出國報告(出國類別:出席國際學術研討會)

美國中西部政治年會會議

服務機關:國立政治大學國際事務學院

姓名職稱:如大維副教授 派赴國家:美國芝加哥

出國期間:102.04.10-102.04.16

報告日期:102.05.17

摘要

本人於今(102)年參與美國中西部政治學年會,期間共參與三個場次:第一場次爲文章發表人; 第二場次爲與談人,第三場次爲主持人兼任評論人。本活動除每年舉辦一次外,亦爲政治與國際關係 領域之重要學術活動。期間與世界各地學者交流,並期望能藉由自身參與,爲政大提升在國際學術間 的能見度略盡心力。最後,感謝政大研究發展處的經費補助,使本次參與國際學術會議得以順利成行。

目次

壹、此次出國參加學術會議之緣起3
貳、 會議議程與進展3
參、感想7
肆、建議8
伍、附件9

壹、 此次出國參加學術會議之緣起

此次出國參加學術會議,是參與在美國芝加哥所舉辦的「美國中西部政治學年會」(簡稱 MPSA)。 MPSA 是世界上最大的政治科學年會之一,總計吸引了超過五千人與會,會議本身也包含了百餘個議程場次。

有幸參與此次盛會,讓本人能夠在眾多學術先進前發表自己的學術研究,再者,在會議中擔任與談人 與主持人,也能夠接觸在政治科學領域最新的研究,並且與眾多的學者專家進行互動與交流。

有關於此場會議的特色與重要性,請參考以下由 MPSA 所提供的資訊:

「美國中西部政治學年會」作爲世界上最大的政治科學年會之一,此年會在每年的春天定期舉辦。2013年的 MPSA,估計有來自美國與其他 55 個國家,超過 5700 位的發表人,在此發表了超過 4700 篇文章。經過學科領域的劃分,此次會議包含了超過 70 個議程場次,而大部分的場次都是探討跨學科的領域,吸引了來自不同領域的專家學者參與此次盛會,使此次會議呈現多元並存的面向。

(MPSA 網站: http://www.mpsanet.org/Conference/tabid/75/Default.aspx)

值得注意的是,這樣的大規模的學術盛會,並未見於在台灣或是亞太的其他地區,因此出國參與這樣的學術會議,對於提升本身的專業與提高學校在國際學術界的能見度,實屬必要。

貳、 會議議程與進展

此次會議舉辦時間是從 2013 年的 4 月 11 日(四)至 4 月 14 日(日),舉辦地點是在芝加哥的 Palmer House 飯店(詳見從 MPSA 官網上下載的附件)。本人是於美國中部時間的 4 月 10 日抵達芝加哥,並於 4 月 15 日早上離開芝加哥。

如要在 MPSA 上發表文章,必須在會議開始的數個月前,向籌備委員會提交文章的摘要。經過籌備委員會及其下的學術委員會的審核,再決定是否接受此篇文章的發表,以及確定是以口頭報告或是海報的形式發表,最後再決定口頭報告的分組場次。

本人的文章這次是以口頭報告的形式發表。關於分組場次的形式,請詳見 MPSA 的說明如下:

場次:一個場次會發表四至五篇文章,包含一位主持人與兩位與談人。主持人負責介紹場次、每一位

發表人以及與談人,主持人須掌控文章的發表時間,並且確保討論的順利進行,而每位發表人則會發表精簡後的文章。大會議程會列出每篇文章精確的發表時間、與談人的評論時間以及開放給觀眾提問的時間。與談人會針對每篇文章作出回應及評論,接著則會由觀眾進行評論、提問與討論。主持人則會掌控每篇文章的發表時間,確保每篇文章都享有同樣的時間。

發表人:每位發表人會在特定的時間長度內發表自己經過精簡後的文章。與談人會給予每篇文章回應及評論,接著則會由觀眾進行評論、提問與討論。

我在此次會議發表一篇名爲"A Foreign Policy Based on Pretty Please? Mitt Romney's Criticism of Barack Obama's Foreign Policy"的文章。(文章全文及發表時所用的投影片請見附件)。我的場次如下:

發表人

19-3 Foreign Policy and the Obama Administration

4月11日(四)下午4:35-6:15

摘要

魯尼(Mitt Romney)如何批評歐巴馬(Barack Obama)的外交政策?回答這問題是很重要的,因爲該問題的重點在於共和黨候選人對外交政策的理解。本篇文章探討了幾個假設,而支持這些假設的最佳證明便在於魯尼試圖將歐巴馬描繪成不同於美國外交政策主流的非干涉主義者。

討論

對於本篇文章的回饋和討論多半是正向的。討論者認為本篇文章可以更著墨於選舉情勢的動態過程,特別是候選人抹黑競爭對手以爭取中間選民支持的趨勢。

二、 主持人及與談人之角色

要符合與談人的資格,必須是在過去幾年間擁有博士學位及出版學術作品。無論是自告奮勇擔任與談人或是受邀擔任與談人,籌備委員會都會將其分派到相關的議題場次,也希望與談人能自願擔任主持人。

有關於 MPSA 對於主持人及與談人的角色定義,請詳見以下網站:

 $\underline{http://www.mpsanet.org/Conference/ConferenceProgram2013/SessionFormatsRoleDescriptions/tabid/702/D}\\ \underline{efault.aspx}$

主持人:主持人負責場次、每一位發表人以及與談人。除此之外,主持人會掌控每一篇文章的發表時間,確保不會超過議程上所排定的發表時間,且維護討論的品質與順利進行。

口頭發表/海報發表與談人:與談人會針對口頭發表或是海報發表的文章給予回應,點出優點及需要 改進之處,與談人也需要針對議程的主題,作更深入及更廣泛的探討。

在此次會議中,除了發表文章,我還擔任了主持人兼評論人以及與談人,參與的場次如下:

與談人

19-5Foreign Policy and China

4/12(五) 早上 10:25-12:05

本人討論了數篇有關中國大陸外交政策以及其對該政策認知的文章。討論過程將焦點放在方法論上,以便引導出我認為應該在文章中被提到的論點。因此,我相信對於原作者將有更多實質上的幫助。至於文章中特定案例的價值也是討論過程中的主題。

主持人兼評論人

19-12 Foreign Policy: Theoretical Perspectives

4/13(六) 下午 2:40-4:20

本人在此討論了從理論觀點理解外交政策的數篇文章。我討論的重點多半著重在尋求更廣泛的文本回顧,以及尋求更宏觀的論文素養,而非僅是將純哲學或歷史研究方法套用至文章中,這些都是研究政治科學常見的問題。本次討論也激起許多火花,因有些作者本身並未注意到這些問題,部分聽眾也舉出某些文章爲例,認爲該文章並未適切地將分析方法建立在相關文本上。

三、 其他活動

除了本身發表、與談與主持的場次,我還參與了其他場次,領域如下:國際關係、國際關係理論、比較政治、美國外交政策與理論。

15-3 IPE and Conflict

4/11(四) 下午 2:40-4:15

這些文章聚焦於由於各種不同貿易策略和經濟政策而導致的衝突。這些資料對我來說極具價值,因本人開始在大學部教授國際政治經濟學課程且正積極尋求對於相關領域的理解。

10-12 Wired for Change?: The Internet, Mass Media, and Chinese Political Attitudes

4/13 (六) 早上 10:25-12:05

本場次主要討論中國大陸公眾意見的當代研究,包含對於中國大陸民族主義不同的詮釋觀點。這也讓我對該議題產生一些有趣的疑問,也就是說,究竟透過檢視部落格和網路資源,研究者可以觀察到多少的資訊?以及研究者該如何以其視角來觀察中國大陸的政策。

10-10 China's Foreign Relations: Domestic-International Linkages

4/12 (五) 下午 4:35-6:15

本場次提供中國大陸國內政問題及對於國內政體所追求的國內策略和國際關係實踐兩者之間連結性之探討。這些對我來說也極具價值的,因本人研究興趣在於由國內層級因素解釋外交政策活動,透過此會議,我得以將此分析方法套用於對中國大陸的研究上。

34-22 Approaches to Justice, Piety, and Civic Education in Homer, Thucydides, and Aristotle 4/13(六) 下午 12:45-2:25

本場次也具有相當的價值,因公民教育和公民共和主義的建立也是本人研究興趣範圍。本場次也以古希臘和對修習堤底斯(Thucydides)的新觀點作爲對比,以引導出本場次的主題。

19-13 Sources of Foreign Policy Behavior

4/13 (六) 下午 4:35-6:15

本場次主要討論不同小國家、衝突和危機中之外交決策。這對於我在教授國際關係理論有莫大的幫助,因該議題觸及到了以不同於國際關係主流理論的觀點來實行外交決策的面向,因此提供我在研究理論上一個有趣的對比。

除此之外,我在會議上遇到許多在該領域享譽盛名的學者權威,並與他們進行交流與互動,以求專業知識上的精進。在會議上也遇到了中華民國外交部駐芝加哥的組長 Andy Tseng,並在他的邀請下與其他來自台灣的與會者共進晚餐。在那並得以認識許多首次碰面的台灣同事,包含了中央研究院和台灣大學的同仁。

參、 感想

這次出國參加學術會議,讓我獲益良多,針對我自己發表的文章,我得到了非常寶貴的回應與評論, 讓我在學術專業上能夠更加精進,同時,參與此次會議也讓我從中累積更多最新的研究與教學想法, 特別是中國大陸外交政策、中國大陸政治、公民教育和國際政治經濟學領域上。無論是在研究或教學 上,都能跟上並掌握學術的脈動。最後,藉由此次會議,我得以與更多的學術先進以及各國官員代表 交流與互動,在一個如此大規模的政治科學年會,與這麼多專家權威齊聚一堂,彼此間的切磋與交流, 每每激盪出燦爛的思想火花。對我而言,這不但是提升自身專業與學術的寶貴機會,也是提升政治大 學在國際學術界能見度的最佳機會。

中西部政治學會(MPSA)會議的優點在於其呈現了大量論文的提報,每個政治科學領域的相關主題或特別議題,例如民主化、發展和女性主義等等,都有數個場次。雖然中西部政治學會不像美國政治科學學會(APSA)具有選擇性機制,但事實上前者論文的品質和後者是並駕齊驅的,且有時甚至更具有價值,因部分的碩士生會透過該學會來報告他們的論文。中西部政治學會也吸引更多來自不同國家的參與者,因此相較於美國政治科學學會和美國、太平洋區域性協會,更具有國際性水準。

我將於今年八月參加美國政治科學學會會議並擔任受邀人演講,但我不確定是否會申請 2014 年中西部政治學會的報告。現在較棘手的情況是中西部政治學會在春季中旬舉行,而美國政治科學學會是在秋季之前便開始舉行。

肆、建議

- 一、此次出國參加會議,感謝有政治大學研究發展處的經費補助,讓我得以順利成行。然而,此次只獲得部分的旅費補助,在旅費的運用上略顯困難,未來如有機會能夠獲得全額旅費補助,將會使出國參加會議的經驗更臻完美。除此之外,根據規定,如要申請出國參加學術會議的經費補助,必需先申請國家科學委員會,作業費時冗長,也希望學校能考慮取消此項規定,使申請流程能更有效率。
- 二、此外,台灣有成立一個能夠討論全球性議題,並將焦點聚集在國家邊境問題以及更容易讓外國學者參與的年度會議的迫切必要。目前台灣國內的國際關係和政治科學會議多半仍是台灣中心,僅將焦點放在兩岸關係或東亞議題上,且將中文作爲會議的主要語言,因此導致會議格局的窄化。這也使研究興趣不在台灣或東亞的學者被迫到國外從事相關的學術研究和更專業的交流活動。目前有這種會議窄化傾向的國家,也包括澳洲和紐西蘭。他們把重點放在國內政治、亞洲事務以及其他與自身有關之議題。對於此問題,台灣可先謹慎地將外國學者來源拓展至太平洋地區(包括東亞、澳洲和紐西蘭,甚至是南亞),接著再將其延伸至美國、歐洲和非洲。會議可以以英文作爲主要語言,並在台北、高雄、新竹或其他設有國立大學的大城市舉辦。
- 三、除了上述討論的會議問題,學者在台灣政治研究領域上的相互協調合作更應有所精進。台灣政治學會(TPSA)的功能是受限的且仍以中文爲主要語言。中央研究院可作爲這種協調工作的要角,並應積極出版相關研究以及在院內舉辦會議和工作坊,如此便能吸引更多台灣政治科學學者,並創造出更有活力的知識社群。

伍、 附件

- 1. 會議議程
- 2. 會議論文發表之該場次資料
- 3. 會議論文
- 4. 會議論文投影片檔
- 5. 擔任主持人及與談人之該場次資料
- 6. 討論及意見

Program Overview

Wednesday, April 10 4:00 pm - 7:00 pm 6:00 pm - 7:00 pm	Registration MPSA Welcome Reception	4 th Floor Empire, Lobby Level
Thursday, April 11 7:30 am - 5:00 pm 8:00 am - 5:00 pm 8:30 am - 10:10 am 9:30 am - 7:30 pm 10:25 am - 12:05 pm 12:20 pm - 2:20 pm	Registration Placement Center Panels and Roundtables Exhibits Panels, Posters, Roundtables MPSA Council Meeting & Luncheon	4 th Floor 4 th Floor Exhibit Hall, 4 th Floor Mercat a la Planxa, 638 S. Michigan
12:45 pm – 2:25 pm 2:40 pm – 4:20 pm 4:35 pm – 6:15 pm 6:30 pm – 7:30 pm 8:00 pm – 9:00 pm	Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables MPSA Exhibitor Reception MPSA Minority Caucus Reception	Exhibit Hall, 4 th Floor Empire, Lobby Level
Friday, April 12 7:30 am - 5:00 pm 8:00 am - 5:00 pm 8:30 am - 10:10 am 9:30 am - 6:30 pm 10:25 am - 12:05 pm 12:45 pm - 2:25 pm 2:40 pm - 4:20 pm 4:35 pm - 6:15 pm 6:30 pm - 7:30 pm	Registration Placement Center Panels and Roundtables Exhibits Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables MPSA Mentoring Reception for Grad Students	4 th Floor 4 th Floor Exhibit Hall, 4 th Floor Empire, Lobby Level
Saturday, April 13 7:30 am - 5:00 pm 8:00 am - 5:00 pm 8:30 am - 10:10 am 9:30 am - 5:00 pm 10:25 am - 12:05 pm 12:45 pm - 2:25 pm 2:40 pm - 4:20 pm 4:35 pm - 6:15 pm 6:30 pm - 7:15 pm 7:15 pm - 8:45 pm	Registration Placement Center Panels and Roundtables Exhibits Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels, Posters, Roundtables Panels and Roundtables Panels and Roundtables MPSA Business Meeting MPSA President's Reception	4 th Floor 4 th Floor Exhibit Hall, 4 th Floor Red Lacquer, 4 th Floor Red Lacquer, 4 th Floor
Sunday, April 14 8:00 am – 10:40 am 8:30 am – 10:10 am 10:25 am – 12:05 pm	Registration Panels and Roundtables Panels and Roundtables	4 th Floor

Theoretical Foreign Policy

A set of papers that address important questions, including what a moral foreign policy would look like, the nature of America's early revolutionary foreign policy, and the foreign policy of small states. In doing so, utilized a diverse set of methodologies and discussed a wide range of cases, representing contributions to very different types of literature (ethics, history, contemporary IR theory).

Just Peace

Literature review in terms of understandings of the state and understandings of war:

- Justify contribution—thinking about war and peace in a non-dualistic fashion not new— Chinese legalists, early modern European realists (Clausewitz)
- · Familiarity with understandings of the state
- Entre into a systematic engagement with relevant political science and IR literature rather than selective and ad hoc interventions and uses of specific pieces of the literature.

State is an entity whose telos is to win wars.

- Not recognizable as a state in IR literature—looks more like a description of a military
- Obligation of statesman to own state and other states not discussed as a way of thinking about ethical obligations
- Even if accepted, would not necessarily produce the set of oughts set out. Appears to produce merely a pragmatic logic rather than a bounded moral doctrine. What if it is easier to win war by preventing it through a pre-emptive strike? By balancing? Colluding with enemy's enemy, assassination (as with More's utopians)?

Acceptance of soft power, foreign aid, as unproblematic both ethically and practically

- Practical problems of effectiveness
- Ethical problems dealing with cultural and economic imperialism

American Revolutionary Policy

Requires location in literature. Tell us what is new, also to help with next problem

Conception of revolutionary policy:

- Multiple: of revolutionary nations, as break with traditional Westphalian understanding, as substantive policy of internal interference, as process: a policy in which ordinary people get a voice
- Cases don't seem to match: within a country vs. interfering in colonial relations:
 - o If narrow view of internal to country, only proposed course re: England counts
 - If broader, then what is a revolutionary policy and what is a revolutionary nation—US, England, France of Louis XVI

Rather than a revolutionary policy, appears to be the emerging norm of the time

Challenging NeoRealism

More on small state vs. weak state; is it an absolute or relative term?

Clarify what is being explained in the context of arguing that a small state's actions may not be determined by structure. What are the actions and how do we conceptualize them in terms of alternative to an understanding that a small state's actions are determined by world structure

- A particular foreign policy approach—Lithuania engaged in a particular policy by choice
- A successful foreign policy gambit—Lithuania's chose policy worked
- A particular outcome-- a state gains independence when before it was controlled
- A particular outcome given a general context—a state (Lithuania) gains independence through its chosen policy because the neighborhood hegemon (Russia) falls apart

Can always create an internal narrative of events which add factors to a neo-liberal understanding. But the argument neoliberals make is that their explanation is parsimonious and therefore better. To argue against this, must not just show that narrative explains, or explains as well, but explains better. This requires an explicit comparison with neorealism as an alternative—what would a neorealist say about this case, what would be a neorealist explanation and how is this treatment superior such that we would be persuaded to accept it rather than a neorealist account?

China and Foreign Policy

Economic Perils of Democracy

Need more on policymaking process in US, but more particularly the PRC re: foreign policy being affected by external factors such as public opinion, institutions of accountability. Gries: Chinese policy bounded by nationalism that the government both encourages and which it must not too directly contradict.

Operationalize national interest. What does it mean? How do we know that a policy better promotes national interest? Can it be identified in a non-subjective fashion?

Problem with case: need to compare operations of systems (assuming operationalization of national interest) by holding context constant. ME is not a constant context because there are different connections and histories attached to that area of the world for the US and the PRC. US—history of involvement, domestic groups and Israel; absent for PRC. If want to demonstrate US policy more affected by internal politics than PRC not, cannot disentangle the finding of difference from the difference in contexts. Must either use a set of cases in which the context is not loaded for either state (possibly Africa), or compare US/ME with PRC and equally contentious area historically, such as Northern Asia/Japan

US/China Relations and Media

Data problems:

- Justify timespan, particularly given unevenness of contributions by year
- Discuss sampling technique
- Coding: what does negative, neutral and positive coverage mean? How are those operationalized?

Baseline: is the media coverage of PRC different substantively for other countries with which the US has contentious or non-contentious relations?

If accept negative coverage, then what? Appears to argue that negative coverage contributes to problems in relationship because somehow affects US policy. Must establish and defend this linkage.

Names Can Hurt:

What is the epistemological community? US/PRC? Policymakers? If more than policymakers, why?

Do more to highlight importance and relevance of findings. What do we derive from understanding how PRC is negotiating its emergence on the world scene? Is this better than

asking a why question (why does PRC act as it does?). Need explicit comparison with other ways of examining the relationship between US and PRC in terms of this emergence.

Are either in fact exercising power, or are they set forward conceptions of PRC as ways of justifying their policies, using and discarding those conceptions when convenient:

- PRC understanding of its role in international institutions importantly contains the selfinterested principle of non-interference in internal affairs. How do we establish that norms/conception in fact are independently important?
- Examples of entrapment for the US different than example from EU: in the latter, the EU
 followed its principle despite material factors weighing against it; in the US example, it
 allows material considerations to outweigh the norms it is promulgating.

"A Foreign Policy Based on Pretty Please": Mitt Romney's Criticisms of Barack Obama

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Introduction

While generally overshadowed by domestic issues, foreign affairs became important late in the 2012 presidential campaign. While some analysts have argued that foreign policy played a relatively minor role in the election itself (Friedman 2012), a significant amount of media attention was paid to foreign affairs in September and October, as Mitt Romney attempted to use the events that occurred in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 to his advantage in order to overcome what some analysts argued was a possibly decisive disadvantage on foreign policy issues (Drezner 2012b). But Romney did not speak of foreign affairs only at that late date. Throughout the campaign and during the preceding Republican primaries, Romney dedicated an appreciable number of speeches to foreign policy and issued several statements that addressed foreign affairs.

How did Romney approach foreign policy as a campaign issue? More specifically, how did Romney attack Barack Obama and promote himself in this issue area? This paper examines Romney's discussions of foreign policy during the Republican primaries and the presidential campaign up to the third (foreign policy debate) with Obama. In the latter, Romney appeared to shift his tactics (Sledge 2012, Zogby 2012). The focus here is on Romney's earlier discussions, in which he made a thorough attempt to draw a contrast between himself and Obama. How did Romney characterize himself, how did he characterize Obama, and what are the implications of those activities?

Literature Review

Romney's foreign policy discussions have been the subject of both journalistic and scholarly attention. Many analysts argue that, despite their attacks on one another, Romney and Obama held many of the same foreign policy positions and views (Kaplan 2012; Lindsay 2011; Feaver 2012; Cohen 2012; Runkle 2012; Zunes 2012). Consequently, in the course of assessing the campaign some observers have held that in presenting his own foreign policy views in the most favorable light, Romney (as did Obama) artificially differentiated himself by exaggerating or tailoring his views to please interest groups, or even by lying (Kaplan 2012; Baker 2012). In contrast, others hold that while Romney and Obama shared many views, Romney substantively differentiated himself by echoing recognizably neo-conservative themes (Horowitz 2012; Jentleson and Kupchan 2012) or by presenting understandings of American exceptionalism that allowed him to criticize Obama as a realist (Wilson 2012).

Obama's foreign policy itself has been the subject of a wide variety of academic interpretations, ranging from arguments that he holds watered-down neoconservative views to arguments that he is at heart a non-interventionist (for an overview, see Quinn 2011). However, while the substantive policy positions of both candidates are of interest as background, as is the issue of the veracity of both candidates' criticisms of his opponent's views and record, this paper focuses on Romney's arguments, and in particular how he attempted to critically compare Obama to

himself. In doing so, it asks how Romney discussed foreign policy matters in relation to himself and Obama. Do any patterns emerge from that attempt in terms of conceptualizations of the US and its place in the world? Did Romney speak of foreign policy in terms of recognizable foreign policy positions when putting forward his own policy proposals and attacking Obama's record? Was he inconsistent and purely opportunist in his discussions, as Cohen and Baker hold? Was he attacking Obama for being a realist, as Wilson contends, or criticizing him for not adhering to neo-conservative views, as Horowitz, and Jentleson and Kupchan suggest? Exploring these questions means assessing whether and how Romney associated himself with a particular foreign policy position or tradition and whether and how he attempted to connect Obama with a different and ostensibly disadvantageous position or tradition.

On the basis of that analysis, we can discuss the various implications of those arguments. If there is no pattern and his attacks were merely opportunistic, such a position may reveal that Romney and his managers were aiming to influence the general public and believed that foreign policy opinion among the public is amorphous and ill-informed. If there is a pattern, we can explore reasons why Romney and his campaign thought exploring those patterns were advantageous to him. If he emphasized particular themes, was Romney only attempting to shore up his support in the Republican base, as Drezner (2012a, 2012b) held, or was he attempting to reach beyond the Republican party, as Sledge and Zogby held he attempted to do in the third presidential debate?

Methods, Data and Propositions

This paper uses a qualitative textual analysis to assess Romney's speeches and statements concentrating on arguments, i.e., connected sets of reasons supporting a judgment or proposition. Each argument is subjected to an analytic examination focusing on its important components (including depictions of the US and the world).

The data sources are Romney's foreign policy speeches, statements and campaign literature: Romney's speech at the Citadel on October 7, 2011 (Citadel), his remarks at the Iowa Republican Candidate Debate on December 15, 2011 (Iowa), his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention on July 24, 2012 (VFW), his "Remarks to the Clinton Global Initiative" on September 25, 2012 (Clinton), his editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* "A New Course for the Middle East" on September 30, 2012 (WSJ), his speech at the Virginia Military Institute on October 7, 2012 (VMI) and material from his election website, mittromney.com.

This paper approaches these texts in the context of the literature on foreign policy arguments and positions. That literature provides insights into how discussions of foreign policy are organized and into the tensions and disagreements among traditions and positions. To map Romney's portrayals of himself and Obama onto those traditions and positions would potentially tell us where in the landscape of American foreign policy understandings Romney located himself, where he located Obama and the relationship between those two locations.

In reviewing this literature, we begin with Walter Mead's discussion of foreign policy traditions,

all of which might be relevant to Romney's portrayals of himself or Obama. *Hamiltonians* in Mead's parlance place importance on defending America's economic interests and using power to promote trade and commerce. Thus, they would support agreements, alliances, memberships and interventions that safeguard economic interests or promote trade, oppose policies that would endanger trade and economic interests and display skepticism towards ventures that do not have economic interests as their basis. *Wilsonians* favor the spread of democracy and freedom and the use of multilateral means. They are in favor of building and maintaining international institutions to help preserve order and peace. Thus, they would base their judgment regarding intervention on its potential to promote a liberal international order and its multilateral and internationalist character. *Jeffersonians* are skeptical of foreign involvement in general because they deeply fear that republican institutions will be harmed by a turn towards imperial ambitions. *Jacksonians* are also reluctant to engage in foreign interventions unless US national security is directly involved, but then support the full and unilateral unleashing of American military power if security interests are at risk.

In contrast to Mead's efforts, Dumbrell's (1999) study concentrates on isolationism, a position Romney may attribute to Obama. The result is a four-part typology of isolationist arguments, in which *Unilateralists* emphasize national interests, the safeguarding of American sovereignty and a distrust of international organizations and allies; *New Populist America Firsters* focus on the need to address American problems rather than engaging in foreign policy ventures, particularly those involving foreign aid and other uses of American resources; *Anti-Globalizationists* resist free trade agreements and decry the effects of corporation-led globalization on the United States as a way of defending American exceptionalism, and *Anti-Imperialists*, who oppose the role of the US as a hegemonic enforcer of post-Cold War peace and order.

Johnstone (2011) identifies a different way of conceptualizing opposition to activism that might be pertinent to Romney's descriptions. In Johnstone's study, *Non-interventionism* is resistance to "political entanglements and military engagements". Johnstone does not view this component as completely opposed to involvement in foreign relations, but rather a position that emphasizes the need to minimize such involvement due to "the threat and potentially negative impact of war on the United States". *Unilateralism*, in contrast, is resistance to becoming tied to alliances and bound by international laws and treaties. Its focus is on freedom of action, a goal, Johnstone argues, that is connected with positive conceptions of American exceptionalism. America's unique character must be safeguarded through the assertion of national sovereignty. Thus for Johnstone, resistance to intervention is connected either with shielding the US from harm caused by alliances and war, or with preserving the autonomy the US is seen rightfully to possess due to its extraordinary nature.

Because neoconservatism has been suggested as a set of arguments Romney used, we turn to Mearsheimer (2005) and self-identified neoconservatives for its characterization. For Mearsheimer, neoconservatism is a form of muscular Wilsonianism. That is, it embraces the universalistic Wilsonian project of spreading democracy and order throughout the world, but by relying more on American strength (particularly its military) rather than upon international institutions. As such, they tend to favor a unilateral rather than multilateral approach to action and intervention. Neoconservatives themselves are split in their understandings. For Irving Kristol (Kristol 2003), neoconservative foreign policy contains a longer list of propositions. It

embraces the healthiness and naturalness of patriotism (thus endorsing a Jacksonian theme in Mead's understanding) while opposing international institutionalism. It distinguishes sharply between friends and foes in the international arena, accepts an understanding of the national interest that includes ideological as well as material components (including the defense of democracy) and rejects a policy based purely on geopolitical calculations. Finally, it accepts fully the responsibilities that accompany being the paramount military power in the world.

For Krauthammer (2004), this list prescribes an overly broad foreign policy agenda. In his version of neoconservatism, American foreign policy should recognize foremost that the US is involved in existential struggles in a Hobbesian world in which it must rely for the most part on its own strength and fortitude. It should seek to spread democracy throughout the world both as an end in itself and as a means for its survival and flourishing. However, unlike Kristol, Krauthammer does not see the US as having to accept fully the mantle as the world's policeman, nor should it intervene in support of democracy in all situations. In this understanding, the US's resources are finite and its survival is the most important goal; therefore, the former should be used judiciously, meaning that interventions of any kind, including those intended to support democracy, should take place only in those contexts in which doing so is a geopolitical necessity.

Finally, there have been suggestions that Romney portrayed Obama's foreign policy as realist. What would this mean? In this context (as opposed to the context of academic IR theory), a realist foreign policy would be based on an analysis of international power structures. As Stephen Walt and Mearsheimer suggest in their popular writings, a realist foreign policy would not see democracy promotion as a useful foreign policy goal. The US would operate in light of its understanding of its power relations with other countries, using power when necessary to defend its interests and existence rather than being moved by ideology. But it would also recognize the limitations of using power and of appearing to threaten the security of other nations. In particular, foreign policy realists argue that when threatened by a power like the US, other nations will seek to defend themselves by developing their militaries and seeking to create hostile combinations rather than acquiescing to the US's desires and seeking to curry its favor, thus rejecting the faith in bandwagoning that Neo-conservatives embrace. Thus, a realist foreign policy would be more cautious than a Neo-conservative policy, though it would probably come closer to Krauthammer's understanding of Neo-conservativism than to Kristol's.

Propositions

What types of answers might we find by employing this analysis? We explore here two possible propositions and a set of sub-propositions:

 P_1 : Romney's discussion of foreign policy is random or opportunistic rather than systematic.

Support for this proposition would come in the form of attacks on Obama's policies which, when taken together, would be neither coherent nor reflective of any firm foundational views of the world that are recognizable in the literature. As such, they could be characterized as the *ad hoc* targeting of what his campaign believed were Obama's vulnerabilities as revealed by contemporary events and news stories. Such discussions may yield themes (e.g., analyses or

discussions that are repeated), but even if so, such themes when taken together would not cohere. Criticisms in this sense would be contradictory; for example, Romney may criticize Obama for not deploying a sufficiently aggressive military policy at one point, and then criticize him for having too aggressive a policy at another time under similar circumstances.

P2: Romney's discussions of foreign policy are systematic

Support for this approach would come in the form of consistent and detailed attempts to outline Romney's position and critique Obama's policies and actions. These efforts could be responsive to particular events, but in doing so pick up on previously elaborated themes and arguments rather than creating new arguments to fit a particular situation. Such discussions would also be coherent, that is, each discussion would be generally consistent internally and there would be consistency in terms of policies, emphases, causal arguments, descriptions of the world and understandings of the United States and the world in general. They would also be consistent in characterizing Obama's policies and in criticizing those policies.

These propositions by themselves are interesting, but the second proposition requires further development in the form of understanding systematic discussions by way of foreign policy traditions. Beyond thinking in terms of foreign policy positions, the most basic way of classifying foreign policy understandings, as we see implicitly in the literature discussed above and explicitly in the MI/CI foreign policy classification scheme put forward by Holsti and Rosenau (1990), is to divide them into those that support and those that oppose activist policies and interventions. Using this simplification in this context, we can initially conjecture that Romney may have adopted an activist position and criticized Obama for employing non-activist policies, or adopted a non-activist position and criticized Obama for taking an activist position.

In reality, of course, arguments fall along a spectrum, ranging theoretically from a complete refusal to sanction any foreign policy endeavors to an indiscriminate approval for all such adventures. Furthermore, we must also keep in mind the generally diverse nature of the arguments on both sides of the spectrum, the nuances and differences among which cannot be fully captured by this single dimension. Foreign policy debates do not just entail one party criticizing another for being supportive of more or less activism, but supportive of more or less activism of a particular type. For example Mead's Hamiltonians and contemporary Neoconservatives, despite some overlaps, are supportive of different types of activism (Hamiltonians are more vigorous in the promotion of trade and commercial interests, neo-conservatives in terms of forward defense postures and muscular democracy promotion). This observation points to the possibility that Romney might be criticizing Obama for adopting a different type of policy position which is, nonetheless, on the same side of the activist/non-activist spectrum.

Thus we have in the abstract four possibilities:

(1) Romney adopts an activist position and criticizes Obama for adopting a non-activist position.

- (2) Romney adopts a non-activist position and criticizes Obama for adopting an activist position.
- (3) Romney adopts an activist position and criticizes Obama for adopting a different activist position.
- (4) Romney adopts a non-activist position and criticizes Obama for adopting a different non-activist position.

Given that Romney has a history of defending activist policies, we can safely assume that (2) and (4) are not in play, leaving us with (1) and (3). What, then, are the possibilities? Understanding how these scenarios would play out entails reference to the preceding discussion of the literature on foreign policy arguments.

Under scenario (1), Romney could adopt a Wilsonian, Realist, Jacksonian, Hamiltonian, or Neoconservative set of arguments and criticize Obama for taking a Non-Interventionist or Jeffersonian position. Some of the more interesting and likely contrasts here would be a) Romney adopts neo-conservatism and accuses Obama of non-interventionism: here the critical emphasis would be on accusations that Obama does not do enough to promote democracy and forcefully promote American interests because he doubts America's exceptionalism and the utility of intervention; b) Romney adopts Neo-conservatism and accuses Obama of realism; here the critical emphasis would be on Obama' alleged failure to do enough to promote democracy and American interests in a muscular fashion because he rejects democracy promotion and is afraid of attracting balancing activities from rivals; c) Romney adopts Jacksonianism and accuses Obama of non-interventionism: here the critical focus would be on Obama's alleged refusal to face enemies forcefully because he doubts the efficacy of force, or d) Romney adopts Wilsonianism and accuses Obama of Non-interventionism: here the critical focus would be on Obama's alleged refusal to act in accordance with international norms and institutions to promote American interests and foster a peaceful world because he doubts the effectiveness and legitimacy of those norms and institutions.

Under Scenario (3), Romney would adopt one of the activist sets of arguments (Wilsonian, Realist, Jacksonian, Hamiltonian, or Neo-conservative) and criticize Obama for adopting a rival activist conception. Again, I only outline some of the more likely contrasts here: a) Romney adopts a Neo-conservative position and accuses Obama of adopting a realist position: here the critical focus would be on Obama's alleged refusal to forcefully promote democracy because he is too concerned with pushback from other nations; b) Romney adopts a Jacksonian or Neo-conservative stance and accuses Obama of taking a Wilsonian approach: here the critical focus would be on Obama's allegedly undue deference to international norms and institutions at the expense of American security interests and/or forceful promotion of democracy.

Analysis of Romney's Discussions

What emerges when we carefully examine Romney's discussions? Whether or not they fit together coherently (a question we examine below), it is apparent from even a cursory examination of Romney's statements and speeches made over the course of the primaries and the election campaign that he continually articulated a restricted set of themes that he used to frame his own policy proposals and to critique Obama's policies. These themes are as follows:

The World is a Dangerous Place:

Romney consistently portrayed the world as posing major threats to the US and its allies. These descriptions are meant to undercut what Romney held was Obama's belief that the world is improving under his watch and that outbursts of anti-American violence in Syria and Iraq are minor exceptions to the rule. Romney's description is of a world that is much more intransigently violent and anti-American. As he put it in his *Wall Street Journal* piece, "These developments are not, as President Obama says, mere 'bumps in the road'". Indeed, Romney came perilously close at times to holding that nothing could be done to make the world better, and that such troubled spots as the Middle East and Northern Africa are in an invincible state of disorder and threat. The major thrust of his argument, however, is that America's global environment poses an unavoidable existential threat to the US, that he is aware of this fact and that Obama either is not aware, or is unable to create policies that are up to dealing with the level and volume of threats that the nation is encountering and will continue to encounter through the foreseeable future.

Sometimes Romney made this point in terms of generalities, underscoring the nature of the world as a whole as violent and threatening. Here the object of the discussion is to emphasize the Hobbesian nature of the globe. The peoples of the world often do not have the ability to keep the peace for themselves, and often have no compunction in attacking their neighbors and the United States. Foreigners in general are not willing to embrace the discipline that allows them to remain orderly. There is no natural ordering device available to the world and (as we shall see below) no other nation is capable or ethically fitted other than the US to provide either international order or, in the case of failed or rogue states, order within states. Such sentiments were prominent in Romney's Citadel speech, where he argued that contrary to the president's depiction, it is difficult to see the end of the current troubles in the windup of the Iraqi and Afghan operations; indeed, the world is even more dangerous today than it was during the Cold War:

"Today, our world is far more chaotic [than when the Soviet Union posed the greatest challenge]. We still face grave threats, but they come not from one country, or one group, or one ideology. The world is unfortunately not so defined. What America and our allies are facing is a series of threatening forces, ones that overlap and reinforce each other."

Expanding on this theme, he argued that the effects of troubles in foreign places are not geographically confined, but threaten the existence and character of the US: "Around the world we see tremendous upheaval and change. Our next President will face extraordinary challenges that could alter the destiny of America and, indeed, the future of freedom." To the VFW, he proclaimed that "The world is dangerous, destructive, chaotic." Likewise his website argued that

"Our country today faces a bewildering array of threats and opportunities" (mittromeny.com, retrieved August 5, 2012). The world in general is not benign, it is not become less threatening and disorderly, and the threats themselves, he holds, are complex and difficult to parry.

Romney also provided discussions of specific sources of threats. The most prevalent sources mentioned are countries in the Middle East, including references to Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Libya. All are identified as experiencing turmoil and violence, problems that affect not only those countries' domestic prospects, but also the well-being of the US. These developments "are major issues that put our security at risk" (WSJ). The "White Paper Fact Sheet: The Threatening Trends Facing America" published on his election website identified several additional locations and sources of disorder and threat. These include China and Russia in the form of "nations with rising ambitions". Romney suggests that these countries might use their growing economic power to pursue revisionist goals with regard to the world economic system. He also points to their non-democratic character as the cause of their propensity "to engage in behavior that undermines international security". Yet another source is "radical Islamic Jihadism," which Romney holds is a primary source of terrorism and the potential wielder of weapons of mass destruction. Failed states, which are unable to prevent terrorists and others from using their territories, are the fourth source. The final source is "rogue nations," containing the familiar entries of Iran, North Korea, but also Cuba and Venezuela. Some of these countries have or are pursuing nuclear weapons, and all "oppose American values and interests," are capable of upsetting the international order, sponsor terrorism and could start regional conflicts that might spread throughout the world.

Finally, Romney reinforced the contention that the world is naturally disordered and becoming more dangerous by asserting that the Obama administration's lack of activity and leadership had made the world more dangerous. Laissez-faire is not an option in international affairs. In these arguments Romney implicitly repeated Madeleine Albright's pronouncement that the US is the "indispensable nation" in asserting that anything less than a full American engagement in the world creates dangers, in that Obama's failure to so engage has "heightened the prospect of conflict and instability" and "can provoke aggression and encourage disorder" (WSJ). The world is not capable of ordering itself; it is only through the force of an external ordering device, in the form of the US, that some order can be imposed. The failure to act as that external device both allows for natural disorder to arise and even encourages the expression of that disorderliness.

American activism is both effective and has a beneficial effect on the world in general

This brings us to Romney's second theme: that he would ensure that the US remains fully and forcefully engaged in the world. An active US that energetically uses its military and political power is the only agent that can ensure that America's vital interests are protected. It is also the case that when the US acts in this fashion, it brings peace both to the international arena and to the various troubled regions and countries of the world. He argues that there is a connection between what is good for the US and what is good for the world— in the course of protecting its interests, the US orders the world and eliminates important causes of conflict and violence. American interests and world interests are the same, just as the enemies of the US are also the enemies of all other peaceful, democratic and free nation. Obama, Romney holds, does not

recognize these connections; he has importantly not fully engaged America's resources because he appears to believe the energetic use of American power creates disorder rather than eliminates it. Thus, we find his website asserting, "The unifying thread of [Mitt Romney's] national security strategy is American strength. When America is strong, the world is safer. It is only American power—conceived in the broadest terms—that can provide the foundation for an international system that ensures the security and prosperity of the United States and our friends and allies (mittromeny.com website, retrieved August 5, 2012).

This linkage of strength with both American safety and the world's greater good is repeated in Romney's Citadel and VMI speeches, as well as his *Wall Street Journal* article. The latter expands on the connection, holding that the combination is "unique" in that the US has "earned" a leadership role "not through conquest but through promoting human rights, free markets and the rule of law. We ally ourselves with like-minded countries, expand prosperity through trade and keep the peace by maintaining a military second to none". In other words, it is the US pursuit of its interests by combining liberalism with military strength that makes its activity both potent and benign.

Romney further equates activity and leadership with a proactive stance. Here, in attacking Obama for a tendency to "jump from crisis to crisis, dealing with one hot spot after another" (Citadel), he argues that effective engagement entails understanding, strategizing, and working to mold the world in a particular fashion. This constructed world has several features. First, it is a world that has the US as its most powerful component, the US being more powerful politically, economically and militarily than any other nation. Second, it will be a world in which the US is the paramount leader. It will set the agenda for attaining global peace and prosperity. It will take the lead in providing order and identifying the sources of disorder. Third, in combining the prior two attributes, it will continue to be a unipolar world. It will not be one in which the US is "one of several equally balanced global powers". It is in that sense that a commitment to US activism in the world will make the 21st century an "American Century" in which the US constructs the world to promote peace, freedom and prosperity and in doing so prevents other, ominous actors from leading the world in a direction that harms global interests (Citadel, VFW, WSJ).

It is in this context that Romney criticizes Obama over his lack of firm policies towards Iran and North Korea and over the events in Benghazi. Obama reacts to rather than preempts trouble, and reacts much too timidly and on too narrow a basis because he is unwilling to mold the world, believing such activity to be illegitimate and counterproductive. Thus Romney's trope that Obama has "apologized for America" rather than forcefully using American strength to confront and face down enemies and rivals. Obama has refused to give help to those seeking to overthrow dictators and battle terrorists, such as those in Libya and Iran. It is this reluctance to do what the US has done in the past, when statesmen such as George Marshall "helped our friends to build and sustain free societies and free markets" and "defended our friends, and ourselves, from our common enemies" that is missing from Obama's foreign policy approach. It this reluctance that

is threatening American interests and making the world a more dangerous, less democratic and less free place to live for all people (Citadel, VMI, WSJ).

It is important to note that in pursuing this theme, Romney consistently puts equal emphasis on both the potency and benign aspects of an active American role in the world. Activity, he argues, is the only way to protect American interests. The US cannot rely upon other countries or a hidden hand (as is the case in markets) to keep the US safe, free and prosperous. But at the same time, US activism in Romney's portrayal is neither ironic nor counterproductive. The active and forceful pursuit and protection of American interests only produces utility. It does not create backlashes that threaten American lives or interests. It does not create wedges between the US and its allies. It does not put the US in morally compromised positions. Romney portrays Obama as thinking and acting otherwise. His reluctance to act forcefully and assume leadership for the US, Romney suggests, is due to Obama's incorrect understanding of the effects of American action on the world. It is not force and leadership that is ironic and counterproductive; it is the failure to use force and provide leadership that achieves the opposite of what is intended:

It is a mistake – and sometimes a tragic one – to think that firmness in American foreign policy can bring only tension or conflict. The surest path to danger is always weakness and indecision. In the end, it is resolve that moves events in our direction, and strength that keeps the peace (VFW)

The US is Exceptional:

What is it that allows a forceful US policy to be productive and effective? How is it that the US rather than other countries is able to combine action meant to benefit it narrowly with results that are good for the entire world community? Romney consciously raises this question to contrast himself with Obama: "Some may ask, 'Why America? Why should America be any different than scores of other countries around the globe?" In answering, Romney characterizes Obama as doubting American exceptional goodness and potency while reasserting his own claim to hold firmly to the belief in American exceptionalism:

I believe we are an exceptional country with a unique destiny and role in the world. Not exceptional, as the President has derisively said, in the way that the British think Great Britain is exceptional or the Greeks think Greece is exceptional. In Barack Obama's profoundly mistaken view, there is nothing unique about the United States (Citadel Speech)

What is the substance of this exceptionalism? Romney points to several characteristics that, by extension, he also holds Obama does not attribute to the US. The first is the idea of freedom and liberty. The US embraces the concept of both individual and collective self-determination that was introduced by the revolution and embodied in Lincoln's conception of a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" (Citadel). The second is the embrace of a concept of divinely created, inalienable, universal individual rights (Citadel). The third is the actual history of American accomplishments and the fruits of its leadership. When the US has led, it has

created an intersection of American interests and global good (VMI), achieving though its use of power and its pursuit of justice, peace and hope (VFW).

Again making an implicit contrast with Obama in his VFW speech, Romney asserted his belief in the unique ability of the US to pursue its ends while doing good things for the world. He would not apologize for the American present or past, its status as the preeminent power in the world, or its use of force:

"I am not ashamed of American power. I take pride that throughout history our power has brought justice where there was tyranny, peace where there was conflict, and hope where there was affliction and despair. I do not view America as just one more point on the strategic map, one more power to be balanced. I believe our country is the greatest force for good the world has ever known, and that our influence is needed as much now as ever".

Conclusion

The first conclusion to be drawn from this analysis has to do with the initial propositions. Are Romney's discussion taken together ad hoc and random, or are they coherent? We see that they can be arranged into themes. Are the themes coherent? The answer appears to be yes. There is nothing contradictory when they are taken together. He points to a dangerous world that the US must engage, and argues that such engagement is fruitful and normatively good for both the US and the world due to America's exceptional character and status. He consistently criticizes Obama for being too timid and for doubting America's values and capabilities. It appears that P₂ is supported rather than P₁.

What of the sub-propositions associated with P₂? How does Romney present himself in relation to Obama, and what label does he attach to himself and to Obama? Again, Romney presents himself as much more aggressive and traditional than Obama. He portrays himself as someone who understands the world as a Hobbesian place filled with existential enemies. His understanding of the US is that of a paramount power that should use its strength to help shape and mold the world to head off the threats posed by those enemies, all the while also contributing to the general peace, prosperity and freedom of the world at large, including encouragement of democracy. Finally, he depicts himself as having faith in the ability of the US to accomplish these goals due to his traditional belief in the extraordinary nature of the US as exemplified in its system of values and its record of benign leadership.

Likewise, Romney portrays Obama as being fundamentally and substantially less willing to engage actively with the world. Obama in his depiction does not see the world for what it actually is, at one time having an overly optimistic understanding that problems and threats are transitory and easily resolved, at other times shying away from confrontations in the belief that the exercise of American power creates disorder and injustice. Obama is overly respectful of the

dubious wishes of other countries and believes that the use of American power has ironic and damaging effects on the wellbeing of the US and the world as a whole. He does not lead; rather, he apologizes for past exercises of American leadership and when faced with threats and danger pursues policies of engagement rather than robust confrontation. The explanation for such policies in Romney's portrayal is the fact that Obama rejects the traditional, bipartisan understanding of the US as exception in its values and goals and the bipartisan policy position that the US should use its power in a transformational fashion. Instead of seeing such an exercise as morally justified due to the exceptional character of the US, Obama thinks the use of power is morally and practically problematic.

What, then, is the distance between the two portrayals? Is Romney depicting Obama as a different and less vigorous proponent of an activist policy or as a proponent of a non-activist policy? And where does he place himself on the activist side? Is he a Jacksonian in Mead's understanding, willing to use American force overseas in direct connection with American security needs, or does he go further in an activist direction, embracing either Wilsonianism or Neo-conservatism?

The closest approximation of Romney's self-portrayal appears to be Kristol's understanding of Neoconservatism. He embraces several of the characteristics Kristol includes, such as a view of the world as lacking natural order, its dangerous character, enthusiasm for the use of force to promote freedom and democracy as well as to protect and promote American interests, and rejection of the notion that US activism is counterproductive or illegitimate. These positions commit Romney to a larger foreign policy agenda than would be consistent with Jacksonianism or even Krauthammer's "democratic realism".

What of Romney's portrayal of Obama? One interpretation, put forward by Wilson, notes that Romney's focus on values and exceptionalism was an attack on the "aridness" of Obama's realist policies, particularly in terms of Obama's failure to speak in terms of exceptionalism and values. Was Romney portraying Obama as a realist? His emphasis on Obama's lack of enthusiasm for democracy promotion and his argument that Obama believes exercises of American strength make the world and the US worse off could be read that way. Romney also underlined his own belief that acquiescence to ceding America's superpower status and become one of several poles in a multi-polar world is a mistake, a line that could be seen as a criticism of realism.

But to label Obama only a realist does not appear to fit Romney's strategy. It would be to attribute to Obama at least some measure of hardness and tough-mindedness. This, for Romney, is to give him too much credit. Moreover, a Romney depiction of Obama as a realist strains against the fact that the bulk of Romney's arguments attribute to Obama a position that is less active than a realist would embrace. Obama in Romney's portrayal is purely reactive, he apologizes for American power, he does not want to confront Iran, he distances himself from Israel, he fails to support those who are fighting American enemies, and he sees the use of American force not just as encouraging balancing against the US, but as having a more

fundamentally perverse effect of creating disorder. This does not appear to be a description of realism.

What is it then? It appears to be closer to an attribution of a non-exceptionalist form of non-interventionism. Such an understanding would reject an activist policy on the basis that the outside world does not need American intervention because that world is already fundamentally like the US, or could be like the US by relying upon a universal set of standards that are not unique to the US. Using American power forcefully in such a world would at best be non-productive and at worst counterproductive. Importantly, Romney had already met and defeated a candidate who possessed those views, and did so by emphasizing the practical and moral importance of foreign policy activism. That candidate was Ron Paul. Romney appears to have been attempting to link Obama with Paul by attributing to them similar foreign policy understandings.

Note that if Romney was attempting to equate Obama with Ron Paul, this depiction goes gone what a sophisticated audience of foreign policy experts would be willing to accept as completely accurate (and thus their criticism of Romney as exaggerating his differences with Obama). It does appear, however, that Romney was trying to signal to foreign policy experts that he was not a realist by underlining the idea that he would have a more active and aggressive policy than realists counsel, so foreign policy elites appear to be one of Romney's targets.

But his general depiction of Obama appears to be aimed beyond the elite. As noted above, some argue that his speeches were aimed primarily at the partisan Republican base. We can see how this would work in terms of how Romney creates a contrast between himself and Obama. He self-identifies as a Neo-conservative and paints Obama as a non-interventionist, thus motivating that base to vote due to the promise of a more muscular policy and the hope that Romney will indeed deliver an "American Century.

But is the exaggerated nature of the contrast necessary if Romney is only aiming to motivate his base? A self-identification as a Neo-conservative and emphasis that Obama is something less would be sufficient for such a task. But Romney goes further, putting himself in the role of FDR, Marshall, JKF and Reagan, and Obama equated with Ron Paul and Noam Chomsky. Something more seems to be at stake here. It could be that Romney was attempting to paint foreign policy as a valence issue, i.e., an issue in which competency is an important factor in voters' choices (Stokes 1963, 1992). When seen in that light, Romney's discussions communicate that his quarrel with Obama is not over policies alone, or that Obama is missing important opportunities to improve the position of the US (a "we can do better" argument), but that Obama is failing in the basic duty of protecting US security and interests by failing to confront enemies, encourage democracies and boldly mold the world. Obama is not competent in foreign policy matters when that issue area is correctly understood. Underlining such a message are his attempts to associate his understanding of foreign policy with a set of bipartisan figures. The message is that he is adhering to a standard that all competent political figures accept and which Obama rejects and

fails to meet. His message, therefore, appears geared to both Republicans hardliners and the general voter—the Neo-conservative self-identification meant for the Republican base, and the criticism of Obama as an anti-interventionist directed beyond the Republican Party.

If this last series of conclusions are correct, Romney was attempting to perform several functions with these speeches—signaling to policy elites, motivating the Republican base and reaching out to non-Republicans. His effectiveness in these endeavors depended on delivering his messages in an understandable form to all these audiences. It does not appear that he was successful in doing so. In particular, the exaggerated contrast between himself and Obama seems to have overshadowed all but the rudiments of his message to the foreign policy establishment. Elites concentrated on rebutting that exaggeration by emphasizing Romney's similarity to Obama. This potentially harmed Romney not only by erasing the distinction he needed to make in order to rally the Republican base and appeal to non-Republican voters, but also by depicting him as a hypocrite, thus reinforcing other trust issues that dogged him during the campaign.

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A Foreign Policy of Pretty Please: Mitt Romney's Criticisms of Barack Obama During the 2013 Presidential Campaign

David J. Lorenzo, National Chengchi University 2013 MPSA Meeting Chicago

Questions

- How did Romney characterize himself and Obama in terms of foreign policy positions?
 - Where his discussions systemic and coherent
 - Where they thematic?
 - Did they contain identifiable positions?
 - · Whom was he addressing

Possibilities in the Literature

- · Romney contradictory and opportunistic
- · Romney exaggerated differences with Obama
- · Romney used Neo-conservative themes to discredit Obama
- Romney used exceptionalist depictions of the US to discredit Obama

Propositions

We can think more formally with regard to possibilities by assessing whether Romney did systematically describe himself and Obama, and if so whether he did so by adopting foreign policy positions that are contained in the literature:

P₁: Romney's discussions unsystematic and incoherent, does not describe himself or Obama consistently in terms relatable to foreign policy positions

P2: Romney's discussions systematic and coherent

- Adopts an activist position and describes Obama as differently/less activist
- Adopts an activist position and describes Obama as taking a non-activist position

Methods and Data

- Use a textual analysis to examine arguments in terms of understandings of the US and the world as well as descriptions of foreign policy arguments, traditions and positions in the literature.
- Data comes from discussions before the third presidential debate (where Romney's tactics may have changed, though he still used the same themes found elsewhere:
 - Speech at the Citadel on October 7, 2011
 - Remarks at the Iowa Republican Candidate Debate, December 15, 2011
 - Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention on July 24, 2012
 - "Remarks to the Clinton Global Initiative" on September 25, 2012 (Clinton), his
 - Editorial in the Wall Street Journal "A New Course for the Middle East" on September 30, 2012
 - Speech at the Virginia Military Institute on October 7, 2012 (VMI) and
 - · Material from his election website, mittromney.com

Arguments, Traditions and Positions

- Derived from the work of Mead, Dumbrell, Johnstone for general understandings of Jacksonians, Wilsonians, Hamiltonians, Non-Interventionists, Unilateralalists, Anti-Imperialists, America Firsters
- · Mearsheimer, Kristol, Krauthammer for Neo-conservatism
- · Walt and Mearsheimer for realism

Three Themes

- The World is a Dangerous Place
 - Recent events in Benghazi and elsewhere "not bumps in the road"
 - World situation as dangerous to the US as during Cold War, the difference being different and multiple sources of threats
 - Middle East
 - Russia and China as rising powers
 - Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela
 - · Failed states
- Obama fails to grasp and appreciate this condition, having an overly sanguine view of the intentions of other countries

American activism is both effective and has a beneficial effect on the world in general

- US activity is effective in protecting US security and furthering its interests
- In pursuing its interests and protecting itself, the US also furthers the interests of the world as a whole
- The provision of leadership to the world is a bipartisan policy supported by George Marshall, FDR, JFK, Reagan
- Leadership important means molding the world and proactively anticipating problems
- US must be the most powerful country in the world, not just one pole in a unipolar world- 21st century to be an American century
- Promote human rights, assertively support democratization
- Obama has engaged rather than confronted Iran and North Korea,
- Obama failed to support democracy activists in Iran and Arab Spring and generally does too little to support democratization
- Obama reacts to problems and then does much too little
- Obama thinks that US action is the source of disorder and problems, thus his propensity to apologize for past instances of American leadership

US an Exceptional Country

- · US is exceptional and not just different
- Exceptionalism the reason why US and world interests coincide
- Exceptionalism made up of history of benign leadership and tightly held core values that are universally helpful
- Values individualism, freedom, inalienable human rights, democratic self-governance

Analysis

- Romney portrays himself as much more an activist and more a traditionalist than Obama
- More willing to use force to defend US interests and to promote democracy
- Argues that Obama believes the use of force is morally and practically problematic
- · Differentiates himself from realism

Analysis: Portrayals

- Romney's self portrait shows him to be more activist than a
 Jacksonian, and more unilateralist and forceful than a Wilsonian,
 and more willing to court risk than a realist. These traits, in
 combination with arguments regarding exceptionalism, leadership,
 molding the world, conflating American and world interests, and
 forcibly supporting democratization make his self-portrayal close to
 that of a Neo-conservative in Kristol's understanding (thus possibly
 confirming the influence of certain members of Romney's foreign
 policy team).
- His portrayal of Obama shows him to disregard traditional understandings of American exceptionalism, bipartisan support for world leadership, timid in the face of threats, and harboring the belief that it is American actions that create disorder and other problems. Less activist than a Wilsonian or realist— looks like a noninterventionist— equation with Ron Paul and Noam Chomsky

Conclusion

- · Large distance between self-portrayal and that of Obama
- · Partially addressed to experts-Romney not a realist
- Neo-conservative self-portrayal appears to have been aimed at core Republican voters
- Obama as non-interventionist appears mainly aimed at non-Republicans
- Criticisms of the exaggeration of distance between himself and Obama may have led to change in tactics at the 3rd debate, where he continued to discuss his themes but acknowledged policy overlap with Obama.

19-3 Foreign Policy and the Obama Administration

Date:

Thursday, April 11 4:35 pm

Chair(s):

Bryan W. Marshall, Miami University marshabw@miamioh.edu

Paper(s):

The War in Afghanistan From the Inside: Civil-Military Relations and the Obama Administration

Looking at the decision-making process in the Obama administration on the war in Afghanistan, we analyze the changes in the interaction between civilian and military leaders and note that theories on civil-military relations fail to explain them.

Marilyne Choquette, *Université du Québec, Montréal* marilyne_choquette@hotmail.com

Obama's Lame-Duck Treaties: New Start and the Law of the Sea

This paper attempts to explain why President Obama's efforts to ratify New START and the Law of the Sea Treaty faced so much opposition in the Senate and how lame-duck congressional sessions became the White House's best chance for success.

Patrick Homan, Northern Illinois University phoman@niu.edu

A Foreign Policy Based on Pretty Please?:Foreign Policy Position-Taking and Mitt Romney's Criticisms of Barrack Obama

In his criticisms of Obama's foreign policy, how did Mitt Romney differentiate himself? Using materials from Romney's presidential campaign, this paper explores this question and the implications of Romney's depictions of himself and Obama.

David Lorenzo, National Chengchi University

lorenzodav@gmail.com

Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Obama Administration

The impact of the American public in affecting foreign policy has been a source of considerable debate over the decades. This paper assesses the correspondence between public opinion and American foreign policy during the Obama administration.

James M. McCormick, *Iowa State University* jmmcc@iastate.edu

Discussant(s):

Nikolay Anguelov, Clemson University nanguel@clemson.edu

Bryan W. Marshall, *Miami University* marshabw@muohio.edu

19-5 Foreign Policy and China

Date:

Friday, April 12 10:25 am

Chair(s):

Zhiqun Zhu, Bucknell University zhiqun zhu@bucknell.edu

Paper(s):

Inside Out, Outside In: Institutional Variations and the Content of Chinese and American Foreign Policy

This paper examines the effect of institutional factors, with a focus on regime and public opinion, on the ideological and non-ideological roots of American and Chinese foreign policies, respectively.

Dina M. Badie, Centre College dina.badie@centre.edu



US-China relations provide an excellent venue to explore the use of structural and productive power. The paper focuses on the mechanisms through which constitutive forms of power operated and the constraints they placed on China's foreign policies.

Andrew Bennett, Georgetown University bennetta@georgetown.edu

Christina Jun-Yao Lai, Georgetown University j1554@georgetown.edu



The paper examines the media portrayal of China in the United States over the past three decades with an aim to understand the implications of China's rise for the bilateral interactions and foreign policy as well.

Xi Chen, University of Texas, Pan American chenx@utpa.edu

Discussant(s): David Lorenzo, National Chengchi University lorenzodav@gmail.com

19-12 Foreign Policy: Theoretical Perspectives

Date:

Saturday, April 13 2:40 pm

Chair(s):

David Lorenzo, National Chengchi University lorenzodav@gmail.com

Paper(s):

Just Peace Theory: Nominalist/Phenomenological Teleology as Nonviolent,
Process vs. End-State Context for Just War

Scholars generally talk of Just War as though this theory stands by itself. I show how Just Peace Theory is the context for Just War, using Gilbert Ryle and Paul Ricoeur's methologies to reintroduce unjust war into just war, and war into peace.

Michael Kazanjian, Triton College mkazanjian@sbcglobal.net

Revolutionary Diplomacy in the Age of Federalism

The Federalists were not conservatives but revolutionaries, prepared to defend the revolutionary government created by the constitution of 1787 even by exporting revolution to the Caribbean, Spanish America, and even Europe.

Michael S. Kochin, Tel Aviv University kochin@post.tau.ac.il

Rogue States or Failed States?: A Text-Based Assessment of Elite Terminology Trends

This paper employs text analysis to track shifts in elite usage of "rogue state" and "failed state" terminology; it assesses alignments between elite terminological muddying and international actors' responses to rogue and failed states.

Ann Marie Mezzell, Lincoln University of Missouri mezzella@lincolnu.edu

Foreign Policy of a New Democracy: Challenging Neorealism Revisited

It is a conventional wisdom in IR theory that a small state's foreign policy could best be explained by structural systemic factors. Was it true during the 90's with the fall of the Soviet Empire and the newly restored independent state of Lithuania?

Sigita Trainauskiene, Kaunas University of Technology sitrai@zebra.lt

Discussant(s):

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