

出國報告(出國類別：出席國際會議暨學術訪問)

出席日本舉辦之國際學術研討會與 進行學術合作訪問

服務機關：哲學系

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派赴國家：日本

出國期間：103年8月19日至8月30日

報告日期：103年9月15日

摘要

此次出國赴日本出席兩個國際哲學學術會議，分別為在橫濱大學舉辦之「The 13th Conference of International Society for Utilitarian Studies: Happiness and Human Well-Being Reconsidered, Concept, History, and Measurement (ISUS 2014)」，以及在京都大學舉辦之「The 2nd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia (The 2nd CCPAE)」，前一會議以倫理學中的效益主義為主題的專題哲學會議，而後一會議則以東亞國家之哲學交流為主。本人在兩會議中宣讀兩篇論文，題目分別為「Mill's Utilitarianism and His View of Moral Normativity」與「Duty, Supererogation, and Utilitarianism」。其間並參與應慶應大學 Narita Kazunobu 教授之邀參與其「well-being」研究計畫與倫理學工作坊，參與者除日本學者，也邀請英國牛津大學 (Oxford University) 之 Roger Crisp 教授以及美國雪城大學 (Syracuse University) 之 Ben Bradley 教授，前者以品德倫理學 (Virtue ethics) (A Third Method of Ethics?) 為講題，後者以死亡的倫理意涵為講題 (How Should We Feel About Death?)。

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1. 參與 ISUS 2014

「目的」

ISUS 會議為國際學界對於效益主義之理論的國際學者社團，專注於倫理學相關的議題，此次會議以人類福祉的研究為主題，頗符合本文專長之領域，尤其，近年來，我在倫理學（不論是規範倫理學或後設倫理學）的研究頗有一些心得，發表之論文為研究成果的一部分。參與會議可更廣泛與此一領域的學者互動，也是我個人參加會議並發表論文的目的。

「過程」

此次會議，個人發表一篇論文，題目為「Mill's Utilitarianism and His View of Moral Normativity」，主要是針對當代學界在道德之規範性的議題，以個人幾年來在教學與研究之心得對此一議題提出論述，論文之論路是重新檢討 19 世紀效益主義哲學家 John Stuart Mill 的理論，並由此來說明並主張，當代英美學界在道德規範性之議題的論述上可以檢討之處。此次 ISUS 2014 的會議有三天，會議的進行包括主題演講 (keynote speech)，專題論文，圓桌論壇 (round table discussions)，小組主題討論 (proposed panel) 等，約有 120 篇左右的論文發表。我的論文的發表被安排在 8-21 下午 14:45-16:30 的場次，同場次發表的學者包括東京大學的 Keiichiro Yamamoto 教授以及 Gothenburg 大學的 Inmar Persson 教授。每位論文發表人有 35 分鐘宣讀與討論的時間。雖然時

間有限，但討論頗唯有意義。如此支多的論文，但同時段卻經常有 4 個場次（10-12 篇論文）同時進行，只能選擇性參與。

「心得及建議」

參與並在國際會議中發表論文是學者間的直接互動，這使個人能在獨自的研究之外，獲得更為直接的衝擊，包括接觸書本與期刊之外的新的理論與思考，尤其是，不同學者直接論述其對某一議題的理解與論述，在會議中論辯，這或許能夠使得學者有意外的收穫，如此，這能夠使一個學者的研究因而有額外的幫助。參加國際會議並發表論文，這在目前已是學界的常態。

2. 訪問並參與 Narita 教授之研究與倫理學工作坊

「目的」

日本慶應大學的 Narita 教授是日本倫理學界頗為知名的學者，我和他相識於 2012 年北海道大學所舉辦的應用倫理學會議場合。此次之訪問並參與其研究計畫，主要是因我們在研究上的共同興趣，當他得知我將參加在橫濱舉行的 ISUS 會議，他問我有無興趣參加他的研究計畫，因為他在 ISUS 之後將舉辦一個倫理學議題的工作坊，除了邀請一些日本學者餐節，他也特別要求牛津大學的 Crisp 教授以及美國雪城大學的 Bradley 教授專題演講。為此，我也樂

意訪問並參加這個工作坊。

「過程」

這個訪問主要是以 Narita 教授的研究計畫為主，主軸是所關切的倫理學議題：福祉的倫理意涵，除了 Narita 教授的說明以及參與學者的意見之外，整個工作坊的進行以所邀請的兩位英美學者的專題演講為兩個主要活動。英國牛津大學的 Roger Crisp 教授的演講主題是關於當今倫理學界對品德倫理學（virtue ethics）的討論，Crips 教授在國際間是頗為知名的倫理學學者，其對效益主義以及其他倫理學議題的著述，頗受討論與引用。這次他對品德倫理學的說明採取較為同情的態度，不過，在會場有些些人不認同。他以為，品德倫理學學者如 Hursthouse 的確對於行為對錯的標準提出一套論述。但，我以為，這個品德倫理學的原則並不那麼可靠。Bradley 教授也認為，如果要對品德倫理學原則辯護，那麼，不同的理論也能得到相同的辯護。

這個工作坊的另一項主要演講的講者是 Ben Bradley 教授，他討論死亡如何是惡的。一般是以某種後果論來說明為何死亡是惡的，例如死亡帶來不可接受的後果。但，這個理路其實不太通，因為，死亡的後果不一定是不好或更不好的。這個議題涉及價值理論的主張，而 Bradley 教授的演將主要是對於常見的思路（例如前述的後果論）提出一些說明與批評，雖然，最後需要依靠價值理論（如生命的意義）才能對死亡的倫理意義提出完整的說明，這是其

論述的結論。

整個訪問主要是參與工作坊以及相關的討論。

「心得及建議」

這次參加這個工作坊的理由，除了與 Narita 教授相識，並且是順道（因為在 ISUS2014 之後），另一個理由是，意圖增進與日本哲學研究之學者的交流。

以往，台灣哲學研究者與日本學者的交流相當有限，台灣學者反而與更遠的歐洲與美國學者有更多的交流。這雖然有其原因，但，東亞鄰近的國家之間的哲學學者沒有理由彼此孤立。這是我個人第一次參與這樣的訪問合作。我個人以為，這應該是有益的。

3. 出席 The 2nd CCPAE

「目的」

這個會議主要意義是促進東亞地區哲學學者家的交流，第 1 屆的會議在台北的中研院舉辦，這一次在日本的京都大學，下一屆（2016）將在韓國首爾舉行。參加這個會議，也就是，經由發表論文以及討論，這的確有促進學者交流的意義。雖然如此，參加這個會議，我個人發表一篇論文「Duty, Supererogation, and Utilitarianism」，目的是將我近年來在教學與研究上的一部分想法作一個整

理，這是大的研究成果的一部分。

「過程」

這個 The 2nd CCPAE 會議的性質類似於台灣哲學學會年會所舉辦的學術會議（類似於美國或澳洲哲學學會的會議），所以，論文的領域涵蓋甚廣。會議的論文發表的主題包括中國哲學研究，歐陸哲學，英美哲學以及佛學等。會議進行兩天，形式包括 5 個主題演講（第 1 天 3 場，第 2 天 2 場）以及 92 篇論文。一天有 7-9 個論文發表時段，每一時段同時經常有 6 個發表議場。所以，會議議程頗為緊密。我的論文發表在第 2 天（8-29）下午 16：10-16：40。我的論文主題屬於規範倫理學的議題，是我多年來研究成果的一部分。這篇論文論說，supererogation 這個議題為何能夠被古典效益主義者以所處理，而不需犧牲其理論一致性。

「心得及建議」

這相會議的特質屬於東亞哲學界的交流活動。這的確是有意義的，隨著整個世界局勢的變化，這樣的會議的確有其脈絡意義。

這次出國開會的報告中，每一個活動的第 3 項是「心得與建議」，我個人有些心得，也做了報告。不過，我沒有提建議，畢竟，這些活動都不是中正大學

主辦。

4. 附錄

以下所附是這次出國所參加的兩個會議的議程，所發表之兩篇論文的 PPT 檔，以及工作坊的兩篇主題演講的講稿。

Mill's Utilitarianism and His View of Moral Normativity

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Two Platitudes

- It is conceptually true that morality is normative. Moral norms provides the standard of moral conduct.
- It is observable that morality can have influence on human actions.

Two Debates - 1

- What is the moral standard?
 - Ordinary norms as given in social life are prima facie standards of conduct.
 - A moral theory explains and justifies the fundamental principle which determines critically moral norms. Philosophically, two lines of argument for a moral theory:
 - Consequentialism (utilitarianism) vs non-consequentialism

Two Debates - 2

- What makes morality influential on human conduct?
 - Morality influences agent on determining their will by giving rise of motives.
- What is debated is how an agent comes to be motivated to act morally? Two lines of argument:
 - Moral internalism (internalism) vs. moral externalism (externalism)

consequentialism

- Utilitarianism is the view that an action is right if and only if this action is, among options available to the agent, to promote the greatest amount of general happiness.
 - A value thesis: happiness is ultimately the only thing good in itself.
 - A naturalistic account of value: desire
 - A deontic thesis: the right thing to do is derived from the best thing to do.
 - Actions are valuable in proportion to the amount of happiness produced accordingly. The best action brings about the greatest happiness for all.
 - It is only right to do the best.

John Stuart Mill

- The utilitarian principle as the ultimate standard of morality of actions
 - Two-level view of morality
 - Indirect utilitarianism
- The sanction view of moral motivation
 - An externalist?
 - Korsgaard and Nagel think Mill to be the best example of externalism (Korsgaard 1996, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”)
 - External vs. internal sanction

Internalism vs. Externalism

- Internalism holds that when an agent makes a moral judgment, it is implied that she is motivated thereby to act morally.
- Externalism denies this internal connection.
- The issue is how to explain that people are motivated to act morally.
- The case of John Stuart Mill.

Mill's Sanction View of Moral Motivation - 1

- According to Mill,
 - THE QUESTION is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any proposed moral standard – What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? whence does it derive its binding force? It is the necessary part of moral philosophy to provide an answer to this question... (U, 3, 1)
 - Two points come to our attention:
 - Mill's sanction is to produce motives.
 - Also, sanction provides morality's binding force, or, sanction is the source of morality's being obligatory.
 - So, there is an indirect link between an agent's moral awareness and her being motivated to act morally.
 - So, it seems Mill is perhaps a clear example of moral externalism.

Mill's Sanction View of Moral Motivation - 2

- Again, sanction is a mechanism of moral motivation.
- This is different from moral awareness internally connected to moral motivation.
- It is observable that sanction may not produce moral motivation. That is, the connection of moral awareness vis sanction to motivation is not tight enough as an internalist would want.
- If so, Mill is an externalist in that he allows a loose or contingent link of moral awareness to motivation.

Mill's Sanction View of Moral Motivation - 3

- External vs internal sanctions (U, 3, 3)
 - Custom as the general external sanction:
 - custom can shape people in that they can be cultivated to develop a sense of morality or a virtuous character such that they tend to be motivated to act morally (U, 3, 1-2).
 - external sanctions can work because they produce 'the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure' in people's minds which are motives or to produce motives to abide by moral norms. (U,3, 3)
 - External sanctions are based on human desire for happiness, whether one's own or other's. (U,3, 3)

Mill's Sanction View of Moral Motivation - 4

- Internal sanction
 - The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same- a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility... This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience (U, 3, 4)
- Conscience is the ultimate internal sanction (U, 3, 5)
 - Conscience as a cultivated moral sentiment or feeling that gives rise to moral motivation upon being aware of moral requirements

Mill's Sanction View of Moral Motivation - 5

- All sanctions, external and external, are to produce an internal feeling which can be very complex in its form and origin.
- The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds (U, 3, 5)
- So, for Mill, it is this subjective feeling of moral normativity that is the binding force or motive of moral actions, which , according to Mill, is ultimately founded on people's desire for happiness. It is however to be noticed that Mill allows for various expressions and origins of this feeling of moral normativity.

Mill as an internalist?

- The above explications of Mill's sanction theory of moral notmativity shows that in Mill's view of moral motivation a feeling or sense of morality is essential. Though sanctions can be external in that the hope of favor and fear of displeasure are motives to abide by moral norms. Mill seems to be an externalist.
- However, if we think that Mill adopts a hedonistic view of happiness, then the desire to satisfy those external and internal feelings is ultimately the desire for happiness.
- In this view, moral motives, whether coming from external or internal sanctions, are connected essentially to desire for happiness. When a person is aware of moral norms, she is motivated to act accordingly, provided that she is so cultivated that she explicitly or implicitly recognizes that acting on moral requirements should bring about happiness.

Korsgaard's Take of Mill

- For Korsgaard, Mill is the best example of externalism. Sanctions can help to promote moral incentives. But they are not moral norms or awareness of moral norms. In this sense, Mill's appealing to sanctions, external or internal, as the sources of moral motivation makes his theory an externalist one.
- On the other hand, in Korsgaard's view, Mill's view of moral normativity does not satisfy Korsgaard's **internalism requirement** which holds that pure practical reason will exist if and only if we are capable of being motivated by the conclusions of the operations of practical reason **as such'** (1996: 327-8, emphasis added).

Two conceptions of internalism

- The rationalist vs. the empiricist
- Korsgaard is an obvious case of the rationalist internalism which holds that human has pure practical reason which can motivate agents to act morally, if the agents exercise pure practical reason.
- An empiricist internalism holds that an agent can be motivated by moral considerations only when to act morally is desired by the agent. An agent can come to be aware of moral requirements through process of rational deliberation. if this moral awareness can motivate the agent to act according to her moral awareness, it is needed that the rational process is controlled by the agent's existing desire. (Bernard Willims 1981, "Internal and External Reasons")

Mill as an internalist!

- Mill can be an internalist in the empiricist sense.
 - Mill does not believe in the existence (or even idea?) of pure practical reason.
 - Mill believes that human actions are driven ultimately by the desire for happiness.
 - People can come to believe in or recognition of a moral requirement through processes of rational deliberation, if the rational conclusions would have power to motivate people to act morally, the rational processes would have to be controlled by people's existing desire (for instance, a desire to be virtuous)(U, 4, 3) or their natural and original desire for happiness (U, 4, 5).

Mill's Sanction in a Different Light?

- Mill complicates himself and puzzles his readers with a different characterization of sanction. Mill says,

For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. (U, 3, 14)
- David Brink (2008, "Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy" in SET) sees penal sanction as the defining feature of the wrongness of actions.
 - Brink argues this is compatible with Mill's indirect utilitarianism.
- A different reading of Mill's statement above is to understand the statement 'We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it...' as an characterization of ordinary morality. Brink seems to take Mill's statement here as his theory of utilitarianism, a critical theory of morality. But it seems that the latter reading can be viable.

Back to Moral Normativity

- Moral normativity is constituted by two elements: it imposes the standard of right conduct and it can influence people's conduct.
 - The first element needs a substantive moral theory to explain the standard.
 - The second needs a theory of moral motivation.
- These two parts of moral normativity may not be mutually independent. A Kantian and a Millian can differ in their substantive moral theories each of which is internally connected to their different views of practical rationality which connects closely to their different views of moral motivation.
- Thus, Kantian and Millian theorists will have different views of moral normativity.
 - The substantive theory of morality and the metaethical theory of moral motivation and moral reason are entangled. Normative ethical and metaethical discussions are distinct approaches of philosophical inquiries but they are hard to be mutually separated entirely.
- The limitation of time prevents this paper from saying anything significant about Mill's utilitarian theory. In exploring Mill's view of moral normativity, this paper focuses mainly on his view of moral motivation which is often neglected and stereotyped as externalism.

• **Thank you.**

2014/8/21

ISUS 2014, Yokohoma University
Hahn Hsu

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The 13th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies
Happiness and Human Well-being Reconsidered
Concept, History and Measurement

August 20-22, 2014

Yokohama National University

Outline of the Time Table
(7th version: August 18, 2014)

Tuesday, 19 August
Evening Reception for the participants

Wednesday, 20 August
Venue: Yokohama National University
☆ Hall, University of Library
◇ Building for Economics Faculty

9:30 registration

10:00-10:40 ☆ plenary programme: Opening the ISUS Conference 2014

Welcome greetings: Daisuke Arie (Yokohama National)

Welcome address: Philip Schofield (the secretary of ISUS/University College London)

Welcome, and the aim of the key theme:

Happiness and Human Well-being Reconsidered: Concept, History and Measurement

Yasunori Fukagai (the chair of ISUS/Yokohama National)

some announces and break

10:50-12:00 ☆ plenary programme

Keynote lecture (I): Michael Lobban (London School of Economics and Political Science)

The role of law in promoting happiness: some nineteenth-century debates

Introduced and chaired by Michihiko Kaino (Doshisha)

With the scheduled discussant David Lieberman (University of California – Berkeley)

12:05-13:10 lunch

13:15-15:00 ◇ sessions (I)

break

15:15-16:30 ◇ sessions (II)

break

16:50-18:10 ◇ plenary programme

Welcome address: Kunio Suzuki (the President, Yokohama National University)

Keynote lecture (II): Maniko Nakano-Okuno (Ohio State University)

Happiness and Well-being of Sentiment Beings Reconsidered: A Case for Contractarian Utilitarianism

Introduced and chaired by Satoshi Kodama (Kyoto)

With the scheduled discussant: Persson, Ingmar (University of Gothenburg)

18:10-18:15 announcements

Thursday, 21 August

Venue: Yokohama National University

☆ Hall, University of Library

◇ Building of faculty of economics

10:00-11:45 ◇ sessions (III)

11:50-13:10 lunch

11:50-13:00 ◇ Business Meeting of the ISUS Committee

13:15-14:25 ☆ plenary programme

Keynote lecture (III): Ben Bradley (Syracuse)

Well-Being at a Time

Introduced by Kazunobu Narita (Keio)

With the scheduled discussant: Iwao Hirose (McGill)

14:25-14:30 announcements

break

14:45-16:15 ☆ roundtable (1):
visiting the project of Transcribe Bentham

14:45-16:30 ◇ sessions (IV)

break

16:45-18:30 ◇ roundtable (2):
the new research method based on the e-texts, Transcribe Bentham, and text editing

16:45-18:30 ◇ sessions (V)

Friday, 22 August

Venue: Port Opening Memorial Hall
(Yokohama Kaiiko Kinen Kaikan)
With the Tower of Jack near Harbour Area

9:30-11:15 △ sessions (VI)

break

11:30-12:40 △ plenary programme
Keynote lecture (IV): Philip Schofield (University College London)
Jeremy Bentham on Utility and Truth
Introduced by Yuchiro Kawana (Kyoto)
With the scheduled discussant Daisuke Arie (Yokohama National)

12:40-12:45 announcements

12:50-14:10 lunch (Bashamichi-Area, et al)

14:15-16:10 △ plenary programme:
Panel with the keynote speakers
Chair: Douglas Long (Western Ontario) & Yasunori Fukagai (Yokohama National)
Main discussant Roger Crisp (Oxford)

16:10-16:20 closing

18:00 farewell dinner by cruising Yokohama Harbour (by advanced booking)

<p>Wednesday, 20 August</p> <p>at Hall, Library</p> <p>9:30 - 12:00</p>	<p>9:30- Registration</p> <p>10:00- Welcome address (Arie, Daisuke: YNU & Schofield, Philip: UCL)</p> <p>10:15-10:35 Welcome, and the Aim of the Key Theme: Fukagai, Yasunori (YNU)</p> <p><i>Happiness and Human Well-being Reconsidered: Concept, History and Measurement - for the preliminary images</i></p> <p>10:35- Short announcement and short break</p> <p>10:50- Keynote Lecture: Michael Lobbán (LSE)</p> <p><i>The role of law in promoting happiness: some nineteenth-century debates</i></p> <p>chair: Kaino, Michihiro (Doshisha) discussant: Hirose, Iwao (McGill)</p> <p>at Hall, Library</p>			
<p>((12:00- lunch in campus))</p>				
<p>Wednesday, 20 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>I</p> <p>13:15 - 15:00</p>	<p>I-1 Well-being and Value Theory</p> <p>chair: Bader, Ralf</p> <p>Chancy Goods & Well-Being Pluralism Vonz, Gerard (Ferdinand University)</p> <p>Welfare Subjectivism, Valuing, and Desire Woodard, Christopher (University of Nottingham)</p> <p>Caring and Well-being Narita, Kazunobu (Keio University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., B</p>	<p>I-2 Philosophical Issues of Consequentialism</p> <p>chair: Persson, Ingmar</p> <p>The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and the Presumption Problem Yoshizawa, Fumitake (Chiba University-PhD Student)</p> <p>Tanikawa, Taku (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science- research fellow)</p> <p>How should a utilitarian answer the question "Why be moral?" Suzumoto, Shunsuke (Kyoto University)</p> <p>A Solution to the Trolley Problem Overland, Gerhard (University of Oslo)</p> <p>Room: Econ., C</p>	<p>I-3 Preference, Number, and Time (1)</p> <p>chair: Holtug, Nils</p> <p>Preference, Indifference and Ambivalence Boot, Martijn (Waseda University)</p> <p>What does the intertemporal choice in behavioral economics mean in utilitarianism philosophy? Yasuchi, Yuichi (Keio University)</p> <p>Parfit on Aggregating Future Utilities for Environmental Policy Hwang, Paul (Northfield Mount Hermon-PhD Student)</p> <p>Room: Econ., A</p>	<p>I-4 Well-being and Desire Satisfaction Theory</p> <p>chair: Bradley, Ben</p> <p>Am I happier as a teacher if my students understand my lecture? : implications of the role theory for the preference satisfaction view of human welfare Iseda, Tetsuji (Kyoto University)</p> <p>The Functional Approach to The Concept of Good and Consequentialism Sala, Krzysztof (University of Szczecin)</p> <p>Does Fulfillment of Mere Past Desires (and Other Similar Desires) Matter? Morimura, Susumu (Hitotsubashi University)</p> <p>Consequentialism, Well-Being, and Other-Regarding or Evil Mental States Sumiki, Makoto (Nanzan University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., D</p>
<p>Wednesday, 20 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>II</p> <p>15:15 - 16:30</p>	<p>II-1 Utilitarianism and Methodological Reasons</p> <p>chair: Takashima, Kazuya</p> <p>J. S. Mill's Critique of the Scientific Foundations of J. Bentham's Utilitarianism Akdere, Cınla (Middle East Technical University)</p> <p>A Benthamite Solution to the Easterlin's Paradox (es) Pellegrino, Gianfranco (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome)</p> <p>Room: Econ., B</p>	<p>II-2 Consequentialism and Moral Reasons</p> <p>chair: Kodama, Satoshi</p> <p>Pluralism about Reasons and Agent-units in Consequentialism: Why Actualism and Possibilism are not incompatible Ando, Koaru (Kobe University)</p> <p>Facets of Moral Duty and the Choice between Act- and Rule- Consequentialism Andrie, Vuko (University of Mannheim)</p> <p>Room: Econ., C</p>	<p>II-3 Preference, Number, and Time (2)</p> <p>chair: Gustafsson, Johan</p> <p>Separability and the value of longevity Hirose, Iwao (McGill University)</p> <p>Counting the Numbers Early: The Maximal Proportional Satisfaction of Incommensurable Values Chapman, Bruce (University of Toronto)</p> <p>Room: Econ., A</p>	<p>until 15:30</p>
<p>Wednesday, 20 August</p> <p>Econ., A</p> <p>16:50-18:15</p>	<p>16:50- Welcome address (Suzuki, Kunio: The President YNU)</p> <p>17:00- Keynote Lecture: Mariko Nakano-Okuno (Ohio State)</p> <p><i>Happiness and Well-being of Sentiment: Beings Reconsidered: A Case for Contractarian Utilitarianism</i></p> <p>Chair: Kodama, Satoshi (Kyoto) discussant: Persson, Ingmar (University of Gothenburg)</p> <p>18:10- announcement</p> <p>Econ., A</p>			

<p>Wednesday, 20 August sessions</p> <p>13:15 - 15:00</p>	<p>1-5 Common Law and/vs Pannomion</p> <p>chair: Bozno-Rev. Malik</p> <p>Utility vs Tradition: Bentham's Use of History to Undermine the Significance of History or Law Gourlay, Kristi (University College London-PhD Student)</p> <p>Bentham's Three Theories of Law Zhai, Xiaobo (Zhejiang University, and University College London)</p> <p>Bentham's Pannomion and the Anglo-American Legal History Kaino, Michihiro (Doshisha University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., E</p>	<p>1-6 Happiness and Virtue in Classical Utilitarianism (1)</p> <p>chair: Mixon, Jr. Rex W.</p> <p>The problematic nature of the concept of Happiness Dubrac, Anne-Laure (Université Paris-Diderot, Paris XII)</p> <p>(Pae)happiness, Performative Language and the Figure of Automaton: reading the deconstructive wedge of Felicitic Calculus Shepero, Carolyn (Palmouth University, Cornwall)</p> <p>J. B. Mill on happiness, liberty, and education Takemiya, Masaki (Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences)</p> <p>Room: Econ., F</p>	<p>1-7 Beccaria, Bentham and Diffusion (1)</p> <p>chair: Dube, Allison</p> <p>Beccaria, Utilitarianism & Evidence-Based Crime Control Liu, Jiabo (Institutional Affiliation Mississippi Valley State University)</p> <p>Beccaria, Condorcet, Bentham: utility and democracy in the European Enlightenment de Champe, Emmanuelle (Université Paris 6)</p> <p>Room: Econ., G</p>
	<p>Wednesday, 20 August sessions</p> <p>15:15 - 16:30</p>	<p>1-5 Paternalism or Cultivation</p> <p>chair: Komatsu, Kayoko</p> <p>Mill on Paternalism Against the best judge argument Wakamatsu, Yoshiki (Gakushuin University)</p> <p>Classical Utilitarianism and the Centrality of Education and Self-Cultivation Habibi, Don (University of North Carolina Wilmington)</p> <p>Room: Econ., E</p>	<p>1-6 Happiness and Virtue in Classical Utilitarianism (2)</p> <p>chair: Quinn, Michael</p> <p>Bentham on the Genealogy of the Principle of Utility: 'I Had It from Epicurus' Mixon, Jr. Rex W. (New York University, Stern School of Business)</p> <p>Mill's notion of Qualitative Superiority of Pleasure: A Splendid Utilitarian Outlook Revisited Mitra, Madhumita (Vidyasagar College)</p> <p>Room: Econ., F</p>

<p>Thursday, 21 August sessions</p> <p>III</p> <p>10:00 - 11:45</p>	<p>III-1 (proposed session)</p> <p>chair: Sparrow, Robert James</p> <p><i>Brain-Machine Interface and Human Well-Being Reconsidered</i></p> <p>Techibana, Koji (Kumamoto University)</p> <p>Nakazawa, Eisuke (University of Tokyo)</p> <p>Yamamoto, Keiichiro (University of Tokyo)</p> <p>Room: Econ., A</p>	<p>III-2 Luck, Inequality, and the Priority Veil</p> <p>chair: Hirose, Iwao</p> <p>On Partial Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons</p> <p>Inoue, Akira (Ritsumeikan University)</p> <p>Unequal well-being in political philosophy and in epidemiology: a remarriage</p> <p>Eyal, Nir (Harvard University)</p> <p>Global Luck Egalitarianism and International Migration</p> <p>Holtug, Nils (University of Copenhagen)</p> <p>Room: Econ., B</p>	<p>III-3 Hume, Smith and Marx relative to Utilitarianism</p> <p>chair: Lieberman, David</p> <p>David Hume: Happiness and Economics</p> <p>Cohen Kaminetz, Shiri (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem)</p> <p>On the Meaning of the Layered and Evolutionary Structure of "Utility" in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiment</p> <p>Taka, Tetsuo (Kyushu sanryo University)</p> <p>Utilitarianism and Marx</p> <p>Matsui, Satoshi (Senshu University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., F</p>	<p>III-4 Utilitarianism and Public Opinion</p> <p>chair: Kaino, Michihiro</p> <p>The Tribunal of society: public opinion</p> <p>Rudan, Paola (University of Bologna)</p> <p>Public Opinion and Delusion: Bentham on Representative Democracy</p> <p>Obata, Shuntaro (Seikei University)</p> <p>Inestimable blessing: the role of the liberty of the press in James Mill's political thought</p> <p>Grint, Kris (Bentham Project, University College London)</p> <p>Room: Econ. E</p>
	((11:50- lunch in campus))		((11:50- ISUS Business Meeting))	
<p>Thursday, 21 August at Hall, Library</p> <p>13:10 - 14:30</p>	<p>13:10- Keynote Lecture: Ben Bradley (Syracuse)</p> <p>14:20- announcement</p>			<p>at Hall, Library</p>
<p>Thursday, 21 August sessions</p> <p>IV</p> <p>14:45 - 16:30</p>	<p>IV-1 ROUND TABLE 1</p> <p>chair: Itai, Hiroaki</p> <p><i>Visiting the Project of Transcribe Bentham</i></p> <p>at Hall, University Library</p> <p>with the Demo and Trial of Transcribe Bentham and some data bases including ECCO, NII-REO etc</p> <p>Room: Hall, Library</p>	<p>IV-2 Measurement of Well-being</p> <p>chair: Chapman, Bruce</p> <p>Do outstating stakes get hammered down? Norm deviation and its influence on happiness and life satisfaction in Japan, Germany, and the US</p> <p>Soedner, Tobias (German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo (DIJ) / Humboldt-University of Berlin)</p> <p>Happiness in History of Economics: Inquiry into a New Measurement of Happiness</p> <p>Kasai, Takato (Doshisha University-PhD student)</p> <p>Household Happiness and Mutual Help: Empirical Analysis in the Case of Married Couple</p> <p>Hagiwara, Risa (Keio University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., F</p>	<p>IV-3 Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Public Policy (1)</p> <p>chair: Akira, Inoue / Overland, Gerhard</p> <p>Utilitarianism and personal good</p> <p>Bader, Ralf (University of Oxford)</p> <p>Is attitudinal hedonism a better version of hedonism?</p> <p>Yonemura, Kotaro (Yokohama National University)</p> <p>Caring for Parents: A Rule-Consequentialist Approach</p> <p>Sin, William (The Hong Kong Institute of Education)</p> <p>Room: Econ., G</p>	<p>IV-4 Moral Enhancement and Neuroscience (1)</p> <p>chair: Iseda, Tetsuji</p> <p>Making everybody too good?</p> <p>Sparrow, Robert James (Monash University)</p> <p>Can mood enhancement threaten our authentic well-being?</p> <p>Eguchi, Satoshi (Kyoto Women's University)</p> <p>(Neuro)predictions and punishment of dangerous offenders: A way out for retributivists?</p> <p>Petersen, Thomas (Roskilde University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., E</p>
	<p>Thursday, 21 August sessions</p> <p>V</p> <p>16:45 - 18:30</p>	<p>V-1 ROUND TABLE 2</p> <p>chair: Fukagai, Yasunori</p> <p><i>Now Research-Method based on the E-texts and Text Editing</i></p> <p>follows to Round Table Transcribe Bentham</p> <p>Speaker includes:</p> <p>Grint, Kris (Bentham Project, University College London)</p> <p>Tateishi, Yuka (National Institute of Informatics)</p> <p>Room: Econ., A</p>	<p>V-2 (proposed session)</p> <p>chair: Katsuragi, Takao (Gakushuin)</p> <p><i>The pursuit of happiness and the family in modern and contemporary Japan: Social and political institutions as facilitators and constraints to human well-being</i></p> <p>Weber, Torsten (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo)</p> <p>Winkler, Chris (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo)</p> <p>Holdgruen, Phoebe (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo)</p> <p>Room: Econ., F</p>	<p>V-3 Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Public Policy (2)</p> <p>chair: Akira, Inoue / Overland, Gerhard</p> <p>The Repugnant Conclusion and Our Imprecise Intuitive Grasp of Well-Being</p> <p>Gustafsson, Johan (University of York)</p> <p>A dialog between Rawls and Arrow on utilitarianism: focusing on Arrow's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice</p> <p>Saito, Nao (Tohoku Gakuin University)</p> <p>Public Selfishness, Private Altruism, and Below Replacement Fertility</p> <p>Gani, Mohammad (Independent University, Bangladesh)</p> <p>Room: Econ., G</p>

<p>Thursday, 21 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>III</p> <p>10:00 - 11:45</p>	<p>III-5 Utilitarianism and Economic Thought</p> <p>chair: Kawano, Yuichiro (Kyoto)</p> <p>A Plea for a Man of System: Bentham and Smith on Political Economy in the (Art and) Science of the Legislator Quinn, Michael (Bentham Project, University College London)</p> <p>Utilitarianism in the British Early-Socialism: William Thompson's Revision of the Principle of Utility and Gender Equality Higata, Naobumi (Chuo University)</p> <p>Mill's criticism of Paine's Rights of Man Nakasawa, Nobuhiko (Kansai University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., C</p>	<p>III-6 Utilitarian Indirect Legislation</p> <p>chair: de Champs, Emmanuelle</p> <p>From Indirect Legislation to Nudge: a Possible Way to Understand Bentham's Normative Framework? Bozzo-Rey, Malik (Lille Catholic University)</p> <p>Jeremy Bentham on Government and Indirect Legislation: Rêgime of publicity, Enlightenment, and Discipline Iwai, Hiroaki (Tokyo College of Transport Studies)</p> <p>Indirect legislation and Utility Study of the effectiveness of indirect legislation Brunon-Ernst, Anne (Panthéon-Assas University / Centre Bentham)</p> <p>Room: Econ., G</p>
	<p>Thursday, 21 August</p> <p>at Hall, University Library</p> <p>13:15 - 14:30</p>	
<p>Thursday, 21 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>IV</p> <p>14:45 - 16:30</p>	<p>IV-5 Liberty, Virtue and Utility (1)</p> <p>chair: Ambrosi, G. Michael</p> <p>Bentham on Private Ethics Takahima, Kazuya (Mall University)</p> <p>Is virtue ethics elitist? A response to the critique of perfectionist eudaimonism Amierska, Anna Switalaka (University of Warsaw-PhD student)</p> <p>Character, Energy, and Democracy: the unity of virtues in J. S. Mill's political philosophy Okamoto, Shinsuke (Hiroshima University-Graduate Student)</p> <p>Room: Econ., C</p>	<p>IV-6 Utilitarianism and Metaethics</p> <p>chair: Nakano-Okuno, Mariko</p> <p>The Certain Intrinsic Desirability of Pleasure Pavson, Inemar (University of Gothenburg)</p> <p>Foundationalism and Its Implications in J.S. Mill's Moral Philosophy Yamamoto, Keiichiro (University of Tokyo)</p> <p>Mill's Utilitarianism and His View of Moral Normativity Hsu, Hahn (National Chung Cheng University)</p> <p>Room: Econ., B</p>
	<p>Thursday, 21 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>V</p> <p>16:45 - 18:30</p>	<p>V-5 Liberty, Virtue and Utility (2)</p> <p>chair: Habibi, Don</p> <p>Challenges for a revised view of Bentham on public reasoning Shafer, James (University College London-PhD Candidate)</p> <p>On the coexistence of utility and liberal principle in J. S. Mill's theory Murata, Minami (Doshisha University-Master's Course Student)</p> <p>Eudaimonic aspects of utilitarianism by J. S. Mill Filhow, Riheta (University of Warsaw-doctoral student)</p> <p>Room: Econ., C</p>

Venue for the third day: Yokohama Port Opening Memorial Hall (Yokohama Kaiko Kinen Kaikan) in Basha-Michi

<p>Friday, 22 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>VI</p> <p>09:30 - 11:15</p>	<p>VI-5 Economic and Political Philosophy from Bentham to Rawls</p> <p>chair: Quidi, Marco</p> <p>Utilitarianism and Eugenics: Some Aspects of Pigou's Welfare Economics Yamazaki, Satoshi (Kochi University)</p> <p>Bentham's Biopolitics Eneaszmann, Stephen (University of Illinois at Chicago)</p> <p>Paternalistic Ideas in the Nineteenth Economic Thought Nakai, Daisuke (Kinki University)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>VI-6 Jurisprudence and Democracy</p> <p>chair: Obata, Shuntaro</p> <p>Happiness and Justice: Bentham on Courts in Democracy Lieberman, David (University of California, Berkeley)</p> <p>Jeremy Bentham: Architect of Jurisprudence Long, Douglas (University of Western Ontario)</p> <p>Bentham was right. Was he? Jiménez Sánchez, José Joaquín (University of Granada)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>VI-7 Utilitarianism and Social Reform</p> <p>chair: Himeno, Junichi (Nagasaki)</p> <p>Chrestomathia: exploded and unexploded shells within Bentham's plans for education Duba, Allison Douglas (Mount Royal University)</p> <p>The Educational Thoughts of Utilitarianism: Focusing on the position of art education Komatsu, Kayoko (Tokyo University of the Arts)</p> <p>Bentham and Utilitarian's Influence on Public Park Movement in England Sudo, Kumi (PREO Institute Inc. Representative Director and President)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>VI-8 Classical Eudaimonism in East and West</p> <p>chair: Zhai, Xibo</p> <p>On Spiritual Freedom and Happiness—A study of Zhuangzi's Philosophy Zhang, Xinyan (University of Redlands)</p> <p>Aristotle and the satisfaction of needs – concept and measurement Ambrosi, G. Michael (University of Trier)</p> <p>The Rise and Decline of 'Confucian Capitalist Thesis' in East Asia: Confucianism, Utilitarianism, and Economic Development Arié, Daisuke (Yokohama National University)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>
	<p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>Room: to be announced</p>

Venue for the third day: *Yokohama Port Opening Memorial Hall (Yokohama Kaiko Kinen Kaikan) in Basha-Michi*

<p>Friday, 22 August</p> <p>sessions</p> <p>VI</p> <p>09:30 - 11:15</p>	<p>VI-1 The Concept of Well-being Reconsidered</p> <p>chair: Woodard, Christopher</p> <p>Naturalism in the Recent Well-Being Literature Supports Naturalistic Moral Realism Chonabayashi, Eyo (Cardiff University - post-doc)</p> <p>Is Forgiveness Good for You? Sizewi, Andras (University of Tromsø - Post Doc)</p> <p>Should We Suffer At All? Kodama, Satochi (Kyoto University)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>VI-2 Well-being and Applied Ethics</p> <p>chair: Sin, William</p> <p>Ethics and Finance: such a dilemma? Mathon, Vincent-Emmanuel (Doctor of Philosophy & Engineer-independent senior consultant)</p> <p>Against Animal Experiments Asano, Kori (Toyota Technological Institute)</p> <p>Geopower and Wellbeing Di Paola, Marcello (LUISS University, Rome - Post-Doc)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>VI-3 Contemporary Issues of Utilitarianism</p> <p>chair: Ando, Ksotu</p> <p>Tracking Cost: Two Types of Emergencies Haydar, Basheer (American University of Beirut) Overland, Gerhard (University of Oslo)</p> <p>Partial Dualism and the No Self-Favoring View Paytas, Tyler (Washington University in St. Louis - Graduate Student)</p> <p>Social Sciences and Humanities Seaman, Jewel (Mahamakut Buddhist University - student)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>	<p>VI-1 Happiness, Population and Policy Goal</p> <p>chair: Nerita, Kazunobu</p> <p>A critical evaluation of the merits and limitations of utilitarianism as a normative consideration in population policy Mok, Francis (Hong Kong Institute of Education)</p> <p>Introducing Prospectism: A Population Axiology to Underpin Neutrality Grill, Kalle (Umeå University)</p> <p>Happiness as a policy goal. Implications and opportunities Fiesl, Martina (University of Florence)</p> <p>Room: to be announced</p>
	<p>Friday, 22 August</p> <p>11:30 - 12:45</p> <p>11:30- Keynote Lecture: Phillip Schofield at Hall, 1st Floor</p> <p>12:40- announcement</p> <p>((12:50- lunch in Basha-Michi Area))</p>			
	<p>Friday, 22 August</p> <p>14:15 - 16:20</p> <p>14:15- Panel with Keynote Speakers / General Discussion: Roger Crisp (Oxford) Chair: Douglas Long & Yasunori Fukagai at Hall, 1st Floor</p> <p>16:05- announcement</p> <p>16:10- greetings & closing (Bozzo-Rey, Malik & Arie, Daisuke)</p>			
	<p>Friday, 22 August</p> <p>18:00</p> <p>18:00- Farewell dinner by Cruising: Yokohama Harbour (by advanced booking)</p>			

How Should We Feel About Death?¹

5/1/14

What are the rational constraints on our desires and emotions concerning death? To clarify what I mean, I am not talking about prudential constraints. It might be that it is imprudent to fear death, or to have any other negative attitude or emotion about death, because experiencing fear, worry, horror or aversion is unpleasant. Perhaps you would be better advised not to think about death at all. These considerations are irrelevant to the question I am interested in. We might rephrase the question in terms of appropriateness or fittingness: what attitudes or emotions is it appropriate or fitting to have concerning death? Even if it is imprudent to fear death very much, it could still be fitting or appropriate to fear death. When I talk about rational emotion or rational attitudes, the latter is what I am talking about.


In what follows I will present a simple story about rational attitudes towards death. I'll give a reason to think the simple story cannot be true. I'll try to make some headway towards a solution that can handle the problem with the simple story. My effort will be at best only partly successful.

1. A Simple Story

A good way to start thinking about how we should feel about death would be by figuring out whether death is bad for us and why. Most philosophers who have thought about these questions have said that death is generally bad for us, and that what makes it bad is that it deprives the victim of more of a good life. We might go on to say something about degrees: how bad death is depends on how much of a good life it deprives its victim from having. Deprivation is a counterfactual notion: what death deprives a victim from having is what *would have happened* to the victim if she hadn't died.² Given optimistic assumptions about the quality of human life, death is therefore normally bad for people, and it is often one of the worst things that

¹ This paper is based on a presentation given at Rhodes University and Colgate University. Thanks to all those present for their helpful comments. Thanks especially to Travis Timmerman, Kirsten Egerstrom, Ward Jones, Jason Kawall, David Gray, Brooks Sommerville... for helpful comments and discussion.

² Nagel, Feldman, Broome, many others



can happen to someone. On this picture death is instrumentally bad for a person, not intrinsically bad for her. Death is bad for someone because of its results, not in itself.

This picture seems like it must be basically right. Some have argued for some bells and whistles to be added. For example, Jeff McMahan claims that the badness of death should be discounted based on, among other things, (1) the extent of the psychological relations that would have held between the person at the time of death and the person at the times she would have been getting the good things death deprived her from getting (the “time-relative interests account”), and (2) the extent to which the victim previously enjoyed a good life.³ For our purposes, we can ignore these bells and whistles.

What is good or bad?
How should we feel about death? This seems pretty simple too. According to “fitting attitude” analyses of value, to be good just is, roughly, to be the fitting object of pro-attitudes, and to be bad just is to be the fitting object of con-attitudes.⁴ Given the deprivation account of the badness of death along with our optimistic assumption, it follows that death is, typically, a fitting object of a negative attitude. Of course, fitting attitude analyses of value are controversial. I don’t wish to defend such analyses. But even if value cannot be analyzed in this way, a weaker claim may still be true: necessarily, something is bad if and only if it is the fitting object of a negative attitude. This would still entail that death merits a negative attitude.

Thus, negative attitudes towards death are, in general, perfectly rational. The end. That was easy. Thanks for reading!

2. Complications

Wait! Maybe things are not so simple. One complication is that there are a lot of negative attitudes one might have about death: fear, dread, worry, hatred, and many more. Someone might think that some negative attitude towards death is rational, but that fear in particular might not be. Scheffler seems to think that this is the main problem for the simple story I just told.⁵ I am not gripped by this problem. If it turns out that, say, dread is warranted but fear isn’t, is this important? I find it difficult to distinguish these emotions from each other anyway, so I just can’t get too worked up about which one is appropriate, unless perhaps one is felt more intensely than

³ McMahan 2002

⁴ Brentano...

⁵ Scheffler 2013, 87

the other (I return to this in Section 7). So I'll focus on other problems. The problem I am primarily worried about is what we might call the *problem of multiplicity of comparisons*

Suppose a young and healthy man named Jim steps in front of a bus and is severely injured; he quickly succumbs to his injuries. Is Jim's death bad for him? It seems plausible to say that it is. But it might also seem plausible to say that if Jim hadn't died when he did, he would have instead experienced a great amount of pain and suffering from being hit by the bus. So each of the following might be an appropriate account of what happened:

Jim got hit by a bus and died. What a shame! He was so young. If Jim hadn't died, he would have lived a long and healthy life.

Given that Jim got hit by a bus, it's probably better that he died. If he hadn't, he would have been severely injured instead. He wouldn't have wanted to live that way.

The first account contains the counterfactual "If Jim hadn't died, he would have lived a long and healthy life." The second implies the counterfactual "If Jim hadn't died he would have been severely injured." Can both of these be true, given that they are incompatible? Yes, because counterfactuals are vague.⁶ This vagueness gets resolved in different ways given conversational context; context helps determine which aspects of the situation we hold fixed when considering what would have happened if something hadn't happened. In this case, which counterfactual is true depends on whether or not we are holding fixed that Jim gets hit by the bus. Holding fixed that he gets hit, the second counterfactual seems true; otherwise the first seems true. Given the truth of the first counterfactual, Jim's death is very bad for him. Given the truth of the second counterfactual, his death is not bad for him. Yet neither counterfactual seems to have any kind of *privileged status*. When considering what would have happened if Jim hadn't died, there is no reason to think that it is particularly appropriate or inappropriate to hold fixed whether Jim is hit by the bus. (Note that this is not to say that anything goes when it comes to evaluating counterfactuals, or that an appropriate context could make any old counterfactual true. If someone says "if Jim hadn't died he would have turned into a hippopotamus," they are just

⁶ Lewis, Stalnaker...

wrong. Here I am not interested in getting deep into theories of counterfactuals -- all that matters is the sensitivity to context, however limited.)

The preceding thoughts about counterfactuals are by themselves boring and not at all original. But when applied to death they are surprising, because we would have thought that there is some absolute fact of the matter about whether someone's death is bad for her. But it seems there is not.

We might say that Jim's death is bad relative to context C1 but not bad relative to context C2. But this would be misleading because it might suggest that there is some monadic property that death sometimes has and sometimes lacks depending on what we are thinking about. Despite grammatical appearances, instrumental badness is not a monadic property. Attributions of instrumental value are fundamentally *contrastive*.⁷ What is bad for Jim is *dying rather than not being hit by the bus at all*. What is not bad for Jim is *dying rather than being severely injured*. There is no absolute fact of the matter about whether Jim's death, full stop, is bad for him, even though context can make an assertion of "Jim's death was bad for him" true. Context makes a particular contrast, or class of contrasts, salient. Thus when we utter a sentence like "Jim's death was bad for him," the reason we may speak truly is that what we say is to be understood as expressing the thought that *Jim's dying rather than not being hit by the bus* was bad for him -- and this is just a way of saying that it was worse for Jim to die than not to be hit by a bus.

If this account of the badness of death is correct, it complicates the picture about rational attitudes towards death. How should Jim feel about his death? Since there is no univocal answer to the question of whether his death is bad, it seems there is also no univocal answer to what attitude or emotion is appropriate for him to have. (The answer can't be: relative to one context he should fear it, but relative to another he shouldn't.) Death is better than some things and worse than others. Appealing to fitting attitudes does not help us, because fitting attitudes analyses of value apply only to *intrinsic* value, which is not inherently contrastive in this way. Remember, death is not intrinsically bad; it is bad because of what it deprives us of.

3. Low-Hanging Fruit: Preferences About Life and Death

⁷ Cf. Schaffer and Hitchcock on contrastive causation, Schaffer on contrastive knowledge...

Given that the badness of death is contrastive, when looking for an attitude that would be fitting to have towards death, we should look for a contrastive attitude. A natural candidate would be *preference*. We do not simply prefer that P; we prefer P to some Q.

When is a preference rational? This seems easy: it is rational to prefer P to Q iff P is better than Q. Thus Jim ought to greatly prefer living a long healthy life to dying, and he should be more or less indifferent between dying or living a short time longer in a severely injured state (depending on how much pain there is, maybe he should prefer death to continued life in such a state).

Here it will be helpful, however, to make a distinction. It may be rational to prefer P to Q even if P is worse than Q, as long as you have good reason to think that P is better than Q.⁸ This would be a “subjectively” rational, though incorrect, preference. Henceforth, I will generally talk of “correct” attitudes towards death rather than “rational” attitudes, since ‘rational’ is vague in this way.

So here is a simple part of the story about correct attitudes towards death: it is correct to prefer a particular future to death iff you would be better off given that future than if you died. But this still leaves out a lot. To prefer P to Q is consistent with liking both P and Q, and also with hating both P and Q. I prefer to have one arm chopped off than both, but I would hate for either to be chopped off. I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, but I like both. So merely preferring to live a long healthy life rather than to die is consistent with having positive attitudes towards both, or negative attitudes towards both. Having a positive attitude towards one’s death does not seem correct, nor does having a negative attitude towards survival when it would bring a good life. So our next question, which is the really difficult one, is to say what would justify a negative but non-contrastive attitude, such as fear or hatred, towards death.

4. Preference and Desire

In attempting to give conditions for an attitude towards death to be incorrect, let me start with the easiest case. Consider someone who has a good life to look forward to, and is fully aware of this, but has a *positive* attitude towards death, e.g. *desires* death. Surely this person has an incorrect attitude. How can we account for this?

⁸ Thanks to Travis Timmerman for pointing this out.

There may be a close connection between preferences and some attitudes. For example we might identify preference with a certain sort of desire. Some desires are conditional.⁹ I desire to go to Binghamton tomorrow on the condition that my tennis match is not canceled. The object of my desire is that I go to Binghamton; but my desire has a condition: that my match is not canceled. If I go to Binghamton but the match is canceled, my desire is not satisfied even though the object of my desire obtains. My desire is also not frustrated. McDaniel and I argue that in this case my desire is canceled or void – it is in a way as if this desire never happened. (Of course, I also have other desires that would be frustrated, e.g. the desire to play tennis tomorrow.) We can understand preference in terms of conditional desire: I prefer P to Q if and only if I desire that P on the condition that either P or Q but not both. Suppose S, incorrectly, prefers death to a good life. It follows that S desires to die on the condition *that S lives a worthwhile life or S dies*; so that desire must also be incorrect, since it is identical to an incorrect preference.

rational
preference

My point here is not to defend the identification of preference with this sort of conditional desire. However, it does seem that whenever one has a desire of this sort, one is committed to having the associated preference, even if the preference and the desire are not identical. If that preference is incorrect, then so is the desire. Other attitudes may be in this way like desire: having the attitude commits one to having some preference. So if I fear death on the condition that I die or live a good life, my fear commits me to preferring a good life to dying.

If this is all correct then it may be incorrect to have certain desires to die. A pro-attitude towards death that is conditional in the way just described has death as its object (along with a complicated thing as its condition). This gives us something in addition to what preference gives us, since one can prefer P to Q while not having a pro-attitude to either. Disappointingly, however, this hasn't really got us very much at all. Just as one can prefer one arm chopped off to both yet hate to have any arms chopped off, someone can desire to live on the condition that one lives a good life or dies, but still hate or like both options unconditionally.

5. Phenomenology

What are we missing? We haven't yet said anything about *phenomenology*. We need to make an important distinction between kinds of desires (and perhaps of other attitudes). Some

⁹ Parfit; Bradley and McDaniel

are "warm," and others are "cold." David Lewis explains the difference as follows: "Some desires, for instance your desire to have Neiss for a colleague, are warm- you feel enthusiasm, you take pleasure in the prospect of fulfilment. Other desires, for instance your desire to hire the best available candidate, are cold." (Lewis 323) Warm and cold desires are distinguished by their associated phenomenology. (This is a move made by Humeans in an attempt to defend the claim that all intentional action is motivated by desire.) When I have a desire to have one arm chopped off on the condition that one or both will be chopped off, my desire is cold. It is a bare preference, not a liking. When I desire chocolate ice cream on the condition that I get chocolate or vanilla, my desire is warm, though of course it wouldn't be for someone who didn't like ice cream.

Suppose you desire to live a good life on the condition that (you die or you live a good life). And suppose this by itself just amounts to a preference for living over dying. There will remain the question of what "warm" attitude one should have towards death. Your desire that P on the condition that (P or Q) can be cold or warm. Your desire that P on the condition that (P or Q) seems justifiable or not depending on the values of P and Q; but what justifies warmth of desire?

Perhaps something phenomenological, such as the feel of a desire, can be neither correct nor incorrect. We might find it strange if someone were not to have certain feelings when contemplating certain future events. But strangeness is not the same thing as incorrectness. This is not to say that attitudes and emotions cannot be incorrect. This would be the case only if they were mere feelings like feelings of warmth, but many have thought that emotions have a cognitive component,¹⁰ and certainly attitudes such as desire do. Perhaps this cognitive component can be expressed as a preference, and we can therefore rationally assess emotions by assessing their preference component. But the phenomenological component of an attitude or emotion seems more difficult to assess rationally. This could help explain why certain attitudes towards death don't seem incorrect. For example, someone might prefer to live rather than die, but not get too worked up about it. She might be free from feelings of terror or fear, though take prudent steps to avoid premature death. Such a person seems, for all I have said so far, not to deserve to be called irrational.

Maybe we really need to be more permissive than we might have thought when it comes to correct attitudes towards death. Maybe we should say that any set of attitudes that is consistent

¹⁰ cites

phenomenological state : 係的 係的 係的 (2748) 係的 係的 係的 係的

係的 係的

01

with a correct preference structure and with fitting attitudes towards what is intrinsically good or bad is rationally permissible. A neutral attitude towards one's death might be not only prudentially wise but also correct. It is your prerogative how to feel about such things, so long as (i) your preferences conform to the values of outcomes for you, and (ii) you don't have unfitting attitudes towards the intrinsically good or bad.

I am tempted by this permissive view, but it seems to me that we cannot settle for saying that preferences (and attitudes reducible to preference) are criticizable while phenomenology is not. For we have attitudes towards death that are not contrastive, not reducible to preference, that we want to be able to criticize, whether they are warm or cold. I have a fear of death that is not reducible to any preference, and I want to know whether it is correct to have that fear. I have a desire not to die, and I am not at all confident that my desire is reducible to a preference for living rather than dying. My desires and fears have death as their object, and do not seem contrastive. So I continue to wonder: how can we get an account of the correctness of non-contrastive attitude or emotion out of an account of the correctness of preference?

6. Emotion regulated by preference?

Sometimes it seems that one attitude regulates another. Beliefs, for example, can regulate other attitudes. Suppose I have a hatred of high-fat foods that is based on a belief that such foods are unhealthy: if I were to abandon that belief, I would no longer hate those foods. In such a case, we might criticize my hatred by criticizing the belief on which it is based. Suppose high-fat foods are not unhealthy. Then my belief is false, and so my hatred is incorrect. Likewise, if my belief that high-fat foods are unhealthy is unjustified by my evidence, then my hatred is subjectively irrational. The defect in the belief infects the attitude it regulates.

We might say a similar thing about preference. A non-contrastive attitude such as fear may be regulated by a preference in the same way it can be regulated by a belief. In such a case, when the preference is incorrect, so is the fear. Thus, if I have a fear of death that is regulated by a correct preference to live rather than to die, my fear of death is correct too; it inherits its correctness from the preference that regulates it (as long as it does not go wrong in some other way).

A correct attitude cannot be regulated by just any correct preference. Suppose I desire to die, but my desire is (somehow!) regulated by a correct preference to live rather than die. In principle this could be possible even if it is hard to imagine such a person. The desire would be incorrect because there is a mismatch between the desire and what regulates it.

Thus we might accept the following principles governing correctness of non-contrastive attitudes:

PI: A pro-attitude A towards P is incorrect if either: ¹¹

- (i) P is intrinsically bad; or
- (ii) A is regulated by an incorrect preference for P rather than some Q; or
- (iii) A is regulated by a preference for some Q rather than P. ¹²

CI: A con-attitude A towards P is incorrect if either:

- (i) P is intrinsically good; or
- (ii) A is regulated by an incorrect preference for ~~R~~^Q rather than some ~~P~~^Q; or
- (iii) A is regulated by a preference for some ~~Q~~^P rather than ~~P~~^Q.

This is a very incomplete view. It does not give us necessary and sufficient conditions for an attitude to be correct or incorrect. It leaves open the possibility that an attitude could be neither correct nor incorrect. And it does not include anything about degrees. Suppose negative attitude E towards P is regulated by the belief that P is worse than Q. But suppose the attitude is mild even though P is much worse than Q, or the attitude is strong even though P is only a little worse than Q. Those seem like incorrect attitudes too – not in valence but in strength. A complete view of the correctness of attitudes should have a proportionality constraint: the degree of a negative emotion should be proportionate to its regulating belief or preference.

What if S has a pro-attitude A towards something P that is intrinsically good, but A is regulated by an incorrect preference for P rather than some Q (because Q is in fact better than P)? Then S's attitude towards A would be both correct and incorrect. But maybe that is just the right thing to say. We should distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic pro-attitudes. One can

¹¹ I say 'only if' because the attitude could still be incorrect if based on a false belief, and probably for other reasons too. I am not attempting to come up with exhaustive conditions for incorrectness.

¹² What about cases where an attitude towards P is regulated by preferences concerning something completely irrelevant to P? Maybe those attitudes should be incorrect too, for similar reasons of mismatch.

have a pro-attitude towards P for itself, and a con-attitude towards P regulated by a preference for Q rather than P. Each of those attitudes must be evaluated on its own. There is no inconsistency in having different attitudes towards P as long as only one of the attitudes is intrinsic.

I think this view will explain many cases of incorrect attitudes towards death. There are many other cases, however, where this view is silent, but where something seems to be going wrong with respect to attitudes towards death. For example:

- (a) the person who is constantly in total fear of death, and whose fear is regulated by a correct preference to live rather than die: 死亡 100% 好.
- (b) the person who desires to die, whose desire is regulated by a correct preference to die rather than be tortured for eternity: 死亡 100% 好, 永生 100% 坏.
- (c) the person who desires to die, whose desire is not regulated by any preferences at all. 死亡, 永生 都好.

What can we say about these cases? I am not very confident about how to deal with them, but there are some possibilities. We might accuse the first two people of a kind of irrationality that does not have to do with incorrect attitudes towards death. (a) Perhaps fearing death all the time is inconsistent with also having appropriate attitudes towards other things, so even though the fear is correct, it makes an overall negative contribution to the correctness of one's attitudes and emotions. (b) The preference to die rather than be tortured for eternity is a correct preference, but since being tortured for eternity is not a realistic possibility, this person is irrational in a different way. This person is in some ways like the person who gets very upset about not having found Aladdin's lamp or the fountain of youth. To be rational, one's attitudes should be directed primarily at objects that are realistic. If being tortured for eternity were realistic, this desire would cease to seem irrational. (c) Perhaps having a desire that is completely unregulated in this way is itself irrational; we might just want to add another clause to CI to the effect that an unregulated desire is incorrect. But what's wrong with having a desire that is not regulated by a preference? This person might just be very unusual but not rationally criticizable.

Handwritten notes on the right side of the page:

- Next to (a): 死亡 100% 好
- Next to (b): 死亡 100% 好, 永生 100% 坏
- Next to (c): 死亡, 永生 都好
- Next to paragraph (b): 不现实
- Next to paragraph (c): irrational, desire
- Bottom right: 100% 好, 100% 坏

7. Conclusion and Remaining Questions about Serenity and Existential Terror

Here, then, are some ways that you might have incorrect attitudes towards death. You might fail to have a pro-attitude towards the intrinsic goods of which death deprives you, or a con-attitude towards the intrinsic evils. You might prefer to die rather than live, even though living would be better for you than dying; or you might prefer to live rather than die even though dying would be better for you; or you might have a desire or other attitude that is identical to such a preference. Finally, you might have a fear or other con-attitude towards death that is regulated by an incorrect or mismatching preference or a false or mismatching belief. Perhaps there are other ways to have an incorrect attitude too.

There is another pair of cases that are puzzling to me. I raise them mainly to indicate that I don't know how to deal with them. Recall the discussion in Section 4 of the serene person. This person prefers not to die, but has no feelings of fear or terror concerning death. I suggested that this person doesn't seem susceptible to criticism for being irrational in any way.

Now consider the person who feels existential terror or angst at the prospect of death. When considering that at some future time, she will no longer exist, she is filled with terror. She does not obsess about it, but contemplating a future in which she is simply not there is terrifying to her.

It seems to me that this person might also be rational. A question that arises is, how can both of these people be rational when they have such different attitudes towards the same thing? Doesn't this suggest that attitudes towards death are like tastes in ice cream?

I am not sure what to say about this. But it seems to me that existential terror poses a problem for the general framework I have presupposed. Terror is not normally a fitting attitude to have towards a mere deprivation of well-being. It is too intense. When we are going to miss out on some good things, we may be sad but not terrified. Consider also that you can have existential terror even if you know you do not have much of a good life to look forward to. The intensity of the terror is disproportionate to the loss of well-being.

This suggests that to account for the correctness of existential terror requires moving to a framework that does not explain the correctness of an emotion by appeal to potential gains or losses of well-being. Perhaps it could be explained instead by appeal to meaningfulness. The prospect of going out of existence terrifies because it threatens to make one's existence, one's activities and goals, meaningless.¹³ Meaningfulness and well-being are distinct axes of valuation;

¹³ Cf. A. Rorty 104

one might be well-off even though one's life is completely without meaning, and one might have a meaningful life but be badly off.

It is far from clear either that a finite existence cannot be meaningful, or that there is any particular link between terror and meaninglessness. Whether considerations of meaninglessness can fully explain the correctness of existential terror will await further investigation.

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A Third Method of Ethics?

Introduction

Baron et al:

In recent years, three ways of thinking about morality have come largely to dominate the landscape of ethical debate. These three are consequentialism, which emphasizes good results as the basis for evaluating human actions; Kantian ethics, which focuses on universal law and respect for others as the basis for morality; and virtue ethics, which views moral questions from the standpoint of the moral agent with virtuous character or motives. (*Three Methods*, 1)

Hursthouse:

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximise well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as 'Do unto others as you would be done by' and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent. (*Stanford Enc.*)

§ 1. Criteria, Explanations, and Consequentialism

Accounts of right action:

C

- P. 1. An action is right iff it promotes the best consequences.
- P. 2. The best consequences are those in which happiness is maximized.

D

- P. 1. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a correct moral rule or principle.
- P. 2. A correct moral rule (principle) is one that ...
 - e.g.
 - (1) ... is on the following list, or
 - (2) ... is laid down for us by God, or ...

V

- P.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.
- P.1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely, the virtues.
- P. 2. A virtue is a character trait that ...
 - e.g.
 - (1) ... is on the following list, or ...
 - (2) ... is a trait a human being needs to flourish, or ...

These views are consistent. But elucidating them will make them inconsistent.

property < good-making
right-making

The importance of *explaining* rightness:

C*

- P. 1. An action is right *solely in virtue of* its promoting the best consequences.
- P. 2. Consequences are best *solely in virtue of* their being those in which happiness is maximized.

C**

- P. 1. An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting the best consequences.
- P. 2. Consequences are best solely in virtue of their being those in which flourishing is maximized.

Consider now the following positions:

Happiness-Maximization (HM): An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting happiness.

Flourishing-Maximization (FM): An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting flourishing.

11/2/21
11/2/21

HM*

- P.1. An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting happiness.
- P.2. Consequences are best solely in virtue of their being those in which the balance of happiness and aesthetic value is maximized.

The *central consequentialist claim*: an action is right solely in virtue of its promoting the best consequences. The consequentialist 'family'.

§ 2. Deontology

! = Ross ... obligations = rules?

D*: An action is right solely in so far as it is in accordance with a correct moral rule or principle.

Principle-based and non-principle-based forms of deontology.

§ 3. What the Virtuous Person Would Characteristically Do and the Virtuousness of Action

V*: An action is right solely in virtue of its being what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.

V**: An action is right solely in virtue of its being virtuous.

act by from

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean:

For example, fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and in general pleasure and pain can be experienced too much or too little, and in both ways not well. But to have them at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the mean and best; and this is the business of virtue. Similarly, there is an excess, a deficiency and a mean in actions. (*Nic. Ethics*, 1106b18-24)

! reasons

Virtuousness = rightness. Example: Generosity. This is standard deontology.

00/25

Ronald Dworkin
this is morality

... of the system {
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§4. Motives and Acting Virtuously

Does virtue ethics focus on motive?

Motives and consequentialism.

Motives and deontology.

Ross:

John Mill

[W]hen we ask what is the general nature of morally good actions, it seems quite clear that it is in virtue of the motives that they proceed from that actions are morally good. Moral goodness is quite distinct from and independent of rightness, which ... belongs to acts *not* in virtue of the motives they proceed from, but in virtue of the nature of what is done. (*Right and the Good*, 156)

The virtuous/virtuously distinction (VV): A *virtuous* action in certain circumstances is what is required in those circumstances and what a virtuous person would do in those, or relevantly similar, circumstances. A virtuous action is done *virtuously* (at least in part) when it is done from a firm disposition to perform actions of such a kind (that is, from a virtue).

Kamm, on virtue.
(x)

Hume:

If any *action* be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never consider'd in morality.

This reflexion is self-evident, and deserves to be attended to, as being of the utmost importance in the present subject. We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or character from which the action proceeded. These alone are *durable* enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person. Actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but 'tis only so far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame. (*Treatise*, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 1, 575)

Ronnie and Reggie: Ronnie and Reggie are vicious gangsters. They are equally ready to kill, torture, and terrorize people, and do so to the same extent. On one occasion, both of them are confronted by someone whose life is in danger and needs help. Ronnie feels sorry for this individual, and helps her, thereby acting in an entirely uncharacteristic way. Reggie, as usual, doesn't.

Distinguish the value of acting rightly from the value of possessing a disposition to act rightly. The categorical basis of such dispositions: habituated states of character along with practical wisdom.

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24 August 2014

Duty, Supererogation, and Utilitarianism

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The Issue

- Utilitarianism in its classical formulation (CU) states that an action is right if and only if this action is, among alternatives available to the agent, the best as to bring about the greatest happiness. This formulation is called classical as it can be found in classical utilitarians such as Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Sidgwick.
- This classical or maximizing utilitarianism is often criticized, among others, for being unable to moralize the supererogatory actions. Call this the supererogation criticism (SC).
- This paper is to argue that CU can be defended against SC and can deal with SC at least in some way no worse, if not better, than some alternative views of utilitarianism on this issue.

CU vis-à-vis SC

- CU receives SC in virtue of its maximization requirement of moral conduct.
 - A supererogatory action is one beyond the call of duty.
 - CU requires that an action be right only if it brings about the greatest general happiness, actual or expected.
 - So, according to CU, nothing is beyond the call of duty.
 - So, there is no action of the quality that is beyond the call of duty.

The Credibility of SC

- SC as a criticism of utilitarianism is credible only if supererogation is indeed a type of moral action.
- But is it credible?
- To be credible, SC needs to address some conceptual and substantive issues as well.
 - A line of thinking:
 - It seems that a conceptual work may be substantively pointless. For example, if UC is indeed the correct theory of morality, then SC would be irrelevant, if not incorrect.
 - So, it seems the success of SC need be supported by a substantive moral theory which justifies the claim that supererogatory actions are morally significant.

Two Tasks for SC

- The conceptual
 - A conceptual work towards SC of CU attempts to show that there are various types of moral actions which include the supererogatory.
- The substantiv
 - A substantive theory of morality has to show that supererogatory actions are indeed morally significant.
 - The relationship between the normative and the metaethical inquiries is concerned by some like Darwall (1998), Dworkin (2011).

Types of Moral Actions

- A prima facie analysis indicates that moral actions can be classified into three types:
 - **Obligatory**
 - An obligatory action is morally required in two ways:
 - it is right to do and wrong not to do, or
 - it is wrong to do and right not to do.
 - The first is usually called 'obligatory', the second 'prohibitive'.
 - **Permissible**
 - A permissible action can be one of two different sorts:
 - It is morally neutral, nothing right or wrong, or
 - It is one among equally morally right actions available to the agent.
 - The first is morally irrelevant, the second morally meaningful.
 - **Supererogatory**
 - An action can be supererogatory in two senses:
 - It is morally meaningful but not obligatory.
 - It is done with a very high value (a heroic or saintly action) or because of great self-sacrifice like martyr.
 - It is done with little or trivial value like being polite or being kind in a social encountering.

Morality of Supererogation

- Is supererogation a quality of an action?
 - Whether yes or no, it involves moral assessments.
- Moral assessments.

Moral Assessments

- The morality of an agent taking an action can be assessed strictly or more broadly.
 - The strict assessment is done only by looking into the moral qualities of actions in terms of the fundamental principle, say, the utilitarian principle.
 - The broader assessment looks into not only moral rightness of actions, but moral qualities of agents as well.

Supererogation - 1

- The common view of a supererogatory action is vague. For it is not clear whether the attribution of supererogation can be based on either a strict or a broader assessment of the moral quality of the target phenomenon – an agent taking an action.

Supererogation - 2

- According to the three-type analysis of moral actions, a supererogatory action can be morally significant in two ways both of which appeal to the notion of moral value (great or small), distinct from that of moral rightness.

Supererogation - 3

- When one attributes supererogation to an action, he at the same time is morally assessing the given action with regard both to the moral rightness of the action and to the moral value of the agent.
 - A supererogatory action must not only be a morally right action itself but also be done by an altruistic agent.
 - It seems that a ‘genuinely’ supererogatory action cannot be done from a selfish motive.

SC and CU's Response

- SC holds only when the broader moral assessment is adopted.
- But CU can bite the bullet since CU can claim that morality is concerned only with the moral qualities of actions. So CU is thus immune from SC.
 - CU's response is closely related to another criticism of CU: CU is too demanding. CU can be tough on this also.

- Can CU take the broader view of moral assessment of actions? Or, does CU simply remain true to its own view of morality?
- There are alternative theories of utilitarianism other than CU.

Alternative Response to SC by Utilitarian - 1

- Satisficing utilitarianism can accommodate the broader view (M. Slote 1989, P. Pettit 1997).
 - An action is right iff it brings about good enough amount of general happiness.
 - So whatever action brings about more than good enough can be assessed as supererogatory.
 - But satisficing view seems problematic.
 - 1. Arbitrariness of threshold:
 - 2. Too many excuses or Self-indulgence, if 1:

Alternative Response to SC by CU – 2a

- The notion of supererogation involves big or small sacrifice of the agent. CU can adopt the broader view of moral assessment of actions when such sacrifice figures in the moral assessment of actions.
 - This can be done by being sensitive to the distribution of utilities across persons produced by the action.
 - Having this sensitivity, CU then gives discount of the moral weight to the happiness of the agent himself. (cf. J-P Vessel 2010)

Alternative Response to SC by CU – 2b

- An action bring about different amounts of utilities to different people. CU can give an action the moral status of supererogation when the action is not only one among the right actions but also brings less utilities to the agent than other equally right actions.

- **Thus, CU not only is sensitive to the moral significance of self-sacrifice of the agent but also attributes a moral status to supererogatory actions.**

summary

- So CU has two strategies to deal with SC.
 - The first is to hold its ground without being moved by SC.
 - The other is to be sensitive to agent's sacrifice in the way shown above.
- The first can be consistently held but with less explanatory power than the second.
- I have attempted to show how the second one can work.

- The issue of supererogation is not adequately addressed if we come short of talking about another aspect of moral assessments which is responsibility.
- A moral theory can be concerned only with standard of morality of actions ONLY.
- But a moral theory can and should be concerned also about agents.
 - Moral assessments of agents are typically done by looking into how responsible an agent is.

Responsibility

- Agents are responsible to act morally.
 - This is normative, rather than descriptive, though it must be true that agents can choose from different courses of actions.
- The moral responsibility borne by an agent can be of different normative strengths.
 - The obligatory imposes inescapable deontic responsibility on agents.
 - The permissible imposes no moral responsibility when the action is morally neutral. But when an agent situated to choose among equally right actions, each alternative as permissible is only right that imposes the same deontic responsibility in virtue of its being right.
 - The supererogatory imposes only optional moral responsibility with some great or small aretaic values.

Duty and Virtue

- Moral assessments can be concerned about moral qualities of actions or of agents. ‘Duty’ is the name of the morally right actions, ‘virtue’ the morally good agents.
 - Two equally wealthy persons donate equal amount of money to charity with roughly the same benefits to the needy. But one person does this from a sense of care or benevolence, the other for fame.
 - Their actions are equally right or have equal moral values.
 - These two persons are evaluated differently.
 - The first person has a moral value in his character, the second much less or no moral value.

CU, Responsibility and Virtue

- A person fulfills her deontic duty (acting rightly) regularly is a responsible person.
- A virtuous person fulfills aretaic responsibility persistently.
- CU, according to this paper, can account for these without giving up the maximization principle.

• Thank you.

The 2nd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia (the 2nd COPEA)

Day 2, October 27, 2014

9:30	<p>Keynote Lecture 4 Leon HORSTEN (University of Bristol, UK) Absolute Infringement and Reflection Principles</p>					<p>Moderator Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University)</p>
10:15	<p>Coffee Break</p>					
10:25	<p>Keynote Lecture 5 Wan-Chuan FANG (Soochow University, Taipei / Academia Sinica, Taiwan) Choice and the Analects— On Fingaretto's Views</p>					
11:10	<p>Coffee Break</p>					
	Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E	Room F
Moderator	Shigeyuki AOKI	Yuko MURAKAMI	Daihyun CHUNG	Naozumi MITANI	Nobuo KAZASHI	Taku SASAKI
11:30	<p>2A1 Hidenori SUZUKI (Nanzan University) What does "industry prepares experiment" mean? its content and implication</p>	<p>2B1 Mana SUZUKI (Kyoto University) How to think about the paradox of Ushenko's picture "A New Epimenides"</p>	<p>2C1 Huiming REN (Shandong University of China) Experience as Knowledge: a Reply to the Knowledge Argument</p>	<p>2D1 Bosuk YOON (Ewha Womans University) Cognitive Penetration and Perceptual Justification</p>	<p>2E1 Sanghyong SHIN (Andong National University) Ryu Yeongmo's Interpretation of "God"</p>	<p>2F1 Benedict S. B. GHAN (Hang Sang Management College) Comparing Utilitarianism, Feminism, and Confucianism in Animal Ethics</p>
12:00	<p>2A2 Ruey-Lin CHEN (National Chung Cheng University) Cross-contextual Projection and Generalization: Revising Popper's Solution for Induction Problem via the Problem of Repetitive Experiences</p>	<p>2B2 Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding PEDERSEN (Underwood International College, Yonsei University) Truth and sub-logical pluralism</p>	<p>2C2 Taeryang KIM (Seoul National University) Not A Case For A Priori Deducibility</p>	<p>2D2 Ryo CHONABAYASHI Normative Explanations and Reductive Explanation Problem</p>	<p>2E2 Fuchuan YAO (Chinese Culture University) A Critique of Non-spatialist View of Buddhist Ethics</p>	<p>2F2 Michael CAMPBELL (Kyoto University) Being-for and Being-with in the Philosophy of Watsuji Tetsuro</p>
12:30	<p>Coffee Break</p>					
Moderator	Kazuhisa TODAYAMA	Masashi KASAKI	Tetsuya KONO	Kazunobu NARITA	Yasuo DEGUCHI	Satoshi KODAMA
14:00	<p>2A3 Bo-Chi G. LAI (Da-Yeh University) New Approach to Responding Modern Debates of Species Concept</p>	<p>2B3 Yohan JOO (Yonsei University) Epistemic Virtue, Luck and Knowledge</p>	<p>2C3 Masahiro MORIOKA (Osaka Prefecture University) Persons: Another Aspect of the Concept of Person</p>	<p>2D3 Makoto SUZUKI (Nanzan University) The Mathematical Representation of Moral Structures</p>	<p>2E3 Ick Hee KOO (Sogang University) Aristotle on Blind Spot</p>	<p>2F3 Bo OHEN (Fukuoka University) Socio-historical Causal Descriptivism An Alternative Theory of Names</p>
14:30	<p>2A4 Hsiao-Fan YEH (National Chung Cheng University) Discovering Mechanism, Manipulative Investigation, and Date Model: An Example from C. H. Weddington's Work</p>	<p>2B4 Lin FENG (National University of Singapore) Faultless Disagreement</p>	<p>2C4 Takafumi KATO (Kyoto University) How can Peirce's theory of mind be reconstructed in the contemporary context?</p>	<p>2D4 Tomoko ISHIDA (Keio University) Prototypic View of Moral Judgment</p>	<p>2E4 Takahashi SASAKI (Kansai University) William James's argument on the Ethos of Belief</p>	<p>2F4 Nobutsugu KANZAKI (Shiga University) Need for a new, a Species Environmental Ethics</p>
15:00	<p>2A5 Jonathan HIRIOKO (Academia Sinica) Retail Realism and Wholesale Treatments of Theoretical Entities</p>	<p>2B5 Toshihiro SUZUKI (Sophia University) Phenomenology of Intuitions of Skilled Experts</p>	<p>2C5 Kriszjan LAASIK (Shandong University) Distant Things: A Closer Look</p>	<p>2D5 Ralf M. BADER (Merton College, University of Oxford) Hyperintensionality and the supervenience argument</p>		
15:30	<p>Coffee Break</p>					
Moderator	Ruey-Lin CHEN	Nobutsugu KANZAKI	Sho YAMAUCHI	Shunsuke SUGIMOTO	Yasuo DEGUCHI	Michael CAMPBELL
15:40	<p>2A6 Hitoshi HIYAGON (The Institution of Professional Engineers, Japan) Kazuhisa TODAYAMA (Nagoya University) The prospect of professionalization of engineers in Japan</p>	<p>2B6 Gerard VONG (Fordham University/Australian National University) Anti-Majoritarianism = Against Always Benefiting the Greatest Number</p>	<p>2C6 Oiwook WON (Korea Institute for Advanced Study) Kim and Gordon on Action Explanation and Mental Simulation</p>	<p>2D6 Yoshiyuki YOKORO (Keio University) Butler's Distinction Defended: The Nonidiotic Contextuality of "Identity"</p>	<p>2E6 Jong Uk LEE (Sogang University) Swedenborg's Influence on Kant's Theory of Time and Space</p>	<p>2F6 Motohiro KUMASAKA (The University of Tokushima) Re-thinking Anthropocentrism in Japanese Culture: Non-anthropocentric Naturalism and Anthropocentric Communication with Nature</p>
16:10	<p>2A7 Hiroya SHIMOYAMA (Nagoya University) The origins of technique and relaxation time</p>	<p>2B7 Hahn HSU (National Chung Cheng University) Duty, Supererogation, and Utilitarianism</p>	<p>2C7 Chia-lin TU (Chang Jung Christian University) Ontology of Emergentism on Mind-Body Problem</p>	<p>2D7 Kunimasa SATO (Nihon University / University of Miami) Sensitizing Reasons by Emulating Exemplars</p>	<p>2E7 Il hwan YU (Sogang University) A Study on Political Implication of sensus communis in Kant's Aesthetics</p>	<p>2F7 Sanghyu SHIN (Ewha Womans University) The Ethical Implications of Human Nature and the Prospect of Posthumanity</p>
16:40	<p>Coffee Break</p>					
Moderator	Tetsuji ISEDA		Tora KOYAMA	Makoto SUZUKI		
16:50	<p>2A8 Yasuo NAKAYAMA (Osaka University) An Evolutionary Theory for Science and Technology</p>		<p>2C8 Steven Michael JAMES (Japan University of Economics) The Roots of Triangulation in the Proximal-Distal Debate: Davidson's Rejection of Quine's Dualism and the Problems of Error and Objectivity</p>	<p>2D8 Naozumi MITANI (Shinshu University) The Return of the Dad - On Millikan-Brandson debate about the legacy of Wilfrid Sellars</p>		
17:20	<p>2A9 Inkyo CHUNG (Korea University) Validity of arguments: Proof-theoretic accounts</p>		<p>2C9 Tetsuya KONDO (Rikkyo University) Towards a new ontology of Information</p>	<p>2D9 Chih-ming HU (National Chengchi University) Simultaneous Causation? Some Remarks on the Notion of Sahabhō-hetu</p>		
17:50	<p>Coffee Break</p>					
18:00	<p>Closing Remarks: Masahiko MIZUTANI (Kyoto University, Japan) In-Rae CHO (Seoul National University, Korea)</p>					
18:10	<p>Closed</p>					