

出國報告（出國類別：進修）

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(Harvard Kennedy School)
進修報告

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摘要

兩岸關係自 2008 年以來，持續低調而穩定地影響著我國外交方針。即便檯面上暫顯降溫，然雙邊關係仍如地磁力量般無時無刻地牽動我外交資源之分布與走向，無論我策棋何處，都不得被動地依循地磁線方向因應調整策略。

兩岸局勢倘能妥處，即如蛇打七寸，省卻後續連帶之氣力虛耗。面對中國大陸快速崛起及全球佈局態勢，筆者認為中國對於兩岸的政治談判將不會有「留待下個世代解決」之耐性。我政府應走在局勢之前，預作談判規劃及輿論佈局，方能乘民主之力道掌握台灣未來命運之主控權，而非任由惡鬥下的政黨操控及盲目的民意淹沒方向，方能有效地防守並創造台灣人民福利。

本次進修目的，除加強自身談判能力訓練、國際關係素養，亦盼瞭解以小國地位，如何在兩岸迴旋及其他大國角力混戰之中，策略性爭取槓桿優勢及自我保全。

筆者在溝通藝術課程中，“Story Telling”所作之演講經教授點評表現優異，以書面詢求本人授權將該演講錄影片段作為未來示範教材內容。另在政治寫作課程，筆者致聯合國基金會資深顧問 Gillian Martin Sorensen 之倡議信亦經教授以書面詢問本人意願將該篇文章留作教材。相關內容，謹檢附為報告附錄。

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壹、進修目的

筆者於 2013 年短期赴美國布魯金斯研究所（Brookings Institution）從事國際非政府組織相關專題研究進修時，曾乘華府地利之便參與多場周邊智庫之研討會、布魯金斯研究所「認識國會」訓練課程（Executive Program），並赴喬治城大學（Georgetown University）旁聽國際關係等。幾次面對老美分析我國國情侃侃而談，觀點見解之鞭辟入裡，令我折服，自嘆弗如，深感自我專業能力及對國際議題認知程度實有不足。

回顧 13 年公務生涯，我似已漸受形塑成為標規之政策傳達及執行者，而批判、思考、創新、及自我成長能力卻逐漸消磨殆盡。回想剛進部時尚自恃外語能力不差，胸懷未來致力提升國格之熱情與自信，如今竟隨年歲增長，反失去在國外學術及外交戰場積極與學術精英論辯交鋒之能力及膽識。自忖身為外交人員，本應具更大勇氣及涵養，方有能力與資格在海外捍衛國家利益、代表國家形象。身為戰場位國境之外的外交人員，僅在追求平安順遂的公務生涯中默默凋零，確有不甘。

拜華府三個月「震撼教育」所賜，筆者決意於返國後即爭取出國進修機會，以加強國際政治相關學養，培養策略分析及外語遊說辯證能力，俾未來面臨挑戰時，有信心及實力貢獻所知所學，不辱使命。

貳、過程

一、前言

兩岸關係自 2008 年以來，如地球磁場般持續低調而穩定地影響著我國的外交方針。檯面上外交爭奪戰爭似顯暫時休兵而不易察覺，但來自基底的地磁力量仍無時無刻地強力左右我國外交資源之分佈與走向，無論我外交布局在地表的任何角落，都不得被動地依循地磁線的方向因應調整策略。

中國大陸在習近平的領導下，國力全面而快速地提升，挑戰美國全球霸權地位。除其軍事力量穩定提升之外，經濟上亦積極推動人民幣國際化，結合金磚成員設立新開發銀行（New Development Bank），並以強大的外匯存底提升與非洲、拉美及中東的投資夥伴關係，即使是美國歷來最親密的盟友—英國，近亦被中國的投資經貿大禮叩開白金漢宮大門。兩國外交手段及全球佈局之消長，即便在動盪的中東亦得見明顯對比：美國自布希時代開始動搖國本地介入與干涉，換來的卻是大伊斯蘭教世界日益高漲的反美情緒，但中國的影響力卻能默默透過經濟力量滲透，以開發資源、投資礦場等方式，獲得默許甚至各地軍閥保護。文化層面上，短短十年之間，中國已在全球超過 120 個國家（地區）成立約 475 所孔子學院，成為最有力的文化輸出工廠，並有計畫地以國家經費贊助特定類型電影及電視劇的全球性輸出，置入性行銷文化形象、試圖扭轉價值認同。中國持「和平崛起」之名，以霸權之姿行全球佈局之實，其綜合國力之提升速度，足讓美國寢食難安，更遑論我國得平起抗衡。

筆者無奈地相信，中國對於兩岸的政治談判將不會有「留待下個世代解決」的耐性。為政者須走在局勢之前，預作談判佈局及輿論準備，而非以民主為託辭，消極放棄掌握台灣未來命運的主動權，任由惡鬥下的政黨操控及盲目的民意擺佈。倘我方因時不我予方被迫坐上談判桌，屆時勢將更難有效防守或創造台灣人民更大的福利。

筆者投入外交志業 13 年，時有不知何去何從、所戰為何之迷惘。此次赴全球頂尖人才薈萃之哈佛大學進修，選修方向除設定談判能力之訓練，亦盼針對我小國地位，如何在兩岸迴旋及其他大國角力混戰之中，策略性爭取槓桿優勢及自我保全，尋求解答。筆者申獲哈佛大學甘迺迪政府學院錄取公共管理碩士學（Master in Public Administration; MPA）後，於 2014 年 6 月展開為期一年之進修計畫，成為連續四年斷層後，首位進入甘迺迪學院學位學程的台灣學生。

二、課程內容

哈佛大學甘迺迪政府學院的一年制公共管理碩士除要求學生參加暑期的學前密集訓練課程外，尚規定三類必修科目：經濟及量化分析（Economics & Quantitative Analysis）、管理及領導（Management & Leadership）及政治思想及機構（Political Thought & Institutions）等。此外，筆者認為外語談判和論述能力為外交人員應具之基本能力，因此決定求教全球知名談判大師 Brian Mandell 教授，將「談判」鎖定為首要重點修習目標。另寫作及演說藝術等可謂政府影響輿論最有效之媒介與工具，亦為加強重點。餘則選修筆者此前未曾碰觸、相較陌生的學術領域，如財經、中東問題、政治心理學等，盼廣泛吸收新知。全年修習課程如列：

(一) 暑期先修課程

1. 計量分析及統計學（Quantitative Methods & Statistics）
2. 經濟學（Economics）
3. 專案分析與研究（Case Studies）
4. 國際人權工作（International Human Rights）
5. 公共倫理（Public Ethics）
6. 全球化挑戰系列講座：包括前墨西哥總統 Felipe Calderon、前厄瓜多總統 Jamil Mahuad 應邀分享危機處理及和平談判歷程等。

(二) 秋季班

1. 政治與美國公共政策（Politics and American Public Policy）
2. 溝通的藝術（Arts of Communication）

3. 政策與政治寫作 (Introduction to Writing for Policy and Politics)
4. 談判分析 (Negotiation Analysis)
5. 財政金融 (Finance)

(三) 春季班

1. 進階多邊談判與衝突解決 (Advanced Workshop in Multi-Party Negotiation & Conflict Resolution)
2. 主權與干涉 (Sovereignty and Intervention)
3. 理性、熱情與政策制定 (Reason, Passion, and Policy Making)
4. 多元團隊之領導藝術 (The Art of Leading in A Diverse World: Skills, Insights, and Best Practices)
5. 企業財經 (Entrepreneurial Finance)

叁、課程心得

一、談判類：

桌邊談判技巧與談判結果固然相關，上談判桌前之協商條件準備、與談判夥伴之私人交誼、關係累積更為成敗關鍵。我於攸關國家重大利益之場域選派之談判代表團應考量團員間之先天個性差異及相對優勢，互補、異質性高之團隊較有利於隨時依據談判對象特質及氛圍相應調整，靈活採行有利戰略。此外，團隊本身默契及與其他國家代表之交誼均須長期培養。於延續性之談判議題上，我應避免頻繁更換談判代表，以免徒然造成人脈流失。

此外，談判代表於會議桌上之氣勢及議程掌握能力與需由個人領導經驗、會議規則熟悉度累積而來，談判本身即屬需經年累月訓練之專業。議題專家不等同談判專業，選派談判代表不應將兩者混為一談。

相關課程訓練重點如下：

- (一) 雙邊談判與多邊談判之準備工作、技巧差異
- (二) 帶領多邊談判團隊與經營外部團體關係
- (三) 將敵人轉化為最佳戰友
- (四) 於未知壓力下控制衝突升級
- (五) 談判壓力下面對資訊轟炸
- (六) 從獨立作戰到團體出征
- (七) 調停高度爭議性公共政策衝突

- (八) 高風險、低確定性局勢下之調停技巧
- (九) 如何化解國際協商與調停過程之攪局者
- (十) 人脈關係與談判佈局

二、 主權與干涉：

分析冷戰結束後，巴爾幹半島、中東、非洲等區域衝突引發之國際干預或不干預歷史事件，得以瞭解國際強權決定是否採行干預之決策因素、模式、合法性、正當性及成效缺失。從盧安達、肯亞、剛果、阿富汗、科索沃、波西尼亞、利比亞、馬利之歷史，吾人觀察所得：

- (一) 多數受到干預之國家都在混亂崩解中收場，甚因破壞原有之區域穩定，製造國際失序黑洞，成就醞釀恐怖份子之環境條件。只有肯亞因及時受到有效國際調停而免除大規模內戰命運成為少數例外。惟大體而言，歐美為首之干預強權以外來強者之姿，於欠缺當地國情風俗歷史基本認知之情況下出兵，多反造成受援國甚至整個區域衝突惡化、死傷規模擴大及延長，軍援對象正義及合法性往往受到質疑、接受扶植的新政權難以有效治理甚至延續生存。
- (二) 如何在國際人道責任及干預效果間找尋平衡點為冷戰結束後聯合國及各軍事干預組織、國家必須面對之決策難題。國際採取干預或不干預的論述及立場彼此監督比較，逐漸演化。科技及媒體於國際干預事件中扮演的角色愈行重要，國際法對此等新興干預工具之運用尚待規範。

- (三) 遠水救火永不及近鄰出手，區域解決方案應優先受到尊重及考量。
- (四) 干預國需備全重建計劃及退場機制，否恐陷人道黑洞，無法抽身。
- (五) 慎戒慣用「反恐」為干預理由，免騎虎難下，影響未來決策彈性。
- (六) 國際傳播媒體之運用對於掌握甚至操控國際干預資源具關鍵影響，干預之正義與正當性存乎事件論述觀點之善巧運用，國家利益方為干預國真正及唯一決策依據。
- (七) 倘中國大陸對我武力攻擊，期待西方盟友基於民主人權價值對我伸出人道援手是極為天真而不實際之想法。除非我國之存續對其他國家核心利益能形成直接影響。我永續生存之道仍存在左鄰右舍之間。對於有助他國及早「嚴正關切」之有力媒體論述應預作準備。

三、 談輿論與媒體溝通：

據近代心理學研究結果，人類大腦的決策過程受情緒影響程度及速度皆大於理性邏輯分析。所謂談判策略、演講藝術、領導能力等管理之術，成敗關鍵與能否有效在第一時間引發群眾有效之情緒反應密切相關。蓋人類並非理性的動物，於貌似理性之決策過程下，包裹的仍是人性面對未知的畏懼以及尋求有利自身基因延續條件之自然生物抉擇行為。尤其某些強大之情緒因子：感激、憤怒、厭惡等對於人類決策行為之影響力已受科學證實並逐部運用於商業行為、選舉策略、廣告產業之中，而「助推」（Nudge）的技巧於公共政策領域之應用近年漸受重視。

就民主國家而言，成功的領導者應懂得策略性導引輿論發展方向，俾得藉勢支持有利國家民生之政策決定。強大的輿論力量，結合選舉可順水行舟；反之則僅能任憑民粹驅使，即便覆舟在即亦束手無策。

行為心理學家以近代美國總統選舉為例，老布希 1992 年的總統連任夢碎，從他和柯林頓在總統辯論的較量中不難看出端倪。老布希言談中不時顯露的權威者姿態，容易令選民感到彼此為「不同族類」，難以信服老布希在深居白宮四年後，還能苦民所苦、疾民所疾。相較之下，擅長於貼近民眾、用簡單語言傳遞關心、面部表情永遠誠懇、柔軟的柯林頓能讓選民情緒得到安撫、產生安全感及信任。8 年後，高爾（民主黨）無法以渠清晰的邏輯及強大的數據分析能力打敗小布希（共和黨），關鍵亦在於小布希懂得以幽默親善的「人性」與選民產生聯結，總統辯論中一句「我想高爾應該是計算機的發明人」一石二鳥地將高爾其後的有力數據、論點全部預先凍結。

借鏡美國兩黨文宣史，深諳政治心理學技巧的共和黨，向懂得以文字、語言引導選民情緒、博取認同，因此自約翰甘迺迪（民主黨）執政之後 45 年之中，共和黨可謂十戰九勝，僅有少數 3 個民主黨總統候選人強生（Lyndon Johnson），卡特（Jimmy Carter）及柯林頓（Bill Clinton）得以個人特質勝選，他們的陣營策士都來自南方，且擅長運用同理心與群眾情緒聯結。惟自柯林頓之後，民主黨政營策士漸漸體認到選舉及政策文字的情緒感染力量，懂得在語言上錙銖計較，並大量運用社交媒體發揮影響力，終於後來居上。

輿論影響力已不僅是領袖必備的個人魅力，更是成功執政的關鍵能力。

肆、其他建議

哈佛甘迺迪學院公共管理碩士學位（MPA）極重視錄取學生之背景及專長多元性，以本學年例，發展中國家的 88 名國際學生就來自 58 個國家，其中 1/3 為各國政府部門中高階官員，1/3 來自 NGO，另 1/3 來自各行各業之領導階層。同學中有索馬利亞總統候選人、南非反對黨領袖、馬其頓前教育部長、聯合國官員、知名國際人權律師、埃及阿拉伯之春民運領袖、巴基斯坦流亡記者、波蘭財政部長、土耳其國會議員、亞美尼亞總統府外交事務副主管、紐西蘭駐泰國大使、菲律賓總統府外交顧問、智利駐聯合國副代表、及多國外交官員、軍警中高階主管等等，背景多元，對於建立國際人脈極具助益。然近年來我國籍學生與中國大陸學生人數比例卻愈見懸殊，申請人數比例為 1:30，在筆者入學之前，本學程已連續 4 年不見台灣學生。相較於新加坡政府每年選送 4 至 5 名官員、日本政府亦有計畫薦送政府官員來此進修，連哈薩克、蒙古政府在此方面都比我國積極，我似應思考如何有效鼓勵政府人員進修。

在美國學生方面，來自中央及地方政府部門或具軍事情報背景者眾，既對美關係攸關我國家存續，本課程除外交部之外，亦極適合我國防部及國安局同仁申請，蓋美國軍情人員在此結業後，皆立獲晉升拔擢，無一例外。於此機緣以同窗之誼建立之人脈，對促進未來台美兩國軍事情報合作之緊密、準確度必助益匪淺。

此外，筆者認為我國家選送中高階人才出國進修或研究係為培養國家人才，意義重大，然返國後似欠缺後續規劃及運用機制。以筆者過去在布魯金斯研究所撰述

之 8000 字政策建議為例，相關研究結果返國後僅是依照公文程序存檔結案，內容無人聞問過目。此次進修返國迄今四個月，亦無相應機制依據筆者進修內容安排返國後之工作性質，預料本篇報告亦將於上傳之後船過水無痕。回想筆者班上同學於畢業之後，曾以來自美國、中國、日本、新加坡及臺灣等國家的公務人員進修返國後職位安排情形做為比較，以此分析各國對人才培養之重視程度，結果我國敬陪末座，令人唏噓。

筆者至盼未來有機會與有心出國進修之同仁分享此次申請學校及進修經驗，在全球領袖人才充斥之哈佛校園，不該獨缺台灣人的聲音。

伍、附錄

- 一、 From the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis to the 2016 Presidential Election: A Case Study of the U.S. Intervention into Taiwan-China Relations
- 二、 An Advocacy letter to Ms. Sorensen

附錄一：「主權與入侵」作業

From the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis to the 2016 Presidential Election: A Case Study of the U.S. Intervention into Taiwan-China Relations

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1. Introduction

The Taiwanese presidential election scheduled in January 2016 foreshadows immense uncertainties for the future of Taiwan. Due to the extreme divergence of cross-Strait policies of the two major political parties in Taiwan, different election results spell different Taiwan-China relations for the years to come. Should the pro-independence opposition party DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) claims victory next year, Taiwan's current reconciliatory political orientation toward China is expected to change. Whatever adjustments on cross-Strait policies DPP might make, the threats of China's military invasion will emerge again after eight years of dormancy under President Ma's administration.

The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis was examined in this paper given the case was the most dangerous and closest military crisis in the past decades between Taiwan and China. From what was observed from this crisis, several questions must be asked before preparing for future military encounter: 1) How have the political dynamics of the China-Taiwan relations

been changing, and how could those changes affect prospect of China's military invasion? 2) What are the chances of international (mainly U.S.) intervention if conflicts erupt again? 3) What types of interventions serves Taiwan's interest, what not? 4) What steps should Taiwanese government take to incubate more favorable conditions to plead constructive international interventions before facing wars?

This paper is conducted for the purpose of analyzing the prospect of international intervention should China takes military actions against Taiwan's independence movement following a possible shift of power in 2016. This research aims to assist the government of Republic of China on Taiwan to develop a more practical perspective about what to expect in international intervention, and to forge proper military and diplomatic preparatory strategies that can maximize the security, stability, and the interest of Taiwan's society.

2. Definitions

Cross-Strait relations refers to the relations between: 1) Republic of China, abbreviated as **ROC**, commonly known as Taiwan and 2) The People's Republic of China, abbreviated as **PRC**, commonly known as China or mainland China. The two political entities are physically separated by the Taiwan Strait in the west Pacific Ocean. In this paper, **cross-Strait policies** are referred to as Taiwanese government's political stance and strategies regarding China-related issues and regulations.

KMT is the abbreviation of the current ruling political party in Taiwan "The Kuomintang" by its direct Mandarin pronunciation, which denotes "Chinese Nationalist Party". It was the ruling party of China from 1928 until its retreat to Taiwan in 1949 after losing the Chinese Civil War to the Communist Party. In Taiwan, the KMT remained the single ruling party until political reforms started in late 1970s. Since 1987, ROC was no longer a single-party state; however, the KMT remains the ruling party until the loss of 2004 presidential election to DPP.

DPP is the abbreviation of the current major opposition party in Taiwan, The Democratic Progressive Party. DPP has won a landslide victory in the Taiwan local elections in 2014, which provides momentum and indication that it has the potential to out-perform the current ruling party KMT in next year's presidential election.

Ma's administration: Ma Ying-Jeou won the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections in Taiwan, ending eight years of DPP rule. With Ma's largely pro-China political platform, Taiwan's relations with China have notably improved ever since. A 2008 TIME Magazine article wrote that in less than three months' time, "*relations between Taiwan and China have arguably seen the most rapid advancement in the six-decade standoff between the two governments*"¹. However, after six years of warming relations with China, public anxiety about China's growing influence also grew. A proposed services trade pact with China triggered massive civil protests and a three-week occupation of Taiwan's parliament in 2014². Ma's pro-China policies were called into serious question after KMT suffered its worst-ever polls defeat in local elections in 2014.

PLA is the abbreviation of the People's Liberation Army, the military of the PRC. It has the world's second-largest military budget (\$131.6 billion in the 2014 official budget), largest standing armed forces, scores of new advanced weapons, and could likely now wage a successful conflict over Taiwan absent an immediate and full American intervention³. It has approximately 2,285,000 personnel, which constitutes 0.18% of the China's population⁴⁻⁶.

3. The prospect of China-Taiwan war

Even to this day, after 7 years of rapprochement and relaxation of tension under Ma's administration, China has yet renounced the use of force against Taiwan. PLA has been

unceasingly modernizing its forces across all domains (land, air, sea, cyber, space) and strengthening its operational capacity and readiness. PLA has now *over 1,600 missiles of various capabilities including the DF-21D "carrier-killer" anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), Combined with the deployment of a robust A2/AD-centric military strategy that seeks to keep U.S. forces at bay*⁷. The military stand-offs across Taiwan Strait remains⁸, making a stark and ironic contrast to the unprecedentedly warming and robust interactions between the two societies.

According to 2013 “National Defense Report” by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense⁴, China’s plan to build comprehensive capabilities for using military force against Taiwan by 2020 is vigorously ongoing. Building on twenty five years of double-digit annual rises in the defense budget, the Chinese government announced in March this year that China will boost its military spending by 10.1 percent to \$141.45 billion as it fires up its development of high-tech weapons systems⁹. The imbalance of military strength between China and Taiwan is accelerating in China’s favor.

The report predicts that the Chinese government is steadily marching towards its goal to effectively prevent foreign forces from intervening in its operations against Taiwan⁴. In other words, China is getting ready for military confrontation against international military intervention, especially the United States, the major hope for Taiwan’s existence.

Now that the war is on the map, what the route will look like? Who will come to Taiwan’s rescue? A history with similar settings two decade ago can be a helpful reference to predict and prepare for the next.

4. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

The catalyst of the crisis was the Clinton administration's approval of a visa in May 1995 for Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his Alma Mater, Cornell University. The Chinese government opposed such decision and considered that an action of U.S. government to encourage Taiwan's leaders to seek formal sovereign independence. Lee Teng-hui visited the United States during 9-10 June and gave a speech in Cornell for the Alumni reunion. His repeated reference of "Republic of China on Taiwan" during his visit was deemed by PRC as a bold challenge to the "One China Principle"^{10, 11}.

China's launch of military exercise

The crisis itself lasted from June 1995 until the presidential election of Taiwan concluded in March 1996. PRC started by public announcement of military exercise, followed by the launch of six surface-to-surface nuclear-capable missiles to the water area close to Taiwan. Meanwhile, army forces in a coastal province was mobilized and fighter planes moved to the coast. Then the PLA Air Force stationed a number of F-7 and F-8 aircraft at airports located within 250 nautical miles of Taiwan, and conducted another set of live-fire exercises 90 miles north of Taiwan. During this period, the PRC continued to test nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, including the new Dongfeng (DF-31) missile with a range of about 4,900 miles. On 17th August, it conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the west of China¹⁰⁻¹³.

The PRC foreign ministry spokesman stated "What we are going to do is make the U.S. realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to take the right track."¹⁴

U.S. military response

After the U.S. Seventh Fleet detected Chinese military live-fire exercises off the coast of Taiwan, the forward-deployed USS Independence (CV-62) aircraft carrier battle group arrived at the region with embarked Carrier Air Wing, USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) missile cruiser, and other ships operating with the USS Independence. President Clinton also ordered additional

ships into the region in March 1996 before the Taiwan's presidential election. Two aircraft carrier battle groups were also present in the region. The Nimitz and her battle group sailed through the Taiwan Strait¹⁵, sending visible and firm signal of US commitment to the regional stability. *The scale of the deployment was said to be the largest one in East Asia since the United States had withdrawn from the Vietnamese War in the mid-1970s¹³.*

Interference of election and lessons learned

China's military intimidation tactic failed because of the U.S. swift intervention. It also created a serious backlash in Taiwan: Lee Teng-hui, by audaciously confronting China, won a landslide victory in the 1996 presidential election. Those advocating a stronger position against China during the election garnered more impetus, the Taiwanese identity started to sweep and grow since then.

The U.S. immediate intervention proved to China its resolve to uphold the principle that Taiwan issue has to be handled in a peaceful way. China learned the lesson by surprise, and started to strengthen its military power since 1996. PLA started to work on various scenario assessments and responding contingency plans with the US intervention¹⁶.

5. The prospect of next international intervention

Taiwan was lucky to escape from extinction twenty years ago thanks to the U.S. response. But if another cross-Strait conflict erupts in 2016, will other countries come to Taiwan's defense? Given that Taiwan is not a member of the UN, and that it is not recognized as a sovereign state by most of the countries with military capacity, should conflicts erupt between China and Taiwan, it is unlikely that any countries except the United States would be willing to risk a confrontation with China without a clear UN mandate, which also is next to impossible. The United States is the only country that is actively protecting Taiwan's status

quo, if not de facto independence from the annexation of China. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal basis for the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability. It obligates the United States to ensure the security and the social economic system of the people on Taiwan, and that the future of Taiwan be determined by peaceful means¹⁷.

However, Taiwan Relations Act is not a treaty. If not because of its own national interest, the United States has no inextricable reason to deplete its own military resource and risk a Sino-American war for a small country so far away. Let's not forget that the United States is the only country not short of the experience, capability, and guts to ignore the UN's mandate when making intervention decisions. Even though the law professor at Hofstra University Julian Ku insists that in the case of Taiwan, because it is not an UN member, any states would violate the UN Charter if it used military force in a way that violated the territorial integrity of another UN member (China)¹⁸. However in reality, legality is not the dominating factor that confines the actions of the United States, the weighted balance of national interest is.

What exactly can Taiwan offer to satisfy U.S. interest that was compelling enough for the United States to put on the scales against the risk of a Sino-American war? Professor John J. Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago listed the reasons that give the United States powerful incentives to keep Taiwan within its China-containment coalition: First of all, Taiwan has significant economic and military resources including its potential as *a giant aircraft carrier that can be used to help control the waters close to China's entire eastern coast*. Acquiring that aircraft carrier would enhance China's ability to expand military power into the western Pacific Ocean, and *the occupation of radar sites on Taiwan's mountaintops would allow China to monitor and target American naval deployments with greater ease*. Those are nightmares that the America surely wouldn't want to see. Second, America's commitment to Taiwan projects U.S. credibility in the region, which is crucial for America if it wants to keep its influence in Asia Pacific and keep its Asian allies cooperative. An

abandonment of Taiwan could inspire other smaller regional states to switch their allegiance from America to a more advantageously positioned China. Should a domino effect be triggered, it can lead to the end of American era in Asia¹⁹.

However, water far off is hard to quench fire near at hand. America's willingness alone without reassuring capacity cannot secure Taiwan's destiny. Facing China's rapidly growing military strength and the lack of basing options for U.S. forces in of the area, America's ability to guarantee Taiwan's security in the future is no longer the same compared to twenty years ago. According to a classified but leaked report run by the Rand Corporation for the Pentagon last year, a computerized simulation indicated that the most likely US-China war scenario would start from Taiwan. The computerized result showed the US military being soundly defeated by Chinese military²⁰. Let's not go into how precise the simulation result is, it is irrefutable that China will eventually reach the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the American military attempts to help. Along with America's own financial difficulties, dysfunctional congress, and its involvement of military intervention elsewhere, there is a growing chance that American policy makers will eventually conclude that abandoning Taiwan outweighs the risk of confronting China.

Consequently, it is unrealistic for Taiwan to put all the hopes on the United States. The U.S. willpower is no longer enough to guarantee a triumph over the war with China. Especially now that time is on the other side against both Taiwan and the United States.

6. Would international intervention work in Taiwan's interest?

For a densely populated island like Taiwan, it will lose the war the first minute any implements of warfare land on its territory. Any military intervention that follows will only cause more destruction and casualties, be it boots on the ground or drones in the sky. Unless

the U.S. is willing to extend the battlefield to Mainland China's territory and accept the risk of retaliation on its own soil. The only way interventions can work in Taiwan's interest is to build effective preemptive measures that can deter China from ever starting the war.

7. Conclusion

- 1) **Effective preemptive measures** are the most needed way of foreign intervention for Taiwan when under China's attack. In Taiwan's case, no western intervener is likely to have more in-depth understanding of Taiwan than its Chinese enemy does. It is unlikely that foreign interveners can distinguish Chinese from Taiwanese given the shared cultural background, language, and race. When the two civil societies have been intertwined to such extent, foreign military intervention on the ground will only add more damage to Taiwanese society on top of Chinese military damage. The similarity of the two sides also makes it too confusing for drones to function. Taiwan has to secure effective preemptive deterrence assistance from its foreign allies as well as its own military capacity building to avoid any Chinese military attempt.
- 2) **Building regional alliance:** Unlike United States, China is a "lonely power" that lacks cordial allies. Even with its closest friend Russia, mutual mistrust lurks. Hardly any nation looks to China for protection. Instead, most Asian countries seek to strengthen their defense ties with the United States and improve their coordination with each other against the possible threat they perceive from China³. Given the unlikelihood of Taiwan's reinstatement of the UN membership in the foreseeable future, hoping for UN mandate to provide legality of future international intervention is unrealistic. To pave the way for potential interveners nearby, Taiwan should put more effort in joining regional organizations, making security alliance with neighborhood countries like India, Japan,

Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, who are also agitated by China' s ascendancy and aggression and fear for its rise.

3) **Countering China' s narrative that defines Taiwan a domestic issue:** China' s persistent and dictatorial claim of Taiwan affairs as “domestic issue” is a formidable blockade for any attempt of foreign intervention. To make future helping hands justified, Taiwan needs a strong counter narrative to help its allies from violating UN charter and to persuade their parliament and nationals why it' s worth the risk and cost to come to Taiwan' s rescue. One China Policy is a malignant tumor that Taiwan needs to get rid of.

4) **Making China' s occupation of Taiwan visually relevant to international stakeholders:** Taiwan should effectively remind the international stakeholders the consequences of China' s occupation of Taiwan, helping others visualize what will ensue after Chinese naval and air forces breaks the first island chain: China would be able to *directly threaten Japan' s southwestern approaches and potentially sever its air and sea lines of communication*” . After taking control over the Taiwanese islets in the South China Sea, the Chinese military will exert stronger pressure on other states throughout Southeast Asia Pacific. *Chinese submarines stationed at the Taiwanese deep-water bases at Hualien and Su Ao would enjoy unfettered access to deep Pacific waters, both expanding their operational reach and rendering them more difficult to detect and prosecute in the event of conflict*²¹. Only when the bystanders realize what price they' ll have to pay for doing nothing for an endangered peace-loving neighbor like Taiwan, they will have more motivation to lend a helping hand.

5) **Starting negotiation process with the worst enemy while strengthening BATNA:** Unless China encounter sudden drastic political revolution, economy collapse, or other

unpredictable catastrophe in the near future, it's already an inexorable trend that China will become unstoppably powerful that Taiwan will eventually have no choice but to accept China's conquest. Taiwan should start to contemplate its negotiation package while still of value to China. Meanwhile, Taiwan should reinforce its own BATNA and make China understand that it can either be its best friend or worst enemy. For example, strategically strengthen its military capacity. Just like how Berlin built a navy that was strong enough to inflict so much damage on the Royal Navy that it would cause London to fear a fight with Germany and thus be deterred¹⁹.

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附錄二：「政治寫作」作業：致聯合國基金會資深顧問 Gillian Sorensen 之倡議信

Dear Ms. Sorensen,

Thank you for sharing with us your stories and invaluable experiences as the former Assistant Director-General of the UN last month at Harvard Kennedy School. You may remember me

from the question I raised then. When you claimed that the UN is the only place in the world where every nation and human being can have a voice, I couldn't help but interrupt by throwing you that difficult question about my country, Taiwan. Your hopeful words cannot be true. The UN can never be an organization for all when the existence of 23 million Taiwanese like me is still intentionally ignored.

I admit, I knew you wouldn't have an answer to my question. UN officials always dismiss our case as a "political problem." But my classmates from 80 other nations needed to hear about the unfair treatment of Taiwan by the UN. They needed to hear how the most powerful organization in the world still couldn't figure out a way to hear the voice of Taiwan. My classmates needed to know that the reason Taiwan became the only nation excluded by the UN is not because we did anything wrong, but simply because China opposes our inclusion. I had to make my classmates understand that Taiwan is a peace-loving, democratic, economically highly developed country that voluntarily complies with the UN norm of human rights - voluntarily in our case, because without a membership, the UN doesn't care what we do. Taiwan's very identity being denied by the UN is not what we deserve.

I know that China -Taiwan relations are a highly political issue. I also know that with China's veto power, the UN won't be able to accept Taiwan's request for reinstatement before our two countries sort it out. But what I asked was not about immediate political recognition by the UN, but rather about recognition for the existence of the Taiwanese people.

How can the UN pretend that Taiwan is not on the map when making policies about global pandemic disease control, about nuclear proliferation, about global aviation regulation, or about global environmental protections? We Taiwanese are also human beings who will die from H1N1 or Ebola if the viruses come across the border. Without due opportunities to participate in the UN and its affiliated organizations, our national security and environmental safety are constantly threatened. Worst of all, our dignity as human beings is not respected.

Allow me to tell you how the Taiwanese have lived for the past forty-three years while blocked out of the UN system. We have had to manage to survive on our own, like a homeless person on the street. Imagine how passersby elude him. The government never bothers to deal with him, so long as he suffers in silence. He is denied participation in the community he grew up in. Nobody cares when he's sick or dying. That's what it's like to be Taiwan.

Just like the Emperor's new clothes that everyone pretends to see when there's no such a thing, Taiwan's existence is solid and real. The world sees it, yet pretends it's not there. Let me give you some examples. Taiwan is located in the highest Tsunami risk zone in Pacific Ocean, where approximately 85% of tsunamis occur. Simply because Taiwan is not a member of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission under the UN system, we are blocked out of the network of the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific. Should tsunamis one day hit Taiwan, 23 million people would be wiped out without receiving any warning from the network. On the climate change front, Taiwan is also enduring increasingly extreme weather

strikes in forms of typhoons, flooding, or landslide. Yet we are not able to collaborate with other nations in forming effective integrated strategies to minimize casualties because Taiwan is not a UN member.

Not only is our national security at stake, global security is also compromised because of our exclusion. Because we are unable to participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) under the UN system, we are deprived of access to most current international aviation regulations and guidelines. As an international airline hub serving more than one million flights and nearly 40 million international and domestic passengers every year, our exclusion from ICAO poses a serious threat to international aviation security.

These are just a few examples. I can name 100 more, even 1000 more if you allow me. The UN's current attitude of doing nothing devastates Taiwan's competitiveness and opportunity to thrive. It also puts Taiwanese lives at great risk. So please stop using the status quo to justify inaction. The status quo will always be the easiest choice for world leaders to veil their passivity and incompetence in dealing with sensitive issues. But it's an irresponsible one. Every day of the status quo is another day's torment for the Taiwanese.

Ms. Sorensen, though you have retired from your official position in the UN, because of your distinguished contributions in the past and your stature as a top female world leader, you remain respected by the world and your UN colleagues. I ask you to use your sympathy,

wisdom and influence to urge your colleagues to tackle the problem of Taiwan's absence from the UN. With all the talent in the world, I believe the UN will be able to use administrative remedies to address this issue.

Please don't forget that the reason most people in Taiwan refuse to surrender to China, the emerging super power, is because we don't want to let go of our values of democracy, human rights, and freedom. Let me ask you this one question: what would it mean to the UN and to the world, if one day, Taiwan stopped trying? While our government is already doing its best to improve relations with China's government, please give us the encouragement we need to not give up.

Hear our voices, please.

Sincerely,

Erica Lee