

- Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) Review Team (9.2)
- Mandate began in Oct 2010
- Composition (SO/AC representatives, independent experts, Designated Nominee of the Chair of the GAC, Designated Nominee of ICANN's President & CEO)
- Terms of Reference
- Subteams

- Draft Report (15 March 2012)
 - 28 recommendations + supporting text
- Final Report (21 June 2012)
 - 28 recommendations + supporting text
 - Submitted to Chair of ICANN Board

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The Security, Stability & Resiliency of the DNS Review Team (SSR RT)

Recommendation 1: ICANN should publish a single, clear and consistent statement of its SSR remit and limited technical mission. ICANN should elicit and gain public feedback in order to reach a consensus-based statement.

Recommendation 2: ICANN's definition and implementation of its SSR remit and limited technical mission should be reviewed in order to maintain consensus and elicit feedback from the Community. The process should be repeated on a regular basis, perhaps in conjunction with the cycle of future SSR reviews.

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Recommendation 3: Once ICANN issues a consensus-based statement of its SSR remit and limited technical mission, ICANN should utilize consistent terminology and descriptions of this statement in all materials.

Recommendation 4: ICANN should document and clearly define the nature of the SSR relationships it has within the ICANN Community in order to provide a single focal point for understanding the interdependencies between organizations.

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Recommendation 5: ICANN should use the definition of its SSR relationships to maintain effective working arrangements and to demonstrate how these relationships are utilized to achieve each SSR goal.

Recommendation 6: ICANN should publish a document clearly outlining the roles and responsibilities for both the SSAC and RSSAC in order to clearly delineate the activities of the two groups. ICANN should seek consensus for this across both groups, recognizing the history and circumstances of the formation of each. ICANN should consider appropriate resourcing for both groups, consistent with the demands placed upon them.

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Recommendation 7: ICANN should build on its current SSR Framework by establishing a clear set of objectives and prioritizing its initiatives and activities in accordance with these objectives. This process should be informed by a pragmatic cost-benefit and risk analysis.

Recommendation 8: ICANN should continue to refine its Strategic Plan objectives, particularly the goal of maintaining and driving DNS availability. The Strategic Plan and SSR Framework should reflect consistent priorities and objectives to ensure clear alignment.

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Recommendation 9: ICANN should assess certification options with commonly accepted international standards (e.g. ITIL, ISO and SAS-70) for its operational responsibilities. ICANN should publish a clear roadmap towards certification.

Recommendation 10: ICANN should continue its efforts to step up contract compliance enforcement and provide adequate resources for this function. ICANN also should develop and implement a more structured process for monitoring compliance issues and investigations.

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Recommendation 11: ICANN should finalize and implement measures of success for new gTLDs and IDN fast track that expressly relate to its SSR-related program objectives, including measurements for the effectiveness of mechanisms to mitigate domain name abuse.

Recommendation 12: ICANN should work with the Community to identify SSR-related best practices and support the implementation of such practices through contracts, agreements and MOUs and other mechanisms.

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Recommendation 13: ICANN should encourage all Supporting Organizations to develop and publish SSR-related best practices for their members.

Recommendation 14: ICANN should ensure that its SSR-related outreach activities continuously evolve to remain relevant, timely and appropriate. Feedback from the Community should provide a mechanism to review and increase this relevance.

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Recommendation 15: ICANN should act as facilitator in the responsible disclosure and dissemination of DNS security threats and mitigation techniques.

Recommendation 16: ICANN should continue its outreach efforts to expand Community participation and input into the SSR Framework development process. ICANN also should establish a process for obtaining more systematic input from other ecosystem participants.

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Recommendation 17: ICANN should establish a more structured internal process for showing how activities and initiatives relate to specific strategic goals, objectives and priorities in the SSR Framework. It also should establish metrics and milestones for implementation.

Recommendation 18: ICANN should conduct an annual operational review of its progress in implementing the SSR Framework and include this assessment as a component of the following year's SSR Framework.

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Recommendation 19: ICANN should establish a process that allows the Community to track the implementation of the SSR Framework. Information should be provided with enough clarity that the Community can track ICANN's execution of its SSR responsibilities, while not harming ICANN's ability to operate effectively. The dashboard process being used to track implementation of the ATRT recommendations serves as a good model.

Recommendation 20: ICANN should increase the transparency of information about organization and budget related to implementing the SSR Framework and performing SSR-related functions. Information should be provided with enough clarity that the Community can track ICANN's execution of its SSR responsibilities, while not impeding ICANN's ability to operate effectively.

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Recommendation 21: ICANN should establish a more structured internal process for showing how organization and budget decisions relate to the SSR Framework, including the underlying cost-benefit analysis.

Recommendation 22: ICANN should publish, monitor and update documentation on the organization and budget resources needed to manage SSR issues in conjunction with introduction of new gTLDs.

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Recommendation 23: ICANN must provide appropriate resources for SSR-related Working Groups and Advisory Committees, consistent with the demands placed upon them. ICANN also must ensure decisions reached by Working Groups and Advisory Committees are reached in an objective manner that is free from external or internal pressure.

Recommendation 24: ICANN must clearly define the charter, roles and responsibilities of the Chief Security Office Team.

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Recommendation 25: ICANN should put in place mechanisms for identifying both near and longer-term risks and strategic factors in its Risk Management Framework. This process should be informed by insights from research, business partnerships, ICANN Supporting Organizations and other sources. ICANN should publish information about risks, recognizing the sensitive nature of some of these factors.

Recommendation 26: ICANN should prioritize the timely completion of a Risk-Management Framework. This work should follow high standards of participation and transparency.

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The Security, Stability & Resiliency of the DNS Review Team (SSR RT)

Recommendation 27: ICANN's Risk-Management Framework should be comprehensive within the scope of its SSR remit and limited missions.

Recommendation 28: ICANN should continue to actively engage in threat detection and mitigation, and participate in efforts to distribute threat and incident information.

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ICANN Public Comment Period

Public comments are requested to inform subsequent Board consideration and action.

Link: http://www.icann.org/en/news/public-comment/ssr-rt-final-report-21jun12-en.htm

Timeline:

Comment close: 30 July 2012

Reply Open: 31 July 2012

Reply Close: 29 August 2012



