



Exposure Monitoring and Health Surveillance

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Training Course April 2015

AUSTRALIAN ANIMAL HEALTH LABORATORY
www.csiro.au

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Medical Surveillance Criteria

- The purpose of medical surveillance is for the early identification of conditions, if any, that could present an increased risk of adverse health effects related to the task being performed.
- Based on the type of work being performed, including consideration of factors such as the duration of the task, the materials being used, and the potential for exposure, medical surveillance is either recommended or required for the job.



Medical Surveillance Criteria

- In the US the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have specific requirements. These include;
 - Exposure to noise levels exceeding 85 dBA in a 8 hour TWA
 - Wear a respirator
 - Handle any of 13 regulated carcinogens
 - Handle a list of chemicals (including formaldehyde)
 - Handle radioactive chemicals
 - Exposure to asbestos
- Various advisory groups (e.g. Biosafety Committee) ... may recommend/require medical exams, biological monitoring, immunizations, or titers based on the nature of the work activity*



Exposure Monitoring

- Medical Advice and contingency planning
- Medical Surveillance
- Baseline serum
- Immunization
-



Medical Advice & Planning

- Institutions should seek medical advice when establishing their Health Surveillance and Medical Monitoring programs
- A AHL Medical Advisory Committee
- Medically informed post-exposure response planning should be undertaken to establish;
 - Immediate post exposure-specific response
 - Potential post-exposure prophylaxis options,
 - Recommended diagnostic tests,
 - Sources of expert medical evaluation
-



PC4 Incident response: Accidental exposure to Risk Group 4 Agents

RESPONSE FLOW CHART FOLLOWING PC4 EXPOSURE EVENT

Potential or actual exposure requires an immediate response. A site worker is notified with steps to be undertaken as soon as will allow to be resumed.

Details of the incident are reported to the CAS (OO) immediately.

Details of the incident are reported to the CAS.

Most Serious	OR	Less Serious
Mucous exposure or skin penetrating injury		Dust or glove failure but no direct mucous exposure or skin penetration injury
Exposed site worker should exit the area using normal procedures and report to the SCEU		Exposed site worker can continue to work unless advice obtained by SEM
While the exposed site member is leaving the secure area the Director, Assistant Director, MSD, HSE Manager and the staff member's supervisor will meet to consider necessary actions.		The staff member involved will be offered an opportunity to discuss the exposure in person with an AMAC medical practitioner.
The exposed staff member will be medically assessed by an AMAC medical practitioner and will be quarantined as appropriate soon as possible.		An AMAC member will be consulted to assist in the assessment of risk. A SCEU Chairman will be advised.
If a decision is made to place individuals into quarantine, discussions between the exposed worker and an AMAC medical practitioner will determine.		In most cases of low risk exposure staff will be asked to monitor their temperature (and only for an appropriate period) and immediately report any abnormal temperature or medical symptoms.
For most significant exposures, advice will be sought from authorised AMAC members. Consideration may be given to transfer the affected person to Royal Melbourne Hospital.		If a decision is made to place individuals into quarantine, discussions between the exposed worker and an AMAC medical practitioner will determine whether home quarantine or quarantine in one of the Changing Isolators is most appropriate.
A report of the incident and subsequent discussions will be forwarded immediately to the Victorian CVO, the Victorian Chief Health Officer and the Chief CSIRO Livestock Infection and the Chief of CSIRO.		When quarantine is recommended a report of the incident and subsequent discussions will be forwarded immediately to the Victorian CVO, the Victorian Chief Health Officer and the Chief CSIRO Livestock Infection and the Chief of CSIRO.



Baseline serum

- Traditionally baseline serum samples are collected from 'at-risk' personnel, to be stored for future reference
- If samples are collected, it should be with informed consent & documentation defining;
 - who owns the serum
 - how it is stored
 - who can access it for testing
 - who may order tests and access the results
- Serum should be disposed of once the individual leaves the



Baseline serum

- Some organizations do not collect baseline serum samples for staff—depending on occupational exposure risks
- Instead serum collected immediately after a recognized exposure event and then two weeks after
- Look for a serum antibody rise against specific pathogen
- With many human pathogens it is difficult to establish whether the 'infection / seroconversion' was a result of lifestyle or occupational expos etcure. Eg



Medical Surveillance



- All personnel advised of the risk of occupational exposure to microorganisms
- A serum sample should be collected (with informed consent) as soon as practicable following an occupational exposure.
- Staff encouraged to seek medical evaluation for symptoms that they suspect may be related to infectious agents in their work area (PUOs)
- May consider health surveillance cards to provide attending medical staff with phone number to obtain expert & informed



Illness Surveillance Card for Staff



Keep this card in your possession. In case of an unexplained febrile illness inform your supervisor. If you seek medical attention present this card to your Medical Practitioner




The bearer of this card works in an area of the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory where endemic and exotic pathogenic microorganisms are handled. In the event of an unexplained febrile illness further information about these microorganisms can be obtained by contacting the Microbiological Security Manager on (03) 5227 5300.



Immunisation

- Immunisation should be offered to all staff working with agents infectious for humans based on medical advice
- Immunisation should be kept current — need system
- Consideration should be considered to immunising support staff
- In Australia guidance is available from the latest editions of *The Australian Immunisation Handbook*
- Immunisation usually doesn't prevent infection, just symptoms
-



Work at BSL4

- When working with Risk Group 4 viruses, a system shall be set up for;
 - reporting accidents and exposures to microorganisms
 - monitoring employee absenteeism
 - the medical surveillance of illnesses that are potentially laboratory associated
- Annual medical assessment to determine fitness for work in encapsulated suit
- Compulsory First Aid training tailored to resuscitation in a PC4 environment



1 Purpose
This document describes the responsibility that PC2 staff have in reporting febrile illnesses and the responsibility that supervisors of PC2 staff have in following up on unexplained staff absences. Because of the high risk nature of the work performed at PC2, staff who become ill as a result of laboratory activities present a potential health risk to their family, the environment and the wider community. CSIRO has a responsibility to ensure that this risk is minimised and that processes and procedures are in place to minimise this risk.

2 Procedure
2.1 Illness surveillance cards.
Consistent with the recommendations of the WHO Biosafety Manual, all staff working at PC2 and PC4 at AARH will be issued with an illness surveillance card similar to the one in Appendix A below.

2.2 Febrile illnesses - Staff responsibilities
All staff performing work at PC2 whether in the laboratory or in the LAF have a responsibility to report febrile illnesses to their supervisor and the BSG.

All staff working in a PC2 environment at AARH have a responsibility to call their supervisor or the manager to report any unexplained absences from work - before 10 am on the day of the absence. This includes any absence for any reason (sick leave, etc.).

Staff who have had recent (21 days) and relevant PC4 laboratory or LAF exposure will be encouraged to seek medical advice for any febrile illness from their own General Practitioner (GP) or a GP recommended by AARH.

When visiting a GP for attention for an unexplained febrile illness staff are requested to present their illness surveillance card so that the GP has the contact number of an Infectious Disease physician on the AARH Medical Advisory Committee who is familiar with the nature of work being conducted at AARH.

The GP in consultation with a member of the Medical Advisory Committee will make an informed decision on whether additional follow-up pathways are recommended.

2.3 Unexplained absence - Supervisor responsibilities
Supervisors and direct line managers (whether CSIRO employees or not) need to be cognisant of the risk that PC2 staff with laboratory-associated absences present to themselves, their families and the wider community and understand that they have a duty of care to ensure that all unexplained staff absences are followed up immediately.

Appropriate follow-up can include talking with work colleagues to determine whether the staff members had indicated that they would be late or absent from work. It may include calling the absent staff members home or someone who is responsible for their family or emergency contact numbers. These contact numbers can be obtained from CSIRO HR where necessary, although supervisors are encouraged to compile a list of all relevant staff contacts.

End of procedure

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End of procedure

Medical Surveillance

- Staff advised to report any PUO and seek medical advice
- Staff must report to supervisor when absent from work
- Supervisors have an obligation to establish contact with any subordinate staff that does not report for work or call in



Any Questions?



Personal Exposure Monitoring


Personal
Exposure
Monitoring



Thank you

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Intra- and Inter-laboratory transport

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Intra-laboratory transport - background

- The United Nations issues the “UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods”.
- These form the basis of most national and international
 - International Civil Aviation Organization**
 - International Maritime Organization**
- These regulations cover all forms of dangerous goods, chemical,



CSIRO Intra and Inter-laboratory transport



Intra-laboratory transport - background



- The UN *Guidance on regulations for the Transport of Infectious Substances, 2013–2014**
- The Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air published by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are the legally binding international regulations
- The ICAO rules apply on all international flights.
- Within country national legislation applies. This is normally based on the ICAO provisions.
- The International Air Transport Association or IATA produce the IATA Dangerous Goods

*The UN *Guidance on regulations for the Transport of Infectious Substances, 2013–2014* is included on your USB

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Intra-laboratory transport



Infectious substances are defined as; *substances which are known or are reasonably expected to contain pathogens;*

- Cultures;** the result of a process by which pathogens are intentionally propagated
- Patient specimens;** collected directly from humans or animals, including, but not limited to, excreta, secretions, blood and its components, tissue and tissue fluid swabs
- Biological products;** used either for prevention, treatment, or diagnosis of disease in humans or animals, (eg vaccines)
- Genetically Modified Organisms;** Genetically modified microorganisms not meeting the definition of infectious

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Category A Dangerous Goods

An infectious substance which is capable of causing permanent disability, life-threatening or fatal disease in otherwise healthy humans or animals.

- **UN2814: INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE, AFFECTING HUMANS (cause disease in humans or both in humans and animals)**
- **UN2900: INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE, AFFECTING ANIMALS (cause disease only in animals)**

Assignment based on ... professional judgement concerning individual circumstances of the source human or animal



CSIRO Intra and Inter-laboratory transport



Category B Dangerous Goods

An infectious substance which does not meet the criteria for inclusion in Category

- **UN3373: “BIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE, CATEGORY B”**

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Dangerous goods - Exemptions

- *Substances that do not contain infectious substances or that are unlikely to cause disease in humans or animals*
- *Substances containing microorganisms that are non-pathogenic to humans or animals (RG-1)*
- *Substances in a form that any present pathogens have been neutralized or inactivated such that they no longer pose a health risk*

..... unless they meet the criteria for inclusion in another class
Depending on quantity fixatives may be classed as hazardous

Packing Instructions

Different packing instructions depending upon class;

- **Class A infectious substances** (UN2814 /UN 2900)
– Packing Instructions 620
- **Class B infectious substances** (UN3373)
-


Packing Instructions 620

Packaging must meet UN Class 6.2 specifications;

The primary receptacle or the secondary packaging shall be capable of withstanding a pressure differential of not less than 95 kPa*


Combined packaging must pass;

- 9-metre drop test,
- puncture test,
- pressure test and
-





Packing Instructions 620

- Primary container (withstand pressure diff of >95 kPa)
- Wrapped in absorbent material (sufficient for packaged contents)
- Packed in watertight secondary container which includes label with itemised list of contents




Packing Instructions 620

- For surface transport there is no maximum quantity per package
- For Air transport;
50 mL /50 g for passenger aircraft
4 litres/4 kg for cargo aircraft
- If any receptacle with a capacity for more than 50 mL shall be orientated in the outer packaging so that the closures are upward.
- Orientation labels (“UP”) shall be fitted to two opposite sides of out packaging.



Packing Instruction 620 - Labelling


1. the shipper's (sender's, consignor's) name and address
2. **the telephone number** of a responsible person, knowledgeable about the shipment
3. the receiver's (consignee's) name and address
4. the United Nations number followed by the proper shipping name (UN 2814 "INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE, AFFECTING HUMANS" or UN 2900 "INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE, AFFECTING ANIMALS only", as appropriate)




Technical names need not be shown on the

Packing Instruction 620 - Labelling

- The outer packaging shall bear the UN packaging specification marking which indicates that the packaging has passed the performance tests to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
- temperature storage requirements (optional)
- when dry ice or liquid nitrogen is used: the technical name of the refrigerant, the appropriate UN number, and the net quantity.



Packing Instruction 620



Shippers Declaration

- Virtually the same information that is included on outer packaging is included in declaration
- For the purposes of documentation, the proper shipping name shall be supplemented with the technical name.
- Must designate if it is suitable for cargo and passenger as well as whether the material is radioactive


WARNING

Users are advised to fill in details with the applicable Dangerous Goods Regulations for the Airworthiness of the aircraft in the context of their operations.

UN No.	Proper Shipping Name	Technical Name	Quantity	Weight	Volume	ADR	ADR
UN 1845	Dry Ice	Carbon Dioxide	2	2	0	0	0


Packing Instruction 650

- Triple packaging still applies
- For surface transport there is no maximum quantity per package
- For air transport:
 - no primary receptacle shall exceed 1 litre
 - outer packaging must not contain >4 litres (for liquids)
 - except for packages containing body parts, organs or whole bodies, the outer packaging must not contain more than 4




Packing Instruction 650 – labelling

- Each package shall display the following information:
 - for air: the shipper's (sender's, consignor's) name, address and telephone number
 - for air: the telephone number of a responsible person, knowledgeable about the shipment
 - the receiver's (consignee's) name, address and telephone number
 - the proper shipping name ("BIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE, CATEGORY B") adjacent to the diamond-shaped mark
 - temperature



Packing Instruction 650 – labelling


- when dry ice or cryogenic liquids are used as refrigerant then appropriate label affixed
- Dangerous goods documentation (including a shipper's declaration) is not required
- International shipments require:
 - a packing list/proforma invoice that includes the shipper's and the receiver's address, the number of packages, detail of contents, weight, value (eg no commercial value)
 - an import and/or export permit and/or



Intra-laboratory transport

Labelled, leak-proof and impact resistant secondary containers should be used to move infectious material between containment zones in the same building to prevent a spill or leak if a container is dropped.

- Within laboratory between BSC and incubator
- Between BSC or incubator to inverted microscope
- Between rooms within a containment zone
-



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Intra-laboratory transport

Many companies sell them “specimen transport containers” or



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Secondary containers don't have to be expensive



CSIRO: Intra and inter-laboratory transport



Questions



CSIRO: Intra and inter-laboratory transport



Thank you

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Standard precautions and sharps safety

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Standard Precautions

Standard precautions

- Concept of *Universal Precautions* was introduced in mid 1980's as the medical community grappled with the emergence of AIDs and rising incidence of Hepatitis in medical personnel.
- Essentially, they were good hygiene habits, such as hand washing and the use of gloves and other PPE, correct handling of hypodermic needles and scalpels, and aseptic techniques.
- Bodily fluids (and patients) were to be treated as though they



<http://www.sarantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/HIV->

“Precautions to protect against exposure must be taken when there is any potential for exposure to bodily fluids. It is assumed that all bodily fluids have the potential to transmit disease”

The Universal Precaution Rule:

Treat all human blood, bodily fluids and other potentially infectious materials

STANDARD PRECAUTIONS

A simple, consistent and effective approach to infection control



Minimise contact with blood and body substances by utilising safe work practices and protective barriers.

STANDARD PRECAUTIONS APPLY TO ALL PATIENTS



Standard precautions

- Although it is a medical term and a ‘medical approach’ the principals are equally applicable to work involving animals
- Just because you don’t know that it is infected doesn’t mean it isn’t
 - Hendra
 - Nipah
 - Rabies
 - Leptospirosis
 - Ebola
 - SARS
 - Japanese Encephalitis
 - MERS
 - Marburg
 - Hantavirus



Personal protective equipment (PPE)

ASSESS THE RISK of exposure to infectious material or contaminated surfaces BEFORE any laboratory, animal or field-based activity.

Select PPE based on the assessment of risk:

- Clean non-sterile gloves
- Clean, non-sterile gown (front covering, long sleeved)
- Mask and eye protection or a face shield

Make this a routine!



Personal protective equipment (PPE)

- Whenever you may be exposed to infectious materials you must wear the appropriate PPE.
- PPE places a barrier between you and potentially infectious

Here are some basic rules to follow:



- Always wear PPE in exposure situations - wear a lab gown, gloves and eye protection whenever splashing is a possibility
- Remove and replace PPE that loses its ability to function as a barrier to potentially infectious materials
- Remove PPE before leaving the work area
- Dispose of contaminated PPE properly-

PPE - Gloves

- Wear when working in the laboratory, in the field or dealing with animals.
- Change between tasks and procedures after contact with potentially infectious material.
- Remove after use, before touching non-contaminated items and surfaces.
- Perform hand hygiene immediately after removal

More later in PPE training session!



Facial Protection (eyes, nose and mouth)

During activities that are likely to generate splashes or sprays of infectious or potentially infectious material (or chemicals).

Wear either;

- (1) a surgical or procedure mask and eye protection (eye visor, safety glasses or goggles)

or

- (2) a face shield to protect mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, and mouth

More later in PPE and respiratory protection training sessions!



Gown

- Wear to protect skin and prevent contamination of clothing during activities that are likely to generate splashes or sprays of infectious or potentially infectious material
- Remove soiled gown before leaving laboratory, and perform hand hygiene.
-

More later in PPE training session!



Hand hygiene: When ?

- Before and after any direct contact with animals or infectious or potentially infectious material, whether or not gloves are worn.
- Immediately after gloves are removed.
- After touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions and contaminated items, even if gloves are worn.
- After contact with inanimate objects in the




Hand Hygiene

Summary technique:

- Hand washing (40–60 sec): wet hands and apply soap; rub all surfaces; rinse hands and dry thoroughly with a single use towel; use towel to turn off faucet.
- Hand rubbing (20–30 sec): apply enough product to cover all



Hand Hygiene: Hand wash



Hand Hygiene: Hand wash




WASH HANDS WHEN VISIBLY SOILED! OTHERWISE, USE HANDRUB

- ⌚ Duration of the handwash (steps 2-7): 15-20 seconds
- ⌚ Duration of the entire procedure: 40-60 seconds

It is a requirement in Australia for all soap dispensers and handwash basins to be hands-

Hand Hygiene: Hand rub



Hand Hygiene: Hand rub




⌚ Duration of the entire procedure: 20-30 seconds

It is a requirement in Australia for all hand rub dispensers to be hands-

Laboratory cleaning

- Use adequate procedures for the routine cleaning and disinfection of laboratory work areas including benches, shelves and equipment.
- Work areas should be decontaminated at conclusion of work, when going for a break and at the end of the day
- The area should be left safe – remember the support staff and



Waste disposal

- Ensure safe waste management.
- Don't overfill waste receptacles
- Place in appropriate waste containers (ie autoclave bags)
- Place sharps in sharps container not in autoclave bags
- Not everything can be autoclaved (batteries, light bulbs, aerosol cans)
- Discard single use items



Sharps Safety


The problem

- In the US¹ there are approximately 385,000 needle sticks and other sharps-related injuries among healthcare personnel annually. 46% incurred by nurses.
- WHO² estimates there are;
 - 16,000 HCV infections and 142 deaths each year due directly to sharp injuries among healthcare workers
 - 66,000 HBV infections and 261 deaths annually
 - 1000 HIV infections leading to 735 deaths over the next

1. <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topsticks/sharpsinjuries.html>
 2. Pruss-Ustun, A, Rapai, E and Hutin, Y. Sharps Injuries: Global burden of disease from sharps injuries to health

The problem


- Survey of Australian Veterinarians¹ indicated that 75.3 % suffered a sharps injury in previous 12 mths and 58.9% reported at least 1 contaminated sharps exposure (n=664).
- Of those reporting a sharps injury;
 - Syringes 63.7% of respondents
 - Suture needles 50.6% of respondents
 - Scalpel blades




1. Leggat PA, Smith DR and Speare R. (2009) Exposure rate of needlestick and sharps injuries among Australian Veterinarians.

Sharps injuries

- 56% hypodermic needles
- 20% Suture needles
- 8% Scalpels
-



Hypodermic injuries



Reduce Hypodermic injuries

- Minimise handling of sharps
- Do not remove or recap needles
- Use guards or safety devices
- Wear puncture resistant gloves
-



Reduce Hypodermic injuries

- Avoid using unless necessary or substitute where possible
- Dispose of syringe and needle as a unit
- Use appropriate sharps containers for discard
- Use Devices with Engineered Sharps Protection
- Do not overfill container




Safety Devices: Key Features

- Are integrated into the device
- Provide immediate protection after use and throughout disposal
- Few devices provide protection during use
-



Engineered Sharps protection isn't a panacea



Scalpels

Scalpel blade injuries 2000-2001

- 78% of injured was not the one holding the scalpel
- 41% occurred between uses (handing, disposal etc)
- 10% during disassembly of scalpel blades from reusable handles
- 68% reusable 32 % disposables
- 94% Hands (right 56%, Left 38%)
- 3% Arms
- 2 % Feet



Figure 5. Mechanism of Suture Needles and Scalpel Blades Injuries: Nurses vs. Physicians
EPINet, 9 hospitals, 2 years, cases = 449





Figure 4. Mechanism of Scalpel Blade Injuries
 EPI/Net, 9 hospitals, 2 years, cases = 271




How to reduce chances of injury with scalpel

- Hands-free transfer—never hand or receive a scalpel by hand
- Place it down on a tray and allow others to pick it up
-



How to reduce chances of injury with scalpel

- Disposable vs reusable
-



The only American company to offer a Safety Scalpel that is 510(k) cleared & meets the FDA injury and prevention guidance.

Spectra Medical Devices, Inc. Proudly Introduces:

Safe-Cut™ Safety Scalpel

- One-handed activation
- A top activation button
- One-handed use
- No visible needle; click and tactile sensation confirms lock is in place
- Color-coded ring for alert handles
- Bulk, non-toxic
- Packaged and Sterile

110, 111, 115



How to reduce chances of injury with scalpel

- Use one hand blade removal devices if not disposable
- Use puncture resistant glove—not cut resistant or
-



How to reduce chances of injury with scalpel

- Use cut resistant gloves – Kevlar
-



Scissors


How many of you have used scissors in the field or the laboratory?



Scissors – what's in a name?



Glass pipettes are dangerous



Some traps



Questions



Thank you

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PPE

Andrew Hill | Biocontainment Microbiologist
April 2015

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What is PPE?



2 | PPE | Andrew Hill

What is PPE?



3 | PPE | Andrew Hill

What is PPE?

Personal protective equipment (PPE) is anything used or worn by a person to minimise risk to the person's health or safety and includes a wide range of clothing and safety equipment. PPE includes boots, face masks, hard hats, ear plugs, respirators, gloves, safety harnesses, high visibility clothing etc.

PPE for risk mitigation

- E - eliminate
- R - reduce
- I - isolate
- C - control
- P **personal protective equipment**
- D - discipline

Why almost last?

- Only protects the wearer
- User dependant
- Often not made to measure
- Ergonomically less than ideal
- Various reasons for failure in protection
 - Poor fit
 - Improper implementation
 - Casual use
 - Not used
 - Poor maintenance
 - Wrong product

PPE | Andrew Hill



5 | PPE | Andrew Hill



6 | PPE | Andrew Hill



We use PPE

- when there are no other practical control measures available (as a last resort)
- as an interim measure until a more effective way of controlling the risk can be used, or
- to supplement higher level control measures (as a back-up).



Implementing PPE

- Appropriate
- Compliance with standards
- Ergonomic
- Fit test
- Training
- If used together – compatible
- Demonstrable benefit
- Monitoring of use
- Storage
- Maintenance
- Change of process = re-evaluate PPE




Limitations

- Know the limitations
 - Laboratory clothing exercise
- Decontamination or Disposal
 - Discussion of various RPE options
- Application and Removal
 - Donning and doffing of gown and gloves
- Protection vs Challenge




Dexterity and Containment Systems



Spot the obvious mistake



Perfect!



Thank you

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Primary containment and BSCs

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April 2015

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What is Primary Containment?

The first barrier between the pathogen and the operator or environment

Specific boxes, containers or vials

Something which isolates the pathogen to a defined space

A BSC

A maximum containment suited laboratory



2 | Primary Containment and BSCs | Andrew Hill

What don't we mean?




- Suits
- PPE
- Other tubes \ containers without biological seals
 - Standard Eppendorf tubes
 - Universal bottles without 'O'ring
 - Sandwich boxes
- Disinfection



3 | Primary Containment and BSCs | Andrew Hill

Primary Containment - Control at Source

- Where practicable maintain a physical barrier
- In the absence of a physical barrier other methods such as air movement.
- Filters can form part of the primary barrier
- Control in this way minimises and defines the potentially contaminated area



4 | Primary Containment and BSCs | Andrew Hill



Problems with primary containment

- You can't put everything in a box
- Limited equipment available
- Expensive to implement
- Limits dexterity of operator



5 | Primary Containment and BSCs | Andrew Hill



Biological Safety Cabinets

Various equipment described as :

- BSCs
- MSCs
- (Virus) Hood
- Laminar flow
- Clean Workstation
- Clean Bench

Equipment described using these terms may not be appropriate for infectious work.

6 | Primary Containment and BSCs | Andrew Hill




Biological Safety Cabinets cont'd.

(Micro)biological Safety Cabinets come in three types Class I, II & III


However:

- Class II has international subtypes including A1, A2, B1, B2
- Class II type Cytotoxic
- Class I / III hybrid
- Class III +/- Passbox
- All sorts of duct configurations

Microbiological agent: Hazard / Risk Group vs Cabinet Class:
Misconception over Class of BSC and hazard group of organism



Biological Safety Cabinets - Class I



- Purpose: Operator Protection
- Inward air flow with total exhaust
 - Aperture velocity $0.5 - 1 \text{ ms}^{-1}$
 - Standards differ by country
- Operator Protection Factor $>10^5$



Class I - Basic function



Class I - Operator Interaction




Class I - Equipment Considerations



Biological Safety Cabinets - Class II

- Purpose: Product & Operator Protection
- Recirculation and Inward air flow with partial exhaust
 - Most common 70% exhaust
- Recirculated air provides laminar air curtain
- Operator Protection Factor 10^5



- HEPA Filtered Air
- Contaminated Worksurface Air
- Contaminated Room Air



Biological Safety Cabinets - Class II

Origin and Standard	Designation	Inflow	Exhaust options	Recirculate air from work area?
EU/UK BS 5726 BS EN 12469		≥0.4m/s	Recirc. to lab Canopy Hard Duct*	Yes
USA NSF49	A1 (A)	>0.38m/s	Canopy	Yes
USA NSF49	A2 (B3)	>0.51m/s	Canopy	Yes
USA NSF49	B1	>0.51m/s	Hard Duct	Yes
USA NSF49	B2	>0.51m/s	Hard Duct	No
Australia AS 1807.22		>0.4m/s <0.45m/s	Recirc. To lab Canopy	Yes

Standards will often default the performance specifications to 'Manufacturers Stated Values'. This does not mean they are effective.

- *With anti blow back protection



Class II – Basic function




Class II – Operator interaction



Biological Safety Cabinets - Class III

- Purpose: Operator Protection, Inherent Product Protection
- Sealed envelope
 - Gauntlet (glove) port access
 - With or without pass-box
- HEPA Filtered inward air flow with total exhaust
- Operator Protection Factor >10⁶
- Aperture velocity at glove breach >0.7ms⁻¹ (~ 6 ms⁻¹)



Class III – Smoke clearance



Laminar flow – Clean workstations etc.

- PCR Hoods



- Cleanroom benches



Fume hoods/cupboards/powder stations




Incidents and failures - BSCs


- Whatever happens - Don't panic!
- **Spills**
 - Clean up small ones as you go
 - Large spills require thought - stop work
- **Failure of BSC or power to BSC**
 - Learn 'normal operation' cycle of cabinet
 - Minimise aerosol production
 - Make safe as best as possible and stop work
 - Withdraw from cabinet and remove PPE



Dexterity and Containment Systems



Laboratory equipment - Centrifuge



Laboratory equipment - Incubators

- CO₂ etc.
- Tissue culture
- Solid media
- Liquid media
- Eggs



Laboratory equipment - Cold Storage

- Maintenance of the barrier
 - Failure & dropping
- Appropriate vessels
 - Flasks
 - Tubes
 - Secondary containment?
 - Sample integrity vs LN safety
 - Inside or outside threads



Thank you

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Safe Centrifuge Operation

Greg Smith | Microbiological Security Manager

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Overview

Introduction to centrifuges

Hazards

Rotor care

Safe centrifuge operation

Rotor failure

CSIRO Safe Centrifuge Operation



Introduction

Three general classes of centrifuge:

- Low speed (< 6000 rpm)
- High speed (max. 30,000 rpm)



CSIRO Safe Centrifuge Operation



Hazards – OHS/HSE considerations

- Sample leaks (aerosols, contamination)
- Sample imbalance
- Stress failure of component parts
- Contact with rotating parts
- Mechanical failure of rotating parts
-



CSIRO Safe Centrifuge Operation



Hazards – OHS/HSE considerations

Operating centrifuges can expose users to several dangers:

Physical

- Rotors can be HEAVY – lift and fit with care.
- Contact with rotating parts

Biological

-

CSIRO Safe Centrifuge Operation



Centrifugation is a high risk activity

- Centrifugation of pathogens carries a very high risk of infectious aerosol production and release!
- Aerosols are created when fluid escapes from the sample container, rotor or centrifuge while the centrifuge is in operation.
- This may occur when spinning uncapped samples, or when a leak, spill, or breakage of the tube occurs.
- Spills can occur during loading/unloading and sample



CSIRO Safe Centrifuge Operation



Hazards – Rotor stress


Parameters that Determine Rotor Stresses

- Rotor Speed
- Rotor Geometry
- Rotor Weight
- Sample Weight
-




EVEN LOW SPEED ROTORS CAN BE HIGHLY STRESSED

Hazards – Rotor stress: Corrosion



Hazards – Rotor stress: Corrosion

Cumulative effect of tensile load and a corrosive environment can result in a significantly reduced service life of the metal.



Rotor care

Wash rotors and buckets


- Do not allow corrosive materials to dry on rotor.
 - ✓ Wash rotor and components immediately if salts or other corrosive agents are used or if a spill has occurred.
 - ✓ Wash with approved detergent ('Solution 555*'), warm water and nylon brush when necessary.



Rotor care


Wash rotors and buckets

- Use plastic or wooden tools to remove O-rings or gaskets for cleaning—do not use metal tools that could scratch anodized surfaces.
- Use a mild detergent such as Beckman Solution 555 diluted 10 to 1 with water, and a soft brush to wash rotors and rotor components and accessories (*Most laboratory detergents are too harsh for aluminium rotors and components*)
- Rinse thoroughly with water
- Air-dry the body or buckets upside down



Rotor care – cleaning and storage

- Do not wash rotor components or accessories in a dishwasher. Do not soak in detergent solution for long periods, such as overnight.
- Do not immerse or spray a swinging-bucket rotor body with water because liquid can become trapped in the hanger mechanism and lead to



Rotor care – cleaning and storage

- Keep rotors clean and dry.
- Store fixed-angle rotors upside down with lids and inserts removed.
- Store swing-
- Do not expose aluminium rotors to:
 - Strong acids or bases
 - Alkaline detergents
 - Salts of heavy metals




Rotor care – maintenance

Examine rotor, lid and O-rings

Wipe clean the O-rings or gaskets regularly (lubricate after cleaning).

- Replace them about twice a year or as required




Preparing to perform a centrifuge run

Only trained persons should operate a centrifuge.

Wear appropriate PPE:

- GOWN
- GLOVES
- SAFETY GLASSES
-




Safe centrifuge operation



Examine rotor, lid and O-rings (each run)

- Check and lubricate O-rings with silicon vacuum grease (Beckman). Ensure they are attached properly.
- Lubricate threads with Spincote (Beckman) if required.
- Inspect rotor and lid for rough spots, scratches and signs of



Safe centrifuge operation



Examine rotor, lid and O-rings


- Frequently clean all surfaces that contact O-rings.
- Regularly clean the threads of the rotor (lid, handle, buckets, cavities, and so on) with a nonmetal brush and a small amount of concentrated detergent, then rinse, and dry thoroughly.
- Lubricate the threads (*Spincote for Beckman*)



Safe centrifuge operation

Pre-run Safety Check

- Make sure the ultra- rotor is equipped with overspeed disc
- If disk is missing replace it
- Check the chemical compatibilities of all materials used
- Verify that tubes, bottles, and accessories being used are




Safe centrifuge operation



Examine tubes

- Discard any tubes that are discoloured, crazed or cracked
- Crazing —is the result of stress relaxation. If a crack approaches the outer wall of the tube or bottle, discard it
- Properly stored have an indefinite shelf life if.
- Store in a dark, cool, dry place away from ozone, chemical fumes, and




Safe centrifuge operation - Balancing

Ensure that the load is balanced

- A difference of 0.5 grams at 500,000 x g is equivalent to a 250 kg difference.


1. Balance tubes by eye, seal lid, decontaminate and dry outer surface. Remove from BSC
2. Measure difference in weight on balance
3. Return to BSC and add require volume to adjust balance (ie 1 gm=1mL)
- 4.



Safe centrifuge operation

Fill levels

- Do not overfill tube — fill levels depend on the angle of the fixed angle rotor.
- Check manufactures recommendations for maximum fill





Safe centrifuge operation - Balancing



Ensure that the load is balanced

Balancing a fixed angle rotor for 2, 3, 4 or 6 sample containers

Balancing a swing out rotor




Safe centrifuge operation - Balancing

Isopycnic gradient

1. Accurately balance gradients (sucrose or other) on the bench without sample.
2. Transfer to BSC and layer equal amounts (volume) of sample on top. Seal, decontaminate and dry* surfaces.
- 3.

*It is essential that all traces of disinfectant are removed from the tube and the tubes are dry before loading into rotor buckets.

Moisture can result in: 1) Collapse of tube or 2) difficulty in removing tube



Safe centrifuge operation - Balancing

Swinging Bucket - ultracentrifugation

- Match numbered caps with numbered buckets.
- Screw the caps into the bucket until there is metal-to-metal contact.
- Tighten flat caps with a screwdriver.
- Attach all buckets, loaded or empty, to the rotor in corresponding numbered location.
- Loaded buckets must be arranged symmetrically
- Opposing tubes must be filled to the same level with liquid of the



Rotor failure – when things go wrong. . . .

USER ERROR IS THE BIGGEST CAUSE OF CENTRIFUGE MALFUNCTION.



- Failure to place lid on rotor
- Failure to secure rotor lid
- Failure to secure rotor to drive
- Overload of rotor's max. mass
- Running swing-out rotor with missing buckets
- Swing-out buckets hooked incorrectly
- Improper balance of tubes
- Use of tubes not rated for high speeds



Rotor decontamination & sterilisation


- Labware contaminated with radioactive or pathogenic solutions should be decontaminated or disposed of following appropriate safety guidelines and/or regulations.
- Select a disinfectant that will not damage the tube or bottle material.
- Most ultracentrifuge bottles and rotors are resistant to:
 - 70% Alcohol allow >1 hour
 - Autoclaving at 121°

Questions



Thank you

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Aerosols, respiratory protection and fit testing

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
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Laboratory Acquired infections

Source	Clinically apparent cases 1849 to 1974
Accident	702
Animal or ectoparasite	659
Clinical Specimen	286
Discarded glassware	47
Human autopsy	74
Intentional infection	19
Aerosol	522
Work with Agent	827
Other	16
Unknown	769
TOTAL	3921



(31 LAIs/ year)

K.M. Pike, Laboratory-acquired infections: incidence, fatalities, causes, and prevention. *Ann Rev Microbiol* 23 (1973), pp. 41-66

CSIRO, Respiratory Protection and Fit Testing

Importance of Aerosols

82% of laboratory infections were not due to a known accident such as inoculations, ingestion, splashing, wound injuries. (Pike 1976)

Most LAIs are presumed to be caused by aerosols.

*This may be an over estimate!



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Aerosols

The probability of producing infectious aerosols increases with the titre of the material being handled.

Aerosols can also originate from dry material such as animal bedding, dried spilt material, bacterial cultures on a plate,



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Where do aerosols come from?




Figure 2 Aerosol generated from centrifuge accident (●), Andersen: $y = x^{0.92}/5828$, $r^2 = 0.989$; ▼, Cyclone: $y = x^{0.91}/4169$, $r^2 = 0.975$.

A direct relationship was found between titre and aerosol concentration. The lower the titre the less likely is that significant aerosol exposure will occur

Bennett A, Parks S (2006). *Microbial aerosol generation during laboratory accidents and subsequent risk assessment*. *J Appl Microbiol* 100(4): 658.

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Where do aerosols come from?

Accident (10 ⁹ spore/ml suspension)	Aerosol Generated (cfu/m ³)	CONTROL
Centrifuge Rotor Leak*	2.30 x 10 ⁴	SEALED ROTOR
Flask Breaks in Shaking Incubator*	1.15 x 10 ³	USE PLASTICWARE
Dropping Large 2l Bottle*	1.37 x 10 ⁴	USE PLASTICWARE
15ml Spill from 1m*	2.07 x 10 ³	WORK IN CABINET

A direct relationship was found between titre and aerosol concentration. The lower the titre the less likely is that significant aerosol exposure will occur

Bennett A, Parks S (2006). *Microbial aerosol generation during laboratory accidents and subsequent risk assessment*. *J Appl Microbiol* 100(4): 658.

CSIRO, Respiratory Protection and Fit Testing



Aerosols from Laboratory accidents

Accident	Casella CFU m ³	Anderson CFU m ³	Cyclone CFU m ³
Dropping Flask (250mL 0.75 m)	173	643	1.03 x10 ³
Syringe filter (10 mL)	3.7 x 10 ³	493	2.07x10 ³
Fungal Plate (4x plates <u>dropped</u>)*	>3.3 x 10 ³	1.34 x 10 ³	>1.56 x10 ³
Centrifuge bucket (unsealed)	150	64	142
Bacterial Plate (4x 3d old plate)*	26.7	3.6	8.2
15 mL spill from 900mm	387	493	2.07 x 10 ³

Tracer Suspension 2 x 10⁹ *B. atrophaeus* spores/mL
 * Doesn't have to be a liquid to create aerosol

Bennett A, Parks S (2006). *Microbial aerosol generation during laboratory accidents and subsequent risk assessment.* J Appl Microbiol 100(4):656-



How long do particles stay in the air?


Particle Size (µm)	Time aloft
20	1.5 min
10	8.3 min
5	35.7 min
2	2.8 hrs
1	12.0 hrs
0.5	41.7 hrs

Particle	Size (µm)
Pollen	20
<i>Clostridium sp</i>	5.0
<i>Bacillus anthracis</i>	1.118
<i>Brucella sp.</i>	0.566
<i>Coxiella burnetii</i>	0.283
Hantavirus	0.096
Ebola	0.088
Parvovirus	0.022



Aerosols

- Particles can deposit in the nose, mouth, pharynx and larynx (the head airways region), deeper within the respiratory tract (from the trachea to the terminal bronchioles), or in the alveolar region.
- Where aerosol particles within the respiratory system strongly determines the health effects of exposure to such aerosols



Jones RM, Brosseau LM. Ebola virus transmission via contact and aerosol—a new paradigm. Centre for Infectious Disease Research Policy. <http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news/perspective/2014/11/commentary-ebola-virus-transmission-contact-and-aerosol-new>




Aerosols

Droplets >0.1 mm (>100 µm)
 --- they contaminate surfaces

Droplets 0.005 - 0.1 mm (5–100 µm)
 --- evaporate in 0.4 -1.7 seconds and infectious aerosols may remain airborne


Particles change size - lose 50% in 1 second due to evaporation



Aerosols 50-100 µm (Trapped in nasal mucosa)

Low energy input yields larger droplets >50 µm.

- Pipettes with no visible spill
- Careful pouring
- Opening lyophilised cultures
- Opening containers
- Centrifugation
- Infected animals




Laboratory acquired Infections, 4th edition Collins and Kennedy (1999), information adapted from Kenny and Sable (1968) and Stern et al



Aerosols < 5 µm penetrate the alveoli

High energy input yields smaller droplets <10 µm

- Vortex
- Automatic pipettors
- Harvesting or dropping infected eggs
- Shaking machines
- Dropping culture plates
- Pipette spills
- Infected animals




Laboratory Acquired Infections, 4th Edition Collins and Kennedy (1999), information adapted from Kenny and Sable (1968) and Stern et al



Droplet vs Airborne

Short vs Long (1-2 metres vs >2 metres)

Surgical mask vs N95 Masks



Droplet transmission

- A form of contact transmission in which respiratory droplets carrying infectious pathogens transmit infection when they travel directly from the respiratory tract of the infectious individual to susceptible mucosal surfaces (nasal mucosa, conjunctivae, and less frequently, the mouth) of a recipient; "generally over short distances, necessitating facial protection"
 - 1 metre rule (social distancing) now extended to 2 metres
 - Influenza is considered to be droplet spread
 - Surgical mask recommended
- SARS, Influenza, Rubella, meningococcal



Aerosol transmission

- The dissemination of either airborne droplet nuclei or small particles in the respirable size range containing infectious agents that remain infective over time and distance.
- May be dispersed over long distances by air currents and may be inhaled by susceptible individuals who have not had face-to-face contact with the infectious individual
- **N95 (P2) mask or higher is recommended**



N95 has passed US test



We don't know what we don't know

- The association of droplet exposure with infection is confounded by inhalation exposure
- Close contact with infectious people permits droplet exposure but also maximizes inhalation exposure.
- It is incorrect to conclude that because long-range transmission of infection is not observed, a pathogen is transmitted only by the droplet route.
- Given a choice, particularly when dealing with unknowns I would

We don't know what we don't know

COMMENTARY: Ebola virus transmission via contact and aerosol — a new paradigm

Filed Under: Ebola, Healthcare-Associated Infections, VHF
 Rachael M Jones, PhD, and Lisa M Brosseau, ScD | Nov 18, 2014 | Share | Tweet | LinkedIn | Email | Print & PDF

Editor's note: Today's commentary was submitted to CIDRAP by the authors, who are national experts on respiratory protection and infectious disease transmission. In September they published a commentary on optimal respiratory protection for Ebola, and in May they published a similar



- Influenza and rhinovirus and gastrointestinal viruses (norovirus and rotavirus) may be transmitted by small-particle aerosols, despite their primary classification as droplet- and contact-

Respiratory protection - face masks



How many have used respiratory protection?



Which respirator?

- P1: Mechanically generated particles
- P2: Mechanically & thermally generated particles (RG2 & RG3 agents)
- P3: For all particulates - top level protection (RG2 & RG3 agents)



Which respirator?

$$\text{Protection factor (PF)} = \frac{\text{Conc. of hazards outside hood}}{\text{Conc. Of hazards inside hood}} = \frac{20}{2} = 10$$

Minimum (or assigned) protection factor (MPF / APF) =
Level of protection a device is expected to deliver 95% of the time –

A device with an APF of 10 can be used where the conc. of Hazard is

Assigned Protection Factors

MPF*	Respirator type	Comment
10	Half-facepiece (P2 or N95)	Respirator needs to be fit tested to the individual
50	Powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) with half-facepiece	Devices covering half-face provide lower levels of protection
50	Full-facepiece respirator with P3 or HEPA filter	Respirator needs to be fit tested to the individual
100	PAPR with P3 or HEPA filter and head-covering hood	Considered to provide high protection. Fit testing to the individual not required
10 000	Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with positive pressure demand	Not practical for most microbiological applications

* Minimum protection factor that could be assigned to the respirator type

Respirator Rules

- Respirators should not be touched while being worn
- Respirators should be changed when they become moist
- Respirators should never be reapplied after they have been removed
- Respirators should not be left dangling around the neck
- Hand hygiene should be performed upon touching or disposing of a used respirator
- Respirators should be removed outside the contaminated area and disposed of in a closed receptacle.
-

Factors that affect fit (and efficacy)

- Training
- Correct fitting procedure
- Dental work
- Repeated removal and refitting of mask
- Smiling and frowning
- Employee attitude
- Makeup on face
- Design of respirator - one make or size does not fit all!
-



Factors affecting face seal

- Beard or facial hair
- Shape or size of face
- Long hair
- Earrings
- Glasses/spectacles
- Facial markings – scars or moles
- Any of these can potentially impair the performance of P2 masks



The problem with hair

- Beards, side burns, moustaches – even stubble
- Long hair

Should have a policy that staff are clean shaven at the start of their shift

Particle	Size (μm)
Pollen	20
<i>Clostridium sp</i>	5.0
<i>Bacillus anthracis</i>	1.118
<i>Brucella sp.</i>	0.566
<i>Coxiella burnetii</i>	0.283
Hantavirus	0.096
Ebola	0.088
Parvovirus	0.022



Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Duckbill mask
-




Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Separate the mask edges
- Put a small bend in the nose wire
- Hold upside down and gently shake the straps



Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Separate the 2 headbands
- Ensure the nose piece is at the top of mask
-




Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Roll your thumbs up
-



Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Place chin into “cup” of mask
-



Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Release lower headband
- Release lower band from thumbs position under your ears
- Position other headband at back of



Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Ensure that mask is symmetrical on face and edges aren't folded
- Conform nose piece to your nose and across cheek bones
- Adjust



Donning the Mask – Kimberley-Clark N95

- Mask firmly positioned under chin
- Straps positioned at base of neck at back of



Fit Checking

- Inhale and exhale several times while wearing the mask
- Mask should collapse slightly on inhalation and expand slightly upon exhaling
- The wearer should not feel any air leaking around the mask with



3M™ 9320
Dust / Mist Respirator



Incorrect fit

Inappropriate fit may be identified by:

- Air leaking around mask
- Mask not expanding and collapsing
- Glasses or face shield/goggles fogging



Reposition mask

Repeat fit check



Popular Science



Doffing mask

- Never remove mask inside the contaminated environment
- Perform Hand hygiene
- Remove mask by the headbands only
- Perform Hand



Fit or seal check and must dos

- A fit check must be performed every time a mask is applied
- Ensures that you have achieved a good seal
- Never re-use a mask.
- Wet or damaged masks must be replaced immediately
- Always perform hand hygiene before application and after



Who needs Fit Testing?

- New starters or those using a respirator for the first time
-
- Fit testing is different to fit checking
- Guidance for fit testing contained in AS/NZ Standard 1715 or OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 Appendix A
- Two types of fit testing
 - Qualitative
 -



Comparison of qualitative and quantitative

Qualitative	Quantitative
Inexpensive (\$400 for 3M kit)	Expensive (\$18K)
Relies on subjective response	Objective measurement
Simple to use	Allows quick determination
Particle test (not gas or vapour)	Generates particles or measures existing
Not suitable for high Factor devices PF>100	Can test PF>100
Some people don't respond to reagents	Maintenance and calibration required



Performing Qualitative fit test

- Fit test kit (hood, collar, sensitivity solutions, 2 nebulizers, instructions)
- Private area away from distractions
- Washing facilities and drinking water
- Stopwatch
- Allow 20-30 minutes per person
- FT-10 Saccharin
- FT-30 Bitrex
- May need several – time to wash down & dry units between test



Performing Qualitative fit test



Questions



Patent Life-Saving Respirator.



JOHN TAYLOR & CO., Sole Agents,
Produce and Grocers, 111 Market Street, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.



Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR)

Greg Smith | Microbiological Security Manager
Training Course April 2015

AUSTRALIAN ANIMAL HEALTH LABORATORY
www.csiro.au

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PAPR Training Overview

This training covers:

- The need for PAPR's
- Typical Situations for Use
- Advantages of PAPR's
- PAPR Components
- Pre Use Checklist
- System Verification & Calibration
- PAPR Operation
-



This training is specifically focused on the 3M Jupiter PAPR



CSIRO - Powered Air Purifying Respirator Training

The Need for PAPR's

Powered Air Purifying Respirators are designed:

To provide respiratory protection for staff who may potentially be exposed to airborne microorganisms or toxic / noxious fumes and chemicals



CSIRO - Powered Air Purifying Respirator Training

Typical Use Situations

Typical use situations for PAPR's at AAHL include:

- Laboratory staff conducting activities outside of primary containment with respiratory pathogens
- Handling influenza infected eggs in a laboratory
- Investigating or cleaning up certain types of spills
-



PAPR's should be used anytime procedures demand so or when a risk assessment dictates use

CSIRO - Powered Air Purifying Respirator Training



Advantages of PAPR Use

Using PAPR's offers certain advantages including:

- No fit test required (one size fits all)
- Cooler to work in due to air movement
- Provides full face protection
- Glasses can be worn easily
- Suitable for men with beards /facial hair
- Has a higher protection factor than most other forms of



CSIRO - Powered Air Purifying Respirator Training



Advantages of PAPR Use

PAPR has a higher protection factor than most other forms of respiratory protection

MPF*	Respirator type	Comment
10	Half-facepiece (P2 or N95)	Respirator needs to be fit tested to the individual
50	Powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) with half-facepiece	Devices covering half-face provide lower levels of protection
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* Minimum protection factor that could be assigned to the respirator type



[Table from AS/NZ 2243.3 Safety in laboratories: Part 3 Microbiological Safety and Containment]

CSIRO - Powered Air Purifying Respirator Training



PAPR Components

The following components make up the full PAPR unit:

- Battery & Battery Charger



- Calibration Tube (Black Ball)



PAPR Components (continued)

- Backpack and Belt



- Filters



PAPR Filters

-

No P3 – No Use
Both filters of same type
Both Filters changed at same time



Replace after 3



Replace after 12 months

Remember to
remove seal
before use



Pre Use Checklist

must be carried out:



- Check unit is complete & no visible faults including hood
- Inspect the hose / head piece / hood for damage
- Check filters replace if out of date or not sure
- Insert charged battery
- Undertake system verification check to ensure sufficient airflow



Pre Use Checklist - System Verification Check

To ensure sufficient airflow:

- Attach the filters
- Disconnect the air hose
- Insert the air flow indicator tube
- Turn the unit on




Note: If the ball indicates insufficient airflow this may mean low battery charge or clogged filters. The unit will need calibration if the battery and filters are functioning correctly

Pre Use Checklist – Audible Alarm

The PAPR contains an audible warning alarm for low air flow.

To check it is functioning correctly:

- Cover the turbo outlet with your hand
-



Failure of system verification check

- If the unit fails the system verification check
- Check battery and replace with a fully charged battery
- Check filters age and condition (wet, damaged) and replace if necessary
- Repeat system verification check
- Calibrate the unit



Pre Use Checklist - Calibration


To calibrate the PAPR Unit

- Make sure unit has been running for 10 minutes
- Remove the filters
- Attach the calibration tube
- Press and hold in the on button for the entire calibration
-



Pre Use Checklist – Calibration (continued)

- The fan speed will increase and the ball will rise until a short beep
- The ball then falls to the bottom of the tube before slowly rising up the tube again as the motor speed increases
- When the ball moves above the pass mark on the tube release the on button to set the calibration point



PAPR Operation

- Once the unit has been checked, assembled and is functioning correctly:
- Put on the back pack unit and adjust strap to fit
- Put on all other protective clothing lab gown / gloves etc
-

Note: Placing the PAPR under protective clothing allows the gown to be removed easily prior to removing the PAPR which should be removed last



PAPR Storage

After use PAPR units and all components should be cleaned and stored:

- In the packaging provided
- In a dry and clean location
- Away from direct sunlight or high temperature sources
- Filters should be left on the units to protect the seals against mechanical damage
-



Note: Battery life is 8 hours. Recharging in line with manufacturers instructions; up to seven days but not

Dos and Don'ts

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure respirator is in good working order • Complete preflight check and ensure air flow is sufficient • Always fit identical filters • Always change both filters together at a frequency recommended by manufacturer • Always clean and store properly • Ensure other PPE is compatible | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Never use in oxygen deficient atmospheres • Never use particle-only filters against gas/vapour or vice versa • Never use if dirty, damaged or incomplete • Never use if providing insufficient air or alarm is activated • Never keep working if fan stops or the flow rate falls – leave work area immediately |
|---|---|

PAPR Training - Questions



More details can be obtained from 3M or from AS/NZ Standard 1715:2009 Selection, use and Maintenance of



Thank you

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Responding to Incidents and Spills

Greg Smith | Microbiological Security Manager
April 2015

AUSTRALIAN ANIMAL HEALTH LABORATORY
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Biosafety: Microbiological Incident

A microbiological incident is an occasion when an accident or failure releases or has the potential to release microbiological material



CSIRO: Responding to Incidents and Spills

Incident Response: Needle Stick, cut or bite

- Decontaminate glove before removing
- *if soap and water is unavailable use alcohol hand wash or 80% alcohol solution*
- If needle stick promote bleeding but do not squeeze or cause additional trauma
- If cut- apply clean dressing and apply pressure to limit blood loss
- Inform an appropriate person (e.g. supervisor or Biosafety officer) as soon as possible after the exposure so assessment and follow-

CSIRO: Responding to Incidents and Spills

Incident Response: Splashes

- Irrigate mucous membranes or eyes (remove contact lenses) with water or normal saline
- If eyes are contaminated, rinse while they are open, gently but thoroughly (for at least 30 seconds) with water or normal saline
- If blood or body fluids get in the mouth, spit them out and then rinse the mouth with water several times
- If skin is contaminated but no injury wash thoroughly with soap and water
- If clothing is contaminated, remove clothing and shower if necessary
-



CSIRO: Responding to Incidents and Spills



Incident Response: Spills

Your reaction to a spill will vary as to the nature of the incident:

- The Biosecurity Level of the agent
- The location of the incident



CSIRO: Responding to Incidents and Spills



RESPOND to Spill

RESPOND

- ✓R
- ✓E
- ✓S
- ✓P
- ✓O
- ✓N
- ✓D



CSIRO: Responding to Incidents and Spills



Remove contaminated clothing

RESPOND

Remove gloves and lab gown

Remove shoes if wet



Exit area

RESPOND

- Exit area as quickly as possible, warning others
-



Stop others entering

RESPOND

- Use signage on door to restrict access (Administrative control)
- Inform staff in suite of spill & restricted access
-



Phone Biosafety Office

RESPOND

Phone Biosafety
Office or Supervisor



Discuss incident and approach

Organise Clean up

RESPOND

- Speak with the Biosafety officer or supervisor for advice or assistance to clean up spill
- Gather material, disinfectants, mops, absorbent material & PPE and prepare for clean up
- PPE should be appropriate to risk and transmissibility of organism
 - Gloves ✓
 - Safety glasses / PAPR?
 - Gown or Tyvek?
 -



No rush

RESPOND


30 Minutes



- Take your time & consider your approach
- Allow time (at least 30 minutes) for infectious aerosols to 'settle'
- Directional air flow will remove aerosols via HEPA filter (Most BSL3/PC3 labs have between 14-20 air changes per hr)
-

Decontaminate area

RESPOND



- Clean up under the direction of the biosafety officer or supervisor.
- Use good technique and equipment, possibly with help from the "spills team"
- Prepare room for gaseous formaldehyde decontamination if determined necessary by



Disinfectants

- Choose a disinfectant that is appropriate for the organism associated with the spill and the volume and nature of material involved
- Consider material compatibility
- Make up fresh - where applicable (eg



Disinfectants

- 70% Alcohol is not suitable as a disinfectant for spills clean up and should not be used for anything other than cleaning, skin disinfection or laboratory surfaces that have been previously disinfected with a more appropriate disinfectant.
- 70% Alcohol can be used for cleaning the surface of an already cleaned BSC or work bench prior to commencing work
- 70% Alcohol refers to either 70% v/v Isopropanol in water or 80%



Clean up: a spill outside of BSC

- Approach from a clean area.
- Clean as you go – make a clean path to the spill
- Be on the look out for the unexpected (fragments of broken bottles travel surprising distances).
- Consider other hazards e.g.

- radiochemical
-



Clean up: a spill outside of BSC

- Do not create further aerosols by vigorous mopping or pouring disinfectant directly onto the spilt material
- Cover spilt material with a disinfectant soaked towel (paper or cloth)
- Add further disinfectant to the spill working from the outside in
- Allow the disinfectant to act for at least 10 minutes

10 Minutes



Clean up: a spill outside of BSC

- Remove waste to biohazard bags and tote boxes.
- Report finding to the MSM and your supervisor.
- Tell others about your experiences and how to avoid similar



Clean up: small spill inside a BSC

10 Minutes




- Leave BSC running
- Small spills (<1 mL) should be immediately wiped up using disinfectant-soaked paper towel or other absorbent or flooding area with disinfectant
- Allow the disinfectant to act (for at least 10 minutes) before discarding waste into an autoclave bag for disposal.
- Do not let the material dry onto the BSC work surface.
-



Clean up: large spill inside a BSC

- Leave BSC running
- Cover pools of liquid with disinfectant-soaked paper towelling to absorb the bulk
- Remove gloves and discard in cabinet
- If your gown is contaminated, remove it and discard for



Clean up: large spill inside a BSC



- Remove sharp instruments with forceps and dispose of safely
- Decontaminate cultures, media and materials adjacent to spill
- Wipe down work floor and cabinet work zone with fresh disinfectant solution
- Large spills inside Class IIs may run into the sump of



Clean up: large spill inside a BSC (2)

- If spill is large use sufficient disinfectant or concentrate (Virkon powder or Terminal G) to dilute and inactivate sump area
- With the cabinet running, lift the work floor and clean its under surface and the sump floor with disinfectant
- If the sump is contaminated flood floor with disinfectant solution to completely cover sump floor
- Seek advice on whether cabinet should be decontaminated



Clean up: a spill inside centrifuge

- If a failure is suspected during a centrifuge run
- Immediately switch the machine off and allow the rotor to come
- **DO NOT OPEN THE CENTRIFUGE**
- RESPOND
-



Clean up: a spill inside centrifuge

- **STOP NO ENTRY** sign on the centrifuge room door and contact the Biosafety officer or supervisor. (RESPOND)
- Ask supervisor or biosafety officer for advice on clean-
- **If a spill is discovered after opening the centrifuge;**
 - Avoid breathing any aerosols and immediately but gently (avoid aerosols) close the centrifuge



Clean up: a spill inside centrifuge

- **“STOP NO ENTRY”** sign on the centrifuge room door and contact the Biosafety Officer or supervisor
- Discuss the nature of the incident, the agent involved and its volume and titre with the biosafety officer or supervisor
- Where necessary arrange assistance from biosafety office for inspection and assistance with clean-up of the spill and

Questions



Thank you

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Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

Andrew Hill | Biocontainment Microbiologist
April 2015

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Identification of the hazard

- Know your agent
- Inherent hazards
 - Known vs. Unknown
- Source of material
- Provenance



Hazard:- The 'entity' with potential to cause harm
Risk:- The likelihood of the harm being realized

2 | Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment | Andrew Hill



Hazard awareness

- Air
- Sharps
- Waste
- Gowns
- Gloves
- Porous material
- Shoes
- Culture
- Eggs
- Pipettes
- Storage
- Autoclave
- Paper
- Pens
- Centrifuge
- Animals
- Freezer
- LN₂
- Computer keyboards
- Telephone handset

CSIRO - Identification of Microbiological Hazards Principles of Biocontainment at PC3 & 4



Aerosols Entry via Inhalation

- Energy in – movement out
- Distribution very difficult to model
- May take time to dilute in BSC
- May settle
- Created inside primary containers
- Liquid droplets or dry solids suspended in the air for an extended period

- Pipetting
- Vortexing
- Sonicating
- Bead Beating



CSIRO - Identification of Microbiological Hazards Principles of Biocontainment at PC3 & 4



Droplets Entry via Ingestion or passive inoculation (broken skin, mucosal membranes)

- Relatively large quantity of material
- Possible breach of aperture
- Fall quickly
- Gloves
- Sleeves
 - Pipetting



CSIRO - Identification of Microbiological Hazards Principles of Biocontainment at PC3 & 4



Sharps Entry via Direct inoculation

- Glass, needles, pipettes, scalpels, scissors, thermometers
 - What is 'a sharp'?
- Require manual handling
 - Often in one hand
- Remain sharp after use
 - Become dirty / infectious and sharp



CSIRO - Identification of Microbiological Hazards Principles of Biocontainment at PC3 & 4



Risk assessment

To look is one thing, to see what you look at is another, to understand what you see is a third, to learn what you understand is still something else, to act on what you learn is all that really matters.

—Winston Churchill

“Nothing is more dangerous in microbiology than that which is thought to be safe”

-D. A. Rutter



Microbiological Risk Assessment Exercise 1

Prepare a risk assessment framework for field sampling of bat materials (swabs, urine and tissue) and transport to your laboratory.



Microbiological Risk Assessment Exercise 2

Prepare a risk assessment framework for processing of tissue, swabs and urine for virus isolation including inoculation of both eggs and tissue culture.



Microbiological Risk Assessment Exercise 3

You have been asked to investigate material collected by a probe on Mars. What considerations do you make in your risk assessment?



Hazard control hierarchy – Interpreting a risk assessment and implementing mitigations

•ERIC - PD

Accompanied by How to Study Sharks



ERIC-PD Elimination of the hazard

- Abstinence
- Substitution
- Inactivation

Eliminate



No sharks

Substitute



Guppies



ERIC-PD

Reduction of the hazard

- Volume
- State
- Titer
- Genetically deficient

Reduce



Less, Smaller Sharks

Controlling risk

- Process
 - Minimal steps
 - Maximum manipulation within containment
 - Best ergonomics




ERIC-PD

Isolation of the hazard – Barriers

- Pass box, dunk tank, filters, BSC's, Primary containment, centrifuge, various equipment outside BSC, Secondary Containment the room, filters, door,

Engineer out
(the hazard)



Caged Sharks



ERIC-PD

Control of the hazard - Air Flows, Disinfectants

- Air flows
- Disinfectant (knock down)
- Sterilisation
- Administrative Controls Administrative Controls



10 mins. max. in the pool



ERIC-PD

PPE against the hazard – Personal Barriers

- Often considered as a matter of convenience
- Gloves
- Gown
- Glasses
- Masks
- Respirators
- Hoods
- Suits
- Disposable / Reusable
- Shared / Personal

Personal
Protective
Equipment



Last resort !!



ERIC-PD

Discipline – the last line of defense

- Washing Hands
- Waiting
 - contact times
 - air changes



Microbiological Risk Assessment

Examples of areas to consider (non-exhaustive)

- Disease**
 - Disease severity
 - Transmission routes
 - Prophylaxis availability
 - Susceptible groups
- Task**
 - Volume
 - Titer
 - Processes
 - Equipment
 - Live agent
 - PPE
- Source**
 - Sent or collect
 - Transport
 - Packaging
 - Prior knowledge
 - Previously tested?
- Nature of sample/Agent**
 - Antibiotic resistance
- Decontamination and disposal of waste**
 - Disinfectant
 - Inactivation
 - 'Offensive' waste
 - Destroy / Dispose
- Staff**
 - Training
 - Vaccinations
 - Lead in time
 - Any known allergies
- Storage**
 - Samples
 - In use
 - Product / Derivatives
- Other matters to consider**
 - Licences / Permits
 - Positive control material
 - Can we pass the material to someone more experienced?



Thank you

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