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摘要

京都大學東南亞研究中心與暨南國際大學東南亞研究所共同舉辦的「東南亞政治、文化與移民青年學者工作坊」，藉由研討會青年學者文章的發表與評論，一方面探討東南亞政治、社會與人口移動等議題。另一方面則是兩國東南亞研究的學術交流。

其次，主辦單位邀請印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓等國博士生與青年學者與會，從東南亞研究人員的角度去看東南亞議題，讓這場研討會更具多面性。

會議第一場先探討泰國塔信體制的影響、緬甸軍政府民主化轉型、馬來西亞大選後政治走向、印尼公共政策的執行問題等東南亞國家政治議題。然而，這些文章表現出東南亞地區政治多元化，以及各國政治歷史與變遷的所產生的議題。

第二場則是針對印尼非法移民偷渡的經濟與歷史結構問題；新加坡中國戲劇對時政議題的批判；以及一貫道在泰國異文化下的發展等人文社會問題，進行探討。第三場則是探討臺灣外事警察對於東南亞地區外籍勞工與外籍配偶的管理；以及東南亞地區外籍勞工的進入與臺灣當地原住民的工作權利與階層的流動；最後則是分析菲律賓外僑影響菲律賓政治經濟改革的可能性。

會議最後邀請新加坡國立大學 Paul Kratoska 教授，以亞洲研究題目，作「研究」的探討。闡述作研究的方向、歸納與進行。

最後，這場研討會若能多增加議題，加上會議之前，先多說明會議的議題，相信更能增加研討會的效能。

關鍵字：東南亞政治、移民、文化

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壹、計畫目的

本校東南亞研究所於 2012 年 12 月 9 日至 12 月 14 日前往日本進行學術合作交流，與「京都大學東南亞研究所」(日文為「東南アジア研究所」, CSEAS, The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University)，洽談本校與日方交換學生與相關學術交流事宜，以及洽談本校東南亞研究所與京都大學東南亞研究所簽訂「學術合作備忘錄」(Memorandum of Understanding for Academic Exchange and Cooperation, MOU) 相關締約事宜及未來雙方共同舉辦研討會事宜。在 2012 年交流成果明確，2013 年本校交換生前往大阪產業大學，而本校東南亞研究所與京大東南亞研究所締結學術合作備忘錄於 2013 年 2 月正式簽訂，兩校東南亞研究學術合作則以 2013 年 11 月青年學者研討會，作為兩校東南亞學術研究的開端。

此次研討會由暨南國際大學東南亞所嚴智宏所長與李美賢、陳佩修、林開忠等四名教授，帶領本所何弘欣、沈豪廷、楊大概、劉容秀、陳虹宇等五名博士生前往日本京都大學發表與評論。日本京都大學東南亞研究中心除了老師與博士生參與外，更邀請印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓等國家青年研究人員，共同參與會議。

這次研討會目的是要建立日本京都大學東南亞研究中心與國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究所的學術交流管道，以雙方博士生參與研討會方式進行。透過學術研討會的方式，一方面認識雙方在東南亞地區學術研究的領域，另一方面提供台臺日兩國青年學者的學術交流平台，以擴大與加深東南亞地區研究的領域。

貳、參與研討會過程與心得建議

透過研討會方式，建立起兩校東南亞學術交流的管道。並探討兩校東南亞學術研究的方向與範疇。其次，共同擴展與學習東南亞研究相關議題。

一、參與研討會過程

本次研討會於 2013 年 11 月 8 號在日本京都大學東南亞研究中心會議室進行。以議題分作政治、社會建設、移動與遷移等三類型。首場發表文章分別為他“塔信與泰國：泰國非曼谷地區政治的興起(Thailand under Thaksin: The Rise of ‘Non-Bangkok’ Power in Thai Politics)”；“馬來西亞第十次大選後：社群主義，資本主義或個人獨裁主義？(Malaysia, After GE-13 - Communalism, Capitalism or Caesarism?)”；“憲法法院在印尼的政治崛起：石油和天然氣政策為例(The Political Rise of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia: A Case of the Oil and Gas Policy)”。分別探討泰國塔信體制在非曼谷地區的發展；緬甸軍事政權的轉變；馬來西亞大選後的政治走向；憲法法庭在印尼政治中的興起等議題。

這場會議內容首先是“塔信與泰國：泰國非曼谷地區政治的興起(Thailand under Thaksin: The Rise of ‘Non-Bangkok’ Power in Thai Politics)”，探討泰國政治中塔信體制在非曼谷地區的影響性。這是近年來泰國政治動盪與分裂的重要觀察點。

塔信，當選兩次泰國總理，在現代泰國政治中是最爭議的人物。他贏得了議會絕對多數席次，從而實現在泰國基於“新政治時代”選舉政治。塔信化被形容泰國新政治思維，以及所帶來的各項政治措施。

由皇室，保守派和對手的聯盟所發動的 2006 年軍事政變，導致塔信的下台。但卻未減少他的影響力。他的下台卻引發泰國長期的政治對立，都市與鄉村對立；中產階級與農民的對立；菁英階層與平民的對立。

在此背景下，本文旨在探討泰國的政治體制，塔信政府之間基於政治經濟學角度找出「非曼谷」地區的政治的本質。提供觀察泰國政治重整的途徑。

其次，“緬甸的軍事和民主轉型(The Military and Democratic Transition in Myanmar)”，這篇文章則是討論近代緬甸軍政府轉型的動機與歷程。緬甸結束長達 50 年的軍事統治，在 2011 年成立民選文人政府。然而，有別於 1990 年大選，緬甸軍政府為何在極具優勢，勢力穩固的情況下，推動民主選舉，政治民主化。本文分析認為緬甸推動民主選舉有助於鞏固軍方勢力，並進一步打破國際制裁，消除反對勢力。

再者，“馬來西亞第十次大選後：社群主義，資本主義或個人獨裁主義？(Malaysia, After GE-13 - Communalism, Capitalism or Caesarism?)”，這篇文章分析馬來西亞大選後政治勢力改變的走向。目前馬來西亞政治像 2000 年台灣政黨輪替之前的氛圍。但馬來西亞政治是由兩個聯盟在做抗衡，而執政聯盟是否能維持

執政優勢，以及反對聯盟是否突破僵局，而打破政治的輪替，則是觀察的重點。

馬來西亞的第 13 次政治大選，將可能改變執政聯盟執政的歷史。執政聯盟政權更迭的前景是前所未有，因為它是不可想像的。在馬來西亞由於執政聯盟國陣的（國民陣線）56 年的不間斷的統治（國陣是由佔主導地位的馬來民族統一的機構（巫統），與其他公共團體如馬來西亞中國協會（MCA）及馬來西亞印度人國大黨（MIC），並在馬來西亞半島和沙巴和砂拉越其他較小的政黨聯盟）。

由於壓制性國家法律和缺乏資源的影響下，在馬來西亞國內政治反對派一直支離破碎，但在 2008 年大選，國陣在聯邦議會失去了原有優勢的三分之二多數席次，並失去 13 州政府中 5 個州的執政權。作為成功的三個主要反對黨，人民公政黨，民主行動黨（DAP）和馬來西亞伊斯蘭教（PAS），正式聯盟成為民聯，來管理他們新獲得州政府執政以及作為國會席次。

這次大選更是突顯執政聯盟國陣為鞏固執政權與反對聯盟民聯的對抗。這次大選多達 85% 的選民參與投票。這場選舉是一個馬來西亞政治改變的重要里程碑。也是本文所欲探討的馬來西亞政治版圖變化後，政治將傾向資本主義，還是再次引發軍事獨裁。

最後，“憲法法院在印尼的政治崛起：石油和天然氣政策為例(The Political Rise of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia: A Case of the Oil and Gas Policy)”，這篇文章則是分析 Yndhoyono 政府對於這次影響力，以及在面對精英階層的勢力，國家機構如何與之抗衡。雖然，印尼是東南亞地區最民主的國家，但政治是被菁英階層所掌控。國家政策是在菁英階層間利益的妥協所產生的。

印尼政治經濟學者指出，其民主制度仍然趨於合作，世襲的性質，強大的政治和商業精英們操作新的民主體制。寡頭精英政治上尋求政治與經濟的交易。在印尼未能有足夠的空間來分析 Yndhoyono 政府如何面對精英階層維持他們利益政策問題，為了在每一個公共政策的政治分析域可以提供更詳細和甚至不同的視角來觀察印尼政治。選擇 Yndhoyono 政府在開放石油和天然氣政策研究。尤其是在外國勢力介入開採石油與天然氣之下，Yndhoyono 政府獲得了來自司法機構，特別是憲法法院的支持，成功地抵禦了民族主義的壓力，防止政策改變議會。

要分析這個問題，本文審視如何 Yndhoyono 政府已通過鞏固其權力啟動石油和天然氣的政策，吸引外國大投資的自由化。而反自由主義政策的力量若獲得了具影響力的公眾支持時，Yndhoyono 政府已經將議員和學者，讓他們在政府擔任要職，以阻止反對派在議會，從公眾與策略的管理上干預。

通過上述分析，本研究的目的顯示政府行政的相對優勢地位，為此，首先分析 2001 年實施石油和天然氣法；開放帶來的產業過程中，政策形成的背景和權力鞏固的早期基礎。然後，分析的最有爭議的憲法法院的裁決對 Yndhoyono 政府的支持，並展示如何進一步修改政府失效的法律。

第二場為社會建設，發表文章分別為“印尼漁工移民偷渡到澳大利亞活動的經濟結構受害情況調查(The Construction of Indonesian Traditional Fishing's Involvement in the Activities of Migrants' Smuggling to Australia as a Form of Structural

Victimization) ”； “中國戲劇在新加坡的文化抵抗：表演藝術學校的個案研究（1965-1976）（Cultural Resistance of Chinese Drama in Singapore: A Case Study of Performance Art School (1965-1976)）”； “中國宗教與非中國信徒：一貫道信徒在泰國的敘述（‘Chinese Religion’ with Non-Chinese Believers: Narratives of I-Kuan Tao Believers in Thailand）”。探討印尼漁民偷渡到澳洲的問題；中國戲劇在新加坡的文化抵抗（1965 年至 1976 年）；中國一貫道在泰國的發展等社會發展與異文化的衝擊。

“印尼漁工移民偷渡到澳大利亞活動的經濟結構受害情況調查(The Construction of Indonesian Traditional Fishing's Involvement in the Activities of Migrants' Smuggling to Australia as a Form of Structural Victimization)”，這篇文章探討印尼非法移民的形成問題，國際許多組織研究印尼非法移民偷渡到澳洲，印尼地理位置是最為重要。然而，中東或中亞的非法移民，也是因為地理因素大量進入印尼。而這些非法移民都是從事漁業或交通運輸行業的工作。而非法移民問題不單只是政治或經濟單方面的問題，它涉及到整個印尼社會、文化與經濟問題。本文將分析，什麼是真正的傳統與現實，建設在他們的生活和運輸服務的活動。本文將討論傳統印尼的文化和經濟的複雜性。這也是印尼人成為非法移民的因素與陷阱。

“中國戲劇在新加坡的文化抵抗：表演藝術學校的個案研究（1965-1976）（Cultural Resistance of Chinese Drama in Singapore: A Case Study of Performance Art School (1965-1976)）”，則是分析新加坡中國戲劇內容，對於時政的討論，批判與扮演角色。

新加坡的中國戲劇內容有相當大的關注和批評政治和社會現實的問題。從 1950 的到 1960 年，因為合併與勞動和學生運動和反殖民主義索賠和獨立性。在過去，工會，學生會和戲劇從業者，究竟是誰把中國教育的責任群體不斷地被看作是在官方文件共產黨人或叛軍。不過，這種情況已經開始改變了。2001 年。一種重新定義歷史趨勢 突然出現在新加坡和馬來西亞。研究人員打算重新評估誰被官方文件忽略，描繪他們的壓迫社區 立場，例如，階級對立所造成的經濟政策，有損種族 文化造成的語言政策，以及辯解的合理性與合法性。

不幸的是，這些作品大多仍集中在雙重邏輯的共產主義，而不是調查/非共產主義是如何做到這些左翼團體中國想和應對的現實。尤其是他們如何想像和實踐左翼 的想法。因此，本文將代表中國戲劇組性能 藝術學院為個案，來分析中國的方式戲劇團體解釋和實踐左翼的想法通過自己的表演中國特色和日常動力。

“中國宗教與非中國信徒：一貫道信徒在泰國的敘述（‘Chinese Religion’ with Non-Chinese Believers: Narratives of I-Kuan Tao Believers in Thailand）”，則是介紹泰國一貫道的發展，以及在泰國異文化下，一貫道如何去宣教與融入泰國社會。這是篇探討兩種異文化以及不同宗教之間的交流與融合的文章。

第三場為人的移動與遷移。文章分別為 “臺灣政府對外國移民的管理：案例外事警察為例(A Study of Taiwanese Attitude toward Immigrants—the Case of Foreign

Affairs Policemen) ”；“向上或向下，外籍農民工和台灣原住民的社會流動(Upward or Downward。The Social Mobility of Migrant Workers and Taiwanese Aborigines)”；從匯款到革命：菲律賓僑民對政治和經濟變革的影響(From Remittance to Revolution: The Filipino Diaspora and Political and Economic Change in Philippine Society)” 。針對人口移動所引申出的議題作探討，台灣外事警察對外國移民的管理；台灣原住民與農民工的社會流動；菲律賓僑民對於菲律賓政治與經濟的影響等移動人口議題的研究。

“臺灣政府對外國移民的管理：案例外事警察為例(A Study of Taiwanese Attitude toward Immigrants—the Case of Foreign Affairs Policemen)，這篇文章敘述東南亞外籍勞工在台灣的數量與現況。東南亞外籍勞工(含外籍配偶)，已經深入台灣各地，尤其在偏遠的鄉村地區。而，這些外籍勞工或是外籍配偶已經影響到台灣整個文化、社會與經濟的發展。

根據台灣內政部的數據，在 2012 年年底，共有 483921 外國人住在台灣。在這些人，所佔比例最大的是外國工人（ 434325 人; 89 % ），第二是外籍配偶（ 64,262 人, 13 % ），第三是專業人士(非東南亞亞洲移民, 48,325 人; 9 %)。移民的國籍，最大的分類比例為印尼，其次是越南，第三是菲律賓，第四為泰國。這些東南亞籍的勞工分佈在每一個城市和鄉村，遙遠的山區或海岸。我們可以從這些數據看，這些移民中有很大比例的外國工人和外國配偶，已經關係到台灣的社會和經濟發展。這篇文章則是敘述台灣外事警察，如何協調與管理外籍勞工在台灣安全與秩序。

“向上或向下，外籍農民工和台灣原住民的社會流動(Upward or Downward。The Social Mobility of Migrant Workers and Taiwanese Aborigines)” 。這篇文探討台灣原住民與外籍勞工階層的流動。由於外籍勞工到台灣工作，多是屬於勞動或幫傭的工作，逐漸取代台灣原有的下層階級社會。

縱觀歷史，在台灣，台灣原住民一直被視為少數族裔。然而，來自台灣原住民的電視節目的討論，他們認為外籍勞工的到來會剝奪他們的工作權利。本文試圖探討在台灣外籍勞工的社會流動和台灣原住民工人之間的關聯。這項研究的結果表明，這些即將來臨的外籍勞工沒有威脅到台灣原住民的工作權利。此外，這些外籍勞工在台灣社會中取代了原來的下層階級。

最後 “從匯款到革命：菲律賓僑民對政治和經濟變革的影響(From Remittance to Revolution: The Filipino Diaspora and Political and Economic Change in Philippine Society)” ，這篇文章研究希望透過菲律賓外僑援助菲律賓經濟發展，進而形成一股政治力量，來做菲律賓政治與經濟的改革。希望這股政治力量能獨立於傳統恩施關係的政治力量，從而改變長久菲律賓政治紛爭的問題。

本研究探討，菲律賓僑民如何以及在何種程度上，可以影響菲律賓社會的政治變革。它認為，(1) 在菲律賓社會，菲律賓僑民正在幫助創建一個新興的社會階層 (2)，菲律賓僑民的開發項目以及匯款和有助於創造出一個獨立政治系統，有別於困擾菲律賓政治的惠顧系統。

會議最後，針對博士生研究的方向與寫作能力，京都大學東南亞研究中心特別請 Paul Kratoska(National University of Singapore)教授，針對”亞洲研究的方式(Getting Published in Asian Studies)”，進行專題演講。演講過程對於博士生如何從事研究的方向，方法，甚至是如何英文寫作，都有深入淺出的介紹。

二、檢討與建議

此次研討會除了學術交流與培養東南亞研究人才外，較為重要的是實地了解日本、台灣對於東南亞學術研究的方向與範疇。並透過與印尼、菲律賓、馬來西亞等國研究人員相互探討東南亞議題，較能進一步，以及從更多不同的焦點與角度去分析東南亞的議題。此次會議心得如下：

“塔信與泰國：泰國非曼谷地區政治的興起(Thailand under Thaksin: The Rise of ‘Non-Bangkok’ Power in Thai Politics)”，說明了目前泰國政治動盪的權力架構、影響因素，以及泰國民主政體正在接受軍事政變與民主鞏固的考驗。要了解泰國政治動盪，必須先探討泰國政治動盪的關鍵人物，塔信，權力架構的分配與影響。

“馬來西亞第十次大選後：社群主義，資本主義或個人獨裁主義？(Malaysia, After GE-13 – Communalism, Capitalism or Caesarism?)”，這篇文章說明了馬來西亞政治的變遷，以及所帶來的影響。馬來西亞政治是民族主義、宗教、民主政體所組成的混合體，此次大選關係到政黨輪替，也在驗證民主鞏固在馬來西亞的考驗。另一方面也在驗證伊斯蘭教義與世俗政治觀念的融合與對立。

“憲法法院在印尼的政治崛起：石油和天然氣政策為例(The Political Rise of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia: A Case of the Oil and Gas Policy)”，探討身為東南亞地區最民主國家的印尼，其憲法法庭地位在政治上的地位。文中也點出憲法法庭決議的重要性提升，並與實際執政者政策相違背時，政府所做的反應。

“印尼漁工移民偷渡到澳大利亞活動的經濟結構受害情況調查(The Construction of Indonesian Traditional Fishing's Involvement in the Activities of Migrants' Smuggling to Australia as a Form of Structural Victimization)”，則說明印尼漁工偷渡澳洲對於印尼社會與經濟結構的影響。中國戲劇在新加坡的文化抵抗：表演藝術學校的個案研究（1965-1976）(Cultural Resistance of Chinese Drama in Singapore: A Case Study of Performance Art School (1965-1976))”，使人了解新加坡的中國戲劇中所隱含對時政的批評，也感受到知識分子對政治的改革期許與反思。“中國宗教與非中國信徒：一貫道信徒在泰國的敘述(‘Chinese Religion’ with Non-Chinese Believers: Narratives of I-Kuan Tao Believers in Thailand)”，一文點出中國宗教在異文化的泰國，如何在食衣住行各方面去融入與發展。一方面堅守信仰，另一面融入當地文化的艱辛。

“臺灣政府對外國移民的管理：案例外事警察為例(A Study of Taiwanese Attitude toward Immigrants—the Case of Foreign Affairs Policemen)”；“向上或向下，外籍農民工和台灣原住民的社會流動(Upward or Downward。The Social Mobility

of Migrant Workers and Taiwanese Aborigines)”；這兩篇文章說明了外籍勞工在臺灣的管理方式以及影響。東南亞籍勞工，不僅對於臺灣政治與經濟影響，其社會地位與階層正要取代臺灣原住民的角色。這是隱藏在臺灣社會中，你我周遭之事，而對於外籍勞工所衍伸的問題，臺灣政府卻有意識地忽略、壓抑與制止其問題的發生與解決。

最後，“從匯款到革命：菲律賓僑民對政治和經濟變革的影響(From Remittance to Revolution: The Filipino Diaspora and Political and Economic Change in Philippine Society)”，這篇文章從另一個角度來看其僑民對於母國政治與經濟改革的影響。菲律賓為外籍幫傭的輸出國，其旅居在全世界的菲律賓僑民，或許有可能能成為新的政治勢力，來打破菲律賓執政效率不彰，政治分裂的困境。

其次，透過這次會議，開啟與京都大學東南亞研究中心合作。日本京都大學東南亞研究中心是日本首屈一指的研究機構。而兩校研究對於東南亞研究方向與領域不同，藉此契機，交流與學習，相互擴展東南亞研究領域。

此外，京都大學東南亞研究中心邀請 Paul Kratoska 教授，針對「研究」所進行的討論，不僅給青年研究人員，對「研究」一個完整、深度與廣泛的講解，對於研究人員而言，也是個審慎自我研究的洗禮。個人覺得，這是個好的安排與規劃。這次會議對於兩校博士生，是拓展學術，增進視野的一大機會。然而，若能在增開議題，勢必能有更多的交流空間。

最後，針對東南亞地區學術研究議題，與亞洲地區從事東南亞研究的機構或學校，舉辦青年學者學術交流互訪或研討會，相信能進一步擴大對東南亞地區研究的視野，加深研究領域。其次，透過學術交流，建立東南亞地區研究學術管道與學術價值，這將有別於西方國家的觀點，更能找出東西方學術研究的差異性，對於東南亞議題能更為客觀的看法。最後，臺灣新一代東南亞研究，也更能有機會走出臺灣，拓展與擴大學術視野。

對於京都大學東南亞研究中心所舉辦的研討會，事前議程規劃較為模糊，若能在會議之前清楚相關議題與演講內容，相信更能增加此次會議的效能與目的。然而，台灣東南亞研究若能以此為基礎，舉辦類似青年學者研討會，除了拓展國際視野，增進學術間交流，更能落實東南亞研究。

三、會議照片



圖一：參與「東南亞政治、文化與移民青年學者工作坊」，全體合照



圖二：議題 1:政治(Politics)



圖三：陳虹宇，
“緬甸的軍事和民主轉型
(The Military and Democratic Transition in Myanmar)”



圖四：會議 2: 社會建設(Discursive and Social Constructions)



圖五：會議 3: 移動和遷移(Mobility and Migration)



圖六：Prof. Paul Kratoska (NUS, Singapore) ,
亞洲研究“Getting Published in Asian studies”主講

The Military and Democratic Transition in Myanmar

Abstract

The military regime was the form of rule during Myanmar's transition period. Myanmar's internal ethnic conflict and armed confrontation enabled Myanmar's military to rule firmly. On the one hand, confrontation with the ethnic minority maintained the state's integrity. On the other hand, it suppressed the opposition forces of the civil society, but also maintained Myanmar's military regime for nearly 50 years.

After the 1990 general election, the military government wantonly rejected the election results, which in theory led to the junta's legitimacy being threatened at home and abroad. The junta received international economic sanctions from the United States, Europe, and other countries. The external pressure oppressed the Myanmar's military junta into actively promoting the "Roadmap to Democracy." Thus, the military government's initiative to promote democratization not only strengthened the legitimacy of the regime, but also reconciled the internal strife, alleviated the public clamor for democracy, and searched for opportunities to resolve the ethnic conflict and promote economic development.

I. Introduction

After World War II, Burma was one of the countries in the Third World that

pioneered to implement multi-party parliamentary democracy. In 1948, Myanmar gained independence. Having been influenced by the British colonial culture for so long, it chose the British-style parliamentary democracy as the political system. After independence, the parliamentary democracy faced enormous difficulties and challenges, and the intricate ethnic conflicts, class contradictions, and the ruling group's internal strife made the situation in Burma continue to deteriorate.

In 1962, Ne Win launched a military coup to terminate the fourteen years of parliamentary democracy in Myanmar. Since Myanmar's General Ne Win led a military coup that overthrew U Nu's parliamentary democratic government in 1962 until the elected government was restored in 2011, Myanmar's military government ruled for nearly 50 years, making it the world's longest-ruling military regime after World War II.

The elected government was established in 2011, symbolizing the achievement of Myanmar's "Roadmap to Democracy" program and the completion of the democratization process.

This paper based on the third wave of democratization first analyzed the occurrence of Myanmar's democratization and then explored the history and results of the "Roadmap to Democracy" program. Finally, it concluded and generalized the types of democracy in Myanmar.

II. Factors of Democratic Transition in Myanmar

Huntington summarized five factors that contributed to the third wave of democratization: legitimacy crisis, significant economic changes, religious and cultural forces, impact of international powers, and demonstration effect. The factors of democratic transition in the third world, however, differed in region, culture, time, and type of regime (Huntington, 1991).

Legitimacy Crisis

Since the military coup in 1962, Myanmar's junta faced legitimacy problems. When Myanmar faced the military coup in 1988 for the second time, the legitimacy of the military government was challenged even more. The repeal of the 1947 Constitution and refusal to recognize defeat in the 1990 elections shook the military government's legitimacy until the regime was transferred in 2011.

On September 18, 1988, General Saw Maung again launched a military coup, announced the abolition of the Constitution and the dissolution of the Popular Assembly and national authorities, and renamed the Socialist Republic of the Union of Myanmar as the Union of Burmato overthrow the "Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP)" government¹ and establish a military regime².

¹ In 1962, the military strongman General Ne Win staged a coup to take over political power for over twenty years. The Ne Win administration took the socialist route, politically led by the one-party dictatorship of the "Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP)."

² In 1988, within the military, the "State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)" became the highest decision-making body in the government of Myanmar. From 1992, Senior General Than Shwe replaced Saw Maung to take over the ruling. In 1997, the decision-making body was changed to the

After a stagnation of 30 years, Myanmar's military government once again held democratic elections in May 1990. In this election, Aung San Suu Kyi led the "National League for Democracy" and won an absolute advantage³, but the military junta refused to hand over power, and repealed the election results. Later, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under long-term house arrest, and immigration restrictions and censorship were placed on the "National League for Democracy" and other parties. In 2007, under the leadership of the monks, the "Saffron Revolution"⁴ campaign to strive for democracy broke out. The legitimacy of the military's continued ruling was challenged by the international community, bringing the US-led western forces to place further economic sanctions on Myanmar (Xia Yan, 2008).

Finally, when the Myanmar junta was challenged, the junta also handled it by shifting the focus (national minority armed struggle) and using repression (8888 democracy movement, Saffron Revolution), denial (refusal to hand over power in 1990), guidance (elections held in 2010, transfer of power in 2011), and finally the generation of Myanmar's democratic transition. Furthermore, after the 1990 election, in 2003, it formulated the "Roadmap to Democracy" program, drew up a new

"State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)."

³ The National League for Democracy was established in September 27, 1988. The founders included the Myanmar Army Deputy Chief of Staff Aung Kyi; Myanmar Defense Minister General Tin Oo; and General Aung San's daughter Aung San Suu Kyi. Since 1988, it has been the largest opposition party and political organization in Myanmar. In the 1990 congressional elections in Burma, the National League for Democracy won 392 seats out of 492 seats, accounting for 83%.

⁴ In 2007, the anti-junta demonstrations in Myanmar, also known as the second wave of democracy in Myanmar, were originally a protest against rising prices that turned into the demand for democracy. From September 18, 2007, thousands of Buddhist monks began to participate in demonstrations. Due to the color of the monks' dress, it was also called the "Saffron Revolution."

constitution in 2008, and held the 2010 election. In 2011, the elected government was established. These political reforms were executed by the military government's hierarchical top-down approach of reform. This can explain why the legitimacy was not only questioned by the people, but also why the ruling military elite class differentiated.

Economic Transformation

From 1962 onward, the failure of the socialist economic policies, coupled with the neutral isolationist foreign policy, led to the standstill of domestic economic development and international trade, resulting in a long-term economic decline that caused the UN to list Myanmar, the original forefront of economic development among Southeast Asian countries, as an LDC in 1987. The factors of dissatisfaction within the military government regarding the failure of the economic policy reform, on August 8, 1988, a march movement demanding economic reform was triggered. Under the government crackdown, the purpose was turned into a striving for democracy and aspirations for government reform. The "8888 Democracy Movement" results are as follows: differentiation occurred within the army; a second military coup forced Ne Win to step down; military forces expanded; the opposition "National League for Democracy" was founded⁵.

⁵ The 8888 democracy movement was led by Aung San Suu Kyi, U Nu, and other opposition parties. The political situation in Myanmar showed a great trend of democracy returning, differentiation

Myanmar military government began opening up foreign investment in 1990 in an attempt to resolve its problems in energy, transportation, and other issues of backward infrastructure and equipment, so as to promote economic growth with the pattern of international investment. But because of corruption within the military government⁶, along with international economic sanctions, the economic reform was limited⁷.

Religion and Traditional Culture

Huntington deemed that the modern democracy first occurred mainly in the Christian countries, but traces of democracy appeared more slowly in Islam-, Buddhism-, or Confucianism-dominated countries, because the doctrine of the Western Church and the way of leadership following the Industrial Revolution and politics of parliamentary reform created profound changes. This also shows the energy of the power of religion in politics.

Myanmar is a Buddhist country. In Myanmar's society, the monks enjoy a high social status and play an important role in culture, education, and other aspects. On September 5, 2007, the monk class began to participate in demonstrations. Monks

among supporters of the junta or within the army, and the collapse of the military government.

⁶ In the 2007 "Transparency International" report, among the world's 180 countries, Myanmar and Somalia tied in last place in the Corruption Perceptions Index ranking.

⁷ According to United Nations statistics, in 2007, a third of Myanmar's population lives below the poverty line. Per capita annual income is less than US\$300, making Myanmar listed as one of the world's poorest nations. A third of Myanmar's children are in the state of chronic malnutrition. The government spending in health and education and Myanmar's per capita income are among the lowest in the world.

even announced that they would refuse to accept the alms of the “State Peace and Development Council” members and their families and would withdraw monks serving in the troops. Monks’ open break from the authorities this time significantly impacted the country. In other words, the monks’ action increased the opposition power and hit hard the junta’s ruling authority.

External Pressure

The actions of the foreign government or agency will affect or even decisively affect a country’s democratization. Of course, the factors of external force could lead a country to achieve the efforts of democratization but may also hinder or even prevent the schedule of democratization progress (Huntington, 1991).

Democratization of Myanmar was deeply affected by the international forces. The Government of Myanmar since 1962 adopted a neutralist foreign policy. Since 1990, the military government denied the results of the failed election. The Western countries deepened the implementation of political isolation, arms embargo, all economic sanctions on Myanmar, making Myanmar more isolated in the international arena. Until the establishment of an elected government in 2011 and after the political, economic, and human rights improved, Western countries gradually lifted the sanctions on Myanmar.

Demonstration Effects

When the economic policies failed, under the constant influence of domestic and international democratic voices, the junta in order to maintain its own interests referred to the regime type of each country in the political reform and tried to consolidate power through the pattern of guiding democratic elections. For a similar system state, the democratization can solve various political problems it faced at home. Especially between countries with geographical adjacency and cultural and habitual similarities, the role of “demonstration effect” is even more obvious (Huntington, 1991).

In the third wave of democratization, the military regime in Latin America quit politics, and democratic elections and civilian rule became a trend in world politics. Then, the process and regime type of democratic transitions of Southeast Asian countries became a reference to the junta of Myanmar.

In summary, the reasons for the third wave of democratization will vary with time and space, and no single factor is sufficient to explain all the countries’ democratic development. Each country’s democratization will vary with different conditions, as a result formed by a variety of reasons (Huntington, 1991).

Therefore, Myanmar’s military government faced a legitimacy crisis and the impact of the wave of political democratization at home and abroad. Under the economic dilapidation, failed economic policies, cycle of international economic

sanctions, and other factors, coupled with the palliation of internal ethnic civil war, the easing of the international situation, and reduction of the military necessity and solidarity (David C. Williams, 2011), Myanmar's military government was bound to refer to the current democratic regime patterns in Southeast Asia, to develop a political democratization process with Myanmar characteristics in order to maintain military interests.

III. Significance of Myanmar's Democratic Transition

Based on the domestic strife, economic dilapidation, foreign economic sanctions, and the wave of democratization, Myanmar's military government put forward the political democratization program as an internal attempt by the military government to implement political democratization in Myanmar in order to maintain military interests.

First, Myanmar's military government in August, 2003, promoted the "Roadmap to Democracy" of the democratization process, Myanmar's political trilogy of constitution, election, and governance⁸.

However, the reasons why Myanmar can stably implement the "Roadmap to

⁸ On May 17, 2004, the military government restored the National Assembly and carried out the constitutional process again. On May 10, 2008, Myanmar held a nationwide referendum, passing the new draft constitution. On March 30, 2011, at the same time that Myanmar President-elected Thein Sein and his cabinet were sworn in to the capital Naypyidaw, Myanmar's supreme authority "State Peace and Development Council" officially transferred the power to the new government, which marked the completion of the transition from the military junta to a democratically elected government in Myanmar (Bai Tao, 2011).

Democracy” can be analyzed from a few aspects: First, the military government power is firm. In nearly five decades of ruling, the military junta has experienced trends and impacts of globalization and democratization. The Western sanctions and pressures, ASEAN’s guidance and expectations, domestic monks, NLD, national minority armed forces, college students, other political forces, and the ins and outs of protests and struggles have not changed the fact of the long military ruling.

Although the tripartite political forces of Myanmar’s military, opposition, and national minorities already formed the three pillars in the social structure, the military had the advantages of ruling, and the capabilities of the latter two could not replace those of the military to dominate Myanmar’s political situation (Chenyang, 2006). Under the influence of the military-led nation building for more than half a century, the military leadership considered itself the nation’s creator and guardian. The military power had entered deeply into leadership in political, economic, social, and various fields. Active duty and retired military officers led the operation of the government, state-owned enterprises, and non-governmental organizations; the nationalization of various organizations led to the atrophy of private organizations. To a certain extent, Myanmar’s military organization was a “state within the state” (Morten B. Pedersen, 2011).

The second reason was the planned expansion of the military forces. In 1993 set

up “Myanmar Union Solidarity and Development Association,” with executive power, internally absorbing the servicemen and their dependents and externally recruiting youths widely to join membership. The junta expanded through the Myanmar Union Solidarity and Development Association’s military forces in the private sector and by making them the community of military interests. On August 21, 2010, the Association was reorganized as the “Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)” to participate in Myanmar’s elections. Therefore, the Government Councils are still controlled by the military⁹. The “Roadmap to Democracy” promoted in 2003 essentially maintains the interests of the military. The military junta attempted to return to the regular civilian rule, but did not give up the military-controlled government. Through the constitution and elections, the parliamentary seats were allocated to military and elected officials (democracy), and powers were allocated between the central part of the State and its local part (federal), legally protecting the military’s rights in order to legitimize the military power (Morten B. Pedersen, 2011).

Finally, the civilian government established by the 2011 elections symbolized the process of democratization the military separated from the politics. However, the military still dominated the operations of the Myanmar government and Councils at

⁹ In the 2010 general election, there were a total of 18 million party members, which accounted for 35% of Myanmar’s total population and won 70% of the members’ seats. Furthermore, the 2008 Constitution stipulates to reserve a quarter of the seats in both houses and parliaments at all levels for the military men.

all levels. As far as Myanmar's political power structure is concerned, such democratization process is conducive to the transfer of power, so that the military government was able to make a smooth transition to a new elected government and maintain the country's stability and continuation of the policy (Chenyang, 2011).

IV. Concluding Remarks

The former military junta's highest leader Senior General Than Shwe played a crucial role in the democratic transition and was the main policy maker to boost this political change in Myanmar. The current President Thein Sein, the Federal Parliament Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, and leader of the opposition Aung San Suu Kyi took advantages of the trend to take a big step toward political and reform. The Myanmar people's cumulative discontent with the economy and desire for democracy after a long military dictatorship were the solid bases for political transition in Myanmar. The promotion of the "Roadmap to Democracy" represents the quantitative to qualitative change in the democratic process, so this change is not a mutation, but the constant effort of Myanmar's elite. The international community generally considered the parliamentary by-elections in April 2012 to be free and fair. Although USDP is based on the form of one-party dominance and the parliamentary politics still possess a strong military color, Myanmar's election in 2010 and

by-election in April 2012 still symbolize the politics in Myanmar are developing towards democratization and order (Kong Zhijian, 2012).

Overall, the democratic transition in Myanmar has several characteristics: It is a planned reform designed and initiated by the Myanmar government as a top-down reform with a higher controllability. It was a peaceful change dominated by the military elite, wherein Senior General Than Shwe and President Thein Sein played important roles. It was a political reconciliation, where both the ruling and opposition forces avoided the constitutional legitimacy of the 2010 election results and other major issues. The political reforms this time did not touch the fundamental interests of the army and former junta leaders and thus did not lead to a serious confrontation.

Finally, based on similar customs, Buddhist countries, religious conflicts, massive military forces, and other factors, the military-led democratization process and problems of Thailand became Myanmar's template for future development. And if the new Myanmar government cannot keep making flexible adjustments of policies as Singapore did, maintain social stability through economic development at the same time, and coordinate military interests and the public interest, there is no guarantee a military coup will not happen again and lead to a return to the military authoritarian rule.

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CSEAS



HUMANOSPHERE



NATIONAL CHI NAN UNIVERSITY



Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究所

Young Researchers' Workshop on Politics, Culture, and Migration in Southeast Asia

A joint activity of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University
“Toward Sustainable Humanosphere in Southeast Asia” Research Program,
the Asian Core Program of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
(JSPS), and the Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, National Chi
Nan University

8 November 2013

Middle-Sized Room, Third Floor, Inamori Foundation Building

Center for Southeast Asian Studies

Kyoto University

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This international workshop aims to train PhD-level students, particularly those who are working on their dissertations, to make public presentations in English and prepare their papers for publication in English-language journals. The workshop is organized by the Kyoto University Center for Southeast Asian Studies' “Toward Sustainable Humanosphere in Southeast Asia” Research Program and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science's

Asian Core Program, in collaboration with the National Chi Nan University's Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

PROGRAM

9:00-9:05 Welcome Remarks by Prof. Shimizu Hiromu, Director, CSEAS

9:05-9:10 Opening Speech by Prof. Yen Chih-hung, Director, GISEAS

SESSION 1 (9:15-11:15): Politics

Chair: Hiromu Shimizu

Ho, Ann Hung-hsin, "Thailand under Thaksin: The Rise of 'Non-Bangkok' Power in Thai Politics"

Discussant: Khoo Boo Teik (Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization)

Chen Hung-yu, "The Analyses of Military Power Organization in Myanmar"

Discussant: Pavin Chachavalpongpun (CSEAS)

Boon Kia Meng, "Malaysia, After GE-13 – Communalism, Capitalism or Caesarism?"

Discussant: Chen Pei-hsiu (GISEAS)

Kayane Yuka, "Liberal Policy and the Strategic Management of the Yudhoyono Government in Indonesia: The Case of the Oil and Natural Gas Policy"

Discussant: Lee Mei-hsien (GISEAS)

11:15-11:25 BREAK

SESSION 2 (11:25-12:45): Discursive and Social Constructions

Chair: Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti, "The Construction of Indonesian Traditional Fishing's Involvement in the Activities of Migrants' Smuggling to Australia as a Form of Structural Victimization"

Discussant: Okamoto Masaaki (CSEAS)

Shen Hao-ting, "Cultural Resistance of Chinese Drama in Singapore: A Case Study of Performance Art School (1965-1976)"

Discussant: Caroline Hau (CSEAS)

Lin Yu-sheng, "'Chinese Religion' with Non-Chinese Believers: Narratives of I-Kuan Tao Believers in Thailand"

Discussant: Lim Kay-thiong (GISEAS)

12:45-14:00 LUNCH BREAK

SESSION 3 (14:00-16:00): Mobility and Migration

Chair: Yen Chih-hung

Young Da-kai, "A Study of Taiwanese Attitude toward Immigrants—the Case of Foreign Affairs Policemen"

Discussant: Hayami Yoko (CSEAS)

Liu Jung-hsiu, "Upward or Downward?—The Social Mobility of Migrant Workers and Taiwanese Aborigines"

Discussant: Ishikawa Noboru (CSEAS)

Jan Isaac V. Nolasco, "From Remittance to Revolution: The Filipino Diaspora and Political and Economic Change in Philippine Society"

Discussant: Lee Mei-hsien (GISEAS)

Session 5 (16:00-17:30): Getting Published in Asian Studies

Chair: Caroline Hau

Speaker: Paul Kratoska (National University of Singapore)

This presentation will describe the procedures of international academic publishing in English and provide suggestions about how to meet the expectations of editors of English-language publications.

ABSTRACTS

Malaysia, After GE-13 – Communalism, Capitalism or Caesarism?

Boon Kia Meng¹

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The recently concluded 13th General Elections (GE13) in Malaysia has raised a number of interesting developments for the country, in terms of its political and socio-economic direction. Short-term diagnoses of the results have sought to explain them in two general ways: (1) according to the traditional, ethnic or communal lines, where the Prime Minister, Muhammad Najib Razak (along with certain official media) has characterized the results as a consequence of a 'Chinese tsunami'; and (2) according to certain pollsters & academics, the results show the effects of a rural and urban divide, where the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR), won a large majority of urban parliamentary seats, while the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), did exceptionally well in rural and semi-rural constituencies (particularly in Sabah & Sarawak).

Without discounting these two popular accounts of GE13, I would like to put forward a normative argument that our understanding of present developments in Malaysian politics can be deepened by framing the results in the light of a Gramscian analysis, interpreting the Malaysian state as undergoing a fundamental crisis of the state. As a result of the breakdown of the BN's political hegemony, the ruling classes is struggling to find a viable form of political organization to stabilize their rule, while at the same time deal with the strong electoral challenge by the Pakatan Rakyat. The paper

¹ Boon Kia Meng is a political analyst, educator & activist-filmmaker. His film 'M-C-M': Utopia Milik Siapa?', a winner at the Freedom Film Festival 2012, documenting the issue of escalating house prices and debt in Malaysia, can be viewed here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hv9bWjgEXtc>

will conclude by raising a number of possibilities faced by the Malaysian state, even as certain social forces eg. political Islam, may seek realignment, even as the deepening of neoliberal economic policies would have significant consequences for present political economic regime, inaugurated post-1969, under the aegis of the New Economic Policy, since the 1970s.

The Analyses of Military Power Organization in Myanmar

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Myanmar held the election in November, 2010. President Thein Sein was sworn in on March 30, 2011 with his Cabinet. The highest authority of Myanmar, State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, handed the power to the new government officially. It is symbolized that Myanmar had done the process through the military government to the democratic government.

President Thein Sein of Myanmar held the meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi who is the leader of National league for Democracy of Burma in Capital, Naypyidaw on August 19, 2011. After the National League for Democracy of Burma won the Congressional election on April, 1, 2011, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom and other countries expressed to lift the economic sanction one after another. The continuing cooperation relationship

²Hung-Yu Chen is a PhD. student at the National Chi Nan University. His research interest focuses on the movement of the Myanmar and the cultural, political activities in Myanmar. He participated in the Conference on East Asian regional structure changes and the future development of Taiwan, 2004, with an article – “Overseas corporate strategic alliances and the case of Taiwanese enterprises in Thailand.”

with China, Japan, and Southeast Asia countries also enhanced the investment strength.

Up to 50 years military dictatorship, even Myanmar has gone through “8888 Uprising” in 1988 and “Saffron Revolution” in 2007 that the position of military government could not be shaken. Instead, the Military through a variety of measures consolidated their power. However, beginning from 2011, for what reasons Thein Sein government promotes the politics and economic reformation? The reformation speed is too fast to image that if this reformation can be carried on steady and lasted? Also, if the Military can allow the transformation of powers, or stand in the way of reformation in the end? All of these are related to the military power organization. Hence, the article is tried to discuss the military power organization by three parts, including the party system, the military and politics, religion and politics.

Thailand under Thaksin:

The Rise of ‘Non-Bangkok’ Power in Thai Politics

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Thaksin Shinawatra, twice elected prime minister of Thailand, was the most

³Hung-Hsin Ho is a Ph.D. Candidate at the National Chi Nan University. Her research interest mainly focuses on Thai politics, especially the rising of local power during Thaksin government. She has participated in the 11th International Conference on Thai Studies with an article—“Good Governance or Populist: The local governance of Thaksin regime in Thailand (2001-2006).”

controversial figure in modern Thai politics. He won an unprecedented absolute majority of parliament, thus fulfilling a 'New Political Era' in Thailand based on electoral politics. Thai scholars named the Thaksin phenomenon: new political thinking, efficient governance and his legitimacy of the most electorate never before in the first decade of 21st century as 'Thaksinization.' Following, he was ousted by the 2006 coup d'état, and opposed by the palace, conservatives and a coalition of opponents, but supported by a broad rural people, the prolonged political crisis in Thailand is thus sustained. There is nothing new about the political disputes in Thai society, but it is crucial to explore the political maneuver of Thaksin which could get a wild mass support.

Related literatures are argued that Thaksin's popularity was seen to result from its authentic party operation, CEO-style rule and populist policies directly beneficial to the people. The people in 'Non-Bangkok Thailand,' however, most from rural area of the north, north-east, and among rural migrants in the capital, had been politically enlightened by Thaksin, they countered back the 'new conservative alliance' organized by the rich and urban middleclass in Bangkok, led to severely class struggle. Nevertheless, the civil society discourse dominated by intellectuals and elites traditionally has turned to the local people that could compete to the power of voice.

In this vein, the article aims to examine the process of decentralizing and localizing of Thai political structure is among Thaksin's regime based on political economy perspective to find out the essence of 'Non-Bangkok' politics. This paper offers important observations on the rise of 'Non-Bangkok' political power is the legacy of Thaksin regime dramatically reshape the political territory of modern Thailand.

**Liberal Policy and the Strategic Management of the Yudhoyono Government
in Indonesia:**

The Case of the Oil and Natural Gas Policy

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Indonesia has been through drastic reform since the fall of Suharto in 1998. The reform brought a new system of *trias politica* with the empowerment of the national parliament and the establishment of the constitutional court in 2003. Since then, political influence of judicature has significantly increased. Although many academic works have examined the political role of judicial institutions in newly democratic countries, little attention has been given to those in Indonesia. This research sheds light on the constitutional court's political role in democratic Indonesia, focusing on the oil and gas policy.

While the executive government recognizes the indispensability of foreign investments in the oil and gas industry, the constitutional court sometimes dares to go against the foreign-dependent government policies. The executive arm has had difficulties to pursue those policies to keep attracting investments because of this nationalistic and xenophobic "political intervention" by the constitutional court. The legislative arm on the whole generally supports the executive; however, each politician's stance lacks

⁴ Yuka Kayane is a PhD. student in the Graduate School of Asian and African Studies, Kyoto university, currently undertaking field research in Jakarta focusing on economic policy, constitutional court and democracy in Indonesia.

consistency. Now the political contestation in democratic Indonesia has become far more complex than ever before. This research aims to show the changing dynamics of the political process by examining the decision-making process in the oil and gas policy and several controversial rulings.

**“Chinese Religion” with Non-Chinese Believers:
Narratives of I-Kuan Tao Believers in Thailand**

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In Southeast Asia, most of Chinese religious sects are connected with Chinese migrants. However, the development of I-Kuan Tao in Thailand is different from that. Besides Chinese believers, it is also popular for many Thai in the past 30 years. No matter in urban city or rural area, the Buddha Hall (佛堂 *sathanthaam* สathanthaam) of I-Kuna Tao could be found in some corner of almost every provinces in Thailand. It might be argued that, the tolerance of Thai Buddhism is the reason why I-Kuan Tao, as a “Chinese religion”, could exist in Thailand. However, comparing to other Chinese religious sects in Thailand, tolerance could not totally explain why I-Kuan Tao attracts many Thai, but not only Sino-Thai believers.

In this study, comparing to other reformist Buddhist movement in Thailand, I argue that the development of I-Kuan Tao in Thailand should be understood in the context of religious reformation and its social background

⁵ Yu-Sheng LIN is now a PhD student in the Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University. His research interest is on the anthropology of transnationalism, religion, and gender. His research area is Thailand, especially northeastern Thailand. His master thesis is about northeastern Thai migrant workers who have been working in Taiwan. Now he is studying a religious group called I-Kuan Tao in Thailand, which is mainly disseminated from Taiwan.

in (post-)modern Thailand. Focusing on narratives of I-Kuan Tao believers in gatherings (法會 *prachum tham* 法會), we could see believers use modified Thai Buddhist concepts as teachings of I-Kuan Tao to explain changes of family life in (post-)modern Thailand. Therefore, I-Kuan Tao becomes solutions for some believers to face their difficulties, but sometimes it also faces some conflicts with Thai socio-cultural life.

Upward or Downward? –

The Social Mobility of Migrant Workers and Taiwanese Aborigines

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The progress of science and technology accelerates people to the globalized world. To borrow the book title from Thomas Friedman (2005), the “flattened world” can be seen not only in the logistics and the cash flow, but also the migration of people. Based on the data from the Ministry of Interior, at the end of 2012 (October, 2012) the number of migrant workers in Taiwan was 443,809, which was about 1.9 percent of Taiwan population; whereas the number of Taiwanese aborigines was 526,148, which was about 2.2 percent of Taiwan population. Both the percentages of these two groups are nearly close.

Throughout history, the Taiwanese aborigines are always be seen a minority

⁶ Jung-Hsiu Liu is a Ph.D. Student at the National Chi Nan University. Her research interests are Intercultural Communication, International Migration, Social Mobility, Underclass and others. Since her current research field is in Northeastern Thailand, she also pays attention to Thailand's social and cultural issues. She has presented papers in some conferences, e.g., The 2012 Annual conference of Southeast Asian Area Studies in Taiwan with an article—“*How do They Survive in Taiwan? — Discussing Intercultural Communication Strategies on Southeast Asian Migrant Workers in Taiwan.*”

ethnic in Taiwan. Aboriginal Taiwanese had imbalance distribution in reality. The high drop-out rate and the low educational level caused these indigenous people to be limited in the underclass. On the other hand, migrant workers stayed in the underclass because they were deprived of their civil rights and labor rights.

Both of these two groups are stayed in the underclass in Taiwan, are they getting along? According to the discourse from the Taiwanese aborigines' channel, they thought the coming of these migrant workers would deprive their working rights.

This paper attempts to explore the social mobility of migrant workers and Taiwanese aborigines. Participant observation and semi-structured interviews were used to understand if it is an upward social mobility of Taiwanese aborigines or a downward social mobility of Taiwanese aborigines. In addition, some questions occurred during the observation phase were clarified through these interviews.

Result of this research showed that the coming of these migrant workers did not threaten the aboriginal Taiwanese's working rights. Moreover, these migrant workers were generated a new class in Taiwan's society—beneath the original underclass. Based on Erikson & Goldthorpe's (1992) "The Class Scheme", we can say the Taiwanese aborigines having the upward social mobility since their class is from the non-skilled workers class up to the skilled workers class.

**From Remittance to Revolution: The Filipino Diaspora and Political and
Economic Change in Philippine Society**

Janus Isaac V. Nolasco⁷

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This paper will explore whether, to what extent, and how the Filipino Diaspora can contribute to deep-seated political and economic transformation of Philippine society. Using theories, concepts, and case studies of why and how political and economic change succeeds, and how these intersect with transnational-diaspora politics, the critique will examine several examples of the Filipino diaspora's involvements in Philippine politics and economy. The analysis aims to identify whether and to what extent these involvements hew to theories, concepts, and lessons on why and how political and economic transformation happens. By citing overlaps and/or differences, the study intimates a space where new strategies and discourses of political change can be effected in the Philippines.

⁷ Janus Isaac V. Nolasco is the Publications Officer of the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. He is also the Managing Editor of *Asian Studies*, a journal published by the Asian Center since 1963. Mr. Nolasco has an MA in Asian Studies, major in West Asia, and a BA in Comparative Literature (cum laude), major in Asian-Third World Literature. Both are from the University of the Philippines Diliman. Mr. Nolasco's interests include the history, law, theology, politics, literature, and philosophy in the Middle East, especially during the premodern era. He wants to conduct research on the Persianization of the Middle East, Central Asia and/or South Asia; the political economy of literary production in medieval Islamic societies; the social and/or political history of Islamic law and philosophy; and the politics of contemporary Asian historiography. In the meantime, he has taken to exploring the potential role of the Filipino diaspora in the political and economic transformation of Philippine society. Mr. Nolasco is also a copywriting consultant for DuPont Sustainable Solutions, Training Solutions.

**Cultural Resistance of Chinese Drama in Singapore: A Case Study of
Performance Art School (1965-1976)**

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Chinese drama in Singapore has shown considerable concerns and critiques about political and social reality for a long time. It was especially true from 1950's to 1960's because of consolidations with labor and student movements and claims for anti-colonialism and independence. In the past, practitioners of labor unions, student councils and theatrical groups who actually took the responsibilities of Chinese education were constantly viewed as communists or rebels in official documents. However, the situation has changed since the book "Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history" was published in 2001. A trend to redefine the history abruptly emerged in Singapore and Malaysia. Researchers intended to reevaluate communities who were ignored by official documents and depict their oppressed stances, for example, class antagonism caused by economic policies and diminishing racial culture resulted from language policies, in order to justify the rationality and legitimacy of their resistances.

⁸ Hao-ting Shen is a Ph.D. student at the National Chi Nan University. His research interests include modern Chinese theatre and Left-wing movement in Singapore. He has been accepted for presentation at Kuo Pao Kun International Conference on 14-15 September 2012 in Singapore. The Conference is jointly organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, National Museum of Singapore, The Tangent and The Theatre Practice. The title of his paper is 'The dilemma of social transformation and cultural disconnection in Singapore: A viewpoint from Kuo Pao Kun's works'.

Arguments of precedent research mainly focus on either communist identities or resistant discourses of these struggling communities from a perspective of social class and racial culture. But the implication of cultural decolonization was totally neglected. In fact, the PAP government's administration has followed the ruling disciplines of British colonists since the independence was gained in 1965 and that was what the struggling communities, especially Chinese theatrical groups, fought against. Accordingly, the goal of this study is to explore the cultural resistances and critiques for state capitalism embedded in theatrical practices from 1965 to 1976, the period that Singapore gained independence and the concept of nation state developed, and how these theatrical practitioners thought about and responded to the social reality. This study takes the most representative case, namely, Performance Art School, as example and cites concepts of post colonialism, like "voyage in", "mimicry" and "the third space", as theoretical framework to investigate the resistant discourses presented by theatrical practitioners and the process of confronting internal colonization after the independence of Singapore.

The Construction of Indonesian Traditional Fishing's Involvement in the Activities of Migrants' Smuggling to Australia as a Form of Structural Victimization

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⁹ Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti is a PhD Candidate in the Graduate School of Criminology, Faculty of Political Sciences and Social Sciences, University of Indonesia in Jakarta. She is also a researcher of Research Center for Politics, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. Her research interests mainly focus on international migration. In the process of researching irregular international immigration, such as smuggling and trafficking, in Indonesia, she has also investigated the issue of mobility on a regional basis, at the level of ASEAN. In LIPI, she is part of the ASEAN research team.

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Indonesia is one of the stepping stone countries for many refugees and asylum seekers, which fall into migrant smuggling to Australia. The process of its activities actually facilitate by the Indonesian traditional fishing, which are culturally used to with transporting to Christmas Island or Ashmore Reef. Even though, Indonesia or Australia Governments are seriously combating this process through criminalization the smugglers – traditional fishing, this activities are still running. This paper analyzes the cultural and economic complexity of traditional Indonesian fishing are used by external parties to undergo structural and multiple victimization. It is then encouraging them entered inside trap as a giver of transportation services to the smuggling migrants, which is one of choices in diversification of struggling from their poverty.

**A Study of Taiwanese Attitude toward Immigrants--the Case of Foreign
Affairs Policemen**

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The purpose of this study aims to describe how Taiwan community treats the immigrants. As we know, although our community was established by

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immigrants, a lot of local people do not accept the situation nowadays that lots of immigrants move to Taiwan, especially those who were from the South-East Asian countries. Many studies had indicated that the local community treats immigrants in an unequal way. For example, immigration political policies are contained with "Nationalism", or the mass media set up an ugly image for the South-East Asian women. The media assumes that they got married here for money.

In Taiwan community, the Foreigner Affairs Policemen (F.A.P) have a much closer relationship with immigrants than local people. When immigrants come to Taiwan, they have to apply for alien residential certification (A.R.C) . If immigrants want to stay in Taiwan over 1 year, they have to apply for it. Under the Department of Foreigner Affairs, every police bureau sets up a service center. The F.A.P are playing a role of receiver in our community. So I take the F.A.P as a sample in my study to describe what is in their mind and what their attitude is when they get contact with immigrants.

My study contains three parts. First, nationalism has been rooted in the immigration policing policy for a long time. Second, this study tries to unveil what the F.A.P think when they face immigrants. And the last part is to see how the F.A.P treat immigrants in the service center.

Our community has discrimination against immigrants. That is responded to my study. My study is aimed to reveal and describe how the F.A.P treat immigrants in an unequally way. And you can find the difference between European, American and South-East Asian immigrants in the contact occasion and the mind of the F.A.P.

Thailand under Thaksin: the Rise of 'Non-Bangkok' Power in Thai Politics

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Abstract

Thaksin Shinawatra, twice elected prime minister of Thailand, was the most controversial figure in modern Thai politics. He won an unprecedented absolute majority of parliament, thus fulfilling a 'New Political Era' in Thailand based on electoral politics. Thai scholars named the Thaksin phenomenon: new political thinking, efficient governance and his legitimacy of the most electorate never before in the first decade of 21st century as 'Thaksinization.' Following, he was ousted by the 2006 coup d'état, and opposed by the palace, conservatives and a coalition of opponents, but supported by a broad rural people, the prolonged political crisis in Thailand is thus sustained. There is nothing new about the political disputes in Thai society, but it is crucial to explore the political maneuver of Thaksin which could get a wild mass support.

Related literatures are argued that Thaksin's popularity was seen to result from its authentic party operation, CEO-style rule and populist policies directly beneficial to the people. The people in 'Non-Bangkok Thailand,' however, most from rural area of the north, north-east, and among rural migrants in the capital, had been politically enlightened by Thaksin, they countered back the 'new conservative alliance' organized by the rich and urban middleclass in Bangkok, led to severely class struggle. Nevertheless, the civil society discourse dominated by intellectuals and elites traditionally has turned to the local people that could compete to the power of voice.

In this vein, the article aims to examine the process of decentralizing and localizing of Thai political structure is among Thaksin government based on political economy perspective to find out the essence of 'Non-Bangkok' politics. This paper offers important observations on the rise of 'Non-Bangkok' political power is the legacy of Thaksin government dramatically reshaped the political territory of modern Thailand.

Keywords: Thaksin Shinawatra, Thaksinization, Local Politics

The Military and Democratic Transition in Myanmar

Chen Hung-Yu

Abstract

The military regime was the form of rule during Myanmar's transition period. Myanmar's internal ethnic conflict and armed confrontation enabled Myanmar's military to rule firmly. On the one hand, confrontation with the ethnic minority maintained the state's integrity. On the other hand, it suppressed the opposition forces of the civil society, but also maintained Myanmar's military regime for nearly 50 years.

After the 1990 general election, the military government wantonly rejected the election results, which in theory led to the junta's legitimacy being threatened at home and abroad. The junta received international economic sanctions from the United States, Europe, and other countries. The external pressure oppressed the Myanmar's military junta into actively promoting the "Roadmap to Democracy." Thus, the military government's initiative to promote democratization not only strengthened the legitimacy of the regime, but also reconciled the internal strife, alleviated the public clamor for democracy, and searched for opportunities to resolve the ethnic conflict and promote economic development.

I. Introduction

After World War II, Burma was one of the countries in the Third World that pioneered to implement multi-party parliamentary democracy. In 1948, Myanmar gained independence. Having

Malaysia, After GE-13 – Communalism, Capitalism or Caesarism?

Boon Kia Meng

Malaysians went to the national polls for the 13th time, since the independence of the nation in 1957, on 5th May 2013. It promised to be the mother of all General Elections (GE13) in the nation's history, with the possibility of a change of ruling parties for the very first time. The prospects of regime change is as unprecedented as it was unthinkable, say 5 years ago, given the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional's (BN or National Front) unbroken 56-year reign in Malaysia (the BN is made up of the dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in coalition with other communal parties such as the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) & Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and other smaller parties in Peninsula Malaysia and Sabah & Sarawak. It took up its current organizational form as the BN, post-1969 emergency rule due to ethnic conflicts in Kuala Lumpur of that year).

Political opposition in the country has always been fragmented and disorganized, due to a combination of repressive state laws and the lack of resources, given the BN's power of incumbency and ability to mobilize state resources almost at will. All this began to change electorally, when in the 12th General Elections in 2008, the BN lost their customary two-thirds majority in the Federal Parliament, and also five out of thirteen state governments, an unprecedented achievement by Malaysia's opposition political parties. As a result of that success, the three main opposition parties, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), officially formed an alternative coalition called the Pakatan Rakyat (the People's Alliance), to administer their newly won state governments as well as being the Opposition to the BN in Parliament. The Pakatan Rakyat represented the strongest electoral challenge that the BN has ever faced, which explains why the recent elections were the most highly anticipated and politically explosive General Election to the Malaysian electorate and international observers, alike.

On the 5th of May, 85% of the Malaysian electorate turned out to cast their votes, a new national record. The results returned were as follows: the BN managed to return to power with 133 parliamentary seats, compared to the Pakatan Rakyat's total of 89 parliamentary seats (the Federal Parliament consists of a total 222 seats). This meant the BN's total of 140 in 2008 was reduced, while the Pakatan Rakyat improved from the '82 they had previously. In terms of state governments, the Pakatan Rakyat only managed to secure three state governments this time round, compared to the five won in 2008. The states of Kedah & Perak returned to BN, while the Pakatan consolidated their electoral support in the states of Penang, Selangor and Kelantan. On the surface, these results seem to suggest that nothing much has changed since 2008, give or take some parliamentary seats or states.

Critical elections, Communal results?

Undoubtedly, the 2013 general elections has not only clarified but firmly established a key fundamental insight: the fact that 'critical elections' is now the new normal for Malaysian politics, and will remain so for some time to come. As mentioned above, elections were

Liberal Policy and Strategic Management of the Yudhoyono government in Indonesia:

The Case of the Oil and Natural Gas Policy

Yuka Kayane

Introduction

Scholars of political economy in Indonesia have observed that its democracy still tends to be collusive, patrimonial and patronizing in nature, and powerful political and business elites are seizing the new democratic institutions. The oligarchical elite's interest or cartel politics to seek political/economical rents shapes policy-making and management. Previous studies, however, have failed to provide sufficient scope to analyze how the current elites of the Yudhoyono government successfully sustain their interests in contesting policy. An analysis of politics in each public policy domain can offer more detailed and even alternative perspectives from which to observe Indonesian politics. In this research, I shed light on the liberalized oil and natural gas policy, which averted opposition attack and was solidly maintained by the Yudhoyono government. Although the bashing of the foreign oil companies that dominate the Indonesian oil and natural gas industry was unabated and even gained support from judicial institutions, especially the Constitutional Court, the

Yudhoyono government successfully warded off these nationalistic pressures and prevented policy changes in Parliament.

To analyze this, I scrutinize how the Yudhoyono government has consolidated its power by initiating the liberalization of oil and gas policies, which has attracted major foreign investment. While the anti-liberal policy force has gained influential power in the public once it is supported by judicial endorsement, the Yudhoyono government has incorporated elite business actors and academics, giving them important positions in the government to block oppositions in parliament and public from intervening with the policy's management. Through this analysis, the research aims to show the relative ascendance of executive government, which has still maintained after the political transition under the *trias politica*. To this end, I first look at the law implementation process of the oil and natural gas law in 2001, which brought liberalization to the industry, in order to show the background of policy formation and the early basis of power consolidation for the current government. Then, I analyze one of the most contentious constitutional court rulings from 2012 and the unusually prompt and expeditious response by President Yudhoyono, and show how his government voided further revisions of the law.

Liberalization of oil and gas policy in Indonesia

The Construction of Indonesian Traditional Fishing's Involvement in the Activities of Migrants' Smuggling to Australia as a Form of Structural Victimization¹

Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti²

*Graduate School of Criminology –
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Introduction

Many institutions (UNODC, 2011; IOM, 2010; Weber, 2007) as well as coverage in several national and international media indicate that Indonesia is not only as source and as destination place of migrants, but geographically Indonesia is one of the important states as a last transit for irregular or smuggling migrants who demand to entry to Australia. The irregular migrants are mostly from the Middle East and Central Asia. In such a position, the trip obviously need an agent or broker to help their mobility out of their country (Aas, 2007:36) to transit in Indonesia and across the sea, which are generally from the south coast of Java, as well as Lampung, West and East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and East and Sulawesi (IOM, 2010 and UNODC, 2011).

Mostly transportation services are performed by the traditional fishing, which related with the embarkation in their village. Its activities could not be separated from the traditional fishing ability and culture to navigate the Hindia Ocean, in the waters between Indonesia and Australia. Requests to use the services of traditional fishing to assist migrants to take across Australia are also closely associated with the promise of benefits to

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² I am a PhD Candidate in the Graduate School of Criminology, Faculty of Political Sciences and Social Sciences, University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia. I am also a researcher of Research Center for Politics, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. My research interest mainly focuses on international migration. In the progress of research, that I have done over the irregular international immigration, such as smuggling and trafficking. Although my research is more related to Indonesia, but I also noticed the mobility on a regional basis, at the level of ASEAN, so that where I work in LIPI, I joined the ASEAN research team.

be gained the fishing. In fact, up to 2011 accounting for about 500 traditional fishing's caught from prison in Australia, most of which are due to perform transportation services and the majority of migrants are placed in Darwin. The existence of Indonesian diplomacy today, gradually fishing prosecuted, was released and returned to their home areas, traditional fishing has been positioned as part of transnational crime.

This paper will analysis, what is actually the reality construction of traditional fishing in their life and in the activity of transportation services, which is still ongoing performs. Even though the research is still ongoing process, this paper will discuss the interim of result, which the cultural and economic complexity of traditional Indonesian fishing are used by external parties to undergo structural and multiple victimization. It is encouraging them entered inside trap as a giver of transportation services to the smuggling migrants.

Conceptual Framework

This study is focused on one element of criminology, which is about the offender. The criminal behavior occurs not merely because of the perpetrator internal factors, but is constructed by the external factors that influence. As Young (2001) remains that, their reality is not seen as a whole picture and a higher dominance, which resulted them in a position of social exclusion. Policies accelerated poverty reduction, is seen as part of the project. As a result, a high percentage of poverty occurs in traditional fishing communities, which eventually form the criminal behavior and anti-social behavior, as a result of social construction.

Building on Quinney ideas (quoted by Barak 2001), shows that there are several forms and expressions of the crime itself and related to structural adaptation, which the fundamentals of the crime are close to crime of accommodation than crime of domination.

Left-wing practice of Chinese drama in Singapore: A case study of Performance Arts School (1965-1976)

Shen, Hao-ting¹

Abstract

Chinese drama in Singapore has shown considerable concerns and critiques about political and social reality for a long time. It was especially true from 1950's to 1960's because of consolidations with labor and student movements and claims for anti-colonialism and independence. In the past, practitioners of labor unions, student councils and theatrical groups who actually took the responsibilities of Chinese education were constantly viewed as communists or rebels in official documents. However, the situation has changed since the book "Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history" was published in 2001. A trend to redefine the history abruptly emerged in Singapore and Malaysia. Researchers intended to reevaluate communities who were ignored by official documents and depict their oppressed stances, for example, class antagonism caused by economic policies and diminishing racial culture resulted from language policies, in order to justify the rationality and legitimacy of their resistances. Unfortunately, most of these works still centered on the dual logic of communist/non-communist instead of investigating how did these left-wing Chinese groups think of and response to the reality. Especially how they imagine and practice left-wing thoughts. Thus, this article will take the representative Chinese theatrical group- Performance Art School as the case, to analyze the ways Chinese theatrical groups interpret and practice left-wing thoughts with Chinese characteristics through their performances and daily activities.

Key words: Chinese Drama, Left-wing thoughts, Asceticism

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'Chinese Religion' with non-Chinese Believers: Narratives of I-Kuan Tao Believers in Thailand

Yu-Sheng Lin

In Southeast Asia, most of Chinese religious sects are connected with ethnic Chinese migrants in each area. For example, De-Jiao (德教) is connected with Chinese migrants from Techiou (Huang 2007). The Former Heaven Way (先天道) is based on female Chinese migrants from Guangdong (Topley 1963, Shiga 2010). And Tzuchi, which is mainly connected with ethnic Chinese migrants from Taiwan, became related with Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia and other regions (Huang 2009). I-Kuo Tao, the "Chinese religious sect" which I would discuss here, in former studies, is also considered as mainly connected with Taiwanese businessmen in Southeast Asia (Shiga 2010: 161). Especially in Malaysia and Singapore, the dissemination of I-Kuan Tao and ethnic Chinese migrants are highly related (Sung 1997; Soo 2003; Lim 2012). However, in Thailand, the believers of I-Kuan Tao are not only ethnic Chinese, but most of them are ethnic Thai. Therefore, the dissemination of I-Kuo Tao in Thailand could not only be considered with the factor of "Chinese diaspora".

In this study, I would argue that, the transnational 'Chinese Religion' in modern times should not only be considered in the 'transnational ethnic Chinese' settings, but we should also consider the local context in each area and even the cross-ethnic adoption of the 'Chinese Religion'.

I-Kuo Tao

I-Kuan Tao is one Chinese folk religious sect, which was named by Liu Qing Xu (劉清虛) in 1886 in China, and continued to the present day. However, as many studies show, I-Kuan Tao is connected with some former Chinese folk religious sects, like Luo Jiao (羅教) in the 15th century and The Former Heaven Way (先天道) from the 17th century. Many concepts in I-Kuan Tao, like 'The unification of five major religions' (五教合一), 'The Eternal Mother' (無極老母), 'Three Stages Final Kalpa' (三期末劫), are one kind of folk Maitreya belief mixed with ideas of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Many folk religious sects in the history of China have those concepts as well. I-Kuan Tao could be thought as one of them.

Besides hybridization of different religious concepts, the religious practice, that

The Taiwanese Attitude toward Immigrants – The Case of Foreigner Affairs Policemen

Da-Kai, Young

I. Introduction

Research Background

Based on the data from the National Police Administration, Ministry of the Interior, there were 483,921 foreigners staying in Taiwan in the end of 2012. Among these people, the largest proportion is foreign workers (434,325 persons; 89%), the second is foreign spouses (64,262 persons; 13%), and the third is professionals (not Southeast-Asian immigrants) (48,325 persons; 9%).

As shown in Table 2 which categorized by immigrants' nationality, the largest proportion was Indonesian (182,195 persons), the second was Vietnamese (96,787 persons), the third was Filipinos (84,105 persons), and the fourth was Thais (71,234 persons). In addition, immigrants from Europe and the United States were 18,469 persons. These immigrants are staying distributed almost in every town and country, cities and the far-off mountain areas or along the coast. We can see from these data, foreign workers and foreign spouses have a great proportion among these immigrants. This is related to Taiwan's social and economic development.

【Table1—The Amount of Immigrants in Taiwan-Fu Chien Area from 1992 to 2012】

Upward or Downward? – The Social Mobility of Migrant Workers in Taiwan and Taiwan Aboriginal Workers

Liu, Jung-Hsiu¹

Abstract

Throughout history, the Taiwanese aborigines are always be seen a minority ethnic in Taiwan. According to the discourse from the TV channel of Taiwanese aborigines, they thought the coming of migrant workers would deprive their working rights. This paper attempts to explore the social mobility of migrant workers in Taiwan and Taiwan aboriginal workers. Participant observation and semi-structured interviews were used in this study. Result of this research showed that the coming of these migrant workers did not threaten the aboriginal Taiwanese's working rights. Moreover, these migrant workers were generated a new class in Taiwan's society—beneath the original underclass.

Keywords: migrant workers in Taiwan, Taiwan aboriginal workers, underclass, social mobility

Introduction

Migrant Workers in Taiwan

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**From Remittance to Revolution:
The Filipino Diaspora¹ and Political and Economic Change in the Philippines**

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Introduction: Literary Visions

The *balikbayan* (literally, one who returns to his homeland) has been a staple feature in Philippine literature in English, from Juan Laya's *His Native Coast* and Azucena Uranza's *Bamboo in the Wind* to Ninotchka Roschka's *State of War* and Miguel Syjuco's *Ilustrado*. Whatever the conflict or issue – redefining the nation or leading a revolution - the *balikbayan* is right at the center of the action. These novels do not just present the question of *who* does what and why. They also explore the idea of *where* it will (or should) all come from: abroad.

Statement of the Problem

This study explores why, how, and to what extent the Filipino diaspora can contribute to the political transformation of Philippine society. It argues that (1) the Filipino diaspora is *helping* create an emergent social class in Philippine society (2) and that remittances and the Filipino diaspora's development projects *help* create a distance, if not independence from the system of patronage politics that plagues Philippine politics.

Theoretical Framework(s) and Methodology

This two-pronged argument is framed by and makes sense within the discourse of transnationalism, whose theories, concepts, and realities are linked to those of class formation, economic development, and the relationship between economics and political development. The political and economic potential of the Filipino diaspora falls more sharply into theoretical focus by looking at it as a transnational actor, whose impact is bound by yet transcends the physical, geographic boundaries of the Philippine nation-state. As Jonathan Nakamura says, "...a diaspora should be viewed as encompassing the transnational relations between...its homeland and its

¹ Roughly defined here as Filipinos who live, work, and/or studied abroad. The nuances of this definition will be clarified and addressed in a more refined version of this study.

counterpart overseas communities throughout the world” (Okamura 115).

Secondly, if the Filipino diaspora is a transnational force, it also necessitates a (re) definition and a reconceptualization of the boundaries of the Philippine nation-state. This involves the concept of deterritorialization, as in deterritorialized nations; transnational social spaces (Pries 2011, 3-36) or the notion of the Domestic Abroad, in which diaspora communities are seen as an intrinsic part of the nation-state (Varadarajan 2010). In this sense, California, which houses more Filipinos than any other state in the United States, is less a foreign land than an extension of the Philippines. And while the Filipino diaspora ipso facto live outside the Philippines, at least in the literal, geographic sense that they do not reside in the country, they occupy a virtual though no less real space inside the country, playing a huge role in its political, social, economic, and cultural landscape.

To determine whether the Filipino Diaspora is helping create an emergent social class, this study juxtaposes the definitions and the causes of class formation on the one hand with documentary evidence and empirical observations of the families of Filipino diasporas in the Philippines on the other. The study asks, “What is a social class and why and how do they form? Do the Filipino diaspora and their families back home meet such criteria and comprise a social class? Why or why not?”

Secondly, to establish how the Filipino diaspora helps create less dependence on patronage politics, the study turns to the theories that explore the links between economic clout and political power. The economic impact of the Filipino diaspora, because of remittances and development projects, is well-attested by the literature, including those from Scalabrini Migration Center in the Philippines and the researchers under Diaspora to Development program of the Philippine government. But how can these economic developments help maintain the distance, if not independence from the structures of patronage politics?

This puzzle will be answered by examining at least one town in the Philippines that hosts a substantial number of families that are supported by a family member who lives and works abroad