fighting the ongoing pandemic.</p> <p>Lesson 1: Effective government-led public-private collaboration</p> <p>The battle against COVID-19 is just beginning. Around the world, countries have only limited resources for epidemic prevention, insufficient medical supplies, and are facing panic among the public. As countries grapple with large-scale infections, the United Kingdom, Italy, and others have taken measures to provide medical care for only moderate to severe patients in order to save medical resources. Given the relative lack of</p> <p>(略)</p> <p>misinformation and disinformation is as important as proactively publishing information themselves.</p> <p>In order to prevent the transmission of misinformation and disinformation, Taiwan has established the "Taiwan FactCheck Center," and each department currently has a "Meme Engineering team" (迷因工程團隊). When it discovers misinformation or disinformation online, the team will verify it within sixty minutes and clarify it to the public immediately. These measures can prevent unnecessary panic and anxiety during the epidemic prevention period.</p> <p>Understanding and mutual assistance are stronger than fear</p> <p>The prevention and control of COVID-19 requires joint efforts by governments and citizens. This crisis demonstrates that pandemics do not care about race or national borders. To borrow former US President Barack Obama's words in 2015 "Let's not forget, freedom is more powerful than fear." I would slightly modify it to add "Let's not forget, understanding and mutual assistance are more powerful than fear." Through international epidemic information sharing and medical cooperation, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic can be minimized. If a country can surpass the barriers between political parties and ethnic groups and release epidemic prevention information with active, timely, and integrated measures, it will have made a crucial step towards good governance—the most effective mitigation measures for epidemic prevention.</p> <p>I hope that the United States and people from all over the world can work together to get through this crisis.</p> <p><i>Chang-Ching Tu is the Taiwan senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Asia Security Initiative and assistant professor at the ROC (Taiwan) National Defense University.</i></p> <p>Further reading:</p> 
---	----------	---	---	--

		<p><i>coronavirus has deepened the US-China ideological rift</i>></p>	<p>15 簽署第一階段貿易協議，讓雙方在經濟層面為時一年多的爭議暫時落幕。而近期因為 COVID-19 疫情在全球肆虐，美國國內在確診病例與死亡人數上雙雙躍升為全球之冠，整體經濟亦因大規模的隔離措施造成嚴重影響。近期，美中兩國在冠狀病毒來源、疫情初期通報與管控、新聞記者採訪等議題上再次針鋒相對，緊張局勢迅速升級，由於雙方意識形態與政治制度的差異，美中關係已面臨最根本的障礙，因為相互信任和友好的雙邊關係不僅取決於對於彼此「國家核心利益」的理解，雙方是否能夠構建「兼容的國家身份」更是重要關鍵。</p> <p>筆者使用資料為 2020 年 1 月 1 日至 5 月 12 日期間，中共外交部所公布的 336 則重要公告及文件，以及美國政府重要官員所發表對中共的談話及聲明，透過大數據分析軟體 CORPRS 及 Power BI 來評估美中雙方於此段期間對於彼此身分認知與威脅感知。因為雙方對於彼此「合作夥伴」、「競爭對手」或者「爭執對抗」的身分界定情形，也將進一步造成後疫情時期世界權力板塊位移。</p>	  <p>Chinese President Xi Jinping is seen on a screen during the opening session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China May 22, 2020. REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins</p> <p>Although the United States and China have increasingly confronted each other on issues such as trade, 5G infrastructure, and the expulsion of journalists, both sides continue to insist that they are seeking a positive relationship. But mutual trust and friendly bilateral relations are unachievable as long as Beijing and Washington view each other as a potential threat to their national security or interests. The coronavirus pandemic has fueled these perceptions, with US officials increasingly concerned about how failures in Chinese governance could impact the United States, while Beijing has pushed back on criticism of its ideological and political system.</p> <p>Using data from 336 announcements and documents published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from January 1 to May 12, 2020, as well as statements issued by US government officials, it is clear that the pandemic has worsened the threat perception by both sides, placing even more obstacles in the way of positive US-Sino relations.</p> <p>The perception of a "threat" is essentially a sense of insecurity constructed by interactions between subjects under certain circumstances and conditions, and dependent on factors such as history and norms. As shown in Figure 1, the level of threat to the other can be analyzed through the three aspects of identity, capacity, and intention.</p> <p>(略)</p> <p>After coronavirus: The competition continues</p> <p>In the post-COVID era, US-China relations will enter a more difficult phase. From the analysis of the diplomatic vocabulary used by the two countries during this period, it is clear that Washington no longer sees China simply as a rival, but as a clear threat to its security, economy, and now even its society. In contrast, China still defines itself as a seeking "partnership" with the United States, but has shown itself more willing to hit back rhetorically at Washington and has grown concerned at US criticism about Beijing's political system. China's response to these attacks—publicizing its national experience in the fight against COVID-19 as a model for others to follow and touting its centralized state system—could further deepen the US-Sino rift. The history of ideological confrontation during the Cold War will make it difficult for Western countries, mainly the United States, to back away from ideological challenges.</p> <p>Coronavirus has accelerated changing perceptions in Washington and Beijing and deepened the ideological confrontation between the two different political systems symbolizing "democracy" and "centralization." While both countries had hoped to forge a positive bilateral relationship, the coronavirus crisis has only driven this possibility further away.</p> <p><i>Chang-Ching Tu is the Taiwan senior fellow in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and assistant professor at the ROC (Taiwan) National Defense University.</i></p> <p>Further reading:</p>  <p>This website or its third party tools use cookies which are necessary for its functioning and required to achieve the purposes illustrated in the cookie policy.</p>
	<p>文章網址</p>	<p>https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-coronavirus-has-deepened-the-us-china-ideological-rift/?fbclid=IwAR16yeXF4tVIl5ul4U6CDBtI9nlfL8DZCq2zvqJlZ4V3mAdOBbKrbINJ6NI</p>		

五	2020.8.11	<Under second Tsai administration, Taiwan looks to champion global democracy>	<p>中華民國(台灣)第 15 任總統蔡英文於 5 月 20 日正式宣示就職並發表演說，與全世界每一位總統的就職演說內容一樣，都代表未來對國民的承諾、對國家的治理願景、對國際社會角色與責任的回應。而此次台灣四年一度的總統選舉及就職典禮期間適逢 COVID-19 疫情在全世界爆發，台灣在政府積極治理及全國人民的合作下，有效控制疫情，也讓本次就職典禮具有特別的象徵意義。</p> <p>本研究分析發現，此次蔡總統就職演說使用詞彙出現次數前 5 名的詞依序是「台灣、產業、全球、國家、發展」，與上一任期就職時所提出的「台灣、政府、國家、經濟、社會」相比，這次「產業」一詞出現的比例提升最多，也驗證演說內容中對於未來四年對於國家「經濟發展」的重視。本文由國防安全、兩岸關係、台美合作等三個面向進行分析說明，最後並呼籲全球理念相同的國家應共同合作，積極捍衛人權及民主自由等普世價值觀，共同遏止反民主力量蔓延。</p>	<div><div>Atlantic Council</div><div>ISSUES REGIONS INSIGHTS & IMPACT PEOPLE PROGRAMS EVENTS</div></div> <div><div>TUE, AUG 11, 2020</div><div>Under second Tsai administration, Taiwan looks to champion global democracy</div><div>New Atlanticist by Chang-Ching Tu</div><div>Defense Policy Politics & Diplomacy Taiwan</div></div> <div></div> <div><div>Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen waves to the crowd in Keelung, Taiwan, June 9, 2020. REUTERS/Ann Wang</div><div>The 15th President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Tsai Ing-wen delivered her official inauguration speech on May 20, at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic continues to raise significant concerns about the future of the rules-based international order, the status of global democracy, and the trajectory of cross-strait relations. Taking the speech as a reflection of President Tsai's vision for her second administration, Taiwan's priorities will be strengthening cooperation with allies, accelerated development of asymmetrical defense capabilities, and managing tense cross-strait relations.</div><div>Foreign policy: Strengthened cooperation with allies and like-minded countries</div><div>President Tsai announced that Taiwan will participate more actively in regional cooperation mechanisms, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with its allies, and bolster ties with the United States, Japan, Europe, and other like-minded countries. Taiwan's achievements in preventing the spread of COVID-19 and providing medical assistance to other countries has shown its strength in the field of public health and further highlighted the urgent need of being included as a member in the World Health Organization. With these foreign policy priorities in mind, Taiwan will likely maintain and expand three regional and global roles moving forward:</div><div><div>1. Advocate of universal values: Democracy, freedom, and human rights are Taiwan's core values. Taiwan may look to form more democratic partnerships with like-minded countries and play a constructive role in the US Indo-Pacific strategy.</div><div>2. Node of economic activity and trade: The security of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) is key to ensuring protected trade and economic activity. Taiwan's unique geographic location, excellent global competitiveness, and open and transparent society can empower it to serve as a hub for economic and trade transactions in the</div></div><div><div>This website or its third-party tools use cookies, which are necessary for its functioning and required to achieve the purposes illustrated in the cookie policy.</div><div>(略)</div><div>Taiwan's economic growth is a result of stable, open markets, rule of law, and democracy. In the world in terms of political rights and civil liberties, Taiwan has proved time and time again that it is a model democratic country in the region.</div><div>Amid the global pandemic, the government proactively disclosed various public health information via democratic, transparent, and accountable governance. With the participation and cooperation of its citizens, Taiwan's government effectively controlled the epidemic. This demonstrates not only that democracies can play a key role in leading the global response to COVID-19 and shaping the world that comes next, but also that the key strengths of Asian culture can be compatible with the universal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Moreover, the Taiwan model offers a way to fight pandemics that is diametrically opposed to an authoritarian model based on extremely controlling policies, such as those seen in China.</div><div>In the post-COVID world, the rise of anti-democratic, authoritarian forces will present an urgent challenge for free and democratic countries. In the face of such uncertainty, Mike Abramowitz, president of Freedom House, said, "If major democratic powers fail to set strong examples and provide constructive leadership, it will be impossible to reverse the global trends that threaten freedom for all societies." The obligation to defend human rights and universal values should not be shouldered by any country alone. While Taiwan still faces many obstacles and threats from China, President Tsai's speech has clearly outlined Taiwan's priorities and strong democratic mission: Taiwan will stand with like-minded countries and jointly stop the spread of anti-democratic forces around the world.</div><div>Chang-Ching Tu is the Taiwan senior fellow in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and assistant professor at the ROC (Taiwan) National Defense University.</div><div>Further reading:</div><div></div><div><div>This website or its third-party tools use cookies, which are necessary for its functioning and required to achieve the purposes illustrated in the cookie policy.</div><div>by use of cookies as per our Cookie Policy and Privacy Policy, by clicking on this page, by clicking a link or button or by continuing to browse other</div></div></div></div>
	文章網址		https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/under-second-tsai-administration-taiwan-looks-to-champion-global-democracy/	

資料來源：筆者自行彙整

四、殊榮與成就(推介台灣防疫成果)

本人於四月份所撰寫的「臺灣的防疫傳播學：幾點經驗的分享(Lessons from Taiwan's experience with COVID-19)」一文，接獲智庫主管告知榮獲大西洋理事會全智庫當月超過 250 篇文章中點閱次數第一名(三週點閱次數超過 23,000 次)，成功對外宣揚臺灣的防疫經驗。由於此次研究期間適逢全球疫情爆發，而臺灣在 COVID-19 的防疫成效十分卓越，加上近期美國親臺反中的政治氛圍，此篇分析文章因而受到美國閱聽大眾的青睞，為我國防疫外交適時做了有效國際宣傳。

此篇分析文章有四大論述主軸，分別為一、政府主導、公私協力(Effective government-led public-private collaboration)；二、整合大眾傳播媒體機制(Integration of mass media)；三、替代性社交禮儀與生活習慣的改變(Alternative social etiquette and lifestyle changes)；四、對於不實訊息的重視與澄清(Identification and clarification of misinformation and disinformation)；而結語則引用美國前總統歐巴馬(Barack Obama)所提到的「理解與互助比恐懼更強大(Understanding and mutual assistance are stronger than fear)」，呼籲美國政府和人民應該要更嚴肅、謹慎的去看待這次疫情，而全球各國亦應齊心合作，攜手度過難關。



Lessons from Taiwan's experience with COVID-19

LTC Chang-Ching Tu examines Taiwan's response to COVID-19, which is widely regarded as one of the most efficient worldwide in containing the virus.

This blog has had over 23,000 views since it was posted on April 7, 2020. It was the best performing piece on the Atlantic Council website in the month of April.

[READ MORE](#)

SCOWCROFT IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Every other Friday, our Deputy Director Matt Kroenig goes toe to toe with Emma Ashford in the Foreign Policy column "It's Debatable."

Last week, they went back and forth over Kim Jong Un, the fallout from a potential regime change, and what that means for the United States.

[READ MORE](#)

Hi LTC Tu,

I hope you had a nice weekend.

Our communications team shared some great news this morning about [your article](#) on lessons learned from Taiwan's COVID-19 experience.

Your article was the #1 most visited article on our website for the month of April 2020. As of today, it has more than **22,000** views and was hyperlinked in [an article](#) by Slate Magazine. Thank you for all your hard work writing the piece!

Best,



 **Atlantic Council**

資料來源：筆者提供

伍、心得及建議事項

目前美國的許多智庫每年均設有訪問學者名額，鼓勵美國國內或海外其他國家具有相關議題研究能力之學者或政府官員申請交流，促進多方互動。而位於華府的著名智庫大西洋理事會定期偕同美國商界及政府高層赴台拜訪我國歷任總統，與我國有深厚的情誼，在立場上相當支持我方，長期以來以各種研究報告、研討會及各項交流方式，針對兩岸政策進行研究，並透過適當管道，定期提供美國政府決策機構參考，1993 年我國前總統李登輝能突破中共打壓，順利至美國康乃爾大學演講，以及後續推動美國學術界對於我國加入聯合國一案之注意與討論，當時的「大西洋理事會」與其他華府智庫的大力鼓吹就扮演關鍵角色，因此與相關智庫保持密切聯繫與良好互動，是目前我國政府(外交部)與美國相互溝通的重要管道之一。

我國國防部與美國大西洋理事會已有超過 16 年的合作經驗，歷年均考選一位國軍現役軍官至該智庫「斯科克羅夫戰略與安全中心(Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security)」下設之「亞洲安全倡議(Asia Security Initiative)」擔任訪問研究員，雙方互動良好。鑒於我國在亞太安全戰略、中共解放軍研究、區域安全、中共意識形態、中國政治經濟分析、臺美中三邊關係等領域具有一定的專業研究能量，不論是我國民間智庫或國防大學，若能與美國著名智庫建立穩定之合作交流管道，對於提升我國國際聲譽、輸出臺灣安全戰略觀點將有重要功效，因此建議不論政府部門、民間智庫或國防大學未來應積極拓展與歐美智庫交流合作，並簽訂合作備忘錄(Memorandum of understanding, MOU)，藉由刊物交流、文章刊登、人員互訪、意見分享等各面向合作，建立穩定互動關係，直/間接將我「戰略觀點」輸出，讓美國及全世界能更了解在中共崛起後，臺灣在亞太地緣戰略的重要性，亦可間接推介我中華民國民主自由發展的成果，這些都是我國際宣傳的重要「軟實力」，也是未來進行戰略溝通的重要環節。