

行政院及所屬各機關出國報告

(出國類別：其他)

參加九十三年三月 WTO 新回合農業談判
第二十一次特別會議報告

出國人：

服務機關：行政院農業委員會國際處

職稱：處長

姓名：黃子彬

服務機關：行政院農業委員會國際處國組科

職稱：簡任技正兼科長

姓名：李舟生

出國地點：瑞士日內瓦

出國期間：九十三年三月二十日至二十八日

報告日期：九十三年四月二十七日

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參加九十三年三月WTO新回合農業談判第二十一次特別會議
報告

主辦機關:

行政院農業委員會

聯絡人/電話:

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出國人員:

黃子彬 行政院農業委員會 國際處 處長
李舟生 行政院農業委員會 國際處 科長

出國類別: 其他

出國地區: 瑞士

出國期間: 民國 93 年 03 月 20 日 -民國 93 年 03 月 28 日

報告日期: 民國 93 年 04 月 27 日

分類號/目: F0/綜合(農業類) F0/綜合(農業類)

關鍵詞: 農業談判架構 混合公式 市場開放 境內支持 出口競爭 G-10 G-20 G-33 凱恩斯集團 美歐共同提案

內容摘要: WTO農業談判委員會於九十三年三月二十二日至二十六日召開第21次特別會議 由紐西蘭駐WTO大使Tim Groser主持 主席要求會員間進行溝通 以便在今年七月底之前就談判架構達成共識 以如期完成杜哈部長宣示 此次談判 我農委會極為重視 特派員積極參與 期間曾參與G-10內部會議 另又與美國 紐西蘭 歐盟 凱恩斯集團 非洲集團等進行溝通與諮商 各集團也都能了解G-10之立場 不過 有些會員認為G-10會員過於保守 不願就農業進行自由化 由於農業談判甚為複雜 且與會員之國內政治有極為密切的關係 未來是否能在數個月內就談判架構達成共識 目前仍未可知 但鑒於談判之重要性 我方仍應繼續就農業政策進行改革 以免倉促自由化而影響國內農業發展

本文電子檔已上傳至出國報告資訊網

參加九十三年三月 WTO 新回合農業談判第二十一次特別會議報告

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壹、背景說明

WTO 杜哈回合談判於去(九十二)年九月坎昆部長會議上，因會員在農業談判議題上有諸多歧見，致該部長會議未能就該回合談判達成任何協議，為免重蹈西雅圖部長會議之覆轍，坎昆部長會議授權 WTO 總理事會於同年十二月十五日在日內瓦召開高階官員會議，儘速完成本回合談判。該總理事會仍因多數開發中會員立場與美國及歐盟相左而草草結束，遂使會員又再次將希望寄託在今(九十三)年二月 WTO 總理事會。今年元月美國貿易代表署署長 Mr. Zoellick 致函 WTO 會員貿易部長，表達希望在今年中完成農業談判架構，並針對農業談判各項議題提出較以往為開放之看法，且強調美國不會因今年底之總統大選而影響回合談判。美國的誠意為後坎昆農業談判燃起希望，為展現誠意，Mr. Zoellick 於二月上旬巡迴訪問日本、中共、新加坡、ASEAN 國家、巴基斯坦、印度、南非、肯亞、WTO 秘書長與歐盟等，會員對於在今年中達成農業談判架構給予正面回應。諸多有利因素，使得 WTO 農業談判委員會得以決定於今年三月二十二日至二十六日召開農業談判特別會議。

鑒於該農業談判特別會議係坎昆部長會議失敗以來的第一次會議，且我亦參予 G-10 集團，除須與 G-10 內部成員進一步研擬談

判策略外，亦需與其他集團對話或諮商，將我方對農業自由化與農業改革之看法傳遞對方，以尋求支持及諒解，故本會各級長官對此次會議極度重視。本會派國際處黃處長子彬與該處國組科李科長舟生參加，另我常駐 WTO 代表團顏大使慶章與本會派駐該團之張參事淑賢亦會同出席。

貳、出席會議情形

一、會議議程與進行方式

WTO 第二十一一次農業談判特別會議(Special session)於今(2004)年三月二十二日至二十六日召開(見附件一)，三月二十二日會議，首先通過紐西蘭駐 WTO 大使 Tim Groser 擔任 WTO 農業談判主席，繼而由主席宣佈農業談判進行方式。主席建議三月二十二日下午至三月二十三日由會員相互諮商與討論，三月二十四日上午召開非正式會議，由會員報告諮商談判進展情形，並盤整進度，三月二十四日下午與二十五日再繼續由會員進行諮商，三月二十六日召開非正式會議與正式會議，由會員報告諮商進展情況。主席強調，不希望會員與他談判，而是會員間相互談判。隨後會員即依據此項議程進行會員間的諮商、討論與對話，美國、歐盟、G-10、G-20、G-33、凱恩斯集團、非洲集團等相互間均進行諮商與對話。我參與之 G-10 集團亦與歐盟、美國、

G-33、凱恩斯集團、加拿大、紐西蘭、印度及非洲集團對話；其他集團相互間亦進行對話。

二、主要會員談判立場

為便於了解會員間對農業談判之立場，茲將會議期間主要會員與集團對談判之立場摘要說明如下：

(一)G-10 內部對話

為對外說明 G-10 談判立場並說服會員接受 G-10 立場，G-10 由瑞士領導召開會議討論 G-10 之對外說帖，內容包括 G-10 會員對非貿易關切議題之重視、會員農業生產概況與近年農業改革及農產品進口情形 (G-10 會員多為農產品淨進口國家，農產品總進口值佔世界農產品總進口之 13%)，另特別強調若要以「單一模式適用全體方式」(one-size-fits-all approach)進行談判無法使農業談判成功，唯有展現「彈性」與「平衡」方能確保農業談判之成功。目前 G-10 內部僅在市場開放方面達成共識，即不同意採混合公式(blended formula)削減關稅(若要採取混合公式必須以烏拉圭公式為主)、不接受關稅上限(tariff capping)與強制性增加關稅配額(mandatory trq expansion)；高峰關稅與關稅配額是烏拉圭回合談判結果，若設定關稅上限與擴大關稅配額，將無法維護會員非貿易關切議題。境內支持與出口競爭尚未完成整合，不過，基本上，會員同意削減扭曲貿易的補貼(amber box)(削

減幅度會員間差異甚大)，繼續維持藍色政策與綠色政策；另若能將本集團在市場進入之關切事項納入考量亦可削減出口補貼(附件二)。

(二)美國

- 1、若農業無法在短期內達成共識，則本回合談判難於短期間有所進展；
- 2、希能在取消出口補貼方面訂定時間表，只要歐盟能接受取消所有農產品之出口補貼，願將出口貸款中之出口補貼削減，就糧食援助訂定規範，對出口型之國營企業貿易訂定規範；
- 3、市場進入方面，仍主張採混合公式削減關稅，且先進國家與開發中國家應採同一公式，不過，先進國家可將其 2-3%之產品稅項(tariff lines)納入烏拉圭公式削減，其餘則採瑞士公式削減，開發中國家可有 10%之產品稅項採烏拉圭公式削減；為限制高峰關稅，宜採關稅上限；關稅配額亦應增加；至於 G-33 所主張之 SP，美國僅支持將少數產品列入，且須有一定之標準。
- 4、境內支持方面，宜大幅削減 amber box，支持程度較高的會員應大幅削減，並對個別產品之 amber box 加以約束，藍色政策亦應削減或加以限制，微量條款亦可考量削減，因為其與 amber box 相同，對貿易扭曲亦大；另除非會員能在市場開放方面表

現大幅開放，否則美國不會在境內支持大幅削減。

5、開發中國家享有之 S&D 應有區別，較具競爭力之開發中國家應享有較少之優惠。

6、美國認為 G-10 是貿易自由化的障礙。

從以上之接觸，美國仍堅持採混合公式削減關稅，且透露其中烏拉圭回合公式僅適用少量的稅項；在境內支持方面，原本不願削減微量條款，如今表示願削減，同時將生產補貼之削減與市場是否能大幅開放掛勾，也就是會員若在市場方面不能展現大幅開放，其生產補貼也不可能大幅削減。

(三)G-33

該集團主要由印尼為首之開發中國家所組成，中共與韓國亦參與該集團，基本上要求特殊產品(SP)與特別防衛機制(SSM)以維護本身的農業，在與 G-10 對話時，亦同意不能以 one size fits for all 方式進行貿易自由化，並認同彈性的重要性；市場開放必須使開發中國家享有 S&D，列為 SP 之產品勿需削減關稅，亦不適用 TRQ 之增加，但可適用 SSM；SP 產品由會員指定；另該集團也要求會員大幅削減境內補貼。

(四)歐盟

1、支持混合公式削減關稅，所有會員均應採同一降稅公式，開發中

- 國家可享有優惠(S&D)，與 NTC 有關之產品可豁免關稅上限；
- 2、境內支持方面，可大幅削減扭曲貿易的 amber box 與微量條款，不贊成削減藍色政策，因其為從事農業改革之有效工具，可支持對藍色政策加以 capping；不贊成對綠色政策加以限制。
 - 3、有關出口補貼之取消在政治上具敏感性，無法設定全面取消之時間表；有關出口補貼之削減也應將出口貸款、糧食援助及國營企業貿易納入規範。
 - 4、適度處理 NTC 議題、特殊防衛措施與和平條款。
 - 5、談判宜考量平衡(balance)與彈性(flexibility)兩原則，前者包括兩項，即農業談判與其他談判議題間的平衡，諸如 NAMA 議題，其次則是農業本身在市場開放、境內支持、出口競爭、NTC 與 S&D 之間的平衡；彈性方面，將處理關稅級距，對於未採用瑞士公式之敏感性產品將以增加關稅配額作為補償。

(五)凱恩斯集團

該集團要求會員應遵守杜哈談判指令(Doha mandate)，即大幅削減關稅與增加關稅配額、關稅上限、大幅削減扭曲貿易之生產補貼、取消藍色政策、檢討並嚴格約束綠色政策、明確取消所有農產品之出口補貼，目前美歐主張之混合公式無法達到大幅削減關稅之目標。該集團亦認為 G-10 是貿易自由化障礙。

(六)非洲集團

該集團主要以埃及為首，包括肯亞、烏干達、坦桑尼亞、模里西斯等非洲國家，主張大幅開放市場、削減境內補貼及取消出口補貼，開發中國家宜享有 S&D 等，並宜注意關稅優惠之損失。

附表三為主要會員或集團農業談判立場之彙總。

參、幾點觀察、展望與建議

一、幾點觀察

整體而言，此次農業談判是坎昆會議後首次會議，會員相互間進行諮商與對話雖無明顯突破，但氣氛尚佳，而會員間對重大議題已有深入的了解，也知道相互間的困難，未來仍有極多的工作有待進行，這也是農業談判主席決定於四月二十至二十三日、六月二至四日、六月二十三至二十五日、與七月十四至十六日連續密集再舉行四次談判會議之目的。以下是此次談判會議之觀察：

- (一)美國對談判的推動似乎甚為積極，且期盼能於今年年中達成農業談判架構，其目的不外是為布希總統選舉加分；在此前提下，美國在關鍵時刻可能會對某些議題展現彈性，值得密切注意。
- (二)目前談判三大議題方面(three pillars)均有不易突破的問題，市場開放方面主要以關稅削減方式最困難，會員間意見亦甚為分歧，即使 G-20 極端強調改革之集團，內部對採用混合公式削減

(五)中共亦是 G-33 之成員，似乎甚為重視 SP 與堅持採取瑞士公式削減關稅，之所以如此，因其高關稅項目在入會時已大幅削減之故。

二、展望

未來幾個月，能否提出農業談判架構，各方有不同的看法，基本上，會員仍期盼能依照杜哈部長指示如期完成談判，也有會員對在今年七月底之前提出談判架構表示樂觀，不過，亦有會員認為如此複雜的議題要在如此短暫時間內達成共識不表樂觀。原因是歐盟迄今未就取消出口補貼有任何承諾，因為歐盟必須就此議題完成內部會員之諮商，尤其是法國反對最烈；而今年五月一日，歐盟將從十五個會員變成二十五個會員，新增之十個會員多半為農業生產國，是否願意接受取消補貼也是問題。其次，印度今年下半年也有選舉，農業談判對其選舉也有所影響，亦可能對談判進度多所牽制。綜上所述，要在今年七月底之前完成初步架構似不樂觀，但未來仍有四次談判，且主席足智多謀，美國又極為積極，又有點樂觀。總之，還是需要時間來解決。

三、建議

雖然農業談判可能無法於短期間內達成協議，但為避免多數會員一旦就重要議題達成共識，使我方無法因應，我方似有必要就重要議題準備套案，茲提出以下幾點建議：

(一)仍應積極派員參與今後農業談判，並密切注意談判發展動向。

就敏感性產品依其對農民所得、農業發展之重要性加以分類，以作為未來保護優先順序之參考。

(二)不論未來採取何種降稅公式，進一步降低農產品關稅似已無可避免，故宜分析農產品關稅結構，評估各種降稅公式對我農產品之影響，並研擬因應對策。

(三)未來進一步削減 amber box 似難避免，宜儘速就目前納入 amber box 之產品或政策措施，研擬將其轉為 blue box 與 green box 之可能性，以使我方有較為充裕的談判籌碼或空間換取其他較重要的議題，例如稻米之關稅上限。根據初步了解，目前 G-10 會員中除我國外，多數會員已有大幅削減 AMS 之準備，以日本為例，其削減幅度即可達 80%，因其在 1999 年即將稻米之補貼轉為 blue box，且日本隨時可利用大幅削減 AMS 以換取其他議題之小幅改革，諸如取消關稅上限或不增加 TRQ 等。

(四)新入會會員享有優惠措施應無疑義，中共在這方面亦不斷強調此點，此外，中共亦將敏感產品列入豁免削減之列，基於維護我方利益，我方亦宜適時表示支持。

以上各點建議均係從最壞情況來考量，所謂有備無患，此對我掌握談判先機絕對有很大的利益。

WTO/AIR/2261

4 MARCH 2004

SUBJECT: TWENTY-FIRST (FORMAL) SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
AGRICULTURE: 22 AND 26 MARCH 2004

1. THE TWENTY-FIRST (FORMAL) SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE WILL BE HELD ON MONDAY, 22 MARCH AND FRIDAY, 26 MARCH 2004 IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD. THE MEETING WILL START AT 11 A.M. DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE INCUMBENT FROM GENEVA AND WITH HIS APPROVAL THE MEETING WILL BE OPENED BY THE CHAIRPERSON-DESIGNATE.

2. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE PROPOSED FOR THE AGENDA:

- A. ELECTION OF THE CHAIRPERSON
- B. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

ON COMPLETION OF ITEM B THE FORMAL SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE WILL BE SUSPENDED AND RESUMED AT 3 P.M. ON FRIDAY, 26 MARCH. (FOR MORE DETAILS PLEASE SEE THE FAX RELATING TO THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEEK OF 22-26 MARCH 2004 SENT TO PARTICIPANTS ON 19 FEBRUARY.)

- C. (i) STATEMENT BY CHAIR
(ii) STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS
- D. OTHER BUSINESS

3. PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH REGULAR OBSERVER STATUS (FAO, IGC, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, UNWFP AND THE WORLD BANK) ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE NAMES OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI

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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DU COMMERCE
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO

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FAX

To:	Members of the Committee on Agriculture and Observer Governments	Fax No:	
From:	Tim Groser Chairman (designated) Committee on Agriculture, Special Session	Date:	19 February 2004
Number of pages (including this one):	2	Ref:	

Negotiations on Agriculture: 22-26 March 2004

Following my designation as Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by the General Council at its meeting on 11 February I would like to inform you that the next Special Session of the Committee will take place starting on Monday 22 March at 11 a.m.

In order to strike a balance between the need for providing adequate opportunities for delegations to consult and negotiate among themselves and the imperative of ensuring transparency and collective stock-taking by all delegations, the following arrangements are suggested:

- The formal Special Session will start on Monday 22 March at 11 a.m. to formally appoint the Chairman and the conduct of work for the rest of the week. Subsequent to these two items, the formal meeting will be suspended until 3 p.m. on Friday 26 March.
- Monday afternoon and all day Tuesday 23 March are available for negotiations and discussions amongst delegations.
- An informal open-ended Special Session will be held on Wednesday morning 24 March starting at 10 a.m. to give delegations the opportunity to report on their negotiations and discussions and to take stock of progress made.
- Wednesday afternoon and Thursday are available for negotiations and discussions amongst delegations. In organizing your meetings please bear in mind that the regular meeting of the Committee on Agriculture is scheduled to start at 10 a.m. on Thursday 25 March.
- An informal open-ended Special Session will be held on Friday morning starting at 10 a.m.: (i) to give delegations another opportunity to report on their negotiations and discussions; and (ii) to consider whether and what kind of technical work would need to be undertaken at this stage. ✓
- On Friday afternoon, starting at 3 p.m. the formal Special Session will resume. At this meeting I intend to make a short statement, delegations will have an opportunity to make statements and any items of other business will be addressed.

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If delegations arranging consultations/negotiations amongst themselves so desire I would be available, upon invitation and strictly as an observer, to attend their meetings. Should this be the case I would ask you to inform the Secretariat by Friday 19 March so that I am not expected to be in two places at the same time. An airgram setting out the date, starting time and agenda for the formal Special Session will be issued shortly.

As will no doubt be apparent, the proposed structure for this next meeting has been consciously designed to encourage **direct negotiations and discussions amongst participants**. This, I believe, reflects a widely shared view that, after some two years of the Doha Development Agenda, delegations have already made their initial negotiating positions abundantly clear and little purpose would be served by yet more extensive formal statements addressed to the Chair.

Further, delegations have spent much of the time to date in building up coalitions amongst themselves, reflecting their shared concerns and shared objectives. It is already clear that, without any prompting from the Chair, these various coalitions are engaged in productive informal exchanges, as they seek to explore the possibility of common ground and identification of issues where further work is required. Far from wishing to supplant these exchanges by a formal meeting, my aim is to facilitate further such exchanges by encouraging senior officials to come to Geneva for this "Agriculture Week".

In the meantime, may I suggest that delegations do not wait until 22 March to intensify these exchanges. It would be in all our interests if individual delegations or coalitions arrive in Geneva against the background of having already developed some working hypotheses through further such prior exchanges about how we might move the process forward both substantively and procedurally.

Finally, delegations should also consider whether and what kind of technical work should be initiated and discuss their ideas with their trading partners prior to the Agriculture Week so that the ground is well prepared when we will address this matter at the informal open-ended meeting on Friday morning, 26 March.

With all this in mind, I will continue to meet delegations prior to 22 March to deepen my own understanding of the issues and would welcome any inputs that you may have.

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The G 10 – Who we are and What we need

Who we are:

The G10 is a group of **10 developed and developing WTO Members** who are committed to strengthening the multilateral trading system and successfully concluding the Doha Development Agenda.

- For the G-10 **safeguarding non-trade-concerns**, such as food security, food safety, the viability of rural areas as well as rural development, consumer information and the protection of land and the environment is of central importance.
- In spite of the vulnerability of our agricultures and the difficulty to adapt to constantly evolving international and domestic circumstances, we have been reforming our agricultural policies for many years at a regular pace with considerable impact on the conditions and structures of production and on the incomes and numbers of our farmers. The facts in Box 1 exemplify how the G10 Members have constantly reformed their respective policies to be less trade-distortive.

Thus, we **support a progressive trade reform and liberalization process in agriculture**, but we believe it also legitimate to respect, through the reform process, the diversity of agriculture operated under different natural, historical, social and economic conditions.

- We are **mainly importers** of agricultural products (with the US or the EC as main suppliers) and are contributing in a considerable way to world trade through our high levels of imports of agricultural products. G10 imports represent 13% of world imports of agricultural products, which is far beyond its share in the world population (4%). On the other hand we are only **small exporters** of some agricultural products and our impact on world trade is negligible on the export side (3% of world exports of agricultural products). This sets us apart from other partners in the negotiations (Box 2).

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What we need:

- What we need is **predictability and legal security**, i.e. a degree of certainty on the nature and extent of WTO disciplines so that policy reforms can be planned in a way that is compatible with international disciplines and national policy objectives.
- We are convinced that a **one-size-fits-all approach** will not lead to a successful result and that **flexibility and balance** are key to a successful outcome of the negotiations.

We believe it legitimate to enjoy some flexibility to address our essential concerns, which derive from our agricultural production conditions and our status of mainly agricultural importing countries. In particular, as we move towards less trade-distorting policies, we need to secure appropriate instruments to address our non-trade concerns.


Last Swiss proposal

It should be noted that those instruments employed by the G10 Members are destined to address the concerns of population in heavily import-dependent countries; they should be distinguished from measures providing support for export products.

The concept of tariff capping and the mandatory expansion of TRQs are not adequate responses to the needs of diverse situations in agriculture. They go against the principle of flexibility which is essential in the context of the negotiation on a framework and will remain essential for the negotiation on modalities; and they don't take into account the specific needs neither of net importers of agricultural products nor developing countries benefiting from preferences. This being said, and in order to reach an overall balance in concessions, new and voluntary commitments on TRQ quantities could be part of a compromise solution facilitating acceptance of the blended formula concept, but without capping.

If we are given the necessary flexibility to address our concerns we are ready to show flexibility to respond to the specific and most sensitive concerns of other groups or Members. We are open for a dialogue with all groups to further explore possibilities of flexibility within a realistic level of ambition leading to an outcome which will be acceptable for all WTO Members. Such an outcome can only be engineered through a real multilateral process involving all sensitivities and situations present in the agricultural negotiation.

- We are supportive of effective and meaningful Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries and LDCs. We consider that participants to the negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda should undertake to take into account the importance of longstanding preferences for developing countries and LDCs. TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, and in particular paragraph 16 thereof provides a good basis to further considerations in this regard.

 **We are committed to the WTO reform process and to the resumption of the negotiations in accordance with the Doha mandate. If fostered by the WTO at a socially and economically acceptable pace, the trade reform and liberalization process will contribute to our internal ongoing reform.**

Box 1: Reform efforts of the G10 - Illustrative figures:

Economic reforms in Bulgaria were accompanied by a dramatic decline of production levels. In 2001 agricultural production amounted only to 56% of the 1989 level. During the period 1990-1996 grain production was reduced by nearly 60%, cattle stocks declined by 60%, pig numbers by over 50%, the total area sown with crops fell by nearly one quarter. In the period 1997 - 2000 the net income per agricultural producer fell by more than one third.

In Iceland payments to agriculture have decreased from 9% of the total state expenditure in 1990 to 3.3% in 2002. The number of farms with support targets in milk and/or sheep decreased from 3791 in 1990 to 2479 in 2001.

Japan has vigorously reformed its support policies for agricultural products and the prices of major commodities, such as rice, wheat, soybean and milk, are now determined on a market-oriented basis. As such, the composition of support has shifted away from market price support to less trade-distorting direct payments. For example, in 1998 Japan abolished the system of price support for rice and the rice price is now determined by market force and the wholesale rice price dropped by 30% from 1993 to 2000. As a result, Japan's trade-distorting domestic support has been reduced by more than three quarters since 1995. The current reform programme to improve agricultural productivity foresees a situation where 60% of the paddy fields are managed by farms whose average size is 14 ha (currently the average size of a business farm of rice was 4.6 ha.).

In Mauritius possibilities of agricultural diversification are extremely limited and only one crop has emerged. The inherent structural constraints of Mauritius significantly limit the possibilities of improvement of competitiveness. Longstanding preferential arrangements enabled the development of sustainable agriculture. Since 2001, a major reform process has been undertaken to reduce cost of production within what it is feasible. This process inter alia provides for a substantial reduction of the agricultural labour force through socially acceptable voluntary scheme, the reduction of the number of sugar factories and the further use of by products. Sugar cane is not only a provider of an agricultural good but is also a key element of the energy strategy of the country whereby clean environment friendly green energy replaces fossil fuels.

Norway's budgetary support to agriculture has been reduced by 9 per cent in real terms since 1995. In 1990 price support accounted for 30 per cent of total direct support, while the corresponding figure for 2002 was 16 per cent - a reduction of 46 per cent. The number of farms is 61000 units, which is a decrease of 27 per cent since 1995. Average farm size is approximately 17 ha arable land, this is an increase of 40 per cent since 1995. In 2002 the average income per man-year in agriculture was 47 per cent of the average income of other groups, the corresponding figure in 1995 was 55 per cent.

Chinese Taipei reduced its agricultural subsidies by 20%, or NT\$3.5 billion, by 2002. In order to fulfil its commitment and cope with the impact of market opening, Chinese Taipei has launched a "Paddy and Upland Utilization Adjustment Program" since 1997, encouraging farmers to fallow their rice, grains or sugarcane fields, or to diversify the production to other crops. Up to the present time, with the exception of rice, the AMS for remaining products has been reduced by more than 50%. In 1995 and 1996, the annual value of agricultural production in Chinese Taipei exceeded NT\$310 billion (around US\$9.1 billion). Since 1996, and especially after joining the WTO, it has been decreasing to NT\$257 billion (around US\$7.6 billion) in 2002, which is a decrease of 17%.

Last Swiss proposal

In Switzerland - Liechtenstein the AP 2002 agricultural policy reform programme (2000-03) brought about the elimination of all guaranteed prices and state-guaranteed processing margins and a consolidation of previous direct payment programmes into a uniform area payment linked to strict cross-compliance requirements plus various payments linked to additional specific ecological and other outcomes. As a result of successive reforms, the composition of support has changed since the mid-1980s with a notable decrease in the share of market price support. Total support to agriculture declined from 3.9% of GDP in the mid-1980s to 2.0% in 2000-02. Between 2000 and 2002 the total number of farms in Switzerland decreased by 2.2% per year. As a further consequence of the reform process, the farmers' income from farming activity decreased by about 18% between 1990/92 and 2002.). A package of agricultural policy measures for the 2004-07 period (AP 2007) became effective as from January 2004. Its key aspects entail the abolition of the milk quota system by 2009, further considerable reduction of Amber Box domestic support and only slight increases in Green Box support.

Box 2: Trade development of G10 - Illustrative figures :

In total, G10's average grain self-sufficiency ratio has declined to merely 39 %. This has amplified civil society's concerns on national food security as an element of non-trade concerns.

*Economic reforms in **Bulgaria** have led to increased imports of agricultural products. From 1999 to 2003 imports of agricultural products rose by more than 56%. From 1995 to 2000 agricultural exports fell by 58%.*

*The total value of exported agricultural products from **Iceland** in the year 2002 was 26.7 million US\$ and the total value of imported agricultural products was 183.1 million US\$ in the same period, or almost seven times the exports. The total value of agricultural production in Iceland was approximately 185.4 million US\$ in 2002, which is almost the value of the imports.*

*Since the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments **Israel** has undertaken voluntarily liberalization steps that led to 60% increase of agricultural imports. This trend resulted in an annual import value of more than 2 billion US\$.*

***Korea's** imports of agricultural products increased from US\$ 6.5 billion to US\$ 9,0 billion between 1990 and 2002(39% increase) and its trade deficit of agricultural products increased from US\$ 5.3 billion to US\$ 7,3 billion (37% increase), making the country one of world's largest net food importers.*

***Japan's** food imports increased from \$29 billion to \$38 billion (29% increase) between 1990 and 2001. In 1999, 45% of Japan's food imports came from developing countries while Japan imports 12% of total food exports originating from developing countries. Japan is the world's largest net importer as well as one of the leading per capita net importers of farm products. The food self-sufficiency rate decreased from 48% to 40% between 1990 and 2001 (on calorie basis).*

*For **Mauritius** one commodity accounts for more than 90% of agricultural exports. It imports nearly all that it consumes and earnings from preferential imports currently cover between 75-80% of food imports. The import cover ratio will deteriorate as liberalisation proceeds.*

*The value of **Norway's** agricultural imports was US\$ 2.4 billion in 2002, which is an increase of 35% since 1995. The value of agricultural exports was US\$ 0.4 billion in 2002 (which equals the value of exports in 1995 in nominal value terms). The trade deficit of agricultural products has thus increased by 45 per cent since 1995, which makes Norway one of the leading net importers of agricultural products, with US\$ 400 per capita in 2002. The self-sufficiency in agricultural products is 50%, measured on a calorie basis.*

*The total value of **Chinese Taipei** agricultural imports amounted to US\$5.7 billion in 2002 whereas the total value of its agricultural exports was only US\$1.8 billion in the same period, with an agricultural trade deficit of US\$3.9 billion (about 51% of its total agricultural production). Food self-sufficiency has declined from 45.7% to 35.4% during 1989 - 2002 (on calorie basis).*

*In 2001 **Switzerland - Liechtenstein's** exports in agricultural products amounted to 2.5 billion US\$ and imports to 5.7 billion US\$, thus net imports amounting to 3.2 billion US\$. Switzerland - Liechtenstein is one of the world's largest per capita net importers of agricultural products. In 2001 exports per capita were at 348 US\$ and imports at 789US\$, the net imports being at 441 US\$ per capita. The overall self-sufficiency rate on a calorie basis is quite stable at around 60%.*

附件三、WTO 農業談判各會員或集團談判立場一覽表

93/04/07

會員 議題	我國	日本	美國	歐盟	G-10	G-20	G-33	凱恩斯 集團	ACP 與 G-90
琥珀色措施(AMS)	反對對個別產品 AMS 設定上限，與出口無關係之 AMS 應維持烏拉圭回合方式削減，與出口有關之 AMS 則可大幅削減	可大幅削減，估計削減稻價 80%，主要係保價米已取消收購	已開發會員應大幅削減，且補貼程度愈高，也贊成對個別產品 AMS 加以 capping	同意大幅削減 AMS，不贊成對個別產品 AMS 加以 capping	同意削減貿易之 AMS(會間可削減之幅度差異甚大)，不贊成對個別產品 AMS 加以 capping	要求大幅削減之支持，並要求對個別產品以 AMS capping	尚未形成共同立場	要求大幅削減之支持，並要求對個別產品以 AMS capping	同意大幅削減支持措施
藍色措施	維持藍色措施，不設定上限與削減	維持藍色措施，不設定上限與免削減	贊成全面取消，但亦支持設定上限為農業產值之 5%，	不支持削減，但可支持設定上限	維持藍色措施，或加強規範	取消藍色措施	尚未形成共同立場	取消藍色措施	加強規範
微量補貼	同意削減	可削減	同意削減	主張削減或取消	未有具體共識	先進國家取消，開發中國家維持	尚未形成共同立場	先進國家取消，開發中國家維持	
以上三項總額	反對設定上限	未提	以 2004 年此項總額為上限進一步削減	設定上限	未有具體共識	設定上限	尚未形成共同立場	設定上限	
綠色措施	維持現有綠色措施標準與條文，	維持現有綠色措施標準與條文	不應設限	同意強化適用範圍，惟不應削減	應予維持	檢討綠色措施規範並加限制	尚未形成共同立場	檢討綠色措施規範	加強規範

會員 議題	我國	日本	美國	歐盟	G-10	G-20	G-33	凱恩斯 集團	ACP 與 G-90
	不設定上限	文，不設定上限		或設定上限					
關稅調降	反對設定關稅上限，非不得已，亦須堅持少數敏感性產品之處理；主回拉幅度削減農產品關稅	反對設定關稅上限，採行漸進式農業改革	以混合公式削減並設定關稅上限(先進與開發中國家均適用同一公式)	全體會員均以混合公式有關之產品回拉，無公式適用部分敏感產品以增加 TRQ 數量作為補償；支持關稅上限	反對設定關稅上限，主張關稅應具備足夠彈性，故支持回拉為主要措施	尋求以其他稅式改善現行之公式(印度和烏拉圭，中共主張瑞式)	反對設定關稅上限，主張關稅應具備足夠彈性，並應提供防衛措施，以烏拉圭為主，合式要降稅	認為混和公式開放市場之目標，主產品均須納入削減範圍，且應大幅削減關稅及關稅上限	
關稅配額	不增加關稅配額數量，且關稅配額內產品之配額不應削減	反對關稅配額擴增	調降配額內稅率且增加配額數量	調降配額內稅率且增加配額數量	反對關稅配額強制性擴增	擴大關稅配額及加強相關管理措施	反對關稅配額強制性擴增	擴大關稅配額及加強相關管理措施	
特別防衛措施	必須維持	繼續維持	同意 Derbez 文字，即 SSG 之使用及期間尚待談判決定	必須維持	繼續維持	先進國家取消	制定 SSM	先進國家取消，支持開發中國家制定 SSM	
新會特別考量	同意給予特別待遇，含調適期、較小削減幅度及較長執行期程	未提		應給予彈性考量		同意給予特別考量(中共並要求對敏感產品豁免削減)			

<p>會議 議題</p>	<p>我國</p> <p>同意給予部分產品優惠待遇，惟應基於自願性原則</p>	<p>日本</p>	<p>美國</p> <p>開發中會仍以混合公式削減稅之降稅幅度較長於發民生予競爭性開有差別；SP應有限制。</p>	<p>歐盟</p> <p>SP與SSM之觀念，應進一步將任何應將開稅之S&D納入考量</p>	<p>G-10</p> <p>同意在明予低源之農資民特義入之定彈</p>	<p>G-20</p> <p>同意給予特殊暨差特別特採行機殊多貿易</p>	<p>G-33</p> <p>同意給予S&D、SP及SSM，SP應由會員自行指定且無須時用SSM</p>	<p>凱恩斯集團</p> <p>同意給予特殊暨差特別特採行機殊多貿易</p>	<p>ACP與G-90</p> <p>同意給予有效之S&D、SP措施，並應將優惠關稅問題方精於判</p>
<p>出口補貼</p>	<p>入會時已承諾，因此取完全補貼</p>	<p>出口補貼具有高彈性</p>	<p>已開發會應全面限制</p>	<p>已開發會應限制出口補貼，其他出口補貼，將與STE納入規範</p>	<p>其他團在市場之關稅，可在此</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>
<p>出口貸款補貼</p>	<p>應制訂嚴格規範並納入削減</p>	<p>應制訂嚴格規範並納入削減</p>	<p>已開發會應限制出口貸款補貼</p>	<p>應限制出口貸款補貼，其他出口貸款補貼，將與STE納入規範</p>	<p>韓國傾向不支</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>	<p>訂取各口補貼</p>

- 附註：1、G-20 集團包括阿根廷、澳洲、玻利維亞、巴西、中共、古巴、厄瓜多、埃及、印度印尼、墨西哥、奈及利亞、巴基斯坦、巴拉圭、菲律賓、南非、泰國、委內瑞拉、辛巴威。
- 2、G-10 集團包括日本、韓國、瑞士、挪威、冰島、以色列、列支登斯敦、台灣、模里西斯、保加利亞。
- 3、G-33 包括巴貝多、中共、古巴、多明尼加、海地、宏都拉斯、印尼、牙買加、肯亞、韓國、模里西斯、蒙古、尼加拉瓜、巴基斯坦、巴拉圭、巴拿馬、秘魯、菲律賓、賽內加爾、斯里蘭卡、坦桑尼亞、千里達多哥、土耳其、烏干達、委內瑞拉、占比亞、辛巴威、莫三鼻給。
- 4、非洲集團主要關切議題包括低度開發會員應豁免進一步自由化、農業貿易自由化對糧食淨進口開發中會員及低度開發會員之衝擊、優惠關稅流失、非關稅障礙、特殊產品(SP)及採行特別防衛機制(SSM)等，該集團希望農業談判架構能將會員之主要關切事項納入考量，並堅持杜哈宣言所宣示之目標。