



Session # 4
Charging Strategies
– Ensuring a Successful Financial Performance

Airport - Airline Risk Sharing Model For Better Partnership

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



Why AP-AL Relationship?

- → Airline(AL), especially LCCs, has concern about Airport(AP)-related costs.
 - e.g., Landing Charges, Gate Payment ...
- APs are greatly affected by ALs.e.g., Hub (Base), Frequencies, ...
- → Discussed for Long but Still Significant Issue e.g., Start-up aides, Vertical Relationship,...

Complex Relationship (AP-AL)

- Conflicting (Zero-Sum Game)
 - → Landing Charge, Gate Payments...
- → Inter-dependent / Joint-Venture type
 - → Jointly Serving Users (Need Both)
- → Can we improve the AP-AL relationship?
 - → Yes, if we can design contract smartly.
 - e.g.; Examples vary depending on APs, areas, ... NOTO_AP (150,000pax/year) case







[NOTO AP Spec]

Opened

2003

AP Authority

Ishikawa Pref. Gov.

Runway 1

2,000m x 45m

Construct. Cost

about US\$270M

Serving Airline

ANA; 2 RTs/day to Haneda







Load Factor Guarantee Mechanism (LFGM)


Contract (b/w NOTO AP and ANA AL) specifying the payment from AP to AL (or reverse) based on the difference between a target load factor and a realized load factor of the route

Payment = Target LF - Realized LF

+: $AP \rightarrow AL$, -: $AL \rightarrow AP$




Payment Structure of LFGM (conceptual)





NOTO Contract Payment Structure (actual)



Source: Hihara (2008)



Actual Data at NOTO Case

Year	Target LF	Realized LF	Payment AL→AP(¥10 ⁸)
1	70%	79. 5%	0. 97
2	63%	64. 6%	0. 15
3	64%	66. 5%	0. 20
4	62%	65. 1%	0

AP consistently beat expectation and keep services.

Source: Hihara (2008)

A Lot of Efforts (examples)

AP;

- → Promotion Campaign Budget (1.1M\$/year)
- → Landing Fee Cut by 2/3
- → AP Parking Free of Charge
- → Incentive Payment to Tickets on NOTO=Haneda
- → Improve Bus and Taxi to/from AP

AL;

- → Improve Connection at Haneda
- → Discount for Connection Ticket
- → Quality Travel Package (domestic/int'l)

Multiple Functions of Contract

- → AP & AL share revenue fluctuation risk.
- → Incentive device to improve each effort (to meet target LF or to get payment)
- Commitment to serve AP by AL




Analyses from Several View Points are possible.

Risk Sharing gets Balanced?

Efficiency Gain by the Contract?

Linear Contract can be Optimal?





Conclusion

- → AP-AL relationships could be made into better risk sharings by designing contracts smartly.
- To reach smart contract, clever incentive design & decreasing asymmetries is the key.
 - e.g., level the playing field,
 enhance transparency,
 improve communication ...





Special Gratitude to

- * Kansai International Airport Co., Ltd.
- → Airport Environment Improvement Foundation
- → Narita International Airport Co., Ltd.
- → Japan Airport Terminal Co., Ltd.







Thank you for your attention!









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