

行政院及所屬各機關出國報告

(出國類別：進修)

外 37

赴美國約翰霍普金斯大學高等國際研究
學院進修報告

服務機關：外交部新聞文化司

出國人職稱：薦任秘書

姓 名：吳文齡

出國地區：美國

出國期間：民國九十二年元月九日至十二月廿三日

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聯絡人/電話:

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吳文齡 外交部 新聞文化司 薦任秘書

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內容摘要: 本報告主要分為四部分: 1、赴約翰霍普金斯大學高等國際研究學院研修國際公共政策碩士之目的。2、所研修八門課程之內容要點及學習過程。3、學習成果及心得(附進修期間所撰寫之部分學術報告、政策報告及申論文章,主題包含美國外交政策、中國大陸社會問題及南海問題研究等)。4、建議事項。

本文電子檔已上傳至出國報告資訊網

摘要：

本報告主要分為四部分：1、赴約翰霍普金斯大學高等國際研究學院研修國際公共政策碩士之目的。2、所研修八門課程之內容要點及學習過程。3、學習成果及心得（附進修期間所撰寫之部分學術報告、政策報告及申論文章，主題包含美國外交政策、中國大陸社會問題及南海問題研究等）。4、建議事項。

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赴美國約翰霍普金斯大學高等國際研究學院進修報告

九十三年六月廿三日

一、目的

本人於九十一年四月經外交部甄選奉准參加「中華民國／中美洲經濟發展基金會」之「主管訓練計畫」，該計畫提供進修人員最高五萬美元赴國外著名學府，於一年期間修完公共政策或管理課程碩士學位。

進修人員須自行申請學校，並經該基金會同意。本人於參考美國各著名學府資料後，決定申請約翰霍普金斯大學高等國際研究學院（SAIS, Johns Hopkins University）國際公共政策碩士班，十一月獲學校通知錄取並於九十二年元月九日赴該校開始春季班課程。

申請該學院之主要原因係：

- 1、SAIS 位處華府使館區麻塞諸塞大道上，為美國著名之國際關係研究學府，師資優良，與美國政府互動頻繁，現任美國國防部副部長沃夫維茲即為 SAIS

前任院長，此外包括知名政論學者福山、中國問題專家藍普頓、高立夫、卜道維及〈毛澤東私人醫生回憶錄〉英文編輯石文安等均於 SAIS 任教；學生除美國各州名校菁英外，其餘來自各國政府部門、經濟研究機構或重要跨國公司中高階主管，素質極高，競爭激烈，加以校址緊鄰各國駐美大使館、布魯金斯研究所及卡內基基金會等重要學術機構及智庫，提供學生廣泛國際視野及實務進修交流經驗，學生畢業後進入國務院、世界銀行及聯合國工作者極眾。

2、SAIS 秉 Johns Hopkins 大學一貫學術及實務並重之傳統優良學風，如中國問題專家藍普頓教授原為「美中關係全國委員會」會長，卜道維為美國外交學院東亞事務部主任，國際法學者 Ruth Wedgwood 教授亦曾任職於日內瓦聯合國人權委員會，彼等除經常於美國重要期刊、電視媒體或報紙發表文章外，亦不時向美政府提供重要建言，深悉美國政策脈動，此一學術環境對於個人學習頗有啟發作用。而 SAIS 同學或來自日本外務省、韓國、新加坡外交部，或為秘魯或阿根廷

駐美大使館政治參事或一等秘書，俱為各國俊秀，平日學生間交契友善熱絡，學習上亦可收彼此切磋砥礪之功，而SAIS固有懷疑辯證的研究討論風氣對學習及擴大國際視野更有極大裨益。另SAIS校區雖小，反因其規模不大使師生同學間彼此熟稔，日常互動頻繁，不論課堂或課餘時間均能切磋討論吸收新知，對本人學習上受益匪淺，而SAIS老師嚴格之治學態度及慎密之辯證討論亦可供作日後治學及行事圭臬準則。

二、學習過程及課程概況

根據學校規定，國際公共政策碩士班學生須修完八門專業課程並通過該校之高級英文測試方可獲得學位。本人於九十二年元月入學時即已通過SAIS之高級英文測試，惟為進一步加強個人英文聽說讀寫的能力，以便充裕應付紛至沓來的各學科學習壓力，仍自願修習英文寫作及英文會話聽力訓練，並均獲致良好之A-成績。至本人所修習之八門專業課程，茲分述如下：

1、春季班課程：（共修以下四門課程，於九十二年

二月開始，並於五月結束)

(1) China in the 21st Century: Challenges to State and Society (廿一世紀的中國大陸：國家與社會面臨的挑戰)

Professor Anne F. Thurston (石文安)

T教授為知名中國問題專家，並曾擔任美國暢銷書籍〈毛澤東私人醫生回憶錄〉之英文翻譯，擅長透過社會學及人文關懷角度觀察研究中國大陸的政經及社會發展形勢。該課程有助於對中國大陸社會內外問題有通盤了解，課程內容涵蓋極廣，包括中國大陸貧窮問題、貧富不均問題、失業問題、人口及糧食問題、貪污及犯罪問題、疾病衛生問題、環境問題、教育問題、少數族群及兩岸統一問題、社會價值問題及加入WTO後面臨全球化挑戰等。

(2) International Relations of Asia After WWII (二戰後亞洲國際關係研究)

Professors Nathaniel B. Thayer and Richard Wick

T教授為SAIS日本研究所所長，W教授則為前美國中情局國際問題專家，該課程依時序陸續介紹二次大戰

後亞洲國際關係之變遷及發展，協助學生通盤瞭解戰後迄今之亞洲國際問題安全問題，內容包含第二次大戰對亞洲影響、南亞及東南亞反殖民過程、中國之內戰、韓戰及冷戰之濫觴、日本經濟重建、不結盟運動及中印衝突、中蘇衝突及中美關係正常化、越戰及其對亞洲之影響、東南亞及東協的誕生及發展、中國大陸的崛起、後冷戰時期蛻變的強權關係、印巴衝突及核武擴散、恐怖主義及區域整合等。

(3) U.S.-China Relations (美中關係)

Professor David M. Lampton (藍普頓)

L教授為SAIS中國研究所所長，曾擔任美中關係全國委員會會長多年，為美國學界著名之中國問題專家，出版眾多著作及專文，美國會、行政部門及媒體並經常就美中台三邊關係問題徵詢渠意見。該課程內容分別以歷史觀點、決策過程及雙邊問題角度探討美國與中國關係發展過程及內涵，包括中美關係正常化過程、中美兩國外交政策之決策機構及過程及國內影響因素、中美關係中領袖之角色及台灣問題、中美關係

有關核子擴散及安全問題、反恐戰爭、雙邊貿易、人權問題及中國面臨全球化問題等。

(4) The Conduct of Foreign Policy (外交政策行為)

Professor Holborn

H教授為SAIS資深老師，已在校內執教逾卅餘年，極孚人望。該課程主要在有系統介紹美國外交政策的制定過程及行為模式，有助了解美國外交政策決策內涵。課程內容包括美國總統、國務院、國防部、情報機構、國會等角色與外交政策決策之關係、外交經濟政策、媒體角色、官僚文化與危機管理及重要案例研究等。

2、暑期班課程：（共修以下兩門課程，於九十二年六月開始，八月結束，課程內容如下）

(1) Principles and Practices of Conflict Management (衝突管理的原則及實務)

Professor John T. Crist

C教授身兼美國和平研究所（U.S. Institute of Peace）

高級研究員，對於國際衝突的緣起、發展過程及解決方法極有研究，更有實際親赴斯里蘭卡調解塔米爾虎軍與斯里蘭卡政府軍武裝衝突之實務經驗，課程著重實例研究。課程內容包括衝突之分析管理及解決、調停、談判、戰後重建、衝突干涉、和平維持行動及各項案例研究（以阿紛爭、科索夫及伊拉克戰爭）等。

(2) Strategy and Policy (戰略與政策)

Professor Thomas Keaney

K教授為美國空軍上校退伍，曾在美國空軍及美國國防大學教授戰爭史、戰略及著名軍事家著作等。本科目旨在研究如何以戰爭手段達成政治戰略目的，與前述衝突管理課程旨在研究如何以外交手段促成和平，恰自從相反觀點討論詮釋國際政治風貌，頗饒興味。課程內容包括戰略研究、克勞塞維茲戰爭論、科技及組織對戰爭影響、馬漢海權論、總體戰爭、杜黑及米契爾空權論、聯合作戰、有限戰爭理論、嚇阻理論與核武使用、革命戰爭、恐怖主義及非傳統戰爭等。

3、秋季期班課程（共修以下兩門課程，於九十二年九月開始，於十二月結束，課程內容如下）：

(1) Chinese Foreign Policy (中國外交政策)

Professor David M. Lampton

繼春季班開辦「美中關係」課程並廣受學生歡迎後，L教授於秋季班再就中國大陸外交政策開課，相較於春季班僅著重於美國與中國關係，本課程著重以宏觀角度探討中國周遭環境及其內部問題對其過去五十年外交政策之影響。課程涵蓋冷戰時期韓戰及越戰、美中俄三邊戰略關係、後冷戰時期中國外交政策、外交政策結構及過程、菁英觀點及民意角色、中國的主權概念：台灣、西藏及香港、解放軍之角色、中國有關嚇阻及核武擴散觀點、外交經濟及貿易政策、中國在國際組織之角色及中國與美、日及俄羅斯其他強權關係等。

(2) Introduction To International Law (國際法介紹)

Professor Ruth Wedgwood

R教授為美國國際法知名學者，曾擔任日內瓦聯合國人權委員會執行委員，亦曾參與科索夫種族衝突調停工作，法理學識及實務經驗兼備。課程涵蓋國際法演變、國家及國際組織、非國家角色對國際法的挑戰、國際法與國內法關係、國際人權、國際人道法、國際刑事法、海洋法、國際環境的保障、世界經濟管理、武力之使用及對國際法觀念上的挑戰等。

三、學習成果及心得（附進修期間所撰寫之部分學術報告、政策報告及申論研析之文章主題，包括美國外交政策、中國社會問題、南海問題研究）。

1、學期成績：全年之總成績單請詳附件一。

依據該外交學院之規定，各科目學期總成績最高為A (=excellent); 次高為A - (=very good); 其次為B + (=good)。以上所修之八門科目中，總成績獲A有以下一科目：「廿一世紀的中國大陸：國家與社會面臨的挑戰」。成績獲A -有以下四門

科目：「美中關係」、「衝突管理的原則及實務」、「中國外交政策」及「國際法介紹」。總成績獲B + 有以下三門科目：「二戰後亞洲國際關係研究」、「外交政策行為」及「戰略與政策」。

2、進修一年期間，所修之八門專業科目大多需繳交兩篇以上報告，以下係三篇以美國外交政策、中國社會問題、南海問題研究美國之拉丁美洲政策、中美關係、兩岸關係、東亞國際關係等為主題之學術報告及政策報告（中文摘要）：

**（1）Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality in China
（中國大陸貧窮、失業及貧富不均問題）（全文請詳附件二）**

本報告為「廿一世紀的中國大陸：國家與社會面臨的挑戰」課程期末學術研究報告。

中文摘要：中國大陸自一九七八年進行改革開放以來，至一九九七年為止已成功地使二億人民脫離貧窮之列，儘管國際經濟不景氣，中國大陸每年仍享有8%的經濟成長率。根據世界銀行估計，如中國大陸經

濟榮景持續，中國大陸在公元2020年可達每人年均所得（GDP per capita）一萬美元，相當於2003年葡萄牙人民平均所得。然而，在經濟榮景背面，中國大陸經濟仍存在許多隱憂：首先，根據世界銀行估計，迄一九九九年為止仍有二億人民仍生活在「赤貧」狀態（每日消費能力不足一美元）；其次，自由市場經濟使許多經營無效率的國營企業解體或靠裁員勉強營運，大批失業或待業勞工極可能形成社會治安的隱憂；最後，經濟成長帶來嚴重的貧富不均問題，二〇〇〇年中國大陸的基尼指數已達45.8，接近貧富懸殊最嚴重的拉丁美洲情況，而大批的高幹子弟或「太子黨」居中牟利，更強烈加深人民不滿的情緒。貧窮、失業及貧富不均三項經濟問題彼此關連密切，若不能有效同時因應處理，將為中國大陸未來政治發展及穩定投下變數。在貧窮問題方面，中國大陸當局以達成赤貧階級溫飽程度、改善落後地區基本民生建設、協助貧窮地區人民自謀生計、控制人口成長及與國際組織合作濟助貧困等方法加以改進；在解決失業問題方面，中

國大陸當局以維持沿海地區經濟快速成長、鼓勵企業向內地發展、保障失業工人基本福利及協助失業工人重新就業等方法改進；在貧富不均問題方面，中國大陸當局以縮短城鄉差距、允許貧困鄉村地區人民有條件向城市遷徙、提升貧困地區人民生活水準及打擊奸商巨賈不法行為等方法加以改進。

成績：A (=Excellent)

(2) Three Analytic Approaches to the Cuban Missile Crisis (古巴飛彈危機的三種分析方法) (全文請詳附件三)；

本報告為「外交政策行為」課程之期末學術研究報告。
中文摘要：一九六二年十月十六日至十月廿八日被稱為人類有史以來最危險的十三天，美蘇雙方以足以毀滅全世界的核子武器相互對峙，最終在雙方政府克制下和平落幕。美國哈佛大學甘乃迪學院院長Graham Allison於一九九九年出版「決策本質：解析古巴飛彈危機」乙書，以理性角色模式、組織行為模式及政府政治等三種模式解讀分析古巴飛彈危機美蘇雙方政府

決策過程。在理性模式方面，美國假設蘇聯為一理性國家，其行為均有其意圖及目的，因此蘇聯在古巴部署飛彈係有 1、防衛古巴；2、為冷戰進行全球佈局；3、展現其飛彈實力；及 4、迫使美國撤離柏林等四個目的，而蘇聯也在美國 1、展現其核武優勢；2、以海上封鎖展現其決心；3、同意不入侵古巴；及 4、同意將撤除其部署於土耳其戰略飛彈四項行動下，同意撤離部署於古巴的飛彈。在組織行為模式方面，則假定政策非依理性，而係政府各部門基於效率考量，執行其標準作業模式（SOPs）制定而成的，蘇聯得以快速於古巴部署飛彈及美國得以執行大規模海面封鎖均得力於其政府部門有效率的組織行為，因此得以提供領導者可行的決策選項。惟組織行為因組織體系龐大亦產生若干執行盲點，因此甘乃迪總統甚至須親自指揮監督在加勒比海攔截蘇聯貨輪的美國戰艦，以免美國船艦在執行封鎖任務擦槍走火而釀致巨變，他也終止艾森豪政府時期授權美軍基地指揮官必要時可使用核武的「歐洲防禦計畫」（EDP），但他對另一「快

速反應計畫」(QRA)毫不知情，以致古巴危機期間駐北約美軍轟炸機仍滿載核武隨時準備使用；而蘇聯未對部署在古巴的飛彈加以偽裝掩蔽，美國一直認為蘇聯有意藉此向美國示威，實則係蘇聯飛彈部隊為求效率，乃依其本國標準作業程序在古巴建立飛彈基地，而在其國內作業程序本無偽裝掩蔽之步驟。凡此種種，皆顯示組織行為之影響力已凌駕理性模式甚至領導人所能掌控範圍。在政府政治模式方面，則假設決策輸出實則係國內政治角力的結果，政府不同部門所擁有之權力、斡旋能力、對不同議題之關切程度決定政策的取向，而組織行為更被細部區隔為許多個別的部門角力後妥協的結果，得勢的部門不同，所產生的決策結果也不同。古巴飛彈危機期間，美國政府內部包括國家安全顧問、國務卿、退休資深大使、國防部長、空軍總司令及參謀聯席會議主席分別提出置之不理、祕密訪問、外交壓力、封鎖、空襲及全面入侵古巴等不同方案，最後由羅伯甘迺迪（甘迺迪總統之弟，其時為司法部長）擔任「總工程師」綜合各方意

見及利益，最後決定以外交最後通牒方式結合海上封鎖要求蘇聯撤出飛彈，如蘇聯不從，再以空襲方式摧毀飛彈。

Graham Allison所提出的三種模式，宛如「戴上三副不同眼鏡」解讀政府決策過程，理性模式以宏觀角度綜覽事件，組織行為模式及政府政治模式則以微觀角度細部檢驗解剖組織及個別角色，而越來越多解密資料及微觀分析顯示，古巴飛彈危機期間美蘇對峙的危險程度其實遠較原先雙方政府所設想情況嚴重，而廿一世紀全球及區域問題，包括核武擴散、科技進步及恐怖主義肆虐問題，亦遠較古巴飛彈危機期間嚴重，決策者更須審慎瞭解及掌握決策的本質，方能在後冷戰時期提供未來人類努力的方向及未來。

成績：A- (=very good)

(3) “Track Two” Diplomacy in Resolving the South China Sea Conflict: the Role of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

（解決南海爭端的二軌外交：南海會議）（全文請詳附件四）

本報告為「衝突管理的原則及實務」期末學術報告。

中文摘要：在三百六十萬平方公里的南海，七個鄰近國家各自援引一九八二年聯合國海洋法，宣稱擁有全部或部份星羅棋布數以百計的大小島嶼，自一九七四年以來至少已發生兩次海戰，若未能有效建立和平機制，將可能發展為南海各主張國家之間戰爭。南海爭端除牽涉領土糾紛外，還包括爭奪海道、石油資源及漁場控制權等利益糾葛，由於這些利益的無可妥協性，加上南海各國家間長期的衝突和彼此的不信任，使得官方溝通管道陷入僵局。有鑒於此，印尼退休大使 Hasjim Djalal 一九九〇年在印尼及加拿大兩國政府協助下，成立了處理南海潛在爭端工作會議（The Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea，簡稱南海會議）的非官方論壇會議機制，企圖以所謂非官方的「二軌外交」方式為南海爭端尋

求解決之道。南海會議自一九九〇年首屆會議於巴厘島舉辦以來，將各國政府代表、海洋專家及學者集結一堂，由於「二軌外交」為非官方機制，所作成結論亦不具約束力，各國代表反能因此暢所欲言，坦然面對各種敏感議題，並共謀可能之爭端解決方案。美國政治學者P. Terrence Hopmann 曾提出兩種談判模式：(1) 斤斤計較 (bargaining) 的談判模式：爭端存在於談判者間，談判為零和情況，一方之得即為另一方之失；(2) 問題解決 (problem-solving negotiation) 的談判模式：將爭端視為談判者之間共同問題，談判者共同致力解決爭端。南海會議的「二軌外交」機制，充分發揮「問題解決」談判模式的特性，藉由各種工作會議設計議題，從而逐漸化解官方「一軌外交」的「斤斤計較」談判模式，而若干南海會議的「二軌」結論甚且成為日後「一軌」會議結論的藍圖，例如九一年第二屆南海會議中揭櫫和平解決領土紛爭、不使用武力、各國自制等原則的萬隆宣言，即成為九二年東協國家有關南海問題馬尼拉宣言的藍本，而南海會

議倡議建立信心機制（CBMs）及「預防性外交」（preventive diplomacy）等概念，促成二〇〇一年「東協區域論壇預防性外交概念及原則」文件的推出，而二〇〇二年在金邊簽署的「南海各方行為宣言」，更是南海會議自一九九二年以來所持續推動各國建立南海「行為準則」（code of conduct）的成果。儘管許多人批評南海會議流於「談話會」的形式，而南海情勢依然詭譎多變，但藉由南海會議持續推動「二軌外交」的努力，誠如Hasjim Djalal 大使所說：「我們可以較從前更有信心航行過南海危險的水域」。

成績：A- (=very good)

四、建議事項：

1、建議本部同仁及其他部會人員有機會能繼續前來本學院進修：

SAIS 國際公共政策碩士班課程壓力雖重，惟選課自由，學生於一年內修畢本校所開之八門課程（不包括英語及其他語言課程），即可取得國際公共政策碩士學

位。本人前申請SAIS前曾廣閱美國各校進修資料，其中SAIS、喬治華盛頓大學及丹佛大學（中南美司韓科長健豪曾就讀該校）均開有國際事務碩士一年修習課程計畫，極適合我政府中高階層官員前來進修。本人來 SAIS 後曾向藍普頓及卜道維等學者請益，彼等告知我政府自林秘書秀美（現派至我駐雪梨辦事處服務）於前年畢業後，已有年餘未見任何台灣學生前來 SAIS 就讀，每逢討論台灣議題時，往往僅有大陸學生到場宣揚所謂「一個中國」原則及「一國兩制」制度之優越性，對未有台灣學生表達持平意見頗表遺憾，彼等是以對本人來校進修至表歡迎等語，本人在 SAIS 一年進修期間，為唯一之台灣學生。相較下，中共外交部每學期至少選派兩名副處長級官員赴 SAIS 就讀，並不定期派員參加三個月之短期進修課程，顯見中共外交部對 SAIS 之重視程度。鑒於 SAIS 學風優良，師資卓越，地處華府重要地段，復為美國中國問題研究重要智庫，應可列為我政府未來遴選同仁出國進修之重點進修學校。

2、建議加強與該學院「中國研究」學者之關係：

本人在 SAIS 進修期間，藉由課程研修及平日請益互動之機會，與 SAIS 中國問題學者如藍普頓、卜道維及石文安等老師建立密切師生關係，石文安老師（〈毛澤東私人醫生回憶錄〉英文翻譯）因本人課業整體表現不俗原因，對本人頗有讚許肯定，卜道維則因個人對台灣政經發展研究興趣原因，經常與本人討論有關兩岸關係各種情勢發展情況，亦建立密切之聯繫合作關係。近年來由於中國大陸政經力量崛起及兩岸情勢變化關係，「中國研究」已超越「日本研究」成為美國學術圈內重要顯學之一，SAIS 因地利之便與美政府互動頻繁，對美政府中國政策建言頗有影響力，與彼等中國問題學者加強聯繫互動確有必要，如我政府能續派遣學生至 SAIS，並積極加強與 SAIS 「中國研究」學者互動關係，或考慮於校內辦理與兩岸事務有關之研習活動，對於增進美國學界對我立場之瞭解與認識極有裨益，有助於加強美國學界及政界對我國有更肯定及友善之觀感。

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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Scott Rowland

Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality in China

China's Economic Performance in the last two decades

Since China started its economic reforms and opened up to capitalism in 1978, the income level of Chinese people has been greatly improved. The World Bank estimated in 1997 that more than 200 million Chinese have been brought out of poverty as a result of the Government's policy of adherence to free market economy, an impressive achievement highly praised by the renowned international organization and envied by many other staggering developing countries.¹ Moreover, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of the State Council, China's economic growth was not deterred by the global depression but in fact enjoyed an 8% increase in its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002.² If the rapid speed of economic growth continues, the World Bank believes that the Chinese people can attain the goal of GDP per capita of \$10,000 by 2020. This would make Chinese people enjoy standard of living equal to or better than that of the Portuguese today.³

Persistent Problems of Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality

In spite of optimistic prospects in China, the economic reforms in the last two decades also brought some negative impacts.

First, free market competition increased unemployment among the Chinese society. Many state-owned industries and enterprises ceased to operate due to lack of efficiency.

¹ *Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China*. (Washington, DC: World Bank 1997),ix

² The National Bureau of Statistics of the State Council, PRC, "Statistical Communiqué Of the People's Republic of China on the 2002 National Economic and Social Development", 28 Feb. 2003, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newrelease/statisticalreports/1200303120088.htm> (5 May, 2003)

Those survived were compelled to dismiss surplus workers in order to maintain their competitiveness. The laid-off workers received only basic living allowances to eke out their livings. Reemployment could be highly difficult if these laid-off workers lack professional skills or proper vocational trainings. Dissatisfied with meager subsistence funds and consumed with hatred for longtime unemployment, millions of laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises can be destructive to social order and the stability of the communist regime.

Secondly, rapid economic growth accelerated inequalities and widened disparities between rural and urban areas in China. The Gini Coefficient (a measure of income inequality) of China's individual income increased from a low 28.8 in 1981 to 38.8 in 1995 and a hazardous 45.8 in 2000,⁴ which was close to that of Latin America and the Caribbean, the most notoriously unequal regions of the world. Many corrupt "sons of high-ranking officials" or "the Prince's party" are considered as taking advantage of rising opportunities to earn unlawful profits. If this trend of inequality continues, it would reach the limit of what ordinary Chinese people can tolerate.

Thirdly, although many Chinese people are much better off than they were two decades ago, there were still 200 million Chinese people categorized by the World Bank as "absolute poor" (a person with consumption capability of less than US\$1 a day) in 1999.⁵ Many of these impoverished people live on unproductive lands in central and west China. It will take immense efforts of the Chinese government to help them attain the minimum

³ China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century. (Washington, DC: World Bank 1997), 21

⁴ "How Wide Is the Gap of China's Individual Income?", People's Daily, August 31, 2001

http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200108/31/eng20010831_78962.html (5 May, 2003)

⁵ "Country Brief: People's Republic of China" World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank. <http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/> (11 Feb. 2003)

standard of living of “WenBao” (to have people adequately fed and clothed) and gradually shake off poverty.

If the Chinese government fails to address the three problems, these problems will eventually undermine growth, worsen people’s agony and disrupt social stability.

Government’s Efforts in Addressing the Three Problems

Entirely aware of the latent dangers and possible chain reactions of aggravation by the three interrelated problems, the Chinese Government has exerted many efforts to reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality:

1) To Reduce Poverty:

Poverty reduction is the Chinese Government’s most essential work. Since poverty in China is basically a rural phenomenon and most of the destitute areas are situated in central and west China, the Chinese government chose the poorest 592 counties (the counties with a yearly income of less than 400 yuan per peasant) in the rural areas as the foremost beneficiaries of the “8th Seven-Year Priority Poverty Alleviation Program for Rural China”, and appropriated large amount of special aid-the-poor funds to improve poverty in these counties.⁶ The special aid-the-poor funds include financial and credit ones. The financial aid-the-poor funds were used to achieve following objectives:

-To offer “WenBao” for the most destitute people:

The financial funds granted heavy subsidies to solve the problem of food and clothing for the most destitute people in the rural areas. The task has been carried out quite successfully.

⁶ “China: Overcoming Rural Poverty” <http://poverty.worldbank.org/library/view/8077/> (11 Feb. 2003)

-To improve the infrastructure of less developed areas:

For those poor people but with better living conditions, the funds were used to improve their hometowns' basic infrastructure ranging from the construction of basic farmlands, small irrigation works, country roads, electricity and drinking water systems to offering of technical trainings for the poor people.⁷ This could help people improve their standard of living and develop a more viable environment to for economic development.⁸

The credit aid-for-poor funds served:

-To help the needy people earn their own livings:

The credit funds were used to assist poor households in establishing their own business such as crop cultivation, poultry raising or retail shops so that their incomes can increase. The terms of mortgage and guarantee for loans were softened to accommodate the needs of poor people. The repayment time can also be negotiated and prolonged.⁹

The huge population in China has become a heavy burden for the government to fight poverty effectively. The Chinese government therefore needs to curb the increase of its population to ensure the success of its economic development and achieve the objective of poverty reduction:

-To control the increase of population:

China has implemented a strict one child policy since 1978. The population growth rate has dropped from 2.58% in 1970 to 1.12% in 1994 with average increase of 14 million

⁷ The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "*The Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China*", White Papers of the Government, Oct. 2001, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/fp1015/t-3.htm> (5 May, 2003)

⁸ "*Poverty Relief in China.*" <http://www.chinagate.com.cn/english/index.htm> (11 Feb. 2003)

⁹ The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "*The Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China*", White Papers of the Government, Oct. 2001, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/fp1015/t-3.htm> (5 May, 2003)

people per year.¹⁰ To further control the population growth, the Chinese government intensified education of family planning in rural areas and has eventually achieved some desired effects. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the State Council, the total population of China was 1,284.53 million at the end of 2002. The population growth rate has dropped to 0.641% with only a marginal increase of 8.26 million people last year.¹¹

The low level of education in rural areas can be detrimental to the Chinese government's efforts in creating economic incentives for further development. To increase knowledge and competitiveness of poor people in rural areas so that they are in a more favorable position to shake off poverty, the Chinese government attempted to extend and deepen education in poverty-stricken areas:

-To promote education and technological training in rural areas:

The Chinese Government funded the "National Project of Compulsory Education in Poor Areas" in 1995 to assist the poor in acquiring proper education or technological training. It also encouraged non-governmental organizations (NGO) to actively participate in its efforts of promoting education in rural areas. The "Hope Project" is a successful example. It is estimated that, since 1989, this NGO-sponsored "Hope Project" has established 8,355 Hope schools and helped 2.3 million children to go to school. The Chinese government also dispatched more than 30,000 scientific and technological personnel from universities or research institutes in the past 15 years to promote cultivation techniques in poor townships or villages. They have implemented 580 aid-for-poor

¹⁰ The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "Family Planning in China", White Papers of the Government, Aug. 1995, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/familypanning/index.htm> (15 March, 2003)

¹¹ The National Bureau of Statistics of the State Council, PRC, "Statistical Communiqué Of the People's Republic of China on the 2002 National Economic and Social Development", 28 Feb. 2003, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/1200302280246.htm> (15 March, 2003)

projects, established more than 1,500 technological demonstration centers, and promoted over 2,000 agro-techniques in poor areas.¹² These efforts have increased the yield of croplands and raised peasants' incomes.

The Chinese government also strengthened cooperation relationship with renowned international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program to address the poverty problem in China:

-To cooperate with the international community in reducing poverty:

The World Bank has been the largest sponsor in China's task of poverty reduction. Its aid projects covered nine provinces, 91 poverty-stricken counties and benefited more than eight million poor people. The United Nations Development Program also carried out some aid projects in China. Other countries such as the UK, the Netherlands and Japan or organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, the Ford Foundation, the CARE of Japan, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation also offered economic assistance in helping the poor people in China. These financing projects provided useful expertise and experiences for the Chinese government to fight poverty more effectively.¹³

2) To Increase Employment Opportunities:

To reduce the dangers of social destabilization by prevalent unemployment, the Chinese government carried out some projects to increase employment and protect the welfare of laid-off and unemployed workers. These efforts included:

¹² The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "The Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China", White Papers of the Government, Oct. 2001, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/fp1015/t-4.htm> (5 March, 2003)

¹³ Ibid.

-To maintain rapid economic growth in coastal areas:

The Chinese government believes that as long as rapid economic growth can be maintained, domestic and foreign demands can expand to the extent that millions of new employment opportunities will be created to satisfy the need for more workers. Strong economic performance has therefore become the Chinese government's foremost objective to achieve prosperity and social stability at the same time. The Chinese government may still need to support preferential policies in coastal cities to prop up thriving economy and sustain the stability of employment market in these areas.

-To encourage the expansion from the coast to the hinterland:

The Chinese government offered many preferential incentives in the hinterland in central and west China to attract investors from coastal cities to expand their businesses westward. Many inland cities and provinces have prospered on the strength of this westward development policy. Thousands of new job opportunities have been created to benefit the inland people. The profits of economic reforms were therefore shared more extensively. The Chinese government is also funding the hinterland provinces and cities to develop industries or enterprises with local features.

-To promote reemployment of laid-off workers:

The Chinese government established many reemployment service centers in state-owned enterprises to assist laid-off workers in finding other jobs. These centers provided employment information and vocational guidance for laid-off workers. The government also encouraged laid-off and unemployed workers to take reemployment trainings conducted by these centers. According to the Information Office of the State Council, more than 13 million laid-off and unemployed persons nationwide had taken retraining

courses from 1998 to 2000, and the reemployment rate after six months of training reached about 60%. The government also carried out a "starting a business" training program, offering training to laid-off and unemployed workers who wish to establish small businesses, helping them register with the related administrations and providing small loans to increase their opportunities of success.¹⁴ The Chinese government is also establishing human resources net working systems in urban areas to assist migrants and laid-off workers to find jobs.¹⁵

-To protect the welfare of laid-off or unemployed workers:

The Chinese government has adopted a "two guarantees" policy to guarantee the basic livelihood of the laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises since 1998. The basic living allowance was offered for a maximum of three years; if these laid-off workers still could not find jobs, they could receive unemployment insurance payments for a maximum of two years; at the end of the two-year period, if they still could not be reemployed, they can apply for the minimum living allowance paid to urban residents. According to the White Paper on Labor and Social Security of the Information Office of the State Council, most of laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises have received their basic living allowances on monthly basis. Although the living allowance is not enough, it has played a role of unemployment relief payment, helped laid-off workers make a livelihood, and maintained the social stability in China in a sense.¹⁶

3) To level inequalities:

¹⁴ The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "Labor and Social Security in China", White Papers of the Government, Apr. 2002, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/20020429/1.III.htm> (5 May, 2003)

¹⁵ *Sharing Rising Incomes*, 4

¹⁶ The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "Labor and Social Security in China", White Papers of the Government, Apr. 2002, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/20020429/1.III.htm> (5 May, 2003)

The high inequality in China is certainly an issue of serious concern to the government, as it causes widespread discontent and social protest. The Chinese government has adopted three approaches to reduce the disparity of the country from three different approaches:

-To narrow the gap between the coastal and inland areas:

Since most of the 592 poverty-stricken counties chosen by the Chinese government are situated in the central and western regions, the Chinese government has requested the more-developed provinces and cities in coastal zones to support the development of their inland counterparts in terms of human resources and finance. This scheme is carried out by demarcation of responsibility areas: Beijing helps Inner Mongolia; Tianjin helps Gansu; Shanghai helps Yunnan; Guangdong helps Guangxi; Jiangsu helps Shaanxi; Zhejiang helps Sichuan; Shandong helps Xinjiang; Liaoning helps Qinghai; Fujian helps Ningxia; and the cities of Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen and Ningbo help Guizhou.¹⁷ While capital and technology-intensive industries flourished in these coastal provinces or municipalities, the less competitive labor-intensive industries were encouraged to transfer to the less developed areas in the hinterland where labor is relatively cheap and natural resources are rich.

- To allow conditional migration from poverty-stricken rural areas to urban areas

Peasant households were permitted to move from poverty-stricken rural areas to more favorable urban areas for the improvement of their livelihood. The government allowed the migration by 1) subsidizing poor households to migrate and resettle near their

¹⁷ The Information Office of the State Council, PRC, "The Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China", White Papers of the Government, Oct. 2001, <http://www.china.com.cn/e-white/fp1015/t-4.html> (5 March, 2003)

relatives or friends in cities; 2) establishing resettled townships to accommodate poor households near urban areas; or 3) allowing poor households to keep their “hukous” in their rural areas until the new settlements are well in shape for stable production and habitation. According to the statistics of the Information Office of the State Council, about 2.6 million poor people have been relocated through the government’s aid-for-poor migration policy.¹⁸

-To raise the standard of living of the poor and prosecute illegal activities of the rich:

To narrow the gap between the poor and the rich, the best solution is to raise the standard of living of the poor in the destitute areas. For the poor, in addition to those implemented aid-for-poor projects, the Chinese government has endeavored to sustain rapid economic growth and accelerate urbanization of the rural areas to quicken the process of poverty reduction. For the rich, the Chinese government main task was to seize the proceeds of illegal activities such as evading progressive taxes and bribing government officials in exchange for unlawful profits. Heavy sentences ranging from long-term imprisonment to the death penalty were imposed to curb illegal economic activities.

Workable Options in the future:

Some options can be considered to better solve the problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality:

1) The Chinese government can dispatch some special poverty reduction teams to the poorest counties to do research on the essence of their poverty and improve the pathetic situations with direct funding from the central government. Close cooperation with some

¹⁸ Ibid.

humanitarian NGOs in China can enhance the effect of aid. The accumulated work experiences learned from successes or failures in these regions can help the government correctly evaluate the current poverty problem, so that effective aid projects can be envisioned and undertaken in other poor counties in the future.

2) The Chinese government can further consult international organizations and utilize their expertise and experiences in Africa or Latin America to cope with poverty in China. Some of their suggestions, such as the World Bank's proposal to directly allocate poverty funds to townships instead of counties, can help the use of these funds more efficiently.¹⁹

3) The Government can establish agricultural financing cooperatives at the township level in light of successful experiences of agricultural development in Taiwan. These micro-financing consultative units can not only provide loans to farmers to buy fertilizers, grains or machinery in order to raise their agricultural production, but also offer expert advice to farmers of planting more profitable crops. The experiences of agricultural development in Taiwan also show that profitable crop cultivation needs to be market-oriented and diversified. The marketing system of agricultural products should also be streamlined to effect sales and enhance peasants' income. Adjustments in the current land policies such as the transfer of leasehold of land cultivation rights may be needed to bring more effective utilization of the limited croplands in China.

¹⁹ "China: Overcoming Rural Poverty" <http://poverty.worldbank.org/library/view/8077/> (11 Feb. 2003)

- 4) According to the survey of the World Bank, there are around 40 million long-term migrant workers in China.²⁰ To be more accommodating with the fluidity of the migrant population, in addition to current conditional migration policy in poverty-stricken areas, the Chinese government should consider the revision of the current “hukou” registration system. Migrant workers with evidence of having stayed in cities for more than 10 years, for example, can be allowed to settle down to new “hukous”. As for those migrant workers ineligible for resettlement requirements, the Government can tentatively allow them to register in city halls as “itinerant residents”, so that their residence records can be tracked. It can also help city halls to effectively control the increase in city population, care for the needs of immigrant workers and reduce the rate of crimes.
- 5) The Government should attempt to eliminate some economic policies biased toward rich employers and businessmen at the cost of workers. Laws should be enacted to request the employers to gradually increase benefits of workers or offer shares to workers to cultivate their senses of participation and identification with the companies.
- 6) In addition to prosecute illegal activities of rich businessmen, the Chinese government should enact laws such as the government procurement law to regulate the market transactions, so that the market competition can become more transparent and healthy. The Chinese government should also make efforts to fight the prevalent corruption among government officials and investigate illegal economic activities of “sons of high ranking officials” and “the Prince’s party” to ease the exasperation of ordinary Chinese

²⁰ *Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China*, 54

people. The World Bank's suggestion to establish a supra-institutional monitoring administration similar to the Independent Commission of Anti-Corruption (ICAC) in Hongkong should be adopted. This will help coordination among different government institutes and strengthen the Government's integral work in fighting corruption.²¹

²¹ *China 2020*, 37

Three Analytic Approaches to the Cuban Missile Crisis

"Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us."

-- John F. Kennedy

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The thirteen days starting from Oct. 16 to 28, 1962 of the Cuban missile crisis remain the most dangerous moment in the recorded history of mankind. It was a crisis in which the US and the Soviet Union stood "eyeball to eyeball," as described by Dean Rusk, with massively destructive nuclear weapons in hand. Both sides showed their readiness and determination to defend their national interests, but both sides also displayed their self-restraint and flexibility in avoiding the final showdown in a catastrophic nuclear war. President Kennedy's caution and his top aides' sapient tactics in handling the crisis successfully pressed the Soviet Union to move backwards and withdraw their missiles in Cuba, while the Soviet Union also won the US pledge not to invade its ally Cuba and its assurance to remove missiles from Turkey. Understanding the crisis will not only enhance our knowledge of the governments' actions and the "essence" of their decision-making, it will also teach us a good lesson of what can be undertaken to prevent the Armageddon of nuclear war in the future.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, in their 1999 celebrated book of Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, deftly

analyzed the crisis from three perspectives or “conceptual lens”: rational actor (Model I), organizational behavior (Model II) and governmental politics (Model III). It was a rewritten edition of Graham Allison’s 1971 classic book of Essence of Decision, while incorporating all new information from the Kennedy tapes and recently de-classified Soviet files. It provided insightful analyses of the unfolding series of decisions and events during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Model I: The Rational Actor Model

Allison and Zelikow first attempted to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis as purposive acts of unified national governments. They assumed that all acts of nations are “rational”, which reflect their purposes and intentions to some extent. Since their actions are to pursue for their own interests, nations will carefully define their objectives, select feasible options, evaluate the consequences of their actions, and make rational choices. In other words, the behavior of a nation or a government can be analogous with the purposive acts of individuals and “anthropomorphized”. Rationality, whether “comprehensive” or “bounded”, refers to “consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints” for nations and governments.¹

The Cuban Missile Crisis analyzed by Model I

Four hypotheses were built up by the US to explain the Soviet Union’s

¹ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman 1999), 13-26

decision in deploying offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba:

1. **Cuban defense:** Cuba had important strategic and symbolic meanings for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union needed to deploy these offensive weapons to defend Cuba from the US possible invasion;
2. **Cold War politics:** The Soviet Union was competing for global preeminence with the US during the Cold War. Deploying missiles in Cuba could demonstrate the Soviet Union's worldwide influence and its capability of threatening the US in its backyard;
3. **Missile power:** The Soviet Union believed that deploying missiles near US shores would offer them significant bargaining advantages and offset its gap in strategic nuclear weapons with the US;
4. **Solving the Berlin problem:** The Soviet Union deployed the missiles in Cuba in order to pressure the US to withdraw from Berlin.

To address the crisis, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom), President Kennedy's crisis management team, figured out six possible alternatives:

1. **Do nothing:** The US did not need to react since the deployment of these missiles would not affect the US nuclear superiority;
2. **Diplomatic pressure:** The US could send an ultimatum to Khrushchev requesting an immediate removal of the deployed missiles;
3. **A secret approach to Castro:** The US could induce or threaten Castro to split with the Soviet Union;
4. **Invasion:** The US should invade Cuba in order to remove these

missiles and overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba at the same time;

5. **Air strike:** The US could launch surgical or massive air strikes to destroy the missiles in Cuba;

6. **Blockade:** The US could enforce an embargo on all military imports to Cuba by a naval blockade and request the Soviet Union to immediately withdraw their missiles in Cuba.

Kennedy chose the option of naval blockade to demonstrate the US resolution in eliminating these missiles while giving time to the Soviets to retreat.

The Soviet Union finally decided to withdraw the missiles in Cuba because that:

1. The US possessed overwhelming nuclear superiority;
2. The blockade showed the US determination in getting rid of the missiles in Cuba and it could escalate to more serious military conflicts;
3. The US promised not to invade Cuba if these missiles were withdrawn;
4. The US assured that the Jupiters missiles deployed in Turkey would be withdrawn in four to five months (77-129).

Model II: Organizational Behavior Model

The second approach of Allison and Zelikow was to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspective of organizational behavior. They assumed that government's decisions are outputs of governmental organizations functioning according to their fixed patterns of behavior or

standard operating procedures (SOPs), instead of the government's own rational choices as described by Model I. SOPs are drawn up for faithful observance so that efficiency can be achieved by governmental organizations. Organizations can also be constrained by these SOPs. Allison and Zelikow found that unless their budget or functions are severely challenged, changes in these governmental organizations are slow and can only be achieved in an incremental way based on their existing procedures. Some anomalies and inconsistencies beyond the rational analysis of Model I can thus be properly explained by Model II (143-185).

The Cuban Missile Crisis analyzed by Model II

The Soviet Union's missiles in Cuba were found through planned U-2 aerial surveillance and intensive photography analyses, an impressive work achieved only by organizational efforts. The large-scale naval blockade within the radius of 500 miles outside Cuba could only be carried out by strenuous organizational efforts as well. The efficiency of the US military offered more feasible options for President Kennedy to take into consideration while making his final decision.

Kennedy, however, had to supervise activities of the US battleships stationed in the Caribbean Sea when they were intercepting Soviet cargo ships or submarines. He wanted to ensure that no any military miscalculation would ever possibly happen and create serious results. He also needed to give special orders to halt the execution of the European Defense Plan (EDP) established by the Eisenhower administration, which

had authorized the US commanders in Turkey to use nuclear weapons to attack the Soviet Union without further approval from the President if the US or their military base in Turkey were first attacked. No one ever mentioned another established plan, the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), so bombers deployed in NATO states were still loaded with nuclear bombs and followed QRA procedures for the potential use of nuclear weapons. Organizational behavior based on SOPs indeed exceeded the reach of President Kennedy's control.

Erratic cases of organizational behavior were also seen on the Soviet side. Although the missiles were secretly transported to Cuba, their launch sites were not camouflaged and were exactly constructed in accordance with the design charts in the Soviet Union. The US hypothesized that the Soviets must have wanted these missiles to be found, yet the truth was that the Soviet missile units simply followed their SOPs in constructing missiles sites and camouflage was not a required procedure in the Soviet Union. The Soviet anti-aircraft SAMs were not fired to shoot down the overflying U-2 on Oct. 14 because the Soviet commanders were instructed to use these weapons against air strike, not aerial espionage. The same Soviet forces, however, fired SAMs and shot down the other U-2 on Oct. 27 without authorization from Khrushchev. Its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed. This incident immediately escalated the military tension to a dangerous degree of nuclear brinkmanship. Organizational behavior of the Soviet Union was also beyond the control of Chairman Khrushchev (197-242).

Model III: Governmental Politics Model

The third approach of Allison and Zelikow was to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspective of governmental politics. They attempted to explain the government decisions as results of bargaining games among players with different interests in domestic politics (255). Roger Hilsman's concept of "the concentric circles of power" could be a good example to explain this model. It comprises different circles ranging from the central circle of the President and his key foreign policy advisers, the second circle of the State Department, the CIA and Pentagon, the third circle of Congress, and other outer circles of political parties, interest groups, media and public opinion.² These players' own power, capacity for bargaining, varying degrees of concern over different issues and positions in these concentric circles determine the outcome of governmental decisions. Competing preferences of different players can also be aggregated and adjusted to shape composite options for the approval of the ultimate decision maker. Model III dissects government decision-making from organizations in Model II into piecemeal individual players. Different players of bargaining games can produce different outcomes.

The Cuban Missile Crisis analyzed by Model III

After the disastrous defeat in the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, Kennedy learned that he must be cautious in handling foreign policy and

² John W. Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas*, 6th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1994), 23-30

should not entirely rely on suggestions from military experts from CIA and Pentagon. He enlarged the inner circle of decision-making and added more new civilian members in the ExCom so more diversified opinions could be produced to avoid any mistake of bias. Different alternatives were contended and proposed by different members as follows in the ExCom:

1. Taking no action by McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor;
2. Secret approach to Castro by Dean Rusk, Secretary of State;
3. Diplomatic pressure by Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson, former ambassadors to the Soviet Union;
4. Blockade by Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense;
5. Air strike by Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
6. Invasion by Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (340-343).

It was Robert Kennedy, Attorney General and the President's brother, who became the "engineer of consensus" and combined different opinions of blockade, diplomatic pressure and air strike into a feasible option. The final option for the President was a mix of different interests: The blockade would be carried out together with an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding immediate removal of missiles in Cuba. If the Soviet Union refused to comply, the US would proceed with an air strike (346). 71 37

President Kennedy's personality and crisis management style cannot be ignored. Having learned from the humiliating Bay of Pigs invasion, he was calm and cautious in handling the crisis. Allison and Zelikow commented on Kennedy's personality in laudatory terms:

“We see a president as analyst-in-chief. On each issue, he presses his colleagues to probe deeper implications of each option; to explore ways of circumventing seemingly insurmountable obstacles; to face squarely unpalatable tradeoffs; and to stretch their imagination.” (357)

President Kennedy even purposely avoided attending some of the meetings of the ExCom so that its members were given entire freedom in formulating the best alternative without any scruple.

On the other hand, we saw Khrushchev’s dominant role and impulsive nature during the crisis. His Politburo members seldom gave advice or opposed his judgment. Most of them did not even have foreign or defense policy expertise. He became almost the only protagonist of the whole scenario.

Synthesized Review of the Three Different Models

As we manage to understand the decision-making process of complex events and conflicts in the international or domestic arena, the three analytic approaches envisioned by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow can lead us to see these specific incidents from more multifaceted angles. In their opinions, using different models is like “wearing different glasses” (387), which magnify some factors of the incident and could eventually change the final judgment. Take the example of the decision of naval blockade in Cuba, Model I analysts may consider it as a rational solution to the imminent threat of the Soviet Union; Model II analysts may consider it as a product of organizational behavior in light of the organization’s capacity and constraint (e.g. Since the Air Force could not

guarantee hundred percent destruction of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the guaranteed blockade of the Navy became the only possible option); Model III analysts may consider it as the compromised result of pulling and hauling among different players (e.g. McNamara, Taylor, Rusk and LeMay) while their competing preferences blended and blurred in a long run (385-386).

Model I can serve as an analytic approach in a big picture, or a framework of “macro-analysis” of a historical incident at a general level, while Model II and Model III can help further explore specific factors in the process of decision-making, or a “micro-analysis” of government organizations and individual players in details. The three models can actually be complementary to each other or serve as respective explanatory methods for international or domestic politics (392).

A Critique on the Three Models

Although the book was written as an objective and analytic textbook, as Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow proclaimed: “the best analysts of foreign policy manage to weave strands from each of the three conceptual models into their explanations,” (392) it did not suffice to give readers a vivid guidance about *what* circumstances *which* model could be better applied to explain some historical events and *why* it appears that way. Readers may get bogged down in a labyrinthine imbroglio full of conjecture and prejudice, or simply get lost in the forest of messy and digressive details. The Model III thesis of bargaining games between players in concentric circles of domestic politics also tends to

overemphasize the influence of bargaining process from “American” perspectives, which may be much less salient in authoritarian or communist countries.

Furthermore, although Allison and Zelikow intended to apply the three models to “rationally” explain why and how the Cuban Missile Crisis happened, so that clearer answers can be provided for book readers to understand the actions of their governments, readers may become more and more uncertain about the “essence” of decisions when more and more “irrational” factors of unexpected accidents, misinformation and wrongful perceptions appeared when Model I changes to Model II or III. They may agree with Allison and Zelikow in Model I that strategic nuclear superiority is not the assurance of security; they may feel more worrisome that rigidities of SOPs or fixed organizational behavior in Model II may escalate the military tension to nuclear war; they may totally lose their confidence over the rationality of mankind and capabilities of governments in controlling their own destinies from committing suicidal nuclear wars when they perceived the volatility of the Cuban Missile Crisis and so many mistakes made by different players during the crisis. If the Cuban Missile Crisis was considered the best example of crisis management, how is our current government’s ability to deal with an emergent situation similar to the crisis of October 1962? Allison and Zelikow seemed to imply that the power of “irrationality” was so dominant that it almost prevailed over that of “rationality” in their analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They probably could not agree more with Dean Acheson’s remark of "Homage to Plain Dumb Luck" :

*"I wrote a note to President Kennedy congratulating him on his 'leadership, firmness, and judgment over the past touchy week.' It does not detract from the sincerity of this message to add that I also thought he had been phenomenally lucky."*³

Dr. Ray S. Cline claimed in 1989 that the chance of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis is less than "one in a thousand".⁴ After he attended the oral history conferences in Havana in 1992, and heard from Anatoli I. Gribkov, the field commander who oversaw the planning and deployment of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, he changed his mind and believed that there was indeed a high possibility of a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁵

Is Our World Safer?

When Kennedy raised the alert status to Defense Condition 2 on Oct. 22, 1962, thousands of nuclear weapons carried by ballistic missiles and bombers were ready to be used. It was the most dangerous moment of the most dangerous crisis in the history of mankind. We live to see how the US and the Soviet Union avoided unintended consequences. Should we believe that our world is safer than it was during the crisis in 1962? Well, Allison and Zelikow did not think so. They believed that the direct nuclear threat to the US has increased substantially. They argued that although Model I analysts may believe our world has become safer since the Cold War has ended, the decline of Russia's conventional military

³ "Home page", Thirteen Days and History, <http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/page3.asp> (12 May, 2003)

⁴ Ray S. Cline, "Commentary: The Cuban Missile Crisis", *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1989, 191

⁵ Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, *US Foreign Policy and Crisis Management*, (Taipei: Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, 1993), 91

capabilities has indeed enhanced its reliance on nuclear weapons, hence the risks of use of nuclear weapons increase; Model II analysts notice Russia's deteriorating command and control system of nuclear weapons, which has increased the possibilities of "loose nukes" given to or stolen by terrorists groups; Model III analysts emphasize the roles of different players. Chances of miscalculation may have increased and the issue of "who will be in control of nuclear weapons" should be forthwith addressed (401).

The current Bush administration cannot agree more. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America published by White House in September 2002 highlighted the goals of the US foreign policy after 911 terrorist attacks: 1) to fight terrorist groups and those regimes which harbor terrorism, and that the best defense is an effective offense before the terrorist attacks were carried out; and 2) to exert all-out efforts in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-whether nuclear, biological or chemical-and technologies associated with the manufacturing of WMD or their delivery systems.⁶

When North Korea announced they have possessed nuclear weapons in April of this year and that they may proliferate nuclear technologies to other countries, we know we are not quite far away from the recurrent dilemma of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The caution and experiences that the US has gained from the Cuban Missile Crisis can hence be helpful for the US policy makers to solve the problem peacefully.

⁶ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002", White House, (Washington DC: White House 2002), 1-23

Conclusion

As we enter the post-Cold War era of the 21st century, we are facing more unexpected and complicated regional and global problems, yet we are given less time to handle these problems. Changes in technology like CNN create new rules for crisis management. Today, if an emergent situation similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis appears, it will be spread to the whole world within 24 hours, and that put much pressure on governments to make quicker, less considered decisions. There will be no longer a whole week of deliberation and secret consultations among government decision makers (preface ix). In fact, when Robert Kennedy expressed his worries that the facts of the Soviet deployed ballistic missiles may leak and asked his brother's reaction to this, President Kennedy thought immediate air strike might be the only option to consider. We learn now from declassified files of the Soviet Union that it would trigger a chain reaction and escalated the crisis into a nuclear war (384).

Any indiscreet decisions similar to this will be the last thing for us to see. A firm grasp of the essence of decisions, therefore, can minimize chances of unexpected consequences. The book written by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow offers good suggestions and can serve as a stimulating start for the analysis of the "impenetrable" essence of decision-making, even if their conclusion seems dim and pessimistic.

“Track Two” Diplomacy in Resolving the
South China Sea Conflict: the Role of the
Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts
in the South China Sea

WEN-LING WU

JOHN T. CRIST, PH.D.

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT

“Track Two” Diplomacy in Resolving the South China Sea Conflict: the Role of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

The territorial conflict in the South China Sea has become one of the most heated issues in Asia. Seven countries were embroiled in territorial conflicts over hundreds of islets or reefs spreading across 3.6 million square kilometers in the South China Sea. Each country invoked different legal principles of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to support its territorial claims. Territorial sovereignty, mixed with latent interests in potential hydrocarbon resources, rich fishery reserves, and controlling strategic sea-lanes of communication in the South China Sea, further complicated the conflict. It also made all claimant states reluctant to reconcile or make concessions. At least two bloody naval battles were fought and some other minor incidents happened in the region. The conflict could escalate into a large-scale war and endanger the security in Asia if it goes without international peace efforts at confidence building among claimant states.

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Territorial Disputes and Claims in the South China Sea

Three archipelagos are key to the territorial conflict in the South China Sea. The Pratas Islands are currently occupied by Taiwan, but claimed by Taiwan and China. The Paracel Islands are occupied by China, but claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Spratlys Islands are considered to be the most intricate and explosive area, in which 22 islets or reefs are occupied by Vietnam, 14 by China, 11 by Philippines, 10 by Malaysia, and 1 but the largest island occupied by Taiwan. The Spratlys Islands are entirely or partly claimed by all the occupying states plus

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Brunei.¹ The U-shaped historical waters boundary claimed by China and Taiwan in the South China Sea also encompassed part of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia and aroused its grave concerns (*Of the disputed territories in the South China Sea, please see Figure 1 and 2 attached on last 2 pages of the paper).

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China (the People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (the Republic of China) claim most of the South China on the basis of their historical waters and use of these islands in the South China Sea since China's ancient West Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-23 A.D.).² A 1947 map of the Republic of China, displaying that Chinese territories had included the South China Sea, was presented as evidence to justify their claims;³ Vietnam claims both the Paracel and Spratly Islands on the basis of its historical discovery and use, citing these islands were occupied by French colonial troops since 1933 and subsequently settled by Vietnamese fishermen; The Philippines names some of the Spratly Islands as Kalayaan Group, claiming them as its territory on the basis of the proximity principle of UNCLOS and "discovery" of these islands by a Philippine explorer Thomas Cluma in the 1950s; Malaysia and Brunei claim some of the Spratly Islands because they are situated within their continental shelves.

Other Competing Interests in the South China Sea

The territorial claims in the South China Sea are mixed with attention from other national interests: 1) Control of the sea-lanes of communication: Sea-lanes from Singapore, via Hong

¹ Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea", in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, eds. Crocker, et. al., (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 112

² Jianming Shen, "Territorial Aspects of the South China Sea Island Disputes", in the *Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation* ed. Myron H. Nordquist & John N. Moore, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 152

³ Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea", 112

Kong and Taiwan, to Japan in the South China Sea are considered to be the most important lifeline of trade and oil supplies in Asia. More than 700 ships pass through these sea-lanes daily.⁴ Control of these sea-lanes will have great strategic significance, especially for the emerging naval power of China; 2) Potential hydrocarbon resources: The South China Sea potential deposit of crude oil was estimated to contain approximately 205 billion barrels, accounting for 17 percent of the world's remaining reserves.⁵ The potential profits from oil in the South China Sea are simply irresistible, and too essential to neglect for the economic development of claimant states; 3) Dwindling fishing grounds: The disputes over the South China Sea were exacerbated by competition for declining fishing resources of the world. The rich fishing grounds in the South China Sea could offer an important source of food, create employment and increase foreign exchange earnings for claimant states.⁶

Military Conflicts and Incidents in the South China Sea

Territorial disputes, sovereignty claims, and other national interests, have all led to some regional armed conflicts in the South China Sea within last four decades. These incidents include: 1) Taiwan dispatched troops to occupy the Itu Aba Islet, the largest islet of the Spratly Islands, and expelled Philippine fishermen in 1956; 2) China defeated South Vietnam in a bloody naval battle and captured the Paracel Islands in 1974; 3) Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed near the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands, sinking three Vietnamese boats and killed more than 70 Vietnamese sailors in 1988; 4) Malaysia converted the occupied Swallow Reef of the Spratly

⁴ Chien Chung, "Confidence-Building Measures in the South China Sea", in *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Hung-mao Tien & Tun-jen Cheng, (New York: East Gate Book, 2000), 269

⁵ *Ibid.*, 278

⁶ John C. Baker & David G. Wiencek, *Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 5

Islands into a tourist resort in 1991, building up a 17-room resort hostel and an airstrip for small aircrafts in spite of strong protest from other claimant states; 5) China occupied the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1994, ignoring the Philippines' accusation of invading its territory.⁷

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“Track Two” Diplomacy

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Reviewing the irreconcilatory nature of territorial disputes, and the long history of conflict and mistrust among claimant countries around the South China Sea, one may begin to wonder whether it is possible to find ways and means to reduce the risks of potential armed conflict in the region. Since official negotiations among claimant countries were quite unlikely, especially without an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, some informal or “track-two” diplomatic efforts were made to promote confidence-building measures and reduce tension in the region. Among these efforts, the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea co-sponsored by Indonesia and Canada has been the most successful example of “track-two” diplomacy in resolving the South China Sea conflict.

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Workshop on Managing Potential conflicts in the South China Sea

The Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea was created by Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia in 1990, and supported by both governments of Indonesia and of Canada. Having realized the flexibility and openness of “track two” diplomacy, Amb. Djalal initiated the informal workshop process and invited officials and marine experts from claimant states around the South China Sea to meet, and exchange views in the conflict

⁷ Chien Chung, “Confidence-Building Measures in the South China Sea”, 262-267

every year in Indonesia. Since the workshop process shelved the sensitive issue of territorial claims in the region, and participants attended the meetings privately, the informal workshop was welcomed by all claimant states and has become an indispensable forum of discussion and dialogue in addressing the South China Sea conflict.

The First Workshop was held in Bali, Indonesia in January 1990. Since the initial meeting was a new attempt to break the stalemate, only participants from six ASEAN states were invited to seek a common ASEAN position. The Second Workshop took place in Bandung in 1991, and this time participants from non-ASEAN countries such as China, Taiwan, and Vietnam were invited to expand the dialogue mechanism of the workshop process. A consensual statement regarding some basic principles of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, no use of armed force, and exercise of self-restraint in the region was adopted as tentative guiding principles, and used to quell any potential conflict. The Third Workshop was held in Yogyakarta, in 1992, and created some technical working groups (TWGs) on marine scientific research and resources assessment. Experts groups were also proposed, in an effort to formulate feasible cooperative projects in the region. More technical working groups such as TWGs on marine environmental protection, safety of navigation, shipping and communication, and legal matters, were established at the Fourth Workshop held in Surabaya in 1993. The Fifth Workshop, hosted in Bukittinggi, in 1994, was used to approve some concrete projects framed by expert groups, such as those on conservation of biodiversity, tides monitoring, database creation, and information exchange in the South China Sea. Subsequent workshops and meetings after 1994 simply searched for more feasible ways to pursue cooperation, build confidence, and avoid conflict. As of January 1999, 32 various meetings under the framework of the workshop process were

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convened and produced valuable conclusions and recommendations.⁸ The Twelfth Workshop held in Oct. 2002 in Jakarta was the latest event of the “track two” diplomacy.

Advantages of the Workshop’s “Track Two” Diplomacy in Resolving the South China Sea Conflict

The power of the Workshop’s “track-two” diplomacy lies on its inclusiveness and candidness. Since all participants, whether from government officials to academics, attended the informal forum in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their countries, they are much more willing to discuss sensitive issues frankly, and express their opinions openly, in an effort to craft solutions to resolve existing problems. Likewise, these informal meetings do not place any binding obligations on their governments. In other words, the informality of the workshop process provides an inspiring working atmosphere, and actually facilitates the methodology of resolving problems, so that the issue in the South China Sea was not exclusively treated like a conflict between the participants, but rather as a common problem confronting all participants. The problem-solving orientation of the informal “track two” diplomacy in this regard, in P. Terrence Hopmann’s concept, can be more likely to achieve favorable results since the territorial issues in the South China Sea are indeed complex, and aggravated by multiple parties with varied opinions and intense emotions, as opposed to the bargaining-style negotiations of formal “track one” diplomacy.⁹

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idea

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⁸ Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea”, 116-119
⁹ P. Terrence Hopmann, “Bargaining and Problem Solving”, in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Crocker, et. al., (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 458-464

Governments can outright refuse some recommendation of “track two” initiatives they dislike, while adopting anything useful for future policy-making.¹⁰ Thus, common objectives among all claimant states can be more easily attained while divergence of opinions in the territorial conflict would not slow down the peace process.

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Moreover, government officials and experts participating in informal “track-two” diplomacy could be the same official representatives of their countries on formal “track-one” diplomatic occasions. The familiarity with the issue and other participating “partners” (instead of being treated like potential “adversaries” in a bargaining-style negotiation) can contribute to creating a friendly atmosphere of trust and cooperation. The Workshop process, after 12 years of assiduous effort in seeking ways of cooperation among all the claimant states, has served as a good example of “track two” diplomacy and has successfully reduced tension in the South China Sea.

The Transfer of the Workshop Conclusions and Recommendations to “Track one” Level

Although the workshop process was created to encourage dialogue and promote confidence-building measures (CBMs) on an informal basis, it has not only complemented “track one” diplomatic efforts, but has also broken the stalemate of the “track one” diplomacy and accelerated its progress. The 2nd Workshop statement in Bandung in 1991 actually served as the draft blueprint for the formal “ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea” issued in Manila in 1992, in which the principles of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, no use of armed force, and exercise of self-restraint promulgated by the Bandung statement were adopted and observed

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¹⁰ Ian Townsend-Gault, “The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in Ocean Affairs”, *The South China Sea Informal Working Group, University of British Columbia*, <http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/scsl/>, (July 8, 2003)

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as guidelines in resolving the conflict.¹¹ The workshop's promotion of CBMs and its endeavor of "preventive diplomacy" in the South China Sea helped the materialization of the document of the "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy" in 2001, in which confidence-building measures, norms building, and enhancing channels of communications were conceptualized and employed to guide the practice of all ARF members.¹²

Probably the most encouraging development in the South China Sea conflict was the signing of the "Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea" in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in Nov. 2002. It was the finalization of the "code of conduct" concept advocated by the workshop process since 1992. The Declaration reaffirms the principle of peaceful settlement of the conflict, and commits to the 1982 UNCLOS and other universally recognized principles of international law to solve the conflict; it encourages dialogues and exchange of information between military officers of claimant states around the South China Sea; it also advocates more cooperative activities on marine scientific research, environmental protection, safety of navigation, rescue operations, and combating illicit drugs and piracy. Again, the final adoption of the code of conduct in the South China Sea by all claimant states proves that the counsel and final recommendations of the informal workshop process can be constructive and transferable to "track one" level, and hence reaffirms the value of "track two" diplomacy in managing conflicts in the post cold war era. ✓

Conclusion

¹¹ Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea", 118
¹² "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC*, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/30449.html> (July 10, 2003)

While the Workshop has achieved many significant successes in its long-time undertaking of peaceful management of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it is not without its constraints and dilemmas. For one thing, the workshop process was extremely slow and has been criticized for serving only as a “talk shop” for participants with dissimilar opinions. For another thing, although the Workshop emphasized its position of pure informality and neutrality, China’s political influence was so dominant that Taiwan was never allowed to host any meeting since the creation of the workshop process in 1990. Finally, since the Workshop has entirely shelved sensitive issues of sovereignty over disputed territories in the South China Sea, the seemingly promising success of the workshop process might only offer a false promise of cooperation, while allowing powerful claimant states such as China to gradually consolidate its military positions in the region.¹³

Indeed, the South China Sea conflict is far from being resolved. The dilemmas of the workshop process simply reflect the complexity of the conflict and the fragility of cooperative relationship between ASEAN countries and China. First, China’s intransigence over the issue of its territory has been well known and would be extremely difficult to alter. Its current compromising attitude could be a strategy to win more time in strengthening its naval capabilities. Secondly, China has perceived the contradicting interests of ASEAN countries in the territorial conflict and may grasp opportunities to disunite and disrupt the common grounds of ASEAN countries. In fact, China has persuaded the Philippines to sign a bilateral code of conduct agreement in 1995.¹⁴ More attempts at dividing claimant ASEAN countries may be made by China to weaken ASEAN’s integral negotiation ability. Thirdly, Taiwan’s exclusion from joining the Declaration of the

¹³ Chien Chung, “Confidence-Building Measures in the South China Sea”, 298

¹⁴ Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea”, 124

ASEAN-China code of conduct because of ASEAN's adherence to the so-called "one-China" policy could undermine the diplomatic efforts of solving the conflict. Although Taiwan was not a contracting party of the ASEAN-China code of conduct, it has owned the largest and inhabitable Itu Aba Islet of the Spratly Islands as its advance base, thus it can simply take any unilateral actions in support of its sovereignty in the South China Sea.¹⁵

Fortunately, Taiwan has always adopted a good neighbor policy in managing its relationship with ASEAN countries. It could at least attend the Workshop as a decent dialogue partner, so that updated information and opinions of all claimant states can be exchanged, cooperative projects can be formulated and discussed, and a better understanding and interaction among all claimant states around the South China Sea can be established. In spite of the remaining uncertainty and latent dangers of the conflict, the current situation in the South China Sea is indeed much safer than it was merely a decade ago. Through persistent efforts of the Workshop's "track two" diplomacy, we may agree with Amb. Hasjim Djalal's elated remark, "...we are perhaps now sailing somewhat more confidently than before through the dangerous waters of the South China Sea."¹⁶ Indeed, this is more appropriate now than ever before.

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- Well argued and developed
- nice use of Hopmann's
distinction about bargaining
styles - need to develop more on
issues in dispute + workshops
approach to addressing them

¹⁵ Yann-huei Song, "South China Sea and Taiwan", *PacNet Newsletter*, CSIS, <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0040.html> (July 11, 2003)

¹⁶ Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea", 130

Figure 1: Disputed Waters In the South China Sea

(Major sea-lanes of communication are indicated by dashed lines.)

Source: Chien Chung, "Confidence-Building Measures in the South China Sea", in *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Hung-mao Tien & Tun-jen Cheng, (New York: East Gate Book, 2000), 263




Figure 2: (A) Historical Waters Claimed by both China and Taiwan in the South China Sea, and (B) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.

(Their claims not only overlap one another, but are also well within the area of the historical waters claimed by China and Taiwan)

Source: Chien Chung, "Confidence-Building Measures in the South China Sea", in *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Hung-mao Tien & Tun-jen Cheng, (New York: East Gate Book, 2000), 265

