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(出國類別：八十九年度公教人員出國專題研究)

兩岸復談中之美國因素研究 (1998--2000)

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一、華府喬治華盛頓大學席格中心主任迪克森 (<i>Bruce J. Dickson</i>) 之信函評論職訪問期間表現為優良之訪問學者。	
二、專題研究報告：「The Role of the United States behind the 1998 Resumption of Cross-strait Dialogue」 (網路英文版於華府喬治華盛頓大學席格中心： http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/scholar_papers/Lee2-01.htm)	
三、許世銓, "The One China Principle, Positions of CCP, KMT and DPP" 此份報告是許世銓到美國訪問時帶給美國學者參考之作品。 由哈佛大學費正清研究中心研究員陸伯彬贈與職。	
四、Samantha F. Ravich, "Examining Trends of Convergence and Divergence across the Taiwan Strait: NCAFP's Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy And Cross-Strait Relations", <i>American Foreign Policy Interests</i> , December 1999. 作者是CSIS之研究員，美國藍 德公司之博士，此份報告是職訪問 Samantha 時，作者所贈與。 是第二管道會議之較為詳細之紀錄。	
五、於美國華府、波士頓、紐約、洛杉磯及舊金山等地參訪所遇 各界人士名片	

I 摘要

時間：民國 89.06.28-89.12.28

地點：美國喬治華盛頓大學艾略爾特國際學院席格爾東亞研究中心擔任訪問學者，並訪問華府、紐約、波士頓、洛杉磯、舊金山等地計廿多位兩岸關係之學者專家

- 美國在兩岸最大利益是擁有和平之兩岸環境，此正符合美國在亞洲戰略及商業利益，最能體現的作法是三支柱。
- 一個中國政策 (one China policy) 意指美國「認識到 (acknowledge) 在臺灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分」，美國對於兩岸的這個立場「不提出異議」。和中國之「一個中國原則」(one China principle) 並不一樣。
- 和平解決是中共應放棄以武力解決台海問題，但臺灣不應挑釁。
- 兩岸對話是美國可為兩岸對話創造良好環境扮演積極的角色，但美方不宜介入作為調人。
- 倘美國介入兩岸事務，美國國內政治將被牽扯進兩岸談判協商的過程中，使美國國內政治成為解決兩岸爭議的策略。倘使美國國會及社會大眾無法久耐兩岸問題延宕未決，恐將不務實地尋求快速但不恰當的解決之道。而臺灣是民主國家，要施壓並不恰當，也不容易。
- 美國學者認為「特殊國與國關係」是對美方有人提出「中程協議」之回應，因此阻斷海基、海協之「第一軌道」的溝通，中共也推遲汪會長訪台。
- 美國認真思考推動「中程協議」等長期策略的可行性，以穩定臺海兩岸間的穩定與和平，確保美方利益。即使名稱不叫中程協議，其政策思維已深入人心。(李侃如稱長期政治穩定架構用意即是如此)
- 何漢理所提出之中程安排，或許是一個穩定之架構但是對於未來兩岸是否採取統一架構，則由兩岸自行決定 (即對未來結局是開放式)。何漢理一九九九年之更新文章將其定義為 Interim Arrangements，採用複數形式，並且避開協議等法律用詞。
- 第二管道具規模者為裴利個人角色及「美國外交政策全國委員會」
- 建議本會運用電子郵件網路訊息，加強對研究兩岸關係學者宣導。
- 建議本會應設美東 (駐華府)、美西 (駐舊金山) 人員各一名 (約科長層級)，以隨時反應最新訊息，並提供美方正確資訊。

II 具體成果報告：兩岸復談中之美國因素研究 (1998--2000)

一、美國對於兩岸政策之基本立場（三支柱與相關議題之探討）

三項不穩定因素：（一）大陸使用武力（二）台灣宣告獨立（三）兩岸軍力競賽

大陸方面一直宣稱台灣問題是中國與美國關係中最为敏感之問題。¹台灣方面的說法則是，沒有台灣問題，只有兩岸關係問題。事實上，從兩件事情，可以看出，美國的確是在兩岸關係發展上佔有重要之地位。第一件事情是李總統以私人身份訪問美國，造成大陸認為台灣務實外交有了新的突破，並且破壞中美台三方格局，所以大陸之反應就是九五年、九六年之軍事演習。第二件事情是一九九九年七月特殊國與國關係發表後，美方派遣高層人員分赴兩岸瞭解情況，避免兩岸重啟戰端。顯見美國因素，是兩岸中之重要而微妙之角色。甚至有大陸學者說，若是沒有美國給台灣撐腰，兩岸早已經統一。²兩岸關係中，學者分析指出有三項不穩定因素，³就是（一）大陸使用武力；（二）台灣宣告獨立；（三）兩岸軍力競賽。大陸民心由於民族主義及愛國主義，認為台灣是中國之一部分，大陸領導人不能讓台灣獨立；台灣則是民主化及台灣民族主義之影響，希望在國際上有自己之主體地位；加上美方一個中國政策下，秉持三公報及台灣關係法，售予台灣防衛性武器。使兩岸關係形成（一）大陸武力加強及對台灣恫嚇，（二）台灣尋求獨立及軍事武器之加強，（三）所以就形成一項軍力競賽之惡性循環。而只要一方有小型衝突，就極容易引起兩岸之危機。大陸方面認知是台灣問題久拖不決，符合美、日地緣戰略利益，對中國不利，為了中國的地緣戰略利益應該要求儘快解決「台灣問題」，但美、日介入又成為實現兩岸統一難以逾越的障礙。對此，中國的基本立場是，一方面應在國家統一的旗幟下，繼續推動兩岸政治談判，堅決擠壓一切台獨活動空間，同時要通過各種渠道，拓展兩岸經濟文化交流，增

¹中共外交部部長唐家璇在全國人大九二次會議，就國際形勢和中國外交政策舉行中外記者招待會中有關「臺灣問題」講話，「中美關係中還存在臺灣問題，臺灣問題始終是中美關係中的一個最重要、最敏感、最值得注意的問題，我想只要雙方都能夠嚴格地恪守中美三個聯合公報和中美聯合聲明各項原則，特別是遵循相互尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政、平等互利等重要的原則，中美關係就有可能平穩的發展。就中國而言，我們是願意和美方共同努力，排除一切干擾，排除各種障礙，以把一個健康穩定的中美關係帶入下一個世紀。」，香港文匯報，一九九九年三月八日。參見蘇格，美國對華政策與台灣問題（北京：世界知識出版社，一九九八年六月一刷），頁八一—二。

²筆者二千年六月至十二月到華府喬治華盛頓大學席格爾中心擔任訪問學者，研究室左右有二位大陸解放軍大校，有二位來自上海及北京之研究人員，都關心兩岸關係之發展，此一對美國之評價及對台灣之影響，幾乎是大陸學者除了一國兩制外之異口同聲的共識。

³筆者於二千年十月在波士頓大學費正清中心訪問陸伯彬（Robert S. Ross）教授之意見。

進台灣民眾對中國的民族認同感；另一方面，對美、日使 TMD 及美、日同盟「保護範圍」擴大至台灣的任何動向都要堅決反對，並使美、日及台獨份子得到明白無誤訊息：統一台灣是中國最根本的地緣戰略利益所在，迫不得已時，中國毫不含糊地使用武力。⁴

李總統訪美及兩國論之爭議

一九九五年李登輝總統以私人身份回到母校康乃爾大學，並發表演講。台灣的自主性及對台灣主體之意識逐漸高漲，加上一九九六年三月的大陸導彈試射，造成台海危機，美柯林頓政府為落實台灣關係法的承諾，對中國展示強大的武力嚇阻，派遣兩個航空母艦戰鬥群巡防台灣海峽。⁵此後，中國重新思索戰略定位，並開始大量於東南沿海部署飛彈針對台灣，兩岸關係雖自一九九八年十月中旬，「辜汪上海會晤」後，稍有緩和，但面對中國不斷擴張軍力及一再地文攻武嚇，兩岸並未能化解敵意，走向和平。一九九九年七月，李登輝總統接受「德國之聲」媒體專訪時，指出兩岸關係是「特殊的國與國關係」引發「兩國論」爭議，⁶兩岸關係隨即再陷緊張，中國海協會更於七月三十日當天退回海基會董事長辜振甫解釋「特殊國與國關係」的談話稿，這種不理性的行為加上中國不斷表示將中止海協會長汪道涵訪台活動，使得兩岸關係在大陸發表江八點之後陷入第二次低潮。

柯林頓政府採取與中共擴大交往政策

一九九六年三月，中國在台灣海峽的軍事演習，震驚了包含美國的全世界，美國開始關注並重新檢討其「中國政策」，以往美國對於「中國政策」的主導權，亦從國會及輿論界轉移到行政部門手中。柯林頓第二任政府的新政策即是對中採行擴大交往(enlarge engagement)，並提出與中國建立「建設性戰略夥伴關係」，在具體做法上，美國開始公開表示希望兩岸早日恢復會談，而不對會談方向預設立場。鑑於一九九五年李登輝總統訪美後兩岸會談破裂，而一九九六年的台海飛彈危機中，當時美國華盛頓郵報並指出，台灣是麻煩的製造者(trouble maker)，⁷美國正視到台灣的情勢發展可能跳脫美國所設定的框架外，亦開始加重台灣對維持台海和平穩定責任，並將對台政策界定在戰術模糊(ambiguous)與戰略清晰

⁴中國時報，二千年十二月十八日，「中共智庫：台灣問題久拖不決 不利中共」

⁵ Lee Ming-Yi, "The Role of the United States behind the 1998 Resumption of Cross-strait Dialogue", Research Paper in Sigur Center for Asian Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, p.2.

⁶ 聯合報，一九九九年七月十日，第 4 版及中國時報，二千年十二月十八日。

⁷ 大陸學者楊傑勉在其文章中，一直努力將台灣塑造成麻煩製造者之角色。 Jiemian Yang, *Recent Development of PRC Policy Toward Cross-Strait Relations*. 此份論文是楊傑勉到每訪問時，交給美方學者參考。楊來自上海，一般印象是開明派，但是文章中罵起李登輝及台灣當局，其用詞遣句，相當不客氣。

(clear)之間，⁸以免未來台灣內部的發展超出美國的控制範圍，使得美國承擔被迫以大規模武力介入台海。裴利在「預防性防禦」一書中，詳述一九九六年台海危機當時劉華秋訪問華府及當時派出兩艘航空母艦的內幕。當時身為國防部部長的裴利告訴劉華秋：「針對台灣的侵略性軍事行動會被視為對美國利益的威脅，美國不僅有足夠的軍事力量保護在該區域的重大國家安全利益，同時也準備有所展示。」隨後在武力對峙邊緣的緊張關係，讓美國與大陸關係一度陷入谷底，但繼之而來的交往則讓雙方認知到唯有促成兩岸的對話交流，才是遏阻區域危機的最佳戰略。⁹

回顧美國對中國之政策，美國過去幾任總統對中國採行的都是交往政策。交往政策由尼克森簽署的上海聯合公報開始，只是往後也有些起伏波折。這些時好時壞的起伏包括：一九七九年卡特總統承認中國；一九八九年天安門鎮壓及美國制裁；一九九四年柯林頓總統重新啟動交往政策；一九九六年中國向台灣發射導彈，美國部署兩個航空母艦戰鬥群；隨後，中國國家主席江澤民與柯林頓舉行了兩次高峰會。江澤民一九九七年十月成功地訪問美國，以及柯林頓回訪中國，象徵著中美關係自一九九六年三月台海危機以來的解凍。只是這項受到歡迎的新進展，在中美雙方依然存在芥蒂，並可能稍縱即逝。台灣仍然是中美發展雙方關係的重心，任何一方的錯估都可能使台海兩岸原本就已脆弱的穩定和進展毀於一旦。此外，美國對中國人權狀況的改善、武器的擴散、西藏問題，以及貿易逆差等議題上，始終不表滿意。目前雙方關係的改善進展依然十分脆弱，美國理解到，美國必須把握時機，進一步為雙邊關係奠定更堅實的基礎，而增進了解和聯繫，將可為雙方關係未來的發展提供穩固和可預測性。¹⁰

「三不政策」將美與中國關係推到最高點，一九九九年美誤炸中共大使館事件使雙方關係降至谷底

再者，柯林頓於一九九八年上海行時喊出「三不政策」的口號，這是美國希望藉由非正式口號的提出來換取中國對中美核武互不瞄準的協議。¹¹一九九八年六月柯江會議及其後三不承諾的提出，將一九九六年三月的美中關係推到最高點。在大陸處理完國際因素之後，兩岸重要之一九九八年辜汪會晤才緊接展開。儘管如此，美中之間的疑慮並未消除，而在柯江會後逐漸走下坡。一九九八年八月韓國試射「大浦洞一號」飛彈越過日本上空，¹²引起美日高度關注，美日間安保防衛再度引發討論；一九九八年末開始，美國極欲出售「戰區飛彈防禦系統」

⁸ 這一部份之討論相當多，指一個中國之定義，美方保持模糊，以適宜運作，但是要求台海和平之重要目標，則是清晰地。

⁹ 中國時報，一九九九年三月十三日。

¹⁰ William J. Perry, "The Future of U.S.-China Engagement", American Assembly, San Francisco, July 11, 1998.

¹¹ 詳見「一九九六年三月以後美國、台灣與中共關係的發展」，丁樹範，中國大陸研究，第41卷，第12期，民國87年12月。

¹² 詳見聯合報一九九八年九月一日，第一版。

(TMD)予日本，且不排除出售於台灣，這挑起了中國對美軍售台灣的敏感中樞，中國以此為美日欲聯合台灣達成同盟以對抗中國；一九九八年十二月美國提出中國「人權報告」，報告中顯示中國的人權狀況未有顯著的改善，亦引起中國對美國以人權干涉中國內政的抗議；¹³一九九九年三月，中美再度爆發李文和的核武竊密案，間諜的陰影籠罩中美；一九九九年五月北約轟炸南聯以及美國誤炸中國駐貝爾格勒大使館事件，使得中美關係陷入谷底，加上一九九九年朱鎔基訪美，於WTO談判上未獲實質進展，這皆使得中美關係瀕臨決裂。

就中國而言，一九九六年三月以後，其對美及對台政策亦產生變化。中國意識到與要成為廿一世紀的區域霸權，唯有與美國保持良好的互動，中國的大國地位才得以更加突顯，因此開始改善與美國的關係，並藉此向台灣施壓，另外中國也逐步改變以往的負面形象，換取美國的改觀與在某些議題，特別是經貿議題上的讓步。對台政策上，中國利用柯林頓所提的「三不政策」，¹⁴要求各國比照此模式公開宣示以對台造成壓力，並對台進行外交上的資源爭奪戰，¹⁵並設法與台灣進行政治談判，尤其將「結束敵對狀態」列為對台談判的第一議題。然而中國以不放棄武力為後盾，一九九六年三月的台海危機為中國的軍隊找到戰鬥的新目標。

中國之對台政策目標在防獨促統

短期內，和美國相同的是，中國對台政策的目標定位在使台灣不脫離其預設範圍內，如此可避免在新疆、西藏引起的連鎖效應，而中國領導人也不必背負台灣是從其手中分裂出去的歷史責任。¹⁶

一九九九年七月，李總統於媒體「德國之聲」的專訪時表示，兩岸關係為「特殊的國與國關係」引起了中國的強烈反應及美國的高度重视。美國因此分別派遣了亞太事務助理國務卿陸士達至中國及美國在台協會理事主席卜睿哲來台進行了解，柯林頓總統亦親自致電予江澤民，這無形中為中美關係自5月誤炸事件之低潮關係的修復帶來契機。但是中國未改善其強烈態度，不僅退回海基會董事長

¹³ 詳見香港文匯報一九九九年二月二十八日，第三版。人權報告參見 <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ps981221a.html> 及 http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990120_koh_china.html。

¹⁴ 柯林頓一九八八年上海座談會發言：美國政府還明確承諾不支持「台灣獨立」、不支持「兩個中國」或「一中一台」、不支持台灣加入任何必須由主權國家參加的國際組織。

¹⁵ Lee Ming-Yi, *op.cit.* 筆者歸納大陸對台政策有一個中國原則、武力威脅、外交孤立及政治談判設定前置條件等。

¹⁶ 大陸學者裴敏欣歸納美方政策稱為不獨、不統、不武（筆者於二千年十月九日在華府卡內基國際和平基金會與其訪問討論意見）。許多美方學者多次提到江澤民沒有顯著功績，所以希望在台灣問題上有取得進展。至少不要在其手中讓台灣脫離出去。

辜振甫對解釋「特殊的國與國關係」的談話稿之後，中國軍機飛越海峽中線的傳聞不斷，加上中國刻意推遲海協會會長汪道涵訪台，這使得台海情勢再陷緊張。事實上特殊國與國關係，是台灣預備走上政治談判桌前之定位工作，一如大陸提出一國兩制及一個中國原則，也是一種定位工作一樣。但是卻造成美國及大陸之誤解。¹⁷

美國在兩岸分三個階段角色：「不介入期」（1982）、「鼓勵交流期」（1987）、「建議兩岸進入政治協商期」（1998）

美國對於在兩岸互動中應採取何種角色與立場，其轉變並非無痕可尋。從一九八〇年代起美國的態基本上可分為三個階段。第一階段是「不介入期」。最能代表美方早期對兩岸立場的聲明，可回溯到一九八二年美國與中共簽署《八一七公報》前的七月十四日，當時美國向台灣表達六項保證，¹⁸這六點保證傳達了一項重要的訊息，即美國在軍售案中除了作為客觀的平衡者外，也保證在兩岸中作為客觀的觀察者，不介入作兩岸的調停者，也不向台灣施壓走向談判桌。美國這個態度一直持續到一九八七年，其間並無改變。第二階段為「鼓勵交流期」，一九八七年三月美國國務卿舒茲（George P. Schultz）在上海表示，「我們歡迎有助於緩和台灣海峽緊張情勢的發展，包括間接貿易與日益頻繁的民間交流在內。我們堅定不移的方針是促進一個有利於這種發展繼續發生的環境」。美國這項鼓勵兩岸交往的政策一直持續到冷戰後都沒有改變，預期以後也不會有變化，而差別在於美國會採用多強烈的字眼以促使台灣與中共的接觸，美國是否會間接或暗示的促使台灣走向談判桌。第三階段是「建議兩岸進入政治協商期」。美國態度第三次的重大改變是在一九九八年開始。在經歷了一九九五年李登輝總統訪美、一九九六年的中共對台灣周邊飛彈試射、一九九七年美國與中共建立「建設性戰略夥伴關係」後，美國對於台灣在台海與亞太安全中可能的角色有了不同的認知。不論美國對台灣的認知是否完全正確，但是以美國國務院為主的主流意見，認為兩岸「現狀」的不確定性，不只會影響到亞太安全，更會影響到美國與中共「建設性戰略夥伴關係」的亞太佈局。「中程協議」（interim agreement）的意見也就是在這種思維下產生。簡單地說，美國所主張的「中程協議」並不是希望兩岸對「現狀」的延續，而是以雙方共有的協議創造一個「新的現狀」（*new status quo*）而使得兩岸未來關係能夠和平發展。¹⁹

¹⁷ 美國學者蘇傑立直接了當說，台灣推出兩國論，是阻絕汪道涵訪台及和大陸進行政治談判之可能。筆者與蘇傑立於二千年十二月在華府藍德公司訪問意見。

¹⁸ 六項保證是舊根政府向台灣提出：(1)美方未同意在對我軍售上，設定結束期限。(2)美方對中共要求就對我軍售事與其事先諮詢事未予同意。(3)美方無意扮演任何我與中共間調解人之角色。(4)美方將不同意修改台灣關係法。(5)美方並未變更其對台灣主權之一貫立場。(6)美方無意對我施加壓力與中共進行談判。

¹⁹ 張亞中，兩岸統合論，陸委會研究報告。參見<http://www.future-china.org.tw/csipf/press/book/pbp200005-mnu.htm>。

美方認為中程協議及第二管道有助於兩岸和平

對於國際局勢之判斷，美國憂心由於傾向於台灣獨立之陳水扁總統上台後，會導致中共以武力方式解決台灣問題，而美方由於和日本有軍事聯盟，及對東亞情勢之關切，勢必被捲入戰爭中，所以美方積極促成第二管道之溝通，²⁰並對中程協議之建議並不反對，希望對台海局勢有一個穩定而正面之發展。美方在台灣海峽之最高利益就是兩岸問題應以和平方式解決。

美國行政部門對臺海兩岸對話有其立場。柯林頓政府尋求為兩岸建立「無壓力但具鼓勵的環境」。此正符合美國在亞洲戰略及商業利益。美國國會對兩岸對話並無特定立場，但清楚表示支持臺灣安全。美國民意認為兩岸事務應由兩岸的中國人自行和平解決，美國應保持低度介入。美國學者認為美國可為兩岸對話創造良好環境扮演積極的角色。美國政府確實扮演某種積極的角色以鼓勵兩岸對話。基於國家利益的考量，美國也必須扮演積極性的角色——促進者（*a facilitator*）。此角色即為兩岸對話創造積極環境，但避免直接干涉對話中或評斷協議²¹。柯林頓政府中，主張美國在兩岸事務中所應扮演的角色共計有三派：推動兩岸對話者（佔多數）、鼓勵兩岸建設性對話（認為對話過程比結果重要）、遵守美國傳統不介入兩岸事務的角色。倘美國介入兩岸事務，美國國內政治將被牽扯進兩岸談判協商的過程中，使美國國內政治成為解決兩岸爭議的策略。倘使美國國會及社會大眾無法久耐兩岸問題延宕未決，恐將不務實地尋求快速但不恰當的解決之道。屆時將難以區分美國是兩岸對話的促進者或施壓者。²²

美國對兩岸關係之看法，基本上是奠基下列四項，其法理基礎是三公報及台灣關係法

（一）一個中國政策

一九七二年的《上海公報》中，美國對「一個中國」的看法為：美國表示「認識到(acknowledge)在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分」，美國對於兩岸的這個立場「不提出異議」。美國「不提出異議」的涵義在於這是兩岸中國人的自己事，美國沒有必要，更沒有權力表示異議。一九七九年的《建交公報》中，就美國的英文版本而言，美國政府雖然「承認中華人民共和國是中國的唯一合法政府」，但還是卻僅「認識到(acknowledge)中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分」。但是同樣一份《建交公報》，中文版本卻是寫到，美國重申「承認中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分」。一九八二年的《八一七公報》中，中共重申「台灣問題是中國的內政」原則。美國政府也「重申，其無意侵犯中國的主權和領土完整，無意干涉中國的

²⁰ Donald S. Zagoria, *An Interim Report on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations*, p.1, New York: National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

²¹ 葛健生，促進者？美國在兩岸復談中所扮演的角色，行政院大陸委員會出國報告書，2000年5月

²² Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "China-Taiwan: US Debates and Policy Choices", *Survival*, vol. 4. Winter 1998-99.

內政，也無意追求(no intention of pursuing)『兩個中國』或『一中一台』的政策」。雖然在《上海公報》與《建交公報》中，美國都沒有反對台灣是中國一部分的看法，但是在《台灣關係法》中，美國仍將台灣作為一個國家來看待。²³ 一九九八年六月三十日，美國總統柯林頓在上海參加座談會時，公開了由「一個中國」所衍生的「三不政策」——不支持台灣獨立、不支持「一中一台與兩個中國」、不支持台灣參加以國家為主體的國際組織。這是美國總統首次在公開場合中，表示美國的「三不政策」，有學者推論，因為三不政策太偏向大陸，所以才會有柯林頓在二千年三月之演說，要台灣人民同意之話語，以平衡兩岸關係。²⁴美國對「現狀」的認知其時已很清楚，台灣是一個獨立自主的政治實體，但是美國基於政治現實，卻不願對台灣作國際法上國家的承認。美國雖然對台灣是中國的一部分的說法不表示反對，但是美國卻將台灣視為是一個獨立在中華人民共和國之外的政權。²⁵

(二) 兩岸對話

美方不會做一個兩岸之調停者或是平衡者，至多是提供一個兩岸溝通之中介角色。換言之，就是不提建議，不調停，只是鼓勵對話。²⁶所以一個鼓勵對話之促進者，使兩岸和平有維持之希望，將是符合美方之利益。裴利希望經由對話、溝通、簽訂協議，以真正和緩兩岸關係。²⁷在二千年九月，美國總統柯林頓與中共國家主席江澤民，在紐約華爾道夫飯店舉行高峰會談。兩國領袖就包括WTO、台灣、飛彈防禦系統、宗教自由及南北韓關係等五項問題交換意見。柯林頓總統敦促北京與台北新政府對話，以解決當前僵局。江澤民則重申台灣當局必須先承認「一個中國」。這次柯江會談是台灣三月總統大選後，民進黨總統陳水扁執政以來，柯林頓與江澤民兩人首次晤面。江澤民強調，只要台灣當局同意「一個中國」的原則，我們就可以同他們坐下來談，什麼都可以談。柯林頓並未對江澤民的這番話回應，也未表示希望台灣方面的陳水扁總統與江澤民坐下來談。柯林頓僅重申，美方鼓勵兩岸早日恢復對話，和平解決北京與台北之間存在的問題。²⁸

²³ 參見<http://www.dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/cdata.htm#中臺台三角關係>。

²⁴ 筆者於二千年九月訪問華府傳統基金會資深研究員葉望輝之討論意見。

²⁵ 張亞中，*op.cit.*

²⁶ 筆者於二千年十二月訪問喬治城大學教授 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 之討論意見。參見「二千年柯江會白宮高層官員記者會，指台海關係目前處於摸索狀況，美盼促進、鼓勵雙方對話」，*世界日報*，二千年九月十日。

²⁷ 對話及協議項目很多：The two parties should come to agreement on ways to increase cross-Strait intercourse in areas such as business and cultural contacts, communications and transport links, anti-drug, anti-smuggling, anti-crime, customs cooperation, and air traffic control. The early establishment of direct flights between the mainland and Taiwan would be a good start. This would improve cultural contacts and allow easier access for cross-Strait business and investment. An agreement on this matter and greater contact across the Strait in the other areas of trade and communications - including the establishment of direct shipping links - would have near-term and tangible benefits to both sides.

²⁸ *中國時報*，二千年九月十日。

(三) 和平解決

美國政策就是對兩岸議題之和平解決。²⁹美方不見得在意一個中國意涵，或是台灣之戰略地位，或是台灣之經濟利益，但是美方一定在意地是，兩岸問題能否和平解決。這是美國之根本利益。³⁰「對美國來說，追求和平穩定目標的策略，反映在總體國家安全策略之中。希望形塑一個穩定、安全的國際環境……一個戰略上安全穩定的亞洲，一個可以提供貿易、投資及經濟發展走向繁榮的亞洲，符合美國與中國的共同利益。……台灣問題是此行的重要議題。美國信守一個中國政策和三個公報，信守台灣關係法的承諾，相信兩岸和解必須通過和平對話而不是軍事行動，我們承諾盡力發現能達到這種結果的方式。我相信，柯林頓總統也相信，陳水扁總統正在尋找和解的方式，而且他很有可能找到那種方式，但找尋的過程必須通過和平的方式，而不是軍事行動。我們認識到這個問題對於中國是多麼敏感，你們對它的感情是多麼強烈，但我們相信，總是可以找到透過和平手段達成目標的方式」。³¹

(四) 台灣人民之同意³²

美國學者伍夫維茨表示一個中國政策雖然使某些人無法達成台獨的目標，但也確保了台灣的自由、民主、繁榮，同時迴避了主權之爭，於是避免了台海軍事衝突。不過在後冷戰時期，這種架構愈來愈難維持，因為台海兩岸都出現巨變，其中最重大的變化當推台灣的真正民主化。冷戰結束以來，小國寡民的馬其頓、東帝汶等陸續追求獨立，國際環境卻不容許兩千三百萬繁榮民主的台灣人民追求獨立，實在很難說得通。中共方面日益擔心台灣走向「法理上的獨立」（對比於「事實上的獨立」），於是時顯得較以往急迫。在中共國家主席江澤民看來，香港、澳門都已回歸，下一個目標當然是台灣，他希望藉此建立歷史地位。另一方面，任誰都不能否認中共軍方對台灣問題的看法，因為在共軍的戰略思考中，台灣是第一線島嶼防線的樞紐，基於國家安全所需，中共必須有效掌控台灣。³³在亞洲，尤其是台灣，若是其民主發展消失，我們將無法有兩岸之和平。³⁴尊重台灣人民之意願說法，其實不是空泛地，因為台灣是和美國一樣之民主政體，民主之力量就是台灣在兩岸中之優勢。³⁵

²⁹ David M. Lampton, "REALITY CHECK: China's White Paper is Counterproductive", DC: Nixon Center

³⁰ Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, 2000, by The Center for Strategic and International Studies.

³¹ 中國時報，二千年七月十五日。美國國防部長科恩在北京中國國防大學對解放軍軍官發表演講。

³² 雖然沒有經過一致性之默契，但是經由美國在台協會主席卜睿哲之演說，及美國總統柯林頓在二千年三月之演說，讓台灣方面希望將其列為第四支柱。理由是民主之台灣，任何兩岸協議都需要經由立法院及民意之同意，此點是和大陸相當不一樣地。筆者於二千年十二月十九日於華府喬治華盛頓大學席格爾中心發表論文時，對於第四支柱的說法，遭到大陸學者群起反對。柯林頓之說法如下："On March 8, President Clinton declared that "the issues between Beijing and Taipei must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan." This important acknowledgement of Taiwan's democratic success should remain a key pillar of U.S. policy."

³³ 中國時報，二千年八月八日。

³⁴ Paul Wolfowitz, "Asian Democracy and American Interests", DC: Heritage Lectures, March 2, 2000, p.12.

³⁵ 筆者於二千年十二月訪問喬治城大學教授 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 之討論意見。

至於美方基於促進者之角色，所以是鼓勵第二管道，基於平衡者之角色，則會有軍售台灣防衛性武器之作為，此亦有台灣關係法作為依據。基於怕兩岸關係不穩定，所以會有中程協議之提議。當然，美方在台海最大之利益，就是保持兩岸問題之和平解決。至於像是一個中國原則，詳細定義，美方根本不願意介入，美國政治人物理解一個中國原則的也不多。³⁶所以大陸方面每次派人到美國進行遊說，就是希望美方施壓力給台北，接受大陸一個中國原則，停止出售武器給台灣。³⁷但是美方立場是台灣已經是一個民主國家，施壓很難，況且美方又有國會之壓力，不是行政部門可以任意行事。³⁸

二、中程協議之討論

美國一個中國政策之處理五原則

美國在台協會理事主席卜睿哲(Richard Bush)於一九九九年六月向北美台灣商會年會講詞(伊利諾州芝加哥)發表演講，卜睿哲指出：「我堅信台灣人民不必擔心美國處理兩岸關係的方式，那是我們一個中國政策的一部份。此種處理方式遵循五個原則」：³⁹

(一) 美國堅持台灣海峽問題必須以和平的方式解決。

(二) 美國政府相信，具有建設性及有意義的對話及兩岸的交流，是解決兩岸歧見的最佳方法。

(三) 美國政府認為這些歧見必須由雙方自行解決。

(四) 美國對兩岸對話將保持公正，不會對任何一方施壓。

(五) 美國政府認為，任何北京與台北所達成的安排均必須為雙方所接收。同時由於台灣的民主制度，任何這類的安排最後都必須獲得台灣人民的同意。

此一原則，在二千年三月，由柯林頓總統提出，⁴⁰有關和平解決需要台灣人民同意等語。簡言之，美國對於處理台海問題的態度，仍不脫離自上海公報以來所堅持「一個中國」、「和平解決」、「不作調人」的主要立場，以及「戰略清晰、戰術模糊」的基本原則。但吾人可以察覺自一九九六年台海危機以來，華府在這幾個政策面向上都做了一些補強與修正的措施。⁴¹中程協議之提出，就是其中之一。

中程協議之提出

美國幾個重要的學政界人士開始提出「中程協議」(interim agreements)、

³⁶筆者於二千年十月在波士頓大學費正清中心訪問陸伯彬(Robert S. Ross)教授之意見。

³⁷筆者於二千年十月在華府尼克森中心訪問藍普頓(David M. Lampton)教授之意見，當時正有上海學者在華府進行訪問。

³⁸筆者於二千年十二月在華府喬治華盛頓大學席格爾中心訪問迪克森(Bruce J. Dickson)教授之意見。

³⁹美國在台協會新聞資料。http://ait.org.tw/ait/BG/TF/bg9908c.htm

⁴⁰Enshrine "the assent of the Taiwan people" as a key tenet of U.S. policy. On March 8, President Clinton declared that "the issues between Beijing and Taipei must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan." This important acknowledgement of Taiwan's democratic success should remain a key pillar of U.S. policy.

⁴¹羅致政，「美國對兩岸過渡性協議的主張與看法」，國策專刊，一九九九年七月十五日。

「臨時性協議」(modus vivendi)等主張，試圖為兩岸關係建立一套新的互動架構，引起台海兩岸關心兩岸情勢發展人士的關切。事實上，美方學界提出中程協議，政界呼應，乃是因為一九九五年及九六年台海發生危機，美國擔心再次發生危機會被捲入其中，因此提出中程協議。

李侃如之長期政治穩定架構

李侃如所提出，是一個對兩岸長程之政治穩定架構，重點是台灣不獨、大陸不武，兩岸和平五十年。但是對未來之兩岸是採取統一之架構。⁴²李侃如所謂五十年協議的說法，主要是以「一個中國」以及「統一為終局」作為前提，來安排兩岸之間在過渡時期的關係，也就是北京方面承諾不武而台北承諾不獨。同時，在此架構之下雙方應展開政治談判，其議題則可包括三通、台灣軍購等各方面。

何漢理之中程安排

何漢理所提出之中程安排，或許是一個穩定之架構但是對於未來兩岸是否採取統一架構，則由兩岸自行決定。何漢理一九九九年之更新文章將其定義為 Interim Arrangements，採用複數形式，並且避開協議等法律用詞。⁴³對於中程安排，何漢理希望著力在基礎項目之相互保證（中共不武力犯台，除非台灣宣佈獨立；台灣不片面宣佈獨立，除非中共使用武力統一。）、發展兩岸對話機制、擴大經濟及文化連結、擴大台灣在國際社會之角色扮演、軍事互信機制、美方不作調人之角色，僅提出穩定之架構。⁴⁴

陸士達之建議

一九九九年三月二十四日，美國國務院助理國務卿陸士達 (Stanley Roth) 在華府威爾遜國際學者中心，以《台灣關係法》廿週年為題的研討會中演說時指出，台海兩岸在美國不介入的情況下，或許可以在若干困難的議題上達成「中程協議」。他稍後在答覆問題時補充，兩岸在「沒有協議」和「完全協議」之間可以有許多「中程協議」，但他這個說法不代表美方提出具體建議，只是「反映常識」。他強調，美國很重視不扮演調停人的承諾，不會向兩岸任何一方提出具體建議。⁴⁵陸士達的闡述，與同年3月下旬的說法稍有出入。當時他說「經由對話，加上互信機制的建立，兩岸應可就許多困難的議題，達成若干務實的過渡協議」，台北因此理解為「包括事務性議題在內的各種兩岸協議」。如今陸士達明確指出「不宜只限於技術性問題」，已經委婉說出對台北局限於事務性協商的不滿。⁴⁶

⁴² Kenneth Liberthal, "Cross-Strait Relations", paper presented at the international conference on "The PRC After the Fifteenth Party Congress: Reassessing the Post-Deng Political and Economic Prospects" Taipei, 19-20 February 1998.

⁴³ Harry Harding, "Again on Interim Arrangements in the Taiwan Strait", *Taiwan Strait Dilemmas*, DC:CSIS, 2000. 筆者於華府訪問 Gerit W. Gong (CSIS 亞洲研究主任) 時，其提到，因為 Agreement 有法律之地位問題，所以何漢理接受其建議，將新文章之題目改為：Interim Arrangements.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990324_roth_taiwan.html. "Using a phrase that has garnered much favor in Washington of late, I could imagine that "out of the box" thinking within this dialogue might contribute to interim agreements, perhaps in combination with specific confidence building measures, on any number of difficult topics."

⁴⁶ 郭正亮，「民進黨對兩岸過渡性協議的看法」，*國策專刊*，一九九九年七月十五日。

卜睿哲的說明

卜睿哲指出，「台灣方面有人注意到我的好朋友陸士達，在三個月前鼓勵兩岸達成『中程協議』的談話。有人擔心他心中可能已屬意某種特定形式的協議，而美國實際上是想強力促成這種協議，且這種協議會對台灣不利。坦白說，我認為這些人反應過度。陸士達先生所提的『中程協議』，是指非最後解決方案、非全面性、非整體性的協議。不過他心中所想的是客觀上可達成、有意義、可顯著降低兩岸緊張關係的協議。我們同意台海問題不可能在一夜之間解決。可是既使沒有全面性的協議，台灣人民不是也能藉著這些有可能達成的協議，來降低緊張關係，擴大合作並因此建立互信？」⁴⁷理論上，美國無意迫使台北和中共達成這樣的協議，而只是拋出這個想法，希望兩岸都能有新的創意。陸士達的中程協議是指低於最終解決(*less than an ultimate resolution*)、低於全面(*less than comprehensive*)以及低於全部(*less than total*)的協議。但卜氏也認為陸士達心中的這些協議，是指客觀上可以達成、是具有意義以及可以顯著降低緊張情勢的。至於對協議的具體內容為何，卜氏並沒有進一步闡述，也沒有提出自己看法，只是語意模糊地說「創意」(*creativity*)是陸士達講詞中的一個重要關鍵字眼。⁴⁸台北方面則認為「美方最近對兩岸關係的發言，主要是表達對兩岸改善關係的期望，並無施壓之意。不過，我方很關切及好奇的是，卜睿哲所謂的『創意』、陸士達所說在技術協議與全盤解決之間的臨時協議，究竟其範圍、意涵是什麼？」⁴⁹但美國政府倒並不認為一次全包的「中程協議」是可行的，而且也無意擔負起為這種協議催生的艱難工作。在與美方溝通之後，了解美方並沒有懷藏什麼腹案，便積極向美方推銷我方的理念。我方再三強調，被中共片面中斷的事務性談判，其實就可以獲致多項臨時協議，而這些也正是我方所努力追求的。經由不同層面的臨時協議，可以逐步降低緊張累積互信。至於政治議題，我方並不排斥，但以兩岸立場的差距，目前很難有令雙方都滿意的協議。⁵⁰

張戴佑及謝淑麗之解釋

美國在台協會台北處長張戴佑(Darryl N. Johnson)一九九九年四月九日在出席中央研究院歐美研究所舉辦的「台灣關係法廿週年」學術研討會時，在表示歡迎兩岸持續辜汪會談等良性互動外，更以書面聲明表示：「我們也同樣希望，再次借用陸士達先生的話，以兩岸人民的創意可以達成一些中程協議(*interim agreements*)，也許是針對一些兩岸分歧的議題採取一些建立互信的措施」。⁵¹

在同一場研討會中，美國的中國問題專家何漢理(Harry Harding)也以書面文章提出兩岸應簽署「臨時協議」(*Modus Vivendi*)的建議。這已明確地表

http://www.inpr.org.tw/inprc/pub/monograph/m1/m11_5.htm

⁴⁷美國在台協會新聞資料。http://ait.org.tw/ait/BG/TF/bg9908c.htm

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ 中國時報，一九九九年七月三日。

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹美國在台協會新聞稿，一九九九年四月十三日

徵著美國有意希望兩岸在現有的互動中，建構一個雙方都能接受的框架，以減低「台灣議題」未來對美中關係的干擾。⁵²

四月十四日，美國亞太副助理國務卿謝淑麗（Susan Shirk）在國會中的證辭，再度作類似意涵的表達，並表示美國雖不應做兩岸的調停者，但是應作為兩岸和平方式解決的貢獻者。⁵³

李侃如的主張偏離美國政府得對華政策立場

基本上，李侃如的主張均或多或少偏離美國政府得對華政策立場。首先，美國對華政策的基本立場是兩岸問題必須以和平手段解決，美國不介入也不做調人。而中程協議已脫離美國官方這種被動的精神，轉而採取積極主動介入的態度，企圖主導兩岸關係的發展。

其次，美國的態度都為鼓勵兩岸進行對話、談判，但並不針對兩岸應就何種議題對話、協商表示態度。基本上，美國只要見到兩岸進行對話使台海關係得以持續緩和，就已表示滿意，並不主張或建議兩岸要就政治性議題進行談判。然而，李侃如等人所提出兩岸進行對話、談判的議題，諸如三通、以台灣不宣佈獨立換取中共不對台使用武力、軍事信心建立措施、更改國名、台灣的外交空間、尋求統一模式等，均是政治性議題。

第三，美國政府在三個公報中，均指認知(acknowledge)中共主張台灣是中國的一部份的立場，並不對兩岸統獨的終局結果預設立場，只表示此一問題由臺海兩岸中國人自行解決。然而，李侃如等人的提議，均明示或暗示地以最終統一作為兩岸互動的未來方向。⁵⁴

李侃如在其文章中指出，臺海兩岸的一些可能錯誤估算將會把雙方推向悲劇，因此僅沿著現狀(status quo)移動是不夠的，因為現狀具有非常嚴重的潛在危險。此外，大多數台灣民眾的強烈台灣認同意識，以及台灣政府歷史上長期自認為是一主權實體，並拒絕接受中共的統治；另一方面中共又不能接受台灣法理上的分離等因素，使兩岸關係容易陷入衝突的危險境地，而中程協議就是李侃如為解決兩岸衝突、維持台海和平的一種架構。⁵⁵

何漢理對現況表示悲觀

何漢理認為中共於1999年底接收澳門後，對解決台灣問題更具迫切感。在中共軍力不斷增強的同時，台灣人民對在目前情況下兩岸統一卻興趣缺缺，而台灣

⁵² Harry Harding, *op.cit.*

⁵³ Susan L. Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty" Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, April 14, 1999. "Nothing would better serve China's interest than using its developing dialogue with Taiwan to build mutual confidence and reduce the perceived need for missiles or missile defense".

⁵⁴ 林文程，「我國對過渡性協議的看法與對策」，*國策專刊*，一九九九年七月十五日。

⁵⁵ Kenneth Libenthal, *op.cit.*

一直拒絕解除對三通的限制，中共則拒絕修正一國兩制的統一模式，兩岸關係因此陷入僵局。再者，何漢理認為中共將統一提上政治日程表、中共軍力增強、台灣內部要求政府提高台灣在國際社會角色的壓力、台灣權力結構可能因選舉而改變等因素所架構的動態情勢，將使台海現狀的維持據高度的困難，而使兩岸可能走向重新對抗的局面。⁵⁶對於何漢理的主張，美國杭特（Hunter）大學政治系教授柴哥里亞（Donald S. Zagoria）說，何漢理有些想法是不實際的，一個民主的台灣是不會放棄台獨這個「選項」（option）的，而除非台灣產生一些基本改變，北京也不會放棄對台動武，因為北京相信武力是可以防止台灣走向獨立的。⁵⁷

臺灣對於中程協議抱持謹慎態度

台灣方面對中程協議，其實是抱持謹慎態度。有論述指出，兩國論的出現，有其特定的環境背景也是回應中程協議。由於美國總統柯林頓發表「三不」立場，學者提出「中程協議」構想，加上中共聯美、日等國打壓台灣的「大國外交」日見成效，我國政府感到已逐漸被迫滑向中共的「一個中國」陷阱，自己的主權國家地位與空間似乎正在國際間流失，兩岸政治談判壓力愈來愈大。⁵⁸而美方人士認為，「所謂『兩國論是受中程協議刺激所形成』的說法是誇張不實的，台灣有些人沒有全面的觀察美國政策，以致於認為美國會在中程協議上出賣台灣。」

大陸對於中程協議並不贊成

大陸方面對於中程協議，抱持相當不以為然之態度，⁵⁹大陸方面綜合分析這個「中程協議」其透露的信息是：（一）、兩岸不戰不統保持五十年，在這五十年內不進行政治談判。（二）、臺灣可以購買非自衛性武器亦即攻擊性武器。（三）、提升臺在國際社會中的「角色」，以各種身分參與國際活動。（四）、美國擔任兩岸對話「第二軌道」，擔當協議保證人。

大陸方面臺灣問題專家指出，儘管「中程協議」某些內容與中國政府對臺政策有交叉點，但是這些內容是放在企圖把兩岸固定於一種長期分隔的框架內的，我們當然不可以接受。美國在臺灣問題上的戰略目標，就是造成兩岸長期「不戰不和、不統不獨」，形成一種膠著狀態，這樣，美國就可以隨時以臺灣問題來牽制中國。美國數十年來都是圍繞這個戰略目標來制定政策的，這個所謂的「中程協議」也不例外。特別值得注意的是，大陸方面去年以來多次表示臺灣問題不能久拖不決，而美國則在此時刻一再推銷「中程協議」，其用心昭然若揭。大陸方面的對臺政策，從中央領導和中央有關部門人士談話中顯示：（一）臺灣問題不能長期拖下去，解決臺灣問題不能沒有時間概念，將兩岸關係限定在一種不戰不統框架內五十年，不符合兩岸人民迫切要求祖國早日完全統一的願望。（二）兩岸應坐下來為進行政治談判，就政治談判的程序性問題進行磋商。當前，應進行

⁵⁶ Harry Harding, op.cit.

⁵⁷ 中央社，一九九九年四月十日。

⁵⁸ 中國時報，二千年十二月十八日。

⁵⁹ 香港文匯報，一九九九年六月八日。

政治對話，為政治談判創造條件。政治談判不能拖到五十年以後再進行。(三)反對與中國建交國向臺灣出售任何種類的武器裝備或提供生產武器的技術，反對將臺灣納入TMD。(四)臺灣不能加入只有主權國家才有資格參加的國際組織。(五)解決臺灣問題是中國的內政，任何國家無權干涉和插手，美國沒有資格當兩岸「保證人」。兩岸對話也無須在美國開闢「第二軌道」。⁶⁰

現況是否穩定，各方看法不一

中程協議就是對於現狀之不安定感，所以希望有一個協議來穩定現狀。對於現狀之討論，學者有不同之意見，有人認為短期穩定，長期不穩定。⁶¹原因是目前大陸處於權力交換時期，所以短期內對台灣是聽其言，觀其行，但是大陸若有不穩定，將會把台灣問題視為抒解壓力之籌碼，就容易形成不穩定。也有如何漢理、李侃如擔心台灣民主化之後，要求台獨之聲音將會逐漸成為重要影響，造成大陸使用武力犯台，或是如哈佛大學費正清中心研究員陸伯彬所說，台灣由於有美方之安全保護，並有軍售，以致於不願意和大陸談判。⁶²而紐約歌倫比亞大學黎安友教授亦對現況感到不穩定，原因是大陸要求之價碼，一個中國原則，台灣無法滿足其要求，大陸又有民族主義之龐大壓力，形成對台灣用武之可能性越來越高。⁶³對於現況之判斷，一般而言，並不樂觀，原因是大陸充滿民族主義及民粹主義，當大陸內部無法滿足其要求時，或是權力轉換時期，總是以台灣問題為籌碼，以顯示政治正確，這就是為什麼時常有聽說解放軍有強硬立場之談話，⁶⁴及三不五時就有對台時間表之說法產生。⁶⁵的確對現況之憂心，是有所依據地。⁶⁶而美方為了避免捲入台海戰爭，才願意在和平解決之前提下，採取像中程協議這樣的施壓措施。

動態現狀 (*dynamic status quo*) 就成為一項穩定現況之重要原則

現狀既然不容易維持，所以動態現狀 (*dynamic status quo*) 就成為一項重要原則，因為維持台海和平，成為重要之美方利益，即使台灣民主化，經濟發展、市場吸引力，都比不上台海和平對美方來得重要。⁶⁷在此項觀點上，一個單一性質之中程協議，就無法滿足目前之要求，所以複數性質之多項協議，多方面，多性質，包括功能性議題及政治性議題，就成為可以考慮之對象。所以路士達之說法，較為接近美方原來不介入之立場，也較能為台北方面所接受。

兩岸中程協議之重要內涵：前提是台灣不獨，大陸不武，內容是台灣外交空間、直接三通、軍售問題等

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ 筆者於二千年十二月和喬治城大學教授 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 討論意見。

⁶² 筆者於二千年十月在哈佛大學與Robert Ross討論意見。

⁶³ 筆者於二千年十月在歌倫比亞大學與黎安友之討論意見。

⁶⁴ 「逼迫台灣和談，北京加強軍事鬥爭準備」，中國時報，二千年十二月十六日。

⁶⁵ Lynn T. White III, "War or Peace Over Taiwan", *China Information*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (2000).

⁶⁶ 台灣和中國大陸是區域內過去一年來軍事預算與其他國家相較，不降反升的兩個異數。中共 1998 年的國防花費至少是官方公佈預算數字的三倍之多。中國時報，一九九九年十月二十一日。

⁶⁷ Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, 2000, by The Center for Strategic and International Studies.

在中程協議之內容上，前提是台灣不獨，大陸不武，但是由於是民主之台灣，對於未來命運之選擇，其實很難限定是處於統一方向，而大陸又認為武力是解決台灣問題之最好方法，並提出三如果。⁶⁸換言之，前提要達成已經很困難。而內容上，有發展兩岸對話機制、擴大經濟及文化連結、擴大台灣在國際社會之角色扮演、軍事互信機制、美方不作調人之角色，僅提出穩定之架構等。每一項都可以是一個相當大之談判議題。簡單來說，就是兩岸對話、台灣外交空間、直接三通、軍售問題。

對於台灣之外交空間，大陸是持反對意見，其二千年之白皮書指出：「台灣無權參加聯合國及其它只有主權國家參加的國際組織。聯合國是由主權國家組成的政府間國際組織。中華人民共和國政府在聯合國的合法權利恢復后，聯合國組織中的中國代表權問題已經獲得徹底解決，根本不存在台灣當局加入聯合國的問題。台灣當局聲稱聯合國 2758 號決議只解決了中國代表權問題，沒有解決台灣的代表權問題，要求參與聯合國。這是製造『兩個中國』、『一中一台』的分裂行徑，是絕對不能允許的。聯合國的所有成員國，都應遵守《聯合國憲章》的宗旨、原則及有關聯合國決議，遵循相互尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政等國際關係準則，不以任何方式支持台灣加入聯合國及只能由主權國家參加的其他國際組織」。⁶⁹對於某些允許地區參加的政府間國際組織，中國政府已經基於一個中國原則，根據有關國際組織的性質、章程和實際情況，以所能同意和接受的方式對台灣的加入問題作出了安排。台灣已作為中國的一個地區，以「中國台北」的名義，分別參加了亞洲開發銀行（英文名稱為 TAIPEI, CHINA）和亞太經合組織（英文名稱為 CHINESE TAIPEI）等組織。一九九二年九月，世界貿易組織的前身關稅及貿易總協定理事會主席聲明指出，在中華人民共和國加入關貿總協定后，台灣可以「台灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖單獨關稅區」（簡稱「中國台北」）的名義參加。世貿組織在審議接納台灣加入該組織時，應堅持上述聲明確定的原則。上述特殊安排，並不構成其他政府間國際組織及國際活動仿效的模式。⁷⁰

對於軍售問題，這有美方台灣關係法為依據，但是大陸方面也是反對地。白皮書上明確指出：「與中國建交的國家不能向台灣出售武器，或與台灣進行任何形式的軍事結盟。凡是與中國建交的國家，都應本著互相尊重主權和領土完整、互不干涉內政的原則，不以任何形式或借口向台灣出售武器，或幫助台灣生產武器」。⁷¹

對於直接三通及兩岸對話，大陸當局一貫之立場是在「一個中國之原則下」才能進行，而一個中國又形成兩岸對話及經濟交流之一個無形大框架，都是兩岸中程協議，在前提上及內涵尚無法突破之重要原因。又如軍事信心建立措施（CBM），在政治議題尚未取得共識前，也是無法達成地。

⁶⁸中共國務院台辦、新聞辦《一個中國的原則與台灣問題》白皮書，二千年二月。指外國勢力介入、台獨及台灣拖延長久不談判，中共將使用武力。

⁶⁹白皮書，*Ibid.*

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Ibid.*

中程協議對於終局之討論

對於中程協議之結局安排，李侃如及奈伊都明示要以統一為結局。此種安排，是否符合民主原則及台灣政治發展之現況，都值得進一步討論。而陸士達及卜睿哲對於開放性議題及終局由兩岸自行決定之作法，其實是較為符合兩岸現況及美方立場地。李侃如自己也表示：「台灣安全獲得保障是美國對華政策的基石之一，雙方如果有軍事衝突，美國將無法消極坐視。對於曾在台灣引發討論的中程協議構想，他則明確指出，這是他以學者身分提出的想法，從未被放在美國的政策中」。⁷²中程協議可以成為兩岸對話之議題選擇的一種，一種開放性思考，而非限定式要求。此種政治藍圖，其實雙方都不要太過於刻意要求達成，而應該讓兩岸關係自然地發展，經過時間累積出互信後，兩岸就會發展出超結構（super structure）。而且，由於中程協議不是最終決議，所以保持一個開放性思考，而不是將大陸之一國兩制模式硬生生套在台灣頭上，相信是對兩岸關係之良性發展，才有助益。即使美方有新政府產生，由於中程協議有助於台海穩定之思維持續存在，仍有創造性思考之空間。

美國方面各種中程協議主張之內容比較

提出者	用詞	提出時間	主要內容
李侃如 Kenneth Lieberthal	Interim agreement	1998年 2月	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 中程協定：先建立一項在一段期間內（五十年，也就是兩代的時間處理兩岸關係的過渡性協議，其中包含一個開始談判政治統一的日期； ● 不走極端的「一個中國」：在過渡期間，台灣與中共都在「一個中國」之內，但是雙方既非兩個各具排他性的主權實體，也不是中央與地方的關係； ● 不走極端的獨立：台灣明確表示它是中國的一部份，而且不會主張法律上的獨立； ● 禁止動武：中共明確表示不對台動武； ● 自主：各方可以同意在過渡期間，各自保持內政外交的自主性，僅受上述承諾的限制； ● 協商：各方可以同意定期舉行高層會談以降低衝突並增進互信。會談內容應包括台灣的武器採購，可能與中共的軍事部署相連結；開放市場以利商品和勞務能跨越台海自由流動，並包含有利於貿易和投資相關措施，以及建立台海兩岸人民全面性的直接接觸； ● 措詞：各方可以同意將「中華人民共和國」改稱為「中國」，而「中華民國」則改為「台灣，中國」（或類似的稱謂）。還可以試著發展一些詞彙，例如「大中國」，用來指涉中國的這兩個部分。為了增強這些協議的政治份量，它們應該被納入各方的國內法（甚至憲法條文）中。另外，關於如何監督上述協議之執行，可能必須要設立某種雙邊的機構。兩岸顯示出經濟上的互補性，並增加互利性的接觸。目前的緊張狀況對雙方都有害，致使它們共同處理問題（例如最近的亞洲金融危機）的能力受限。短期內展開積極協商的程序，可以從培養信任與動力開始，等到3、5年後再處理根本性的議題
奈伊 Joseph S. Nye	未明	1998年 3月	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 美國應該明白宣示，其政策是「一個中國」和「不使用武力」，如果台灣宣布獨立，美國將不會承認，也不會協助防衛，美國將促使其他國家也不要承認台灣的獨立。 ● 台灣方面明確否定宣布獨立的念頭，則北京也將不會反對給台灣更多的國際生存空間，台北明確表示台灣是中國的一部份，就將獲得更多在國際上表達意見的機會。擴大到「一國三制」，使台灣可以真正維持自己的政治、經濟和社會體制。

⁷² 中國時報，二千年十二月六日。

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●要求台北明確表示放棄任何走向獨立的運動，加強兩岸間的對話，並增加與大陸方面的投資與人員交流。
陸士達 Stanley Roth	Interim agreements	1999年 3月	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●美國對兩岸人民的創意有很大的信心，兩岸可透過必要人員的交流最自然的過程使對話有意義，此一對話或許有助於雙方在任何困難的議題上達成一些過渡協議。 ●美國一向堅持在兩岸和平解決歧見的情形下，避免干預。 ●在「沒有協議」與「最終協議」之間，雙方可以簽署各種過渡協議。
卜睿哲 Richard Bush	過渡性協議	1999年 6月	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●僅僅在兩岸關係的細節上達成一些技術性的協議，並不足以大幅改善雙方的關係，或者激發信任、信心，和為這個關係更多進展求佈局。 ●在缺乏信任和信心的情形下，要期待兩岸的問題能在今年的會議中（指汪道涵訪台，舉行辜汪會談）達成全面的解決，時間似乎尚未成熟。 ●台灣雙方可以就「高於技術性議題，低於全面性解決」的重要議題，尋求達成過渡性協議。 ●在兩岸議題上，美國不會扮演調停者、談判者、中間人等角色。
柯漢理 Harry Harding	Modus vivendi (Interim Arrangements)	2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●兩岸相互提出保證，即中共不武，台灣不獨。 ●兩岸展開全面交流包括通航在內。 ●在台灣不單方面宣布獨立的前提下，提升台灣在國際社會的角色。 ●持續兩岸之對話，利用第二軌道探討包括雙方可接受之各種模式下最終統一之可能性。此一對話台灣方面應包含各主要政黨代表。 ●兩岸應建立軍事互信機制。 ●此一臨時協議的創立(特別是只要台灣不片面宣布獨立，中國大陸就承諾不對台動武)，將容易讓美國在軍售台灣方面有所節制，尤其是TMD。

資料來源：

一、Harry Harding, "Again on Interim Arrangements in the Taiwan Strait", *Taiwan Strait Dilemmas: China-Taiwan-U. S. Policies in the new century.*, DC:CSIS, 2000

二、Harry Harding, "Toward a Modus Vivendi in the Taiwan Strait", the lecture in "U. S. Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years After the Taiwan Relations Act", Taipei. R.O.C., April 9-10, 1999.

三、Kenneth Lieberthal, "Cross-Strait Relations", paper presented at the international conference on "The PRC After the Fifteenth Party Congress: Reassessing the Post-Deng Political and Economic Prospects" Taipei, 19-20 February 1998.

四、Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "A Taiwan Deal" *Washington Post*, March 8 1998.

五、Kenneth Lieberthal, "Cross Strait Relations", 朱雲漢及田弘茂主編，2000【*China under Jiang Zemin*】，第七章。

六、美國在台協會新聞稿，一九九九年四月十三日。

七、1999年3月24日，美國國務院主管亞太事務助理國務卿陸士達(Stanley O. Roth)在對威爾遜中心及美國在台協會合辦台灣關係法廿週年紀念會上演說詞。

三、第二管道對兩岸互動之影響

冷戰過後，亞太地區的戰略架構亦開始移轉為以美國、日本、南北韓、中國及東協等多元互動的模式。南海問題、台海緊張情勢及南北韓對峙進一步突顯，成為亞太區域三大不穩定的來源。其中，中國以龐大的市場及雄厚的經濟實力竄升於本區，並有取代美蘇強權的態勢，近年來，中國不斷強化軍事實力，年度國防預算節節上升，根據美國國防部提交國會關於台海情勢評估報告書，中國於東

南沿海大量部署飛彈針對台灣，更提高亞太地區的不穩定。⁷³

面對區域的動態不穩定發展，特別是中國不斷擴展軍力，美國及亞太各國遂思考以公開和平的途徑尋求此區的安定，「美日安保新防衛指針」的簽定，「美中建設性戰略夥伴關係」的建立及由東南亞各國所組成的「東南亞國協」(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN)的成立，皆是希望對亞太區域中興起的強權做牽制。⁷⁴

第二管道的意義

1995-1996年的台海危機，引起了國際的關注，也提醒了美國以傳統官方的「三報一法」⁷⁵並不足以維持台海穩定，因此，美國開始在兩岸倡議「第二管道」，所謂的「第二軌道」(TRACK II; Second Track Diplomacy)，即是在官方正式的溝通管道之外，由學者專家或以私人身分參與的官員，所組成的對話溝通管道。

裴利的第二管道作為

美中台亦自飛彈危機後開始從事「第二管道」外交的實質活動，美國前國防部長裴利及其所率領的「美中關係全國委員會」即於近幾年積極穿梭於兩岸，⁷⁶由裴利所率領的「美中關係全國委員會」於一九九八年一月分別前往台海兩岸進行溝通了解（主要是上海）。一九九八年七月上旬，在美國前國防部長裴利的主導下，以台海安全為主要議題，在夏威夷與海協會會長汪道涵進行第二軌道會談，⁷⁷並於同年七月十四日利用座談的機會，與我外交部長胡志強溝通兩岸的談判進程。裴利及其所主導的「美中關係全國委員會」又於一九九九年三月先於杭州，後到台北，為美中、美台分別進行對話。⁷⁸一九九九年裴利率團前往杭州參加美中雙邊安全會議，並進行美中與美台之間的「第二軌道」談話，對話內容則

⁷³ 中國時報，一九九八年二月二十五日。同樣對於大陸威脅及福建部署飛彈之作法，史丹佛大學研究員薛理泰 (Li Tai Xue)，亦抱持同樣之看法，就是屬於大陸對台政策戰的一手。「美國希望保持現況，不致於發生突變，造成形勢失控。台灣拖中求變，在陳水扁總統第一任期間，不希望由於自己不謹慎之行動而造成反彈，但是民進黨之台獨傾向越來越明顯。大陸則是遏阻台獨勢力之膨脹為第一優先，大陸希望和美方就解決台灣問題達成某種默契，準備就緒後，交替使用和戰兩手。(和最明顯就是錢其琛八月之講話，戰則是向俄國訂購潛艇、導彈驅逐艦及蘇愷二十七、三十，福建東南沿海國防動員調查委員會已經完成戰備調查。)」此段談話為筆者於二千年十月在史丹佛大學與薛理泰研究員之討論意見。⁷⁴黃敏芬 (民進黨中國事務部副研究員)，「第二軌道之探討」，民進黨電子郵件資料。

⁷⁵ 即上海公報、建交公報、八一七公報及台灣關係法。詳見<http://www.dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/cdata.htm#中美台三角關係>。

⁷⁶ 正確來說，裴利個人角色重於團體，美中關係全國委員會前後任會長暨普頓及何立強皆與裴利關係密切。參見 Lee Ming-Yi, "The Role of the United States behind the 1998 Resumption of Cross-strait Dialogue", Research Paper in Sigur Center for Asian Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University 筆者於二千年十二月在華府席格爾中心之期末報告，第十四頁。

⁷⁷ 裴利自稱，大陸派出汪道涵作為第二管道之聯繫代表。William J. Perry, "The Future of U.S.-China Engagement", American Assembly, San Francisco, July 11, 1998.

⁷⁸ William J. Perry, "The Future of U.S.-China Engagement", *op. cit.*

⁷⁹ Ralph N. Clough, *Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?* (USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers)

包括美中軍事交流現況、「信心建立機制」、台海議題、「戰區飛彈防禦系統」、南亞(印巴)軍備競賽及區域安全等。⁷⁹由美國私人部門扮演兩岸傳話的角色。但是裴利本人則否認有代兩岸傳話之可能,但是對於促進兩岸對話及維持台海和平,裴利個人亦相當自我期許做了許多有益兩岸之工作。⁸⁰裴利所提倡的二軌對話為其推展「預防性防衛」(Preventive Defense)策略的一環,⁸¹在「預防性防衛」的研究計劃中,裴利認為由於美國在處理台灣議題上有所限制,因此「非官方的對話可以扮演一個重要角色,第二管道代表比美國政府所能與所願做的貢獻還多」。⁸²裴利向美政府就對台政策提出了具體的建議,除了上面說的中台兩軍建立信心措施(CBM)外,另外兩個主題是「增加兩岸的接觸」,「協議給予台灣國際空間」。⁸³接觸包括陳水扁政府推動的「三通」在內,關於台灣的國際空間,裴利建議按照「亞洲開發銀行(ADB)、亞太經濟合作組織(APEC)及奧會的模式,中共容許台灣參與國際貨幣基金(IMF)、世界銀行、國際原能總署(IAEA)等組織。他也贊成讓台灣捐助「朝鮮半島的能源發展組織」(KEDO)。⁸⁴二〇〇〇年六月,美國前國防部長裴率領史丹福校友會成員抵達北京,對於外界預期的兩岸第二軌道問題,裴利表示,此行只是帶團到北京玩;據了解,中共目前還未計劃安排高層人士與他見面。至於裴利規劃中美台學術討論活動今年秋天在上海或美國舉行,但暫時未獲中共方面回應。⁸⁵換言之,不論是「美中關係全國委員會」、史丹佛大學研究員身份或是美國議會,若是裴利參與其中,正因為其由前美國國防部長退職之身份及其預防性外交之思維,形成相當具有個人特質之第二管道。

美國外交政策全國委員會的第二管道作為

第二管道提供台灣及大陸雙方學者見面,提出建議討論之管道,在紐約舉行,由美國外交政策全國委員會主辦,是另一個重要之第二管道,自一九九七年

⁷⁹ 賁敏芬, *op.cit.*

⁸⁰ 裴利在公開演說上表示:「我們在會晤中共國家主席江澤民時,他要求我們傳達中共準備重新開啓兩岸對話的信息給李登輝。我認為,在兩岸重新開啓對話時,非官方的管道溝通將扮演重要角色。江澤民還表示,他希望能夠繼續這種第二管道的對話」。William Perry, *op.cit.*

⁸¹ 一九九六年五月十三日在哈佛大學約翰甘迺迪學院,裴利(U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry.)之演講詞:「Preventive Defense」。

⁸² 中國時報,二千年六月十六日。

⁸³ 一,在交流的範圍上,可包括商業、文化、通信、反毒、反走私與打擊罪犯等合作,直航可為一個好的起點,包括海運等有利於雙邊的議題。二,就台灣的國際空間而言,雙方應達成一個務實而適當之協定。就近程而言,北京不應反對台灣參與「朝鮮半島能源發展組織」(KEDO)提供財務上之貢獻,這可讓台灣在區域反核擴散上扮演一個角色。台灣也應成為「國際貨幣基金會」與世界銀行之成員,這是對台灣經濟重要性之承認,而非涉及台灣與中國之間的政治地位。此外,台北也應得以參加國際性的反核武擴散組織如「飛彈科技管制機制」(MTCR)及「國際原子能總署」。三,台海兩岸應發展軍事互信機制。目前雙方在危機發生時連相互溝通的特定管道都沒有,因此雙方發展軍事交往與互信機制將有助於降低緊張與避免錯估危機的發生。中國時報,一九九九年三月十二日。

⁸⁴ William J. Perry, "The Future of U.S.-China Engagement", *op.cit.*

⁸⁵ 中國時報,二千年六月十八日。

至今已經舉行五次(自一九九七年中即展開一個五次為期三年會談時程分別為九七年六月、九八年一月、九八年七月、九九年一月及九九年八月，並於最後一次提出政策性建議與具體主張)，於二〇〇一年二月間繼續在紐約舉行。初期台海雙方之學者討論較少，第二次後，互動就明顯增加。但是大陸方面學者則比較不傾聽台灣方面意見。⁸⁶討論主題有四項：一個中國、台灣之國際空間、經濟議題及美方角色。⁸⁷最後一次討論時，有加上第五個議題，就是台灣之安全，主要是討論美方及台灣之信心建立措施(CBM)。一九九九年第五次討論，雙方學者有提到，乾脆使用「九二年共識精神」以滿足雙方需要。⁸⁸另外哈佛大學亞洲中心在傅高義教授主導下，策劃美中台三邊對話機制，以及東北亞合作安全對話等。⁸⁹規模較大除「美國外交政策全國委員會」外，另外由歌倫比亞大學美國議會(America Assembly)，⁹⁰亦在台北、紐約、大陸分別舉行研討會，產生不少激盪及意見。⁹¹自一九九六年起至今，美國議會於兩岸進行了五個回合的二軌論壇，並根據會議內容及結果向美國政府提出具體建議。美中關係正常化後，美國議會開始規劃與中國進行對話溝通，籌設中國論壇(Chinese Factor Forum)，並舉辦一連串的中國政策研討會。第一回合由美國首任駐北京大使(Leonard Woodcock)率領代表團至兩岸進行對話，美國議會已舉行第五回合的二軌對話，在與台灣的對話中，我外交部委請政大國關中心與其舉行雙邊會議。另外在舊金山附近之Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 亦組成兩岸之學者專家，對兩岸未來發展之可能出現問題，逐一列舉，使用未來學及公共政策方法，以提出問題，解決問題。⁹²

⁸⁶ 筆者與圓桌會議記錄人 Samantha F. Ravich (CSIS 資深研究員) 於二千年十二月訪問記錄。

⁸⁷ Samantha F. Ravich, "Examining Trends of Convergence and Divergence across the Taiwan Strait, NCAFP's Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy" American Foreign Policy Interest, And Cross-Strait Relations (1997-1999). December 1999.

⁸⁸ 同註釋三十二。

⁸⁹ 中國時報，一九九八年七月二十四日。

⁹⁰ The American Assembly was founded in 1950 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower while he was President of Columbia University, with its home, Arden House, donated by Ambassador Averell Harriman and Roland Harriman. Since its establishment, The Assembly has exerted an important bipartisan influence on the deliberation of key foreign and domestic policies. The Assembly determined that, at the end of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first, one of the most important issues confronting American citizens is their relationship with East Asia, and most notably the peoples of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. The 23 million people of Taiwan play an important role in East Asia and America has important economic, cultural, security, and other interests engaged with the island. Further, the world community stands to gain greatly from productive interaction with Taiwan's talented people. More to the point, the Taiwan Strait is one of the few places in the world where the United States could find itself involved in major conflict. 詳見 Lee Ming-Yi, *op.cit.*

⁹¹ The American Assembly "China/U.S. Relation in the Twenty-First Century: Fostering Cooperation, Preventing Conflict" Nov. 14 - 17, 1996, New York.

⁹² Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait. 重要項目如：Indicators that the PRC was preparing for an invasion of Taiwan (PRC initiator)

- A decision by Taiwan to develop weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological) (Taiwan initiator)
- US decides to sell theater missile defense systems to Taiwan (US initiator—but trend in PRC missile deployments also a factor)
- PRC announcement of a timetable for reunification (PRC initiator)

多年來華府智庫「大西洋委員會」及「戰略暨國際研究中心」(CSIS)一直以低調的方式與北京及台北進行第二軌道的交流活動，他們認為唯有直接溝通才能增進了解而拉近彼此的距離。⁹³

第二管道的潛在影響

明確的說，「第二軌道」機制是由民間智庫、學術機構及以私人身分參與的官員所組成，其設立的目的主要是針對重要公共政策及外交問題做討論，而參與成員除本身具有專業知識及經驗外，宜有相當程度的政治代表性及社會影響力，並與政府決策機構保持適度的聯繫與互動，使得第二管道機制的結論與共識得以提供決策者做為參考。⁹⁴「第二軌道」的進行方式在於以實事求是的態度，軟化正式談判的立場堅持，不受官僚體制的約束，藉由學者專家及以私人身分參與的官員之自由對話與交流，進行腦力激盪、提供新思維並擬定新策略。

中共表明不願意美方介入

中共方面的反應仍是模模糊糊，只是汪道涵一九九九年四月上海接受《亞洲週刊》獨家專訪時，肯定了一番美國的「第二管道」，認為雖然不能取代政府，但可以向政府提供意見，供政府參考。海協會常務副會長唐樹備一九九九年三月在裴利訪問大陸時表示：海峽兩岸之間的事是中國人自己的事，不需要外人插手，何況兩岸已有海協會和海基會做為對話管道，「不需要再有什麼第二軌道」。⁹⁵同時海協會向海基會提出由兩會舉辦「兩岸論壇」，以也乎也有開闢新的「第二軌道」之意。⁹⁶美國介入兩岸關係，是過去的歷史形成，大陸雖然原則上反對，但如果美國的介入將可以積極地促進兩岸關係，大陸是歡迎的，只是必須顧慮到是否造成「台灣問題國際化」大陸方面並不希望美國過度捲入兩岸問題，認為這是一個「內政」問題，但若美國希望推動兩岸關係的相對穩定，大陸也不會使勁反對，因為這符合大陸的近期利益。⁹⁷

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- Economic meltdown/chaos in mainland China (PRC initiator)
 - Trend towards “creeping independence” for Taiwan (Taiwan initiator)
 - Trend toward overt American support for Taiwan (including both US actions and perceptions in Taiwan and mainland China)
 - Trend toward increasing “Taiwan identity” and indefinite delay of reunification (Taiwan initiator)
 - Trends in overall military balance across the Taiwan strait (All three parties involved)

⁹³ 中國時報，一九九八年七月十五日

⁹⁴ 中國時報，一九九八年八月十五日。

⁹⁵ 中國時報，一九九九年三月七日。

⁹⁶ 阮銘，「走向一國兩制統一的過渡性協議——汪道涵與美國親中派的上海共識」，國策專刊，一九九九年七月十五日。

⁹⁷ 中國時報，一九九八年七月二十日。李家泉及賈慶國之意見。

國民黨對第二管道的看法及作為

國民黨主席連戰主動在二〇〇〇年九月釋出國民黨與中國大陸「第二軌道」互動的構想。連戰已經在最近要求該黨智庫就兩岸相關議題進行專題研究，並籌劃邀集兩岸三地與國際學者專家，在適當時間、地點做系列性研討。如果有助論壇共識建立，不會排除邀請中共涉台人士與會，也不排除到大陸舉辦的可能性。連戰表示，他在總統大選期間曾經提出簽訂兩岸和平協定與建構台海和平區的具體作法，雖然國民黨在大選中失敗，但是不會放棄對兩岸和平的追求。他透露已經著手建構與大陸、香港及國際間專家學者建立互動管道、整合共識的構想，並視其為黨的重大計畫。⁹⁸

第二管道溝通有其重要性，不宜輕忽

台灣有必要妥善處理與美國「第二軌道」人士、智庫及學術單位的關係，並加強台灣智庫學者於對外關係上的角色，以全方位經營台美中三邊關係。對台灣而言，參與「第二軌道」的運作，可使台灣、美國與中國三者立於對等之位，三方不預設立場，暢所欲言，並可藉此去除台灣是「麻煩製造者」的惡名。而「第二管道」的存在也為兩岸的對話提供多一種機會、多一種選擇，以增進三方的了解避免不必要的衝突。從消極面來看，台灣處於弱勢的一方，似乎亦不太有不參加的權利，在三方二軌對話中的缺席，台灣必須面臨隨時喪失權益或被出賣的風險，而任何對台灣不利的行為，都為台灣所無法承擔的。另外，在三邊的對話中，可使得台灣不同意見有表達的機會，美國亦可透過不同的價值判斷，對台灣的政策提出完整的陳述，增進三方的了解。⁹⁹第二管道正因為是非政府地民間接觸，所以可以有較為寬廣之對話空間，但是不能流於空談，也不能和政策脫勾太為嚴重。所以第二管道可以有傳達訊息、溝通觀念、激發思考等功能，基本上美方學者都是贊成地。進一步思考就是第二管道之深層價值，那一個機構或是個人具有代表性？和政策之連接最強？¹⁰⁰對雙方之立場較為瞭解？並且為中立之態度者？才適宜優先考慮為第二管道之代表。在規劃實際作法時，官方的態度尤其重要，第二軌道的成員或者要有某種授權，或者要有實際執行的政府機關參與提供意見，未來更需要官方管道把共識協議「正式化」，使得新點子及建設性意見可以得到落實。

⁹⁸ 中時晚報，二千年九月十六日。

⁹⁹ 中國時報，一九九八年七月十七日。

¹⁰⁰ 中國時報，一九九八年七月十五日。

第二管道不能取代第一管道

如美中關係全國委員會會長何立強所說：「第二管道是非正式，不能取代第一管道，美、日都有介入第二管道，關心政治、經貿問題」。¹⁰¹事實上，「第二軌道」從來就不是取代既有的海基會與海協會的談判管道，另建談判管道，而是在官方代表的談判場合外，另立一個非正式的、但仍具代表性的諮商與論壇(FORUM)性質的溝通管道。正因其非官方身分，與會者得以較無顧慮的發言，就各種問題提出不同論點，即使有所爭執、衝突，至少不是雙邊官方的正面衝突。但又由於有官方代表性，某些議題得以徹底討論。質言之，一旦以官方身分(即使是民間的海基會與海協會)坐上談判桌，則立場一定要擺在最前方，否則必然引發疑慮。但一些爭議性問題，如主權、國號、國旗、外交、加入國際組織等等，一旦上談判桌即無轉圜餘地。兩岸立場一樣鮮明，還有什麼討論的空間。¹⁰²正因為是非政府之管道，所以「第二管道不是談判，談判是政府行為，第二管道不能產生協議。台灣方面可以參與第二管道，但是總統接見第二管道學者時，就是寒暄，做做人際關係，不要宣布新政策，或是將重要話語託第二管道學者帶話，並不恰當。第二管道只是交換意見，不能弱化政府部門之行政功能第二管道沒有授權，當然不能進行談判，也不能做議題設定」。¹⁰³

第二管道溝通時可以討論之內容

第二管道討論內容，可以是很廣泛，但是要有聚焦，要有政策之可行性，如孔傑榮所指出「理想中規劃方向有兩岸加入世界貿易組織後關係，經濟交流之調整方法，兩岸解決紛爭之中介機構，以國際法探討台灣法律地位，台灣國際空間等問題，都是詳當詳細之規劃」。¹⁰⁴沈大衛則建議：「第二管道很重要，目前有許多雜音，但是台灣籍大陸要找到可靠之第二管道，讓一個中國原則之詳細內容可以清楚表述，而且取得共識，形成大陸方面要提出之政策，就可以展開對話，穩定兩岸關係」。¹⁰⁵最著名之第二管道美國外交政策全國委員會則以一個中國、台灣之國際空間、經濟議題及美方角色為討論主題。¹⁰⁶裴利所主持之第二管道則討論包括美中軍事交流現況、「信心建立機制」、台海議題、「戰區飛彈防禦系統」等問題。所以第二管道參與之學者，不見得是政治學者，基本上應當是對兩岸之現況有所瞭解，對兩岸過去之歷史有清楚之認識。並且在政治、經濟、社會、軍事等方面有一項或一項以上之專長，才能參與討論。討論核心應當是(一)對現存兩岸關係之評價，穩定或是不穩定，(二)短中長期之影響因素為何？(三)進一步討論一個中國問題及兩岸相互定位；(四)而後是兩岸經濟問題，如三通及兩岸加入世界貿易組織；(五)而後是政治談判議題(如結束敵對狀態及和平協定)；(六)台灣之國際空間議題；(七)最後觸及軍事互信機制。由於一般事

¹⁰¹ 筆者於二千年十月在紐約美中關係全國委員會訪問何立強會長之討論意見。

¹⁰² 中國時報，一九九八年七月十七日。

¹⁰³ 筆者於二千年九月在華府傳統基金會訪問葉望輝研究員之討論意見。

¹⁰⁴ 筆者於二千年十月在紐約外交關係協會訪問孔傑榮教授之討論意見。

¹⁰⁵ 筆者於二千年十二月在華府喬治華盛頓大學訪問沈大衛教授之討論意見。

¹⁰⁶ Samantha F. Ravic, *op.cit.*

務性議題之協商相當專業，此類議題在第二管道討論反而相當難以觸及。而大環境確認回復談判之可能性時，第二管道之溝通及傳遞訊息之功能，仍可以同時維持。和第一管道並不產生衝突。因此政府可將「第二軌道」定位為論壇性質，並積極參與美方重要智庫舉辦之第二管道會議，對於美方重要智庫機構辦理有關兩岸關係之公開、半公開或閉門式會議，政府仍應遴派合適學者或具官方身分之代表出席。重要地是加強與區域間非政府組織或會議聯繫管道，將是極其重要的一環。而爭取各非政府組織或會議負責人之支持，將是台灣適時涉入區域間非政府組織的最佳媒介。¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷中國時報，一九九八年七月二十四日。

III 研究及觀摩實習參訪過程心得

一、於席格爾東亞研究中心擔任訪問學者

由於赴美之初，即向美國喬治華盛頓大學 (*The George Washington University*) 艾利爾特國際事務學院 (*Elliott School of International Affairs*) 席格爾東亞研究中心 (*The Sigur Center for Asian Studies*) 申請以訪問學者方式至該中心研究本專題獲准，故自六月廿八日抵達華府後，即逕赴喬大席格爾中心報到。

首先由該中心執行助理 (*executive associate*) 黛博拉·透伊小姐 (*Deborah L. Toy*) 及計畫助理 (*program assistant*) 莊林育子小姐 (*Ikuko Shobayashi Turner*，美籍日裔，其夫為美國人) 兩位協助辦理訪問學者之權利義務等各項行政手續，以及需注意事項。並於七月初拜訪甫自密西根大學返回華府之該中心主任布魯斯·狄克森先生 (*Bruce J. Dickson*，狄克森主任對職於訪問學者期間之評語詳如附件一)，向其報告並討論為期半年之專題研究計劃 (研究期間共三次與主任面談訪問)。此外並與何漢理院長 (*Dean Harry Harding*) 預約拜會時間，於七月底始得見面致謝、報告訪學計劃，並就研究專題之內容請其惠賜意見 (研究期間共二次與院長面談訪問)。

訪問學者學術地位相當於該校教授，故通常申請該校訪問學者須具備博士學位者、或具該研究領域特殊經驗者。於該中心擔任訪問學者，可獲分配一間獨立或兩人一間之獨立研究室以供閱讀資料、撰寫學術報告等學術研究之用。每位訪問學者每月可於該中心之自設小型圖書館內複印資料兩百張 (免費)，如超出此限則另依每張計價收取影印費用。該中心均會於每位訪問學者到校之初，辦妥一張該校之身分證，可用之於進出該校圖書館，每次借書可借廿五本以上 (由於該校圖書館已與鄰近之美利堅大學、喬治梅森大學連線，故可於任何一校借閱書籍資料，身分證亦可用於館際合作之學校借書認證。)，並可免費使用該圖書館之電腦室。

訪問學者來自東亞各國，以日本、韓國及中國大陸居多，另來自臺灣、澳洲則較少見，設有提供訪問學者之獨立研究室計約六間 (其中僅有一間設有電腦備用)。中心內設有一小型圖書室，收集有關東亞研究之各項重要期刊 (內容不及本會十八樓之圖書，但是圖書館館藏則有最新之英文書籍及期刊資料)，除可借閱外，亦可於該圖書室影印或閱讀 (僅可容納約六至八人的座位)。另設電腦室一間，計有兩部電腦可供訪問學者於中心時使用。

席格爾東亞研究中心內另設有「中國政策計畫」 (*China Policy Program*)。指導者為沈大偉教授 (*David Shambaugh*)，渠為前任東亞研究中心之主任。東亞研究中心近年來已有多位來自大陸之解放軍大校級軍官在沈大偉教授主持的該

項研究計畫資助下，赴該中心訪問。沈大偉教授邀渠等參與其於一九九九年於喬大新開之「中國解放軍之研究」課程中討論，並與該批來自大陸解放軍訪問學者互動頻繁。故該中心近兩年來之訪問學者主要來自沈大偉教授主持下的「中國政策計畫」，另餘者為直接向該中心自行申請者，沈大偉一直想促成兩岸軍人於該中心進行非正式之交流。

根據觀察，近年來大陸申請至該中心為訪問學者人數有逐漸增多之趨勢。除解放軍系統可獲「中國政策計畫」資助來訪之外，大陸其他學術單位亦有申請至該中心擔任訪問學者。舉例而言，與^職同時期位於東亞研究中心之研究室之隔壁，即為任職於大陸軍事科學院之解放軍大校軍官王保存（男，年約六十歲），及另一解放軍陸軍大校華留虎（男，年約五十歲），正對門為大陸復旦大學國關係畢業，目前於威斯康辛大學任教之王建偉（男，年約四十五歲），另一位為大陸北京國際關係研究中心研究員錢立偉（男，約四十餘歲，甚少到研究中心，其為美國福特基金會補助）。

二、舉辦非正式論文發表會

在研究期間之尾聲，於十二月十九日經席格爾中心之安排，在其會議室進行一場非正式之論文發表會，將此一期間與美方學者交換意見之心得，以書面方式提交，並發表簡短之說明，接受與會學者之詢問，包括在喬治華盛頓大學進修之大陸學者，都踴躍出席發問，側重點在於一個中國問題（大陸學者稱原則），美方之角色、臺灣之反應，新政府成立之後對於兩岸關係之作為，小三通政策之影響等。大陸學者砲火猛烈，職已視情況於會議中作適時必要之簡短說明，正如狄克森主任所說，我以正面而積極之立場說明或澄清我政府大陸政策之基本立場。方其時，華府初雪，在研討會場外，正飄下細細之雪花，其景象，和職個人第一次二個多小時皆以英文回應、發表之經驗，都令人難忘。

三、參加與國際關係及兩岸關係相關之研討會

華府此間由大學（喬治華盛頓大學、約翰霍普金斯大學、喬治城大學、馬里蘭大學等學校）、智庫（傳統基金會、美國企業研究所、布魯金斯研究所、戰略暨國際研究中心、大西洋理事會、尼克森中心、藍德公司等各傾向自由派或保守派之研究單位）、旅美大陸民運人士或團體、臺灣團體或僑社、國會等單位或部門舉辦公開有關大陸臺灣間兩岸關係與國際關係之學術研討會或公聽會甚多。

各式研討會或公聽會之言論立場及政黨傾向亦各有不同，除可藉此深入瞭解問題不同面向及蒐集議題所需資料外，並可藉此場合認識、交換意見，或進一步可與參與研討會或公聽會之兩岸學者專家或政府官員訪談（或另約定時間訪談），以擴大瞭解議題的面向，並建立與美國研究兩岸關係學者建立聯繫管道，

作為返國後工作上之參考。(相關訪問紀錄一併於報告中呈現)

四、拜訪華府、波士頓、紐約、舊金山等地智庫或大學之研究員、專家及教授等訪談摘要

華府地區：

何漢理 (Harry Harding)

喬治華盛頓大學 Elliott 學院院長

訪問時間：九月七日上午八時及十二月十二日下午二時三十分

訪問地點：喬治華盛頓大學 Elliott 學院院長辦公室



重點摘要：

- 一、汪道涵先生秋天不大可能來訪。(九月接受訪問時表示)
- 二、目前有關「一個中國」問題仍然尚未解決。
- 三、中國大陸以「體法」(此二個中文字，何漢理親自以中文寫出)來要求台灣遵循一個中國原則。
- 四、中國視統一為唯一選項，台灣則是以統一為選項之一，二岸有相當大之差距。大陸方面認為陳水扁將統一只是列為選項之一，是一個大改變。
- 五、他所提出之中程安排，或許是一個穩定之架構。(何漢理新文章將其定義為 Interim Arrangements，採用複數形式，並且避開協

議等法律用詞。)

- 六、對於中程安排，何漢理說基本上我希望某一天兩岸可以達成某種形式的最終協議，這首先還是要有一個臨時協議，以穩定形勢。我們希望這個議題在某一天會解決，從臨時協議邁向最終的協議和解決。目前希望著力在基礎項目之相互保證（中共不武力犯台，除非台灣宣佈獨立；台灣不片面宣佈獨立，除非中共使用武力統一。）、發展兩岸對話機制、擴大經濟及文化連結、擴大台灣在國際社會之角色扮演、軍事互信機制、美方不作調人之角色，僅提出穩定之架構。職回復，其實許多項目都已經在進行，如小三通之開放、大三通之規劃，兩岸加入世貿組織之因應及兩岸對話（在美之第二管道），目前缺乏正式之兩岸海基、海協會協商管道。
- 七、何漢理認為所謂施壓，在台灣及美國等民主社會都是不容易之事情，因為有國會及媒體之監督。
- 八、大陸目前認定陳總統不可能有合作、談判空間，但也清楚理解民進黨目前是執政之政府，擁有實權之執政黨。
- 九、兩岸在九二年討論一個中國，據唐樹備向何漢理表示：「兩岸九二年有認同一個中國原則之共識，才有九三年之辜汪會談」。後來再有九五、九六年之台海危機、九九年之特殊國與國關係，二千年之大選，局勢有相當大之改變。有好的轉變，如錢其琛對一個中國之新說法，就具有彈性，職詢問有關一個中國由誰定義之問題，何漢理表示，的確是大問題，若是一個中國是 PRC，則台灣的確無法接受。台灣問題，也不適合港澳模式來解決。台灣和大陸，也不是地方與中央政府之關係。
- 十、美方希望大陸方面不要使用武力統一之立場是很明確地。新政府若是布希上任，對三不之立場應當仍是持續地。
- 十一、兩岸短期內是不穩定，美方有新總統上任，大陸在二〇〇二年有權力轉移問題，台灣方面更是政黨之間問題重重。
- 十二、在長程上，兩岸問題之解決，可以有一個大中國之概念（這也是一個中國），以邦聯模式來處理。現階段，大陸就結束內戰狀態進行協商。之後北京會施很大的壓力，要台北把統一的條件明確化。但這也會對北京造成壓力，要北京考量以邦聯形式解決台海問題的可能性。
- 十三、台灣目前說，統一是選項之一，而在什麼狀況下考慮與大陸統一。在某種條件下的一個中國(One China but only if)，與在某條件下會選擇統一(We will select unification but only if)，差異看起來不會太大。當然，其基本的概念並不一樣，一個是對統一有承諾；另一個只是說，「我會考慮統一」。台灣其實可以說，

接受一個中國，但是在什麼前提之下（亦即設定條件），其實和統一是一是選項之一，邏輯上說得通，但是字眼上會明確一點。

高立夫 (Ralph N. Clough)

約翰霍普金斯大學教授

訪問時間：十月十三日上午十點三十分

訪問地點：約翰霍普金斯大學



重點摘要：

- 一、兩岸現狀基本上是穩定的，唐飛下台及張俊雄先生之接任院長，並不影響兩岸關係（但是中共對此一改變，其實是震驚 shock，原因是不預期到此一轉變，故仍採聽其言，觀其行之方式。），而陳水扁總統之就職演說及後來之表現，都十分良好。而兩岸之間商業活動仍是十分密切，兩岸加入世界貿易組織，有消息指出，是在今年年底，那也是正面地。而中共領導人目前是關切加入世貿組織後之新情勢發展。對美方而言，剛通過之 PNTR，和大陸關係保持穩定，而大陸方面採取高的姿態，持續以一個中國原則要求台灣方面接受，而對陳總統所提之九二年精神，大陸反應並不接受。
- 二、大陸方面對一個中國原則，並不急著討論內容，而只是要台灣方面接受，其目的是不讓台灣走遠。其立場是從九二年共識，促成新加坡之辜汪會談，而後有江澤民之江八點，甚至在李總統訪美前夕，還派出唐樹備到台灣進行商談，直到李總統訪美，發表演說後，大陸方面意識到情勢嚴重，

所以才推遲辜汪會談，進而有飛彈危機。二岸中斷商談一段時間，而到去年有兩國論，使北京對復談更無意願。所以會要求台灣方面做出具體行動，如領導人聲明，回到一個中國原則，另一方面則要求美國停止對台軍售。（職回應中共當時是以政治對話、程序性商談及政治談判之規劃進行對我之談判，高立夫教授則拿出中共白皮書英文本加以對照。）

- 三、 中共對台灣的種種說法，其實就是內外有別，兩岸上有汪的八十六字及錢其琛之說法，要平等對話、汪說一個中國不是中華人民共和國也不是中華民國，但是國際上，就是不平等，另外有三句話，世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部份，中國為一合法代表就是中華人民共和國。所以對於錢其琛之說法，高立夫之評論是：沒有基本的改變。
- 四、 對於中共中斷協商，高立夫的評論是一個錯誤，原因是若是採取 open door policy 來談，才能逐漸將目的達成。而且從經濟角度，兩岸關係之密切，台灣根本無法脫離 (go away)。
- 五、 第二管道有助於討論及溝通，並建立學者之間聯繫之友誼。
- 六、 對於中程協議，有一種說法是，當陸士達提出中程協議之建議後，台北回應的是兩國論。但高立夫之評論是，中程協議只是一種主意 (idea)，不是一種政策 (policy)，目前也不是美國政府之政策。
- 七、 對於未來事件，高立夫建議台灣應重視在未來世界貿易組織及 APEC 之角色，其實不要在意 APEC 領袖會議，台灣的總統是否能出席，媒體只關心此一重點，其實，在小組會議及部長級會議中，台灣都能有許多角色級功能。此一內部討論及會議時，其實與會之大陸及台灣代表都是平等地，這就是重要的模式，對於日後台灣參加國際非政府組織，可以參考此一模式。

沈大偉 (David Shambaugh)

喬治華盛頓大學國際關係學院政治系教授

訪問時間：十二月七日下午二時

訪問地點：喬治華盛頓大學席格爾東亞研究中心



重點摘要：

- 一、 兩岸關係現況極不穩定，原因是第一、台灣目前之政治狀況不穩定，陳總統之政府缺乏權力基礎，被視為弱勢政府。第二、兩岸間缺乏互動對話機制。從李前總統到陳總統都缺乏對於兩岸對話之規劃。
- 二、 台灣應當先接受一個中國原則，將此定義為對話之基礎。但是很清楚的是，一個中國原則不是目前大陸方面所表述之三句話，也不是國際上對中華人民共和國之三句話，錢其琛之說法，有彈性，但是不夠。所以目前球是在大陸方面，大陸應當先提出一個彈性，而且台灣可以接受之說法，就可以展開兩岸之對話，而台灣方面在大陸提出有彈性之說法後，應當承認一個中國原則。
- 三、 沈大衛建議，一個中國未來之模式應當是邦聯，最為合適。國名可以就是中國，這樣中華民國及中華人民共和國都消失了，雙方都不要對彼此之國名有所堅持。從新建構一個新的中國。大陸方面所提出之一國兩制，不夠彈性，不夠吸引力。既然是邦聯模式，台灣就可以有國際空間，但是這需要兩岸談一談。
- 四、 九二年共識是不是 agree to disagree，聽多了雙方說法，大陸方面有，台灣方面也聽了蘇起之說法，但是都搞混了，現在也不清楚究竟是怎樣一

回事。


- 五、 但無論如何，未來一個中國，不是中華人民共和國，不是中華民國，有助於解決兩岸問題。台灣是中國的一部份，不是中華人民共和國的一省，這也是明確地。這部分，大陸方面要提出意見，要有開放性政策（open policy），沈大衛說他個人向大陸方面也是提出相同之意見。
- 六、 台灣方面希望美國介入調停，及更動三不政策，沈大衛說那是不可能地。
- 七、 第二管道很重要，目前有許多雜音，但是台灣籍大陸要找到可靠之第二管道，讓一個中國原則之詳細內容可以清楚表述，而且取得共識，形成大陸方面要提出之政策，就可以展開對話，穩定兩岸關係。軍隊及退職官員之第二管道也是很重，沈大衛說一直希望邀請台灣國防部高級人員，如上校或將軍到華府來進行訪問計畫，和解放軍有所交流，但是台灣方面一直不肯。
- 八、 中程協議是包裹式決議，一方不用武，一方不獨立。但是沈大衛說二十年、五十年太久了，大陸方面不會同意。五年，是大陸能接受之期限，而解決兩岸問題，沈大衛說法，是越快越好，而形容台灣問題，是重大之癌症，及早處理，對台灣、大陸、美國，三邊都有好處。
- 九、 沈大衛說：張萬年並未像新聞媒體所說，五年內必有一戰之說法。但是對台灣而言，未來十年，大陸對台灣之軍事壓力，將逐漸增強，台灣即使買再多武器，也無法抵禦。換言之，時間在大陸那一方面，台灣之籌碼逐漸減少。
- 十、 台灣可以做的是，解決台灣目前之政治問題。透過第二管道和大陸方面交換一個中國之詳細內容，取得大陸之同意，台灣也可以接受之內容，然後大陸宣布內容，台灣接受一個中國原則，啟動兩岸之協商，當然，目前球是在大陸那一邊。
- 十一、 台灣方面可以有渠道和大陸國台辦副主任周明偉聯繫，周較為彈性，可以談一談一個中國原則。

藍普頓 (David M. Lampton)

約翰霍普金斯大學教授，中國研究系主任

訪問時間：十月四日下午三點

訪問地點：尼克森中心



重點摘要：

- 一、 中共在北戴河會議之後，決定了三件事情：第一是對台灣 wait and see (時間是三個月或更長)；第二是著重經濟改革；第三是不與台灣任何人士，特別是陳水扁進行協議。
- 二、 中共對於唐飛下台，其實是著急地，因為唐飛至少有中國人精神，而新的行政院長是民進黨籍，中共並不信任，但是另一方面，更凸顯陳是少數政府之性質。
- 三、 李登輝先生提出兩國論，其實是朝向不願意談判之路，而陳水扁總統只是說以後不提兩國論了，其實表示不說出，而實質上，中共判斷陳是走兩國論路線。
- 四、 美國在意的是，若是台灣走向獨立，中共使用武力，則台海之和平就受到威脅。
- 五、 陳水扁總統所說九二年精神，和中共所提九二年共識，是有一段差距。
- 六、 現在有十一月之美國總統大選及兩岸加入世界貿易組織問題，並不適合談判，原因是第一：北京等待美國新總統選完之局勢，是民主或是共和黨人當選再做處理；第二是觀察台灣陳水扁之地位有多強，希望能夠強大到能談判，也希望不要衰弱到不能談判。(to be strong enough to talk, and

not to be weak enough not to talk.)

- 七、藍普頓謙虛說，他只是一個小人物 (little potato)，不是密使，第二管道只有學者交換意見之主要功能，即使是裴利先生都不是密使，因為密使是不曝光，您我都不會知道，曝光的，就不是密使。密使必須是保密地及安靜地。外國人不瞭解兩岸關係之複雜，所以無法擔任密使。
- 八、藍普頓預測，二至四年是穩定階段，但是長程而言，兩岸關係不穩定，這樣對美國之利益並不好。不穩定原因是：第一、中國在經濟改革成功後成為強國。第二、台灣相形之下較為微小而又鄰近中國。第三、中國強大之後對台灣施加壓力，而台灣又有新台灣人精神，反對中國施壓。
- 九、美國即使是總統大選之後，不會更動中國政策，就是不希望台灣走向獨立，而美國支持台灣民主化，所以不會對同為民主國家之台灣施以壓力，也不會 push 台灣談判，持續要求兩岸對話，而且重視兩岸經濟交流。對美國而言，兩岸交流及對話是穩定兩岸關係之重要二件事情。(職向藍普頓說明這也是本會重視對話及交流兩支柱。)
- 十、第二管道談論許多內容，如軍事互信機制，經濟改革及交流，但不十分有用，只對學者交換意見層面有用，就是溝通功能，對政策形成並無直接功用。
- 十一、一個中國問題，錢其琛三句話，最後回歸到一個重要問題就是，一國究竟是什麼？在一國的大框架下，包含軍事、外交、社會、經濟制度，就需要討論台灣究竟有多少外交空間及外交承認問題，或是在國際組織中的席位問題。
- 十二、在台灣提出九二年精神，而中國又堅持一個中國原則下，汪道涵不會訪問台灣。
- 十三、中共對台決策人物，主要是江澤民、錢其琛，另外王兆國、熊光楷作用不大，而汪道涵是指標人物，但不是決策人物。
- 十四、楊傑勉及上海學者近日到華府訪問，傳達二項事情，第一是錢其琛改變對一個中國看法，就是和汪道涵一致 (藍普頓表示，就是說之前不一致)。第二件事情就是要求美國不要軍售台灣。但是藍普頓表示，根據台灣關係法，要售予台灣足夠之防禦性武器，就是在武器質量上有彈性 (武器之數量多少及品質好壞)，但是美國有義務售予台灣防禦性武器。

大衛布朗 (David Brown)

約翰霍普金斯大學教授

訪問時間：十月三日上午十點鐘

訪問地點：約翰霍普金斯大學中國研究系

重點摘要：



- 一、一個中國問題，美國並無名確定義，在美國立場上，是以上海公報為基礎，認識到中國方面之立場，美方並不挑戰此一立場，重點是兩岸應和平解決。
(上海公報，美國方面聲明：美國認識到，在臺灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議。它重申它對由中國人自己和平解決臺灣問題的關心。)
- 二、美國支持民主之台灣政府，是基於長久之友誼，及對民主政治之支持；而周邊國家依賴美國，大家都會觀察美國如何對待台灣，這是美國之信用問題。台灣民主化成就，正可以成為中國民主化之借鏡。
- 三、美國軍售台灣，是為保衛台灣安全，以台灣關係法為基礎，確保台海和平。柯林頓之三支柱，其基礎是三公報，但是對民主台灣的支持，仍是美國政策。
- 四、對於台灣之戰略地位，其實美國不因為台灣之戰略地位而考量二岸問題。而陳水扁總統關於就職演說之四不改變及一不廢除（只要中共無意對台動武，本人保證在任期之內，不會宣佈獨立，不會更改國號，不會推動兩國論入憲，不會推動改變現狀的統獨公投，也沒有廢除國統綱領與國統會的

- 問題。)，其實就是符合中共對於現狀之要求，中共就無藉口挑起戰爭。
- 五、陳水扁總統未來一個中國之論點，並不足以作為重啟協商之基礎。台灣必須評估自己之政治、經濟、社會、安全等各項利益，作為是否協商之依據。
- 六、大陸以接受一個中國原則作為重啟協商之基礎，若台灣接受，自然很好，若台灣不接受，大陸就藉口是台灣破壞對話。另一方面，則對台灣各政黨、團體做大量工作，形成台灣政府壓力。
- 七、大陸判斷民進黨執政之政府是弱勢政府，但是台灣可以成立論壇討論一九九二年共識，並透過世界貿易組織解決與大陸之經貿問題。
- 八、台灣對於中程協議，可以務實性的解決事務性問題，再進到政治問題。做到 agree to disagree. 。
- 九、美國政府的態度是不介入，鼓勵雙方對話，只是促進者，也不施壓，因為北京不喜歡美國介入，台灣則不要美國介入，才會有經國總統時期的六項保證。美國則有立法、行政部門不同意見，無法施壓力。
- 十、李登輝總統和陳水扁總統不同，李是不談判，陳則明白宣示要對話、談判，給予美國人正面的印象。陳喜歡的對話架構是 PRC 對 Taiwan. 。
- 十一、錢其琛三句話雖然有彈性，但是不足以構成台灣上談判桌之理由，因為內外有別之說法，使其彈性有限。中共對台政策很清楚，就是鄧小平時期立下之一國兩制，以地區政府，賦予台灣經濟、社會地位、部分之國際空間，江澤民不會更動此一架構，對台工作中，江澤民及錢其琛是指標性人物。
- 十二、新政府由民進黨人士張俊雄接任，對中共而言，會覺得可疑。因為對民進黨之不信任，而目前黨政全由民進黨人士出任要職，中共對新情勢存有疑慮。

武爾茲 (Larry M. Wortzel)

傳統基金會亞洲研究中心主任

訪問地點：華府傳統基金會

訪問時間：十月三日下午三點



重點摘要：

- 一、一般美國人不瞭解一個中國原則，甚至政治人物也不太清楚，事實上，美國一個中國政策是立基於三個公報及台灣關係法之上。美國認知道中國對於一個中國之立場，但是希望和平解決。但是柯林頓總統在上海所提出之三不，是大錯誤。若是高爾上台，會持續柯林頓政策，但是小布希會比較有彈性。
- 二、解決二岸問題需要台灣人民之同意，若無人民之同意，協定或是條約就不可能成立。
- 三、中共目前之作法是聽其言，觀其行 (wait and see)，非常關注地並且小心觀察台灣政局，並使用許多壓力。但是陳總統之演說及表現非常好，台灣有意願對話及談判，大陸則是使用武力威脅。
- 四、中程協議來自李侃如、陸士達之提議，伍爾茲認為是一個危險之壞主意。並不是美國政策，個人意見而已，壞處是推台灣走向談判之路，給予台灣壓力。
- 五、第二管道是有用的東西，不同之學者專家聚在一起，交換訊息，討論，提出不同論點，在此意義上，是好東西，但不是政府政策，美國立場很清楚，就是不介入，不調停，不施壓。第二管道是二岸之第三者，不應設定議程，

是一個自由論壇，任何人都可以提供意見。可選擇使用，即使有十個組織都沒有關係。但是最後一定是政府對政府之談判。

- 六、 加入世界貿易組織對兩岸而言，都是長程之計畫，或許明年（二〇〇一年），兩岸有機會加入世貿。
- 七、 小三通之政策很好，解決一些問題，但是北京之意圖是大三通。日後更好之處理是將軍隊從金門和馬祖撤出，有助於兩岸之和平（表達和平之善意），也可以省一點經費，因為戰略上，在現代武器之下，尤其是飛彈威脅之下，金門和馬祖駐有太多軍隊，其實是沒有作用地。
- 八、 一九九二年共識，是國民黨時代之共識，時空點及領導人都不一樣了，難以恢復。重點是「一個中國」是概念問題，是抽象概念，不能具體化，而中共所謂「一個中國原則」是規範，不可違反，二者不一樣。一個中國可以談，因為抽象，所以各方可以賦予意義，但是一個中國原則就不能談。
- 九、 一個中國底下，可以討論台灣外交空間、中共不使用武力、經濟問題、社會問題、文化交流，但是會影響美國對台軍售，這是解釋權問題。由誰來界定一個中國之意義。
- 十、 對於台灣新的行政院長上台，在此時間點上，中共仍是 wait and see。但是汪道涵是否今年或是明年訪台，把握不大，誰知道呢？（Who knows），變數太多。

Samantha F. Ravich (戴維琪，目前任職於美國副總統辦公室)

CSIS 資深研究員 (紐約圓桌會議五次參與人員及記錄撰稿者)

訪問時間：十二月五日上午八點四十五分

訪問地點：CSIS 華府辦公室



重點摘要：

- 一、 第二管道提供台灣及大陸雙方學者見面，提出建議討論之管道，已經舉行五次，將於明年（二〇〇一年）二月或三月間繼續在紐約舉行。初期台海雙方之學者討論較少，第二次後，互動就明顯增加。但是大陸方面學者則比較不傾聽台灣方面意見。
- 二、 美方扮演一個平衡者之中立角色，不介入雙方之紛爭，不是一個調停者。
- 三、 討論主題有四項：一個中國、台灣之國際空間、經濟議題及美方角色。
- 四、 最後一次討論，雙方學者有提到，乾脆使用「九二年共識精神」以滿足雙方需要。
- 五、 大陸目前認為陳水扁總統之政府為弱勢政府，認為沒有必要進行協商，因為不要給陳加分，協商不出所以然來。大陸認為，陳之弱勢政府，其實有助於大陸推展對台灣之政策及工作。
- 六、 美方希望台灣保有安全之現況，此項穩定，有助於美方利益。但是美方不希望台灣之政府過於強大，導致走向台灣獨立。
- 七、 目前大陸宣告若是台灣走向獨立，就會用武，台灣則稱若是大陸用武，就會走向獨立，其實是一種穩定狀況。

- 八、 政治議題方面，討論最多就是一個中國問題。
- 九、 在台灣國際空間方面，雖然台灣不能加入聯合國，但是有學者提出，應當讓台灣加入世界衛生組織（WHO），例證是像是以往巴解（PLO），不是一個國家，都能成為聯合國之觀察員，何以台灣的目前地位，連一個非政治之世界衛生組織都不能加入，令人訝異。而大陸方面若同意台灣加入，也可以有一個較為良好之形象。
- 十、 最後一次討論時，有加上第五個議題，就是台灣之安全，主要是討論美方及台灣之信心建立措施（CBM）。
- 十一、 對於未來，由於大陸在公元二〇〇二年將進行權力交接，預計在目前，並不不會有對台之大動作出現。換言之，兩岸將有短暫之穩定情況。

葉望輝

訪問時間：八十九年九月二十八日下午二點三十分

訪問地點：華府傳統基金會



內容要點：

- 一、 柯林頓總統之三不政策，其實是違反上海公報精神，上海公報中提到「一個中國」是「美國認識到，在臺灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人都認為只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分。美國政府對這一立場不提出異議。它重申它對由中國人自己和平解決臺灣問題的關心」。此一立場是希望兩岸以和平方式解決二岸問題。對台灣處理一個中國問題之建議，葉望輝表示，不要使用「一個中國原則」字眼，因為不利於台灣。一個中國是北京對台灣在

兩岸談判中設定的不利框架。

- 二、北京所謂一國兩制，在一國之下，例如天安門事件，只要中共覺得有需要，中國人一樣會被施以武力，二制則雖說保障經濟、社會制度，但是卻不保障和平。
- 三、美國應該給予中華民國足夠地防衛性武器，因為確保和平，就是希望中華民國能有保衛自己的能力，並且透過談判，由海基會、海協會之二岸二會談判，到陸委會及國台辦之談判，進入到政府及政府的談判。
- 四、美國應該支持台灣的民主政府，柯林頓總統了解台灣因是民主政府，雙方之間的任何安排最後都須是台灣民眾可接受的安排，換言之，最後兩岸問題的解決若需要訂定協議，都需要經由台灣人民的同意等民主程序才行。
- 五、美方相當肯定陳總統上台後對兩岸關係處理，認為陳是具有理性思考、有彈性、有信用的政治人物，此一部份是令人讚賞地。
- 六、美國應當鼓勵台灣在國際非政府組織中扮演更積極的角色，如 WTO、APEC 等，經由國際非政府組織，可以加速兩岸整合工作。
- 七、整合從小處做起是有幫助地，對中共而言，若是要將台灣處理成香港模式，整合，確認現實狀況，一步步將台灣香港化，將是有所助益。對台灣而言，若是要爭取延緩統一時間，透過國際非政府組織之交流及整合，正可以爭取時間。對美國而言，一個和平穩定之現況，經由國際之努力，正可以將兩岸問題導入減少衝突之正軌。
- 八、對於第二管道，葉望輝認為，第二管道不是談判，談判是政府行為，第二管道不能產生協議。台灣方面可以參與第二管道，但是總統接見第二管道學者時，就是寒暄，做做人際關係，不要宣布新政策，或是將重要話語託第二管道學者帶話，並不恰當。因此，第二管道只是交換意見，不能弱化政府部門之行政功能第二管道沒有授權，當然不能進行談判，也不能做議題設定。
- 九、關於中程協議，並不是美方政策，至多是一項想法 (idea)，葉望輝認為並不可行，因為並沒有一個外在之調停者，美方只希望兩岸問題和平解決，但是不會跳進來當一個調停者。美國不介入，中共也不喜歡中程協議，所以並不可行。對於放棄武力問題，中共是不會承諾，而中共不放棄武力，台灣又不能接受，協議將不會達成。
- 十、大陸上海、及北京之對台學者說法，的確有一點不太一樣，上海一般比較彈性，但是在對台政策上，汪道涵有影響力，但不是決策人物，錢其琛及江澤民才是，所以其實許多人到大陸說見到汪道涵，至多就是傳遞訊息，不能影響決策地。
- 十一、錢其琛三段論之新說法，有一點彈性，但是不要忘記主權及領土不能分割，這樣的彈性，就失去了意義。因為一涉及主權，就是對立，沒有彈性。
- 十二、針對九二共識，葉望輝說「何不各自表述九二共識」，就在此基礎上，重起協商，因為，九二共識，很難說有對一個中國問題取得共識，中共又

一直強調一個中國原則，台灣強調，一個中國，各自表述，那麼，何不將九二共識模糊化，就是一個新的各自表述。

- 十三、 葉望輝認為短期之內，汪道涵不會訪台，因為中共設定一個中國原則，若是對陳總統及民進黨之印象朝向台獨，則汪道涵根本不會見陳總統，也不和執政的民進黨接觸，那他來幹什麼？
- 十四、 明年九月，在美國新總統產生後的第一次 APEC 領袖會議，在美國舉行，或許是兩岸復談的一項契機，原因是，新總統若是願意對中共施加壓力，對兩岸恢復協商加把勁，以產生一個穩定局面，則明年九月就是一個重要時間點。
- 十五、 台灣在對兩岸關係發展上，不要限定於政府對政府關係，其實最重要是人民對人民 (people to people) 關係，因為真正要改變中國大陸，不是政府，而是將人民之想法改變，就要透過人民對人民之直接影響。中共目前重要是經濟改革，社會上重視生活，所以台灣在經濟、社會、文化、教育等方面，透過學校、醫院、基金會、團體、學者來影響中國大陸。並進一步展現台灣之善意。
- 十六、 葉望輝建議，台灣是民主多元社會，很多聲音，很多意見，但是兩岸關係上，應當以陳總統發言，及陸委會主委講話為基調，以整合政策。其他團體、政黨發言只能是各人意見，不能代表政府。
- 十七、 有關兩岸進入 WTO 問題，年內可能沒法達成，葉望輝估計是明年上半年完成。

裴敏欣 (Minxin Pei)

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 卡內基 國際和平基金 資深研究員

訪問時間：十月九日下午二時

訪問地點：卡內基 國際和平基金會



重點摘要：

- 一、 有關一個中國定義，汪道涵及錢其琛都有變化，汪的說法由鬆而緊，錢的說法則是由緊而鬆，但是和台灣底線都有一些距離。錢其琛目前新的三段論，是目前中國大陸有關一個中國框架的最大限度，前二句話是領土及歷史概念(世界上只有一個中國，台灣和大陸同屬於一個中國)重點是第三句話，有政治層面意涵(中國的主權和領土完整不容分割)而汪的八十六字，字數多了，漏洞就大了。
- 二、 觀察汪道涵近日並無發言，可能情形是第一、避免引起麻煩；第二、個人地位微妙；第三中共高層決定。汪道涵訪台問題，短期內不可能，因為中共不會給目前的台灣陳水扁總統加分，但是也不打算弄壞兩岸關係，所以暫時採取聽其言觀其行之冷處理。
- 三、 台灣和大陸目前都是使用兩手策略，台灣是表面上沒有台獨行動，但是實質上有。大陸則是和戰兩手，和呢是對台灣各政黨及民眾做工作，戰呢，就是做軍事準備工作，現在是只做不說，因為中共知道台灣人民有逆返心裡，不喜歡中共武力恐嚇，為了不惹火台灣民眾，所以只做不說。
- 四、 兩國論使中共對台系統措手不及，吃了悶虧，所以現在大陸採取之策略

是觀察，而不出言恐嚇。

- 五、 對台灣陳水扁總統已經定調，從統一不是唯一選項之談話，就認定陳沒有誠意恢復協商。而且認為陳之說法反反覆復，不知道台灣之底線究竟在何處，裴敏欣個人觀察陳總統、唐院長、陸委會蔡主委及民進黨對於兩岸關係之談話，都不太相同，令人難以判斷，用大陸說法就是：一碗水端平。等待一切穩定，再看看台灣水平線上之政策是否能恢復商談。
- 六、 北戴河會議主要是國內問題，不會將兩岸問題提上討論題綱。
- 七、 對現狀之判斷，台灣是避談，而究竟拖對誰有利，兩岸目前是處於不穩定因素中，最害怕有意外事故發生。大陸方面由於共產黨領導，自己覺得有十年、二十年之統治時間，而看台灣民進黨執政，後四年，不知道是否還是再執政地位，所以大陸可以等，但是大陸民心由於民族主義及愛國主義，認為台灣是中國之一部分，大陸領導人不能讓台灣獨立，其心情可以理解。對台灣而言，台灣領導人為個人威望，做出決策，例如李登輝先生訪美，反而激怒中共，或是兩岸軍備競賽，容易引發意外事件。對大陸而言，內部權力之爭，容易挑起台灣問題，增加軍備打台灣都是不穩定因素，所以今後十年是危險年代。國際因素中，美國立場及日本之經濟利益，預測未來，美總統大選之後，若是民主黨上台，政策將持續，若是共和黨上台，政策將改變，但是美方希望台灣不獨立，大陸不用武之立場不會更動。總體而言，對台灣，由於美方及大陸壓力，能拖，但是日子難過，對大陸而言能戰能談。
- 八、 目前之陳水扁，沒有犯錯空間，原因是之前李登輝先生常說一個中國，以此為帷幕，所以所作所為，可以有擋一下之空間，而陳缺乏此一帷幕，所以迴旋之空間有限。但是之前李之兩國論實際上已經是在戰爭邊緣。
- 九、 美國就是希望維持現狀，不讓大陸挑起事端，讓台灣謹守現狀，所以陳就職演說中四不及一不改變，就是不讓台灣向外走。
- 十、 李遠哲先生在組成小組時的判斷是對地。發言也是正面地，但是隨後陳沒有公開稱讚，使此一效用微弱化。裴敏欣判斷，陳水扁總統正走向原來民進黨那一塊，就是宣稱台灣是主權獨立國家，裴敏欣並指出，陳是念法律的，用字非常謹慎，所以當陳說台灣是主權獨立國家，大陸會認為此種宣稱就是法律上脫開一個中國，就是領土及主權分裂，這就是大陸一個中國政治概念之運用。
- 十一、 台灣目前策略是以談待拖，邊談邊拖，但是一定要注意，和鄰近大國，就是美、日之重大利益相吻合，才会有成功出路，裴敏欣建議，甚至可以和大陸談聯合國席位問題，軍隊問題，在非政府之國際組織席位問題，台灣能得多少，就得和大陸談，台灣的底線應當是，具有國際法律地位，此一作為，和美日之是否支持有關，目前美方態度是反對統一，反對台獨，簡稱不統，不戰，不獨。
- 十二、 中程協議不可行，原因是中國、美國、台灣都反對，大陸判斷台灣不敢獨立，所以嫌五十年太長。台灣嫌中程協議斷了自己後路。美方則因為是國

- 內有多元聲音，不可能施壓於民主國家台灣。所以美方會不介入，不插手。
- 十三、 對台灣唐飛院長辭職，裴敏欣認為對兩岸關係沒有影響，原因是裴敏欣認為原來台灣大陸政策本就不是由唐主導，而當時陳總統會任用唐飛，主要是和大陸打交道，唐沒有包袱，而且美方喜歡唐。
- 十四、 目前之第二軌道，其實都是在中共決策體系之外，所以沒有影響，真正參與決策之人，中共不會放他出來參與。例如中央政策研究室的幕僚。裴敏欣建議學者不用太重視，因為若是越在外面說和汪道涵或是錢其琛很熟的學者，照中國之官場，日後汪及錢都不會再諮詢此一人，所以真正參與決策之人，是不曝光的。若要有影響力，中共退休官員或是外交官，如唐樹備，就有一些影響力。
- 十五、 對於台灣大陸政策發言，裴敏欣建議應有足夠紀律性，就是不要多重發言，就是政府之中要有一致性，這樣大陸才能確認究竟是否台灣有誠意要恢復協商，否則政出多門，大陸會覺得難以承諾，會有被耍了的感覺。因此希望台灣政治人物談話不要反覆。除非是蓄意要反覆，這樣會有誤判。

狄克森 (Bruce J. Dickson)

喬治華盛頓大學席格爾東亞研究中心主任

訪問時間：十月十日上午十一時

訪問地點：喬治華盛頓大學席格爾東亞研究中心



重點摘要：

- 一、 新政府，唐飛之辭職，和兩岸關係無關。美方對陳水扁總統的印象是彈性、務實，有對北京談判之誠意，認為陳對於統一之看法，是務實地面對，認為陳至少回到正途，不像是李登輝先生提出兩國論，是走向分開之路。
- 二、 北京關切的是，目前全部都是民進黨之政府，對於一個中國原則接受與否，因此北京不會更友善，態度也不會更好，不會有遽變。
- 三、 陳水扁總統提出九二年精神，北京解讀是陳不接受九二年共識，才會說九二年精神，或說，沒有共識之共識。狄克森說九二年的確沒有簽署文件，沒有備忘錄，沒有書面諒解，若說是有共識，其實是微弱地。

- 四、 錢其琛之三句話，是中共對一個中國之新解釋，重建官方對一個中國之正式詮釋。態度較為務實。此是中共官方改變態度之第一射，照迪克森說法是，最重要不是第一射，而是要觀察江澤民、錢其琛等重要領導人之第二射，要聽到第二個聲音之後，才會知道中共之彈性究竟有多大，要有耐心等待。
- 五、 現狀是否穩定，可能是穩定，就某種層面來說，但是就不安全之層面來說，現況可能不佳。就台灣立場而言，陳水扁總統說沒有共識之共識，表示不願意接受一個中國原則，保持在現況，不會恢復談判。就大陸立場而言，要台灣接受一個中國原則及九二共識，才恢復協商，換言之，現狀是保持在僵持狀態。對美方而言，現況是沒有飛彈威脅，和平狀況，所以美方會認為陳水扁總統表現比預期的好。但是現況不會無限期延續，因為中共不喜歡現況，他會嘗試改變。
- 六、 明年，在美國總統選舉完之後，台灣立委選舉前，美方新總統總是嘗試要改變對於就總統之政策，對台灣關係，主要是依據台灣關係法，為避免戰爭，會依法售予台灣足夠地防禦性武器，作為台灣自衛之用，而美國會往往批評行政部門作得不夠。對於世界貿易組織問題，中國要求台灣依中國一個區域來入會，但是美方態度是獨立關稅領域(名稱TPKM)，此一點是確定地。
- 七、 小三通政策是好政策，解決一些問題，但是仍不夠好(good ,not enough)。
- 八、 台灣歡迎汪道涵訪問，但是可能的時間應該是明年吧。汪道涵訪台，是明確的指標，就是意味中共高層要進行兩岸政治談判，而此一訊息，中共會觀察陳總統之所言所行，所做回應而定。因為目前大陸方面覺得台灣對於一個中國說得不夠，所以信心不足。
- 九、 對於中程協議，台灣不喜歡，因為中程二字，怕被限制住，早先是李侃如之設計，但是預設有統一立場，後來何漢理之設計，至少沒有預設統一之未來，只是對現狀之不穩定做一些處理。對未來如何，何漢理是留給兩岸自行處理。大陸也不喜歡中程協議，原因是香港一九九七之後，大陸希望將台灣列有時程表，中程有五十年，大陸認為太長了。美方不介入，不調停，中程協議也不是美方之政策。
- 十、 對於第二管道，是好點子，可以有溝通，及諒解，建立彼此信任之友誼，應該鼓勵及歡迎，但是聽聽就是，第二管道不會介入政策制訂。
- 十一、 在中共對台政策中，江澤民仍是最重要人物，由他拍板定案，所謂軍方強硬派，地方區域較為軟性，其實都只是參考，因為中共對台決策是黑箱，誰也搞不清楚。但是江澤民對台希望有功績，原因是毛澤東有建國功勞，鄧小平有經改及收回香港，江目前沒有大功績，希望解決台灣問題，奠定個人歷史地位。對中國大陸而言，統一是一致性目標，方法不一，彈性不一，但是對統一之期望則是一致地。

唐耐心 (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker)

喬治城大學教授

訪問時間：十二月十二日下午四時三十分

訪問地點：華府喬治城大學



重點摘要：

- 一、兩岸短期內是穩定地，大陸對陳總統仍是採取 wait and see，但是對台灣在野之各黨派進行工作，到大陸訪問之台灣各黨派，都說陳水扁總統是弱勢總統，即將下台，此點，唐耐心十二月到大陸訪問時，大陸方面對台之學者是如此樂觀之期待，但是唐認為至少四年內，陳之任期是相當肯定地。長期不穩定之因素是，大陸方面之領導是相當弱 (Weak)，當不能解決大陸內部問題時，就會以台灣作為宣洩壓力之管道。
- 二、有關美方尊重台灣人民之意願說法，美國在台協會理事主席布希，早在一九九九年就說過，二千年美國總統說出，大家才加以重視。事實上，若是新總統是共和黨布希，則 AIT 及國務院中像是布希、張戴佑等理解台灣立場之人士會被換掉，其實是台灣方面之損失。
- 三、尊重台灣人民之意願說法，其實不是空泛地，因為台灣是和美國一樣之民主政體，民主之力量就是台灣在兩岸中之優勢。
- 四、兩岸若是缺乏互信，任何協議都不能有效，中程協議亦然。目前已經有一長段時間美方沒有討論中程協議議題。
- 五、第二管道，有助於溝通及討論，有一個機會，將兩岸之學者聚集在一起，是美方目前可以做地。

- 六、大陸目前對一個中國原則，沒有彈性，無線上綱，唐耐心在大陸訪問，幾乎所有學者、所有議題都先冠上一個中國原則，唐認為難以理解。而唐表示，大陸學者在大陸發言，其實是口徑一致地，沒有任何空間。
- 七、大陸北京方面學者表示，上海看似彈性，其實是對美工作，吸引美方注意，汪道涵並不會影響到北京決策。但唐認為大陸中央有許多人出身上海，怎么可能上海沒有影響力。
- 八、大陸方面判定陳水扁總統台獨之傾向是明顯地，也是深刻於內心，所以不會和其談判，也不會和民進黨接觸。
- 九、美方不會做一個兩岸之調停者或是平衡者，至多是提供一個兩岸溝通之中介角色。換言之，就是不提建議，不調停，只是鼓勵對話。
- 十、唐耐心，有一本新書問世，是二〇〇一年出版。資料如下：
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential, (New York: Columbia Press, 2001)

艾倫 (Kenneth W. Allen)

TASC 亞洲安全計畫資深分析家

訪問時間：十二月四日下午三點

訪問地點：TASC 華府辦公室



重點摘要：

十二、台灣在加入聯合國、李登輝先生訪美及兩國論等三件事情上犯錯，導致損及國家利益。

- 十三、大陸在強調政治談判及一個中國原則上犯錯，失去與台灣進行三通之時間。
- 十四、台灣應當嘗試在國際非政府組織及經濟性組織上著力，而不是花力氣在加入聯合國上，即使是加入了，又如何，安理會常任理事國，還是中華人民共和國。
- 十五、目前當面對兩岸處於內戰狀態，讓國民黨和共產黨去解決當時之內戰，結束敵對狀態，並且訂定和平協議 (peace treaty)，就是在黨對黨之階層解決，不要涉及台灣及大陸，中華民國對中華人民共和國之層次。
- 十六、在兩蔣時代，自一九四九年以來，不存有台獨問題。目前兩岸間，大陸最介意就是台灣獨立問題。
- 十七、領導者有三種類型，如政治型，像李鵬，如經濟型，像朱鎔基，如軍事型，像張萬年。但是老百姓最重視經濟，就是生活。
- 十八、台灣當然要重視 WTO 問題，因為這是經濟問題，老百姓關心。
- 十九、兩岸軍事互信機制，不一定要在政治問題解決之後才做，最為明顯就是熱線 (hot line) 及軍事演習之事先通知，有助於互信機制之建立。
- 二十、若是兩岸軍事人員要交流，建議排除政治因素，如國號等問題，最好在夏威夷進行研討，地點好，又有 Dr. Ralph A. Cossa 支持之機構 (Pacific Forum)，有組織，有經驗。
- 二十一、未來一年，局勢其實比較之前在白皮書階段，要好一點，穩定一點，大陸雖然常常顯露出對統一急迫性，如張萬年所說，五年內將有一戰，但是不要太在意，有這樣思考方式之老一輩將逐漸退休，年輕一代比較有世界觀，比較理性一點。中共十六大將是一個接班之重要時間點。

紐約地區：

黎安友 (Andrew J. Nathan)

哥倫比亞大學教授

訪問時間：十月十七日下午一點

訪問地點：哥倫比亞大學



重點摘要：

- 一、 要先理解大陸、台灣、美國對於兩岸關係處理之真正目的，才能進一步討論，有關於對一個中國問題使用不同字眼之意涵。美國使用一個中國政策，有一貫之連續性，大陸使用一個中國原則，指出不可放棄，必須遵守之原則，台灣基本上是對現狀之分離，希望持續越久越好 (as long as possible)。
- 二、 黎安友對兩岸關係的前景立場較為悲觀。他認為，對北京而言，讓兩岸目前的狀況趨於穩定不符合大陸的國家利益，也因此他認為，大陸可能會採取行動，造成兩岸局勢不穩定。所以北京對於現狀而言，研判台灣不會有所讓步，而對現狀之僵持感到憂心及不滿意。至於錢其琛對於一個中國之說法，基本上沒有大的改變。對於大陸對台政策，不管是派系模式、區域利益模式、官僚體制模式，黎安友都認為不是最準確，他認為大陸對台政策，是大陸國家利益模式下之核心利益，牽涉安全之利益。職詢問，台灣對大陸並無構成安全上之威脅，黎進一步解釋，是大陸對外防禦體系下，美日和台灣形成一股防禦力量，對大陸而言，就是安全之威脅。

- 三、 黎表示，九二年共識的確無書面之共識，但是當時雙方對於某些事項有共識，才会有持續推動日後之辜汪會談。台灣方面也很清楚表示，不接受大陸將一個中國原則變成談判之前提，但是九二年的確是有某些共識才能往下談。(make some consensus to talk)。
- 四、 中程協議不是美方政策，也不是美方要推動地，美方也無法幫兩岸設計怎樣之協議內容，這只是學者一些看法而已。
- 五、 同意第二管道有溝通意見之功能，因為不定期之溝通，有助於瞭解彼此意見之歧異，這是有幫助地。大陸方面拒絕和民進黨溝通，其實是失策，因為沒有溝通及接觸，就無法取得共同之瞭解。大陸並不瞭解民主台灣下之現況。
- 六、 現況看似穩定，其實是危險地。大陸不看好陳水扁總統下一任連任之可能性，所以寧可等待四年。因為大陸判斷陳對一個中國原則，不會妥協，不會接受一個中國原則，大陸方面認為這是和李登輝和不一樣的地方，因為李至少還談一個中國。
- 七、 陳總統五二〇演說中提出民主人權等概念，這在大陸方面，和台灣有很大一個代溝。
- 八、 目前兩岸其實沒有太大迴旋空間，大陸經濟改革將持續，台灣目前現況會持續一段時間，二個改變點就是兩岸加入世貿組織，及兩岸大三通，會有新衝擊。
- 九、 黎安友提出一個對大三通之觀點，他認為大陸目前不會輕易答應大三通，職反問，這是大陸之前一直強烈要求之事項，而且對大陸經濟有幫助，黎說，或許之前大三通之利益是大陸及台灣各有五十分，但是大陸認為此時會給陳加分，就是大陸只有四十九分，但是台灣有五十一分，此一衡量下，大陸寧可不要大三通。當然這也是大陸之困境，聲稱要在一個中國原則下進行兩岸大三通，一個中國要不到，大三通可能會被推遲。這是黎對大陸心態之研判。

何立強 (John L. Holden)

美中關係全國委員會會長

訪問時間：十月十七日上午十點

訪問地點：紐約美中關係全國委員會



重點摘要：

- 一、 第二管道是非正式，不能取代第一管道，美、日都有介入第二管道，關心政治、經貿問題。
- 二、 美國一貫立場是希望兩岸以和平方式解決問題，一再強調要談不要打。美國人及美國政府都無法徹底瞭解兩岸對話最微妙的地方。因此，無法拿出一個詳細方案，深信只有兩岸中國人自己才能解決自己問題。美國的角色是一貫地，就是不要一面倒。
- 三、 對於一個中國政策，並不是美方提出，台海兩岸對此一詞之見解差異相當大，大陸充分利用此一詞的技巧。海峽兩岸要對話，最缺乏互信，雙方都怕對方利用己方所說的話來歪曲，來佔便宜。對於台北方面來說，是說未來一個中國，北京則是說一個中國原則，美方所主張一個中國政策，柯林頓總統數月前加上需要台灣人民同意等用語，並且必要時，仍會以軍力介入，這是有台灣關係法作為保證。
- 四、 對於北京之對台政策及發展，整體面是看好，經濟改革及兩岸交流都是看好。汪道涵個人地位並無下降。對台政策仍是以江澤民主導。
- 五、 對時間而言，若是中國大陸經濟改革成功，在和平解決之前提下，中國大陸成功之可能性高，換言之，時間對大陸有利，台獨之可能性是很小地。

北京對最終解決之方式及時間有憂慮感，何立強認為未來將是邦聯或是聯邦形式。

- 六、何立強建議台灣方案不要提太清楚，太清楚大陸會挑毛病，就讓大陸提方案，模糊一點應對比較好。
- 七、對於中程協議，何立強認為不應該明白提出，由美方來提更不適宜，應當暗地去談。目前是有其他渠道可以來談。何立強建議李遠哲或是民進黨信任之人可以到第三地和大陸方面所派之人來談一談。澄清一些問題，提出一些建議，將台灣人民最在意是什麼？最害怕是什麼？通通講清楚，消除彼此疑慮。
- 八、北京方面對民進黨之正式觀點是民進黨搞台獨，心裡如何想就不清楚，結論是等四年。不會積極運作去推翻陳，此點保持有問號，而其實汪道涵對陳水扁總統之看法是蠻開放地（open）。
- 九、其實目前大陸聽其言，觀其行，最主要是怕失敗，怕被台灣騙了，怕丟臉，中國人最講面子問題，而大陸內部也有政治權力鬥爭之問題。目前錢其琛之說法的確和汪道涵接近。大陸由錢放出訊息，但是因為條件還不成熟，所以還不會談，會觀望美國總統選舉之後。等一等，緩一緩，研究研究，就是目前大陸之態度。
- 十、台灣最大問題就是民進黨、國民黨、新黨、親民黨沒有共識，都太政治化，今年五月，何立強曾經和宋楚瑜先生在紐約長談，何立強認為宋是有歷史感，有企圖心，願意做一點事情，何立強強調，陳總統和宋合作有空間，可能性相當高，這樣國民黨就出局了。何立強認為陳總統和宋在兩岸議題上會有相當之合作可能性。何立強評價宋是政治動物，有敏銳感覺。
- 十一、至於有人說大陸會弱化陳總統，何立強認為不可能，因為弱化陳，對大陸並無好處，看不出有此一結論，而大陸目前作法是要減少台獨聲浪，但是大陸最大問題就是不理解台灣是民主社會，有多元聲音，就是對台獨、民進黨、陳總統之三者相關性沒有理清楚，沒有切割乾淨。
- 十二、現況是樂觀，並不悲觀，基本面沒有大危機之可能性，除非像是出現兩國論等不穩定因素。
- 十三、建議台灣不要 push 美國國會通過台灣安全加強法，或是要求將台灣列入 TMD 這樣對行政部門會有困擾及壓力，反而會造成反效果。因為只要大陸不動武，台灣要的自衛性武力就不多，而兩岸若是有軍事競賽，吃虧的會是台灣。
- 十四、何立強也於近日建議歐布萊特，提高對於美方與台灣會面之層級，並且在舒適及便利之原則下處理台灣領導人在美之出入境問題。
- 十五、何立強認為至少陳總統之演說及作為，在兩岸關係上是 do a good job。何並澄清美中關係全國委員會並不親共，他是親美利益，希望中立地促進兩岸關係發展。何對於台灣訪客，給予相當長之訪問時間，極力表現對台灣並無忽視。

- 十六、日後若是布希當選，若是採取和北京對抗之政策，台灣也不見得得利，反而有可能危及台灣。
- 十七、最好方式是在世界貿易組織中，處理兩岸之經貿問題，是一個相當好之管道。
- 十八、何立強將與季辛吉於二〇〇一年二月赴北京訪問。

孔傑榮 (Jerome A. Cohen)

紐約大學法學院教授

訪問時間：十月十九日下午二點

訪問地點：外交關係協會



重點摘要：

- 一、兩岸目前基本面是穩定，但是口頭上不穩定。他認同陳水扁所呼籲兩岸回到「九二年精神」，認為是好的提議，因當時雙方都能擱置歧見坐下來討論，現在兩岸欠缺的就是溝通對話的管道，而兩岸現階段最需要的是增加接觸合作
- 二、孔傑榮認為中共應停止強力打壓台灣，如果雙方的交流愈多，台灣就會可能被吸引與大陸統一，目前大陸市場對台灣很重要，大陸如果想要與台灣統一，應側重在實質的問題之解決，而大陸新一代領導班子能有更務實的作法，將有助於兩岸關係之改善。
- 三、行政院長唐飛下台，大陸評估有潛在性之台獨化可能，而大陸方面觀察陳水扁總統雙十國慶演講並沒有講統一，大陸觀察認為，足以認定了對陳之

定調。


- 四、 第二管道是非官方，非常有用，可以有聚焦之討論。由學者提出不同意見，今年有馬英九、蕭美琴之參加，十一月有辦一場台灣國際地位之國際法探討，請到有丘宏達、陳隆志等學者。理想中規劃方向有兩岸加入世界貿易組織後關係，經濟交流之調整方法，兩岸解決紛爭之中介機構，以國際法探討台灣法律地位，台灣國際空間等問題，都是詳當詳細之規劃。
- 五、 孔建議大陸停止講要使用武力犯台。台灣則停止台灣獨立傾向及不要再講兩國論，相互有所節制。
- 六、 世界貿易組織不只是經濟事項，而且是制度化之管道，若是兩岸都能加入，大陸以主權國家，台灣以獨立關稅領域，但是都是在世貿中之平等地位（雖然中共強調是中央及地方之關係，但是並不成立），可以有制度化協商之管道，中共方面為了世貿，在今年一月，外經貿部派出二十多人到華府喬治城大學受訓，主要負責教授是喬治城法學院院長約翰。
- 七、 九二年精神，其實中共應該接受，然後就可以展開協商，中共目前作法是 wait and see，等美方總統大選及台立委選舉結果，甚至不惜等四年，中共認為陳是弱勢總統，未來之總統大選，國民黨可能是馬英九，親民黨是宋楚瑜，都可以有所等待。所以中共目前作法是和台灣各黨派去談，去尋求共識。

司馬晉 (James D. Seymour)

歌倫比亞大學東亞研究所資深研究員

訪問時間：十月十九日上午十點

訪問地點：歌倫比亞大學東亞研究所



重點摘要：

- 一、 九二年共識應是 agree to disagree。目前現況並不穩定，大陸本身有許多問題，以大歷史觀點，大陸每十年都會有一些起伏變化。
- 二、 大陸應該放棄西方傳統主權國家之想法，改採中國傳統思想，如周朝時有中國及諸侯環伺，來處理兩岸關係。但是此一想法，需要大陸有新生代才可能有希望改變。
- 三、 對於中國人、台灣人、華人等用語要詳細界定，像是台灣原住民是否是華人，此為人種學上用語，目前有政治意涵。
- 四、 司馬晉要求理解小三通之意涵，職予以說明，其關切原因是他去過金門。
- 五、 司馬晉為研究中國大陸勞改之專家，對兩岸關係關心，但是研究並不深入，他的新作品是研究目前在大陸北韓移民之不合理待遇。其自承對中程協議及第二管道等問題並不清楚。

波士頓地區：

陸伯彬 (Robert S. Ross)

波士頓學院政治系教授，哈佛大學費正清東亞研究中心研究員

訪問時間：十月二十三日上午十一點

訪問地點：波士頓哈佛大學費正清中心



重點摘要：

- 一、大陸方面將一國原則提升，擴大目的，為未來談判增加籌碼。所以現在之推遲談判，只是等待時機問題。
- 二、現況是否穩定，和未來是否統一，沒有必然關係。陸伯彬推論，大陸不敢打台灣，原因是有美方之安全保障及軍事武器銷售。現況已經比以前好多了，以前台海有小型戰爭，台灣要反攻大陸，大陸要打台灣。
- 三、有關一個中國問題，就是主權問題，但是陸伯彬說，中共已經要到許多東西，從一九七九年中共與美方建交以來，台灣已經不再是美方之軍事基地及盟友，情勢對大陸有利，而大陸堅持一個中國原則，就是中國人所說，面子問題。台灣有安全之需求，台灣有民主發展，這都是大陸打台灣時要考慮地。
- 四、大陸打韓戰及越南戰爭，都是安全問題，是重要之國家利益。所以大陸方面介意地是，台灣獨立，所以台灣就不要宣佈獨立，因為從一九四九年之後，實際上就是一個中國，一個台灣，美方政府不會這樣講，但是學者可以這樣研析，只是大家不說破，都講一個中國，實際上那有這樣。

- 五、 所以現在大家不要挑戰現況，中共動武，是挑戰現況，台灣獨立，也是挑戰現況。美方就是因為給予台灣軍事安全之保護，使台灣覺得不需要和大陸談判。
- 六、 對現況有威脅是三大因素，一是大陸統一之需求，二是台灣獨立之導向，三是美國軍售台灣問題，主要就是二大項目，神盾戰艦及TMD，中共目前對美國沒有直接之威脅，美國也不會施加壓力於台灣。
- 七、 大陸太大了，美方無從施壓，但是若是大陸方面提出報復，如中東擴散導彈，如北朝鮮問題，將會損及美方利益，這時就會讓美方對台灣施壓。所以美方希望兩岸對話，增加溝通及瞭解，減少美方介入，也不會損及美方利益。
- 八、 明確說，沒有一個中國政策，其實有二個中國，或是說，一個中國，一個台灣。
- 九、 有人推動二岸談判，但是美方不應該干涉。第二管道是好事，有助於瞭解，二岸有對話，有助於美方利益。中程協議若是有助於兩岸穩定，當然沒有問題，其看法和第二管道一樣。

華安瀾 (Alan M. Wachman)

佛萊契爾法律與外交學院教授

訪問時間：十月二十三日下午一點三十分

訪問地點：波士頓佛萊契爾法律與外交學院



重點摘要：

- 一、 穩定是什麼定義，不變不是穩定，在變化中之改變，仍可能達到穩定。
- 二、 目前狀況是台灣已經是一個民主化社會，大陸江澤民本人則是希望有一個在兩岸關係上之歷史地位。而自一九四九年之後，台灣在中華民國控制之下，並沒有其他國家有權力控制台灣，加上一九五〇年代美國以武力介入台海問題，美國角色份外引人注意。
- 三、 研析美國角色，一定要注意二種不同方式，一種是文件的，例如上海公報，但是更重要是行動（action）。學者檢討美方自一九七二年台灣退出聯合國之後，是採取一個中國，一個台灣之政策，在退出聯合國之前，美方甚至希望雙方都存在於聯合國，但是遭到台海雙方同時拒絕。
- 四、 台灣關切的穩定問題，但是若兩岸情勢是穩定地，不表示台灣就沒有安全問題，或是和大陸之間沒有衝突。
- 五、 一個中國問題，就像是美國俗語所說，紅魚（red herring）指台灣，引起大陸之覬覦。但是一個中國問題，不是最基本問題，討論沒有用，因為大陸之一國兩制，台灣不接受，台灣之要求獨立，大陸也不會接受。
- 六、 錢其琛之說法，表示得到大陸領導之同意發言，但是要注意的是，大陸做什麼，而不是大陸說什麼，因為大陸之動作方面並無更變。錢之說法是有較為彈性，但是不夠。因為北京之作法是不放棄武力犯台，人民解放軍並且有為攻台繼續做準備，這代表了北京之最基本之作法。
- 七、 中程協議當然是好事，但是看看中東之問題，以巴之間，有這樣許多成功之協議，衝突仍是迭起。所以兩岸問題建立彼此之信任，這才是最基本問題。
- 八、 第二管道當然可以去做，有人戲稱，只要有飛機票，都可以成為第二管道。
- 九、 大陸對台灣問題之認知，從學者楊傑勉、王緝思、賈慶國所傳達，有二點，一是知道兩岸問題不會很快解決，第二是對時間有急迫感。
- 十、 汪道涵身體不好，若他真能順利訪台，反倒是令人吃驚之事情。但是汪之態度的確是比較彈性。
- 十一、 究竟談判對兩岸是好或是不好，看看中東衝突，反而令人要反省。中國古話有說，天時、地利、人和，的確是，目前沒有天時，又那來人和？或許可以作為參考。

柯偉林 (William C. Kirby)

哈佛大學亞洲研究中心主任、歷史系主任

訪問時間：十月二十四日上午十一點

訪問地點：波士頓哈佛大學亞洲研究中心



重點摘要：

- 一、 此次台灣政府改組，民進黨若能組成像是西德時期之大聯合政府，就能有一段時期之穩定。國民黨由於未民主化，所以才會在台灣民主化浪潮下下台。民主化就像是波浪一樣，會有一些起伏。
- 二、 台灣維持內部及政黨間之共識是相當重要地。但是若是未來民進黨與宋楚瑜之親民黨組成聯合政府，倒是令人驚訝之變化。
- 三、 李登輝前總統，是不講一個中國，這是大陸方面相當介意之處。
- 四、 對於一個中國原則，大陸領導人是有共識，目前有社會、經濟各方面之交流，但是沒有談判，牽涉是中國人之面子問題，就是對於一個中國原則如何有一個處理及下台階。柯偉林預見未來統一模式是聯邦或是邦聯。而且 P.R.C. 也是在此一個中國之內，而不是要求台灣是 P.R.C. 的一部份。
- 五、 未來在世界貿易組織之架構下來談，是有可能地。對中共而言，是一個困境，因為要入世貿組織，是大陸必走之路，而在世貿中和台灣談判，又是大陸不願意，所以對大陸是兩難。
- 六、 對台灣而言，民進黨主導之跨政黨小組是相當重要，因為辜振甫及汪道涵都年紀大了，沒有多少時間可以浪費了。何不讓辜汪見面一次，再談一次九二年共識（精神）究竟是什麼，來解決目前問題。

- 七、 第二管道是溝通作用，對現況沒有改變。
- 八、 錢其琛之新說法有彈性，不危及台灣，可以朝向有利方向發展。
- 九、 中共對陳水扁總統失去耐心，因為李前總統執政十年，中共和他交手過程中覺得受騙了。所以目前是對陳 wait and see。
- 十、 從小三通到大三通，可以學兩韓，簽訂不同之協議，保持良好之溝通狀態。
- 十一、 美國對台灣軍售，是基於對台灣安全之基本需要。大陸則有對統一施以大大之壓力，其實柯建議若是有五十年時間對台灣是夠長了，可以逐漸對大陸產生一些改變。
- 十二、 江澤民和鄧小平比起來，平庸多了，一點都不 smart，頭腦中沒有新點子，也沒有鄧小平之創意及魄力。
- 十三、 九五年、九六年之飛彈危機過了，大陸目前是穩定局面，台灣由於政黨競爭，反而是不穩定局面。柯偉林預判，明年是兩岸進行談判之重要時機。不要單純看到大陸之發言，要重視它的產生結果影響。(outcome)

歐蘇珊 (Suzanne Ogden)

哈佛大學費正清研究中心研究員、東北大學政治學系教授

訪問時間：十月二十四日下午二點

訪問地點：波士頓東北大學政治學系



重點摘要：

- 一、 北京年輕人顯現對台灣強烈之民族主義，不容台灣獨立。台灣則是民主化浪潮下，顯示出自我之獨立意識。

- 二、 美方在 TMD 之架構下，則有助於維護台灣安全，但是又觸及大陸之民族主義。
- 三、 大陸領導強力要求年輕學生對陳水扁總統之發言，不要有過激反應。
- 四、 所以江澤民若是不夠堅持民族主義，將會失去他的職位。對大陸而言，所看到的面向，不只是台灣，還有南北韓、日本、美國、印度等國家之反應。
- 五、 錢其琛之新說法，歐蘇珊反應，和以前之更變不大。(the same to me)
- 六、 第二管道有助於溝通，是好事。
- 七、 慢慢走，統一問題將可逐漸解決。重要的是台灣之經濟發展及民主化之力量。


舊金山地區

馬若孟 (Ramon H. Myers)

加州史丹佛大學胡佛研究所資深研究員

訪問時間：十月三十一日下午一點三十分

訪問地點：加州史丹佛大學



重點摘要：

- 一、 一個中國原則，是主權分配問題，台灣可以提出邦聯模式，和大陸談判，談一個平等分享主權之方式，這樣對台灣有利，也可以避免戰爭。大陸應該要接受邦聯，因為不違反一個中國原則。
- 二、 中共在兩蔣時代，不怕有一個中國問題，在後來之國統剛領也有一個中國

原則，但是在一九九九年之兩國論後，是對一個中國原則之破壞及台灣之回應結果。


- 三、 如何將分裂之中國合為一，主權問題是一個重要問題，陳總統應當面對他，和北京坐下來好好談一談，有關分享主權問題及以邦聯模式來處理。幫聯對兩岸是合作關係。有助兩岸和平。不講統一，不講獨立，兩岸要講合作性架構。
- 四、 談判內容是國防、外交及三通等三大問題。保持在談判狀態對雙方有利。三通是經濟利益，國防則是建立信心措施，外交則享有平等主權。可以擴大台灣之外交空間。
- 五、 假使中共不接受此一建議，那是中國人之面子問題。大陸也怕台灣興起台灣民族主義，對統一之中國有妨礙。
- 六、 兩岸談判可以是平等地，不是上對下的。
- 七、 中程協議或許就可以先談三通、國防、外交之合作性架構。

朱立安. 張 (Julian Chang)

加州史丹佛大學亞太研究中心副主任

訪問時間：十月三十一日下午三點

訪問地點：加州史丹佛大學



重點摘要：

- 一、 目前現況並不穩定，原因是大陸內部有政治之不穩定，而台灣的目前政黨政治也有不穩定之發展。


- 二、美國內之總統大選，大陸也相當關切，會影響兩岸關係之發展。
- 三、長期來看是五十年之變化，而進二、三年事危險時機，江澤民在二〇〇二年下台前希望將兩岸問題作一個解決。第一個步驟就是今年之白皮書。
- 四、一個中國之定義，奧森伯格曾經忠告美政府領導人，要注意如何對待中國之歷史性角色，例如三公報之法定地位。
- 五、對美方而言，台海問題之基本點是重視軍售問題以保障台灣安全，要求以七九年協議之重點，和平解決兩岸問題，重視大陸之經濟市場，對大陸希望逐漸改變其意識型態。兩岸加入世貿之後，又是一個新局面。
- 六、在未來議題談判部分，經濟交流，如三通，將是一個重點。
- 七、第二管道在專業領域有交流是相當不錯地。
- 八、大陸雖稱 wait and see，其實在福建已經布置及動員，導彈部隊作動員，民眾也做政治動員。
- 九、美國政府對兩岸問題是相當關切，擔心其發展。目前釣魚台、南沙、朝鮮半島都是較為平靜，但是兩岸並不平靜。
- 十、大陸不會放任台獨，原因是大陸要擔心疆獨、藏獨等國內問題，及東南亞諸國之反應。

李鴻永 (Hong Yung Lee)

加州柏克萊大學政治系教授

訪問時間：十月三十日中午十二點

訪問地點：加州柏克萊大學



重點摘要：


- 一、 討論兩岸關係，不要忘記大區域，包括美國、俄國，小區域包括日本、韓國、東南亞等問題。
- 二、 台灣正在測試大陸之底線，大陸正著力於經濟交流。
- 三、 在國際政治之現實中，美國不容許台灣完玩台獨之遊戲，美國對一個中國之立場是自一九七二年之上海公報為基礎。大陸領導人不容許台灣獨立，目前台灣又是民政治主，經濟自由，所以兩岸之間，名稱不重要，一定要有一個協議，就是台灣不獨立，和大陸不用武一起談。五十年之時間很長，台灣不要擔心，就接受，在穩定中，以民主自由之力量改變大陸。
- 四、 李鴻永同意台灣所提一個未來中國之意念，因為目前兩岸最重要就是經濟利益及安全問題。
- 五、 台灣在此環境下，可以和大陸討論有關台灣國際空間之問題，一定可以比現狀更好。
- 六、 台灣要考慮實際利益是什麼，用什麼方法，在什麼時間去完成他。不要太在意名稱問題，因為可以在聯合國有席位，都需要和大陸去談。
- 七、 汪道涵能不能訪台，要看大陸如何定義民進黨之角色，和台獨之關係。目前中國是定義陳水扁要將台灣獨立於中國之外，此一狀況下，汪不會訪台。
- 八、 兩岸有可能有中程協議，要看兩岸之長遠目標是什麼？若是方向不同，不會有協議。
- 九、 第二管道是好地，可以溝通意見。兩岸要重視的是經濟及商業等實質利益，三通就是大議題，需要有雙方之妥協點。
- 十、 現在是民進黨好好考慮要不要接受和大陸之協議之時候，目前大陸之一個中國原則是環境中無法更動地，但是可以爭取一些時間。
- 十一、 李鴻永建議接受一個中國人之定義，但是對於一個中國之政治定義不要去討論，李鴻永建議之表述方式如下：一個中國，包括台灣人民和大陸人民，都是中國人，享有傳統文化、歷史，長期有一個政府，但是現在雙方人民住於不同政治制度之下，所以，兩方人民有意願在未來，共創一個統一中國，但是由於現在有不同政治系統，願享有不同之經濟利益整合及政治利益統合，在中國人之基礎上，將有助於一個中國。（就是接受一個中國人之定義在現在，但是政治之中國在未來。）

羅德明 (Lowell Dittmer)

加州柏克萊大學政治系教授

訪問時間：十一月二日上午九點

訪問地點：加州柏克萊大學



重點摘要：

- 一、大陸對台政策之研究，以個人、派系、及官僚之研究都不適合，大陸目前仍是決策黑箱，即使是大陸學者都不知道自己之研究有無受到上級之採納。大陸基調定了，派系、個人、軍隊其實都沒有在對台政策上有不同意見。
- 二、一個中國問題，台灣陳水扁總統好像接受一個中國，各自表述，但是後來又不願意接受。(職緊接就向羅德明教授解釋九二年共識及精神，擱置爭議、對話、交流之意涵，及當年對一個中國雙方各自表述，並無共識之歷史。)
- 三、對大陸而言，一個中國原則，就是主權問題，主權及領土不容分裂。所以大陸在國際關係上不接受一個中國及一個台灣。
- 四、北京是一個相當穩定之政治系統，但是台灣新政府相當不穩定。大陸認為台灣即使是一個民主政治之體制，但是黑金問題太嚴重，不是大陸應該學習之對象。
- 五、邦聯、或是聯邦對大陸而言，都是分裂了，分散了，目前之接受程度都不高。
- 六、北京目前對兩岸局勢相當悲觀，比台灣悲觀，認為可能有戰爭，看不出有

和平之可能。大陸借打仗嚇阻美國及台灣。

- 七、大陸對美方軍售台灣有影響力，大陸反對美軍售台灣神盾戰艦及反對台灣加入 TMD。
- 八、若有中程協議，則兩岸戰略性模糊處將減少。二岸可以有 CBM 以減少誤解及衝突，但是一切問題之最後解決將觸及一個中國問題。
- 九、若是台灣接受一個中國，但聲明各自表述，羅德明認為大陸將同意汪道涵訪問台灣。
- 十、目前台灣應當考量三通之貿易問題及政治問題之關連及因應。
- 十一、目前大陸對台小組曾慶紅之離開，據說和曾慶紅壓迫支持陳水扁總統之台商有關係。
- 十二、兩岸加入世貿之後，大陸將 push 台灣和大陸對三通問題進行談判。

薛理泰 (Li Tai Xue)

史丹佛大學研究員

訪問時間：十月三十一日上午十點三十分

訪問地點：史丹佛大學



重點摘要：

- 一、美國希望保持現況，不致於發生突變，造成形勢失控。台灣拖中求變，在陳水扁總統第一任期間，不希望由於自己不謹慎之行動而造成反彈，但是民進黨之台獨傾向越來越明顯。大陸則是遏阻台獨勢力之膨脹為第一優先，大陸希望和美方就解決台灣問題達成某種默契，準備就緒後，交替使

用和戰兩手。(和最明顯就是錢其琛八月之講話，戰則是向俄國訂購潛艇、導彈驅逐艦及蘇愷二十七、三十，福建東南沿海國防動員調查委員會已經完成戰備調查。)

- 二、九二年共識是國民黨及大陸有一個中國之共識，民進黨由於反核及台獨，不願意承認有九二年共識。
- 三、汪道涵對一個中國之八十六字，由王仁偉執筆，章念馳及章嘉陵提供意見。
- 四、二個擁有核武器之國家不會打仗，因為有恐怖平衡。而且大陸對美國相當重要，如在聯合國之和平維持計畫，反對國際恐怖主義、在導彈技術控制體系（MTCR）及全面禁止核試驗條約（CTBT）等多方面，美國都需要大陸之協助。其他如國際反毒、反走私，亞太地區之穩定及安全，都需要大陸。
- 五、總而言之，國際格局定下來，大陸之重要性遠大於台灣，美國不會為台灣和大陸打仗。台灣只是美國大國格局的一顆棋子。
- 六、大陸對台灣之判斷，在一個中國原則下，未來六至八個月期間，一定會復談。二岸關係會有大之突破，未來大陸會為發展趨向，設定上下限，可預期之將來，兩岸不會有武裝衝突。
- 七、而且雙方之互動，一定是台北採取主動。原因是第一：台灣之政黨政治實質上是如何取得政權，維持政權，其核心有排他性。其重要性遠超過統一或是獨立之意識型態，民進黨遇到大挑戰時，維持政權之重要性遠遠超過對基本教義派之堅持。第二：台灣在野黨最大政治訴求，就是要重新執政，會利用不同之政治事件，為自己牟取政治之利益。在恢復執政地位此點上，沒有妥協餘地。第三：目前台灣之經濟層面不穩定，股市下跌，人心不穩，外資離境，其原因是兩岸關係沒有搞好。陳總統之選前將當選和股市連結，選後股市跌五千多點，對百姓之影響，深入家家戶戶。第四：民進黨支持者及金主之政治態度會改變，就連最支持陳水扁之李遠哲都說，不能說投他票，就要負責他執政後之作為，這表示了美方之態度（薛理泰表示李和美方關係密切）。第五：明年立法院之選舉，若是民進黨要取得多數，一定要在現在起穩定局勢，扭轉頹勢。兩岸關係就是一個突破口，因為外交不可為，經濟一下子起不來，但是兩岸關係可以造勢。第六：民進黨要考慮下一次總統大選要是選輸了，十年內都無法再重新執政。
- 八、兩岸在重要問題上有共識，第一：兩岸都感到一定要有一些措施，否則兩岸可能會爆發戰爭。第二：兩岸內心其實都不願意打仗。第三：兩岸其實都想維持現況，大陸希望回到一個中國原則，一切好談，台灣之國民黨是一個中國，各自表述，民進黨則是現況中趨向獨立。第四：兩岸對美方之解決台灣問題之重大作用，都充分估計，未來走向，一定要估計美方之反應，而美方之基本立場是促使兩岸坐下來談，同時維持現況。
- 九、但是這樣之突破是不利於台灣，原因是大陸對民進黨不信任，要價會更高。

- 十、大陸和台灣之間未來談判之重點就是第一：回到一個中國原則共識。第二：三通問題。

洛杉磯地區：

華德邁 (Michael Y. Warder)

美國克萊蒙研究所副所長

訪問時間：十月二十六日上午十一點

訪問地點：洛杉磯克萊蒙研究所



重點摘要：

- 一、目前不穩定因素，在大陸方面而言，至少有第一、中共在福建部署屬以百計之飛彈威脅台灣安全；第二、大陸沿海及內陸經濟發展有重大落差；第三、法輪功問題。
- 二、共和黨布希若是當選，會基於台灣關係法，繼續銷售武器保障台灣安全，若是民主黨高爾當選，就不喜歡賣武器給台灣。
- 三、對於一個中國問題，美方自始就是認知到海峽兩岸對於一個中國有不同定義，但是美方只是瞭解，不表示認同大陸之一個中國原則。
- 四、台灣最重要就是對於民主、人權、自由之基本價值之重視。這是和世界民主價值觀一致地。
- 五、大陸會觀察美國大選之結果，及日本、韓國、俄國等鄰國與大陸之關係，再做處理。

- 六、 由於九六年之飛彈危機後，之後台灣又有新的總統產生，事實上狀況已經不是一九九二年之時，所以贊成陳總統所說九二年精神的用詞。
- 七、 小三通及日後之大三通，對兩岸之經濟、貿易交流都有幫助，是互蒙其利，是好事。
- 八、 第二管道有助於溝通，在此著眼點下，贊成第二管道。
- 九、 華曾經在一九九七年到上海見過汪道涵，汪強調，在一個中國原則下，什麼都可以談，令外國人印象深刻，覺得汪是較有彈性。
- 十、 建議要加強與美國關係，考量加入TMD，因為其主要是保護日本，台灣角色其實很尷尬。並仿兩韓訂定協議，保障和平。

IV對業務改進之建議事項

一、建議本會運用電子郵件作為與研究兩岸關係之學者進行制度化溝通。

倘本會各項重要訊息除能於網路上供有興趣或專業人士被動查詢外，本會能建立專業人士電子信箱清單，並適時主動透過電子郵件主動出擊、掌握時效，令渠等在短時間內即獲得我最新訊息及政府立場之說明。長期而言，期望藉此養成渠等重視此一管道，並視為專業研判的消息來源管道之一。

二、建議本會應設美東(駐華府)、美西(駐舊金山)人員各一名(約科長層級)，以隨時反應最新訊息，並提供美方正確資訊。

因為對美工作已經成為兩岸關係重要一環，而外交部人員，一方面事務繁忙，另一方面對兩岸關係並不熟練，所以本會若真要做好對美工作，派員常駐，是值得考慮之方式。

三、建議應審慎評估美國因素對兩岸關係之影響。

美方對於兩岸關係之影響是顯著地，對於美方是否繼續以三支柱作為兩岸關係處理之依據，以及美方關心之利益所在，現況是否穩定，台灣是否會受壓力走上談判桌，以及美方對大陸關係之演變等，軍售問題只是象徵性意涵，由以上因素所建構之中程協議及第二管道之溝通方式，都是值得進一步研究之問題。

V 附件

- 一、華府喬治華盛頓大學席格中心主任迪克森 (*Bruce J. Dickson*) 之信函評論職訪問期間表現為優良之訪問學者。
- 二、專題研究報告：「The Role of the United States behind the 1998 Resumption of Cross-strait Dialogue」(網路英文版於華府喬治華盛頓大學席格中心：http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/scholar_papers/Lee2-01.htm)
- 三、許世銓, "The one China Principle, Positions of CCP, KMT and DPP" 此份報告是許世銓到美國訪問時帶給美國學者參考之作品。由哈佛大學費正清研究中心研究員陸伯彬贈與職。
- 四、Samantha F. Ravich, "Examining Trends of Convergence and Divergence across the Taiwan Strait: NCAFP's Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy And Cross-Strait Relations", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, December 1999. 作者是 CSIS 之研究員，美國藍德公司之博士，此份報告是職訪問 Samantha 時，作者所贈與。是第二管道會議之較為詳細之紀錄。
- 五、於美國華府、波士頓、紐約、洛杉磯及舊金山等地參訪所遇各界人士名片



SIGUR CENTER FOR ASIAN STUDIES
ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

March 5, 2001

To Whom It May Concern:

It is a pleasure to offer this letter of recommendation for Lee Ming-yi. Mr. Lee was a visiting scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University from June 2000 to January 2001. He was perhaps the hardest working visiting scholar we have had at the Sigur Center. He arrived early and stayed late working on his research. He also regularly attended the lectures, seminars, and conferences at the many universities and think tanks in the Washington, DC area. In addition to his work in DC, he also traveled to other leading universities in the US, including Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley and others. He interviewed many policy makers and academic specialists on US-China relations and cross-straits issues. He was eager to learn the American perspectives on these matters and was also an effective representative of the ROC position. He provided me and other scholars with recent official statements on Taiwan's current policies toward mainland China and also wrote a lengthy background paper on the "1992 consensus."

During his stay here, he also had the opportunity to talk with visiting scholars from the PRC on a daily basis. With his pleasant personality and careful attention to detail, he tried his best to explain his government's perspective. In December, he gave an informal presentation on the results of his research, describing the ROC, PRC, and US perspectives on how to resolve the cross-straits issues. With several PRC scholars and military officers in the audience, it made for a very lively conversation. But Mr. Lee remained calm all the way through, acknowledging that the PRC may not like the ROC's perspective, but encouraging the PRC scholars to at least understand it better.

The time Mr. Lee spent here was mutually beneficial. He was able to interview many specialists and attend many events related to the cross-straits issue, thereby gaining a better understanding of the diversity of US views. At the same time, he was able to describe how his government's policies have evolved over the years and how Taiwan's academic and policy specialists have developed new proposals for improving cross-straits relations, thereby providing the rest of us with a deeper appreciation for the diversity of views within Taiwan itself. This exchange of ideas is what the scholarly community is all about, and what the Sigur Center's visiting scholar program was designed to achieve. Mr. Lee made the ideal use of his time here, and set a perfect example for others to follow. We were grateful for his time here, and look forward to continuing our relationship with him in the future.

Sincerely,

Bruce Dickson
Director

The Role of the United States behind the 1998 Resumption of Cross-strait Dialogue

Lee Ming-Yi[◆]

Specialist, Department of Legal Affairs,
Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan ROC
December 2000

Introduction

In the March 2000 Taiwan presidential election, despite the threatening tone of China's White Paper on Taiwan and of Premier Zhu Rongji's finger-wagging warning during a press conference a few days before the election, the mainland undertook no immediate military action after the election and allowed a number of conciliatory gestures by the new president, Chen Shui-bian, to pass without specific rejection. Beijing stated it would "listen to [Chen's] words and observe his actions." Chen's advisers suggested that he was a Taiwanese Nixon whose credentials as a thorn in Beijing's side would precisely qualify him to make new strides toward cross-strait reconciliation. Washington hailed the DPP's rise to power as opening a new era in which cross relations with the mainland might move beyond the stalemate that had characterized them for nearly ten years.^[1]

In the cross-strait dialogue, after the first Koo-Wang Talks in 1993, SEF and ARATS had seven meetings on functional issues^[2] in 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively; three vice-chairman level meetings in 1994, 1995; and the first preparatory meeting for the second Koo-Wang Talks on May 27-28, 1995. Both sides slated the second preparatory meeting for the Koo-Wang Talks in July 1995. June 7, 1995, President Lee departed for the United States for a private visit and returned to Taiwan on June 12. During this short time, Beijing published five articles criticizing Lee. On June 16, 1995, ARATS sent a letter to SEF postponing the second Koo-Wang Talks^[3], saying it would contact SEF at an appropriate time. In just five short years, the cross Strait institutionalized channels of dialogue and negotiation were suspended.

It is the international facts that up with the last two meetings of President Jiang Ze Min and President Clinton in 1997 and 1998. The successful visit by President Jiang Ze Min to the U.S. in October 1997 and President Clinton's reciprocal visit to China in July 1998 signal a thaw in U.S.-China relations after the Taiwan crisis in March '96.

After Taipei and Beijing had repeatedly called for direct negotiations according to conditions unacceptable to both, the deputy secretary-generals of the SEF and ARATS met in February 1998 and agreed to facilitate SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu's visit to the PRC. On October 19, 1998, Koo and his delegation returned from Beijing after having spent six days visiting Wang Daohan in Shanghai and paying their respects to President Jiang Zemin in Beijing. Both sides agreed that Wang would reciprocate the Koo visit by leading a delegation to Taiwan in 1999 at a time to be worked out by SEF and ARATS. Both sides seemed poised to resume their negotiations despite high levels of distrust. But this partial détente was short-lived.

On July 9, 1999, when President Lee Teng-hui was interviewed by the Deutsche Welle Broadcasting Company in Germany, he stated that constitutional reform in Taiwan had placed cross-strait relations on "a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government." President Lee's comment stunned Beijing and set off a firestorm of discussion and debate. Beijing's leaders denounced President Lee as splitting Taiwan from China and immediately canceled Wang Daohan's trip to Taipei. Beijing's leaders feared that President Lee might insert his new

two-state theory into the ROC constitution , an act they said would mean declaring Taiwan's independence.^[4]

But the United States' interest in a particular modality of resolution --peaceful--is not as altruistic as it may sound and provides the key for under-standing the nature of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. A commitment to peace around Taiwan is consistent with a realpolitik interpretation of American national interests.^[5]

The U.S. does play a certain active role to encourage the cross Strait dialogues. The U.S. role in the resumption of cross Strait communication is to create an environment for both sides to meet instead of getting into the dialogues or judging the deals directly. America's position is to stay out of the middle, not to be a mediator. All that the U.S. cares about is that the differences between both sides be resolved peacefully. Being a mediator is not an appropriate option. In fact, national interests make the U.S. play an active role as a facilitator. A facilitator does not take a position or judge the two parties in the process of dialogue and negotiation. A facilitator is to create an environment for both sides to have a constructive dialogue.

Over the past decade or more, private cross-Strait exchanges have continued to expand with our active promotion. The quality of exchanges, however, has deteriorated due to Beijing's practice of "politics takes command." Exchange activities were often called off abruptly because of Beijing's excuse of "inharmonious atmosphere." In the area of cross-Strait negotiations, Taipei took the initiative to begin semi-official talks with Beijing in 1991, and Taipei's attitudes toward such talks have become more and more open ever since. Beijing, on the contrary, has fallen back from its previous stance and even interrupted cross-Strait negotiations twice with excuses. Until today, Beijing has not followed the terms of the agreements to meet with each other once every season, to proceed with the second Koo-Wang Talks, and to fulfill the promise of Mr. Wang Daohan's visit to Taiwan for a constructive dialogue. These facts proved that it was Beijing that undermined exchanges; it was Beijing that turned down negotiations; and it was Beijing that sabotaged the process of peaceful unification.

In order to resume cross-strait talks, the ROC government urged the PRC to restart talks many times. (21 times from May 20, 2000-August 28, 2000.)

Chronology of the Times ROC Government Officials Urged the PRC to Resume Cross-strait Talks

[6]

No.	Date	Venue	Contents
1	May 20, 2000	President Chen's inaugural speech	With the end of the Cold War, it is time for the two sides to relinquish hostility and confrontation left over from the old days. We shall not wait longer, because it is time for the two sides to join in creating the opportunity for a grand rapprochement.
2	May 29, 2000	MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen addressing to the Legislative Yuan's Domestic and Ethnic Affairs Committee	The cross-strait institutionalized negotiations are the established dialogue model and formal communication channel. We will strive with utmost effort to bring this channel to its fully function. We will take initiative in facilitating the resumption of dialogue and negotiations between the two sides.
3	May 30, 2000	President Chen receiving U.S. House Representative Matt Salmon	Finding a way to resume cross-strait dialogue and negotiations, including the Koo-Wang talks, is the first priority, otherwise, the three direct links cannot proceed.

4	June 2, 2000	Premier Tang Fei made an administrative report to Legislative Yuan	To reduce cross-strait tensions, we are willing to work on the basis of mutual respect to translate our goodwill into action and actively promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation. We hope to open up a full-scale dialogue, including political agendas, and to conduct a thorough review of the three direct-link policies. At the same time, the two sides are expected to accede into the World Trade Organization (WTO), creating a good opportunity and a turning point for improving cross-strait relations, and a threshold for opening up new economic relations. I want to repeat once again that we have the sincerity and goodwill to improve cross-strait relationship. We expect the other side to reciprocate with goodwill for the benefit of peoples on the two sides.
5	June 2, 2000	Meeting between MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen and legislators	The possibility of holding Koo-Wang Talks in October remained. Our side worked through all channels to realize it. Exchanges of visits between the two sides on all levels are helpful. If invited, I will be glad to pay a visit to the Mainland.
6	June 5, 2000	President Chen receiving John Hamre, head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies	We want to use peaceful means to resolve cross-strait issues. The most pressing issue is to resume dialoguc. The Republic of China is ready to resume talks and negotiations with the PRC at any time.
7	June 5, 2000	President Chen receiving scholars attending the "International Seminar on Interaction between the PRC and Asia-Pacific Region and Future Development"	The Republic of China has exercised the greatest sincerity and goodwill to resume negotiations with Mainland China. "We have no preconditions for cross-strait talks or negotiations. We do not exclude any political issues or the three direct links."
8	June 12, 2000	President Chen receiving U.S. Senator John Rockefeller	It is hoped that the United States can play a more active role between the two sides and that the Koo-Wang Talks can be resumed in this year.
9	June 16, 2000	President Chen meeting the Tainan County Clan Associations Representatives	The PRC should understand that this is an era of conciliation. We can shake hands with the PRC for the purpose of reconciliation, and to reach that point is only a matter of time.
10	June 20, 2000	President Chen at a press conference	I would sincerely invite PRC Leader Mr. Jiang Zemin to sit down and talk without any formality, limitation on place, or preconditions. We can shake hands for the purpose of reconciliation.
11	June 27, 2000	President Chen receiving William Fuller, head of the Asia Foundation.	We have the sincerity and goodwill for improving cross-strait relations. Given on precondition or foregone conclusions, I am willing to have a meeting with Mr. Jiang Zemin without any formality and limitations on the place and agenda. We can shake hands for a reconciliation to find the direction for both sides to move in.
12	July 6, 2000	President Chen receiving U.S House Representative Matt Salmon	The ROC is well prepared at all front to have talks with Mainland China. Any issue can be discussed, with no exclusion of political issues or the three direct links.
13	July 17, 2000	President Chen meeting with the Electric and Electronics Association	The PRC should respond favorably to the resumption of a dialogue through SEF-ARATS channel, not through other unofficial channels.
14	July 20, 2000	Premier Tang Fei replying to interpellations by legislators	The inter-city exchanges between the two sides are highly welcome, which could encourage Beijing officials to quickly resume the SEF-ARATS dialogue and talks.
15	July 27, 2000	Premier Tang Fei replying to interpellations by legislators	Cross-strait relations have become less intense since May 20. The dawn for cross-strait talks has appeared. MAC and SEF should actively communicate with the Mainland China with a hope to start functional or political dialogue.

16	July 31, 2000	President Chen at a press conference	He urges the PRC to work hand-in-hand for the future, build on the previous basis, follow the 1992 spirit, and promote friendly interplay between the two sides. It is hoped that the two sides can develop a proceeding featuring dialogue, exchanges, and a stall on differences so that both sides can move and eventually develop a consensus and reach a conclusion acceptable to both sides. "A consensus of agreeing to disagree" may become "a consensus with agreements."
17	August 4, 2000	President Chen in an interview with Business Week	We hope to sit down with PRC officials to resume talks. This can only be achieved by leaders of the two sides acting with goodwill and wisdom. We are confident that cross-strait relations can be improved. We believe that the most important thing for resuming talks is to let go of prejudices. We have set aside our differences to find a basis acceptable to both sides.
18	August 10, 2000	President Chen receiving U.S. Senator Jack Reed	The ROC is well prepared to open up dialogue and exchanges with PRC leaders or any unit. The key to resolve cross-strait problem is that both sides need to sit down and talk.
19	August 14, 2000	President Chen meeting Richard Bush, AIT Chairman, in Los Angeles	We have more patience. As long as both sides can sit down, set aside each differences, and display sincerity, both sides will certainly develop a consensus.
20	August 19, 2000	President Chen at a press conference in Costa Rica	It is hoped that the two sides can use intelligence and creativity to open up the door leading to negotiations on the previous basis.
21	August 28, 2000	President Chen at a press conference	We hope to follow the principles of "dialogue, exchanges, and setting aside differences" so as to allow both sides to sit down and talk. It is hoped that cross-strait relations can be improved to seek the substance and definition acceptable to both sides.

Beijing's Cross-Strait Policy

In March 2000 Beijing's immediate reaction to Chen's surprise victory was one of silent dismay, but the MFA quickly regained its diplomatic composure, responding to Chen's statements regarding cross-strait relations by saying that it would not only listen to his words but observe his deeds. China's bottom-line security interest in Taiwan is not to control the island directly, but to have sufficient influence to be able to veto Taiwan's military and political cooperation with any future potential enemy of the mainland regime. One country two systems, or even some form of confederation, would serve that goal provided that such arrangements gave China enough influence in Taiwan to guarantee Taiwan's deference to mainland security needs. Such influence could include economic and political components, but what is essential to mainland interests is the ability to separate Taiwan from outside diplomatic and military supporters like the United States, so that Taiwan would have no realistic choice in international alignments but to defer to the needs of Beijing. [7]

The PRC strategy contains the following elements: [8]

- 1) induce the United States, Japan and Russia to commit themselves to the PRC's "one-China" policy in order to ensure that Taiwan cannot hope realistically to gain support for de jure independence;
- 2) gradually reduce the number of states that recognize Taipei and exclude Taiwan from international organizations;
- 3) develop a military posture, including the deployment of mobile missiles opposite Taiwan, that reminds the Taiwanese people that China has the capabilities to inflict heavy costs on Taiwan for pursuing an independent course;
- 4) seek to increase trade and investment relations with Taiwan so that the Taiwan business community

develop an ever larger stake in cooperative relations with the mainland;

5) increase Taiwan's sense of insecurity by working to exclude it from the region of coverage of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

One China

It was the initiative of the Deng Xiaoping regime, taken during the dawn of the reform era and in the shadow of normalization with the United States, that first placed cross-Strait relations in a new and more hopeful light after three decades of cold war and intermittent confrontation. By unilaterally halting the artillery duel and introducing the vision of "one country, two systems" with a "high degree of autonomy" for a Taiwan reunified with the mainland, and by launching the "three links" as a concrete, practical way of building economic and social bridges across the Strait to realize this vision, the Deng regime for the first time since Liberation made a plausible bid to change the hostile dynamic of cross-Strait relations.^[9]

Beijing's policy towards Taiwan really begins and ends with its concept of one China. In August 1998 in Shanghai, Wang Daohan presented an 86 character statement by Jiang Zemin explaining the Mainland's definition of "one China" as it applies to negotiations with Taiwan: "There is only one China in the world. Taiwan is a part of China, not yet unified. Both sides should work together, under the one China principle, to discuss unification in consultations based on equality. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country are inseparable. Under the one China precondition, talks should begin on Taiwan's political status." Wang is a master at appearing flexible while not really giving an inch. Then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated the Mainland more bluntly in 2000: "There is only one China in the world, Taiwan and mainland both being a part of it, and The sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country are inseparable."

The white paper also explicated Beijing's ambiguous position on "one China": on the one hand, one China presently exists and Taiwan is a part of China, but it has no sovereignty and is "only a local authority"; on the other hand, negotiations between Taipei and Beijing may be conducted on the basis of "parity," on an "equal footing."

Indeed, nationalism is the core of "One China Principle." After the reform movement and open-market policies in PRC, the communist ideology was seriously eroded by the newly emerging market economy and collapsed very quickly. The call of Chinese nationalism under the glory of complete unification and nationalist revival easily replaced the dominant role played by the communist ideology in the private sector, and became the crucial measure of the Chinese Communist Party in uniting its people. As a result, it reinforced the influence of nationalism on Beijing's Taiwan policy.

Threat of force

Press reports have suggested the Chinese military has pressed the Chinese government to set a timetable for reunification. The PRC's February 2000 White Paper on Taiwan announced that Taiwan's indefinite refusal to enter negotiations about reunification would constitute grounds for the use of force (the so-called "third if"^[10]). A series of fiery articles appeared in various military newspapers in late July 1999, vowing that China would rather lose a thousand soldiers than give up one inch of China's sacred territory, but expressing confidence that such sacrifices would not prove necessary due to the weakness and vulnerability of "tiny Taiwan."

Today, many Chinese believe the United States still wishes to use Taiwan strategically --as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" from which to launch a campaign to undermine one of the world's last

bastions of socialism.^[11]

Beijing frequently claims that it must reserve the right to use force against Taiwan in order to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course Beijing does much more than just reserve the right to use force. Especially in recent years Beijing has chosen to demonstrate its militant designs through provocative military exercises and even test firing missiles close to Taiwan. China's military modernization, with special emphasis on fighter jets and missiles, is aimed at overwhelming Taiwan's defenses and deterring U.S. intervention in the Strait. As long as Beijing continues to make threats of force its primary mode of communication with Taiwan, its pronounced policy of peaceful unification cannot be taken seriously.^[12]

After so call "three nos" [no support for Taiwan independence, no support for "two mainland Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan", no admission into the United Nations or other international organizations that require statehood] in 1998, it is important to note that there should also be a fourth no--no use of force. We can find that the Taiwan Relations Act was a law and that the 3 communiqués were executive agreements. It was difficult to know which would prevail if they came into conflict. Ultimately the US response to a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be a political decision.

Diplomatic isolation

Beijing's current participation in international organizations is aimed at keeping Taiwan out as much as it is securing benefits for China. Even worse, at Beijing's demand, the most powerful leaders in the world have agreed to block Taiwan's national leaders from even private travel in their respective countries. This diplomatic isolation is supposed to put Taiwan in its place and make its leaders understand that if they want to participate in international bodies, they must first accept Beijing's "one country, two systems" unification offer. Such an attitude demonstrates an amazing lack of good will and encourages no one in Taiwan to consider--much less advocate--China's "one country, two systems" model.^[13]

If the United States would continue to adhere to the "three nos," it means that Beijing's diplomatic isolation to Taiwan success.

Preconditions for dialogue

Both Jiang Zemin and Wang Daohan have frequently said that "everything is negotiable under the one China principle," or "dialogue can only commence under the one China principle." Beijing's approach to cross-Strait negotiations and dialogue is exactly backwards. Beijing seeks first to force Taiwan to accept Beijing's desired framework, and then dialogue can commence to fill in the details of Taiwan's surrender. Beijing has been so rigid in its position that it has made no effort to build Taiwan's confidence in cross-Strait dialogue leading to substantive and practical progress.^[14]

We can discuss one China issue or one China question but we can not accept Beijing's desired framework first. We all know that Taiwan cannot accept Beijing's 1979 federation proposal^[15] nor can Taiwan accept Beijing's definition of "one China" as defined in Beijing's white papers and expects all 160 countries to have diplomatic terms with Beijing as capital of China and representative of China.

Taipei's Cross-Strait Policy

In this still highly unstable context Chen proceeded to launch the foreign policy initiative he had

promised: negotiations with Beijing, without preconditions, with an open agenda, at any venue. These negotiations would include discussions of Taiwan's acceptance of the three links, investment, a peace treaty, and confidence building measures to reduce the danger of cross-Strait crises.

President Chen's speech: *dynamic status quo*

Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention of using military force against Taiwan, President Chen pledges that during his term in office, he will:

1. not declare independence,
2. not change the national title,
3. not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution,
4. not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore,
5. there is no question of abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council.^[16]

A future one China

Official dialogue between the two sides has been halted due to mainland China's insistence that Taiwan explicitly accept the "one China" principle before talks can begin. President Chen Shui-bian has indicated willingness to discuss the "one-China" principle, but has refused to accept it as a precondition for talks. The inability of political leaders in mainland China and Taiwan to find a way to resume cross-Strait dialogue exacerbates misunderstandings and misperceptions and makes a future security crisis much more likely.

To bypass disagreements over the "one China" principle, the discussions based on the "Guidelines for National Unification" adopted by Taiwan in 1991. The PRC would agree to discuss Taiwan's proposal for unification (which envisions short-term, medium-term, and long-term phases leading toward unification). Tsai Ing-wen, the chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, has already stated that Chen's administration will retain the existing reunification guidelines. Discussions on the basis of the 1991 guidelines would incorporate the "one China" principle without requiring Taiwan to reaffirm it explicitly.^[17]

The people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background. While upholding the principles of democracy and parity, building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation through good will, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future "one China."^[18]

The citizens in Taiwan will definitely disagree with PRC's definition on "One China." During past decades, most Taiwan residents have recognized themselves as ROC citizens. In its Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Destiny, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) advocates that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state; so, there is no need to claim independence any more; and the DPP recognizes the ROC as the nation's name. Therefore, the ROC regime is autonomous enough to claim being an independent sovereign state. Furthermore, through democratization, the ROC has been a meaningful symbol substantiated by Taiwanese contents without any relevance with the Mainland. Through substantial democratization, the ROC entity has been reborn as a new republic with Taiwanese contents. Hence, in this sense, Beijing's "one country, two systems" formula is an unrealistic fiction for Taiwan.^[19]

In this light, the Chen proposal to "discuss" one China as an equal interlocutor without accepting it as a principle is a transparent attempt to win mainland recognition for his legitimacy as the ruler of a self-

standing state-like entity without giving up anything in return. It is an offer the mainland is unlikely to accept, or even to take seriously.^[20]

Peaceful coexistence

Taiwan's current policy does not preclude eventual unification, but it definitely precludes unification under current circumstances. No government on Taiwan will ever consider Beijing's "one country, two systems" proposal, as long as the constitution of that "one country" subordinates its government to Communist Party "leadership." If and when Beijing modifies its constitution and legal system, restructures its economy, and substantially liberalizes its politics, only then should the people on Taiwan and their elected representatives discuss potential frameworks for unification. For now, the government wisely seeks a peaceful and separate existence, while building practical links to the Mainland through investment, trade, and tourism.

During the campaign he declared that the search for cross-Strait peace was his highest goal, ultimate concern, and moral duty, and he pledged his willingness to negotiate a relaxation of, and acceptance of, the three links. Taipei rejected "one country two systems" and spurned the one China principle as a precondition for talks, though he expressed Taipei's willingness to discuss this or any other issue, small or large, once unconditional talks were agreed.

Despite some tense periods, especially in 1995-1996, the PRC and Taiwan have maintained a peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait, including growing trade, investment, and cultural exchanges. It should be noted that the Taipei and Beijing have resumed their official dialogue. Taiwan's chief negotiator, Koo Chen-fu, visited the mainland October, 1998 and China's chief negotiator, Wang Dao-han, is expected to visit Taiwan fall, 1999. But for some reasons, Wang Dao-han, still can not visit Taiwan now.

Taiwan has been the touchstone of improved U.S.-China relations since President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique. But Taiwan is also the flashpoint in the relationship, as was shown in 1996 when China's missile firings and live-fire military exercises in the seas surrounding Taiwan compelled the United States to send two carrier battle groups to the area. The Chinese missile firings were in turn a reaction to the government of Taiwan's pursuit of more "international space" to represent its people and economy internationally, and notably the 1995 visit of Taiwan's leader, Lee Teng Hui, to his American alma mater Cornell University. Chinese leaders tend to interpret pursuit of international space by Taiwan as pursuit of independence. In this regard, William J. Perry believes that they are unreasonably suspicious.^[21]

No use of force

In addition to formally recognizing Beijing's effective jurisdiction over the Mainland, Taiwan ended the period of mobilization to resist Communist aggression. These moves made clear once and for all that Taipei has forsaken Chiang Kai-shek's notion of retaking the motherland, and instead will focus on effective governance of Taiwan and a collection of offshore islands. Taiwan will not use force against the Mainland unless attacked. A key objective for Taiwan in cross-Strait negotiations is to get Beijing to make a similar pledge.

The U.S. Role in the Resumption of Cross-Strait Dialogues

Washington's Cross-Strait Policy

The governments of Beijing, Taipei, and Washington all agree that the United States has a role to play in the evolving relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China, although they disagree on what that role should be. The United States is inextricably involved in the dispute between Beijing and Taipei; its action or inaction will affect the way the other two parties behave.^[22]

The United States should try to be a balancer and a facilitator, not a mediator or a negotiator, on Cross-Strait issues. The two sides should be encouraged to resume their dialogue. In addition, unofficial track-two efforts are also helpful.^[23]

In Washington's view:^[24]

1. **We will continue to reaffirm clearly and adhere consistently to our one-China policy as defined by the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.** This policy remains the cornerstone of Taiwan-PRC-U.S. relations and has fostered peace and stability in East Asia and facilitated the remarkable evolution on Taiwan itself.
2. **We will insist that the Taiwan Strait issue should be resolved peacefully.** We reject and oppose the use of force or the threat of force to resolve the Taiwan Strait issue. Furthermore, to quote the Taiwan Relations Act, it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
3. **We will maintain a confidence that the two sides have the creativity to resolve this issue through cross-strait dialogue *on their own*.** The United States will neither play the role of mediator nor pressure either side to negotiate or accept any arrangements that it does not believe are in its interests.
4. We understand that any arrangements between Beijing and Taipei should be on a mutually acceptable basis, and not be imposed on one side by the other. **How specifically to define the "one-China" principle and how concretely to realize it are best left to the two sides of the Strait on a mutually acceptable basis.**
5. We understand that because Taiwan is a democracy, **any arrangements between the two sides ultimately have to be acceptable to the Taiwan public.**
6. We are willing to support any outcome voluntarily agreed to by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The United States has a strong, compelling national interest in maintaining the peaceful status quo between China and Taiwan and in encouraging a peaceful resolution of their differences.^[25]

Base: The Three Communiqués and Taiwan Relation Act

1. U.S. realizes that all Chinese people on both sides of the strait believe that there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of China ("Shanghai Communique" and "Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China").
2. U.S. reiterates its concern that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese people themselves ("Shanghai Communique"). The U.S. policy is ...
3. To make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
4. To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

5. To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
6. To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. ("Taiwan Relations Act")

Reassure Taiwan

On July 14, 1982, the U.S. side, through appropriate channels, made the following points known to the Republic of China that the U.S. side: 1) Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China, 2) Has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese Communists on arms sales to the Republic of China, 3) Will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Peking, 4) Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relation Act, 5) Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, 6) Will not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Communists. ^[26]

Engagement with China

The content of engagement should be a focused, proactive program to shape the U.S.-China security relationship to mutual benefit. Such a program would have four components: ^[27]

1. Deepen and broaden the Defense-to-Defense relationship.
2. Stabilize the Taiwan issue.
3. Engage China on important regional issues like North Korea, Pakistan, and India.
4. Encourage greater participation by China in counter-proliferation and other international security regimes.

Encouraging liberalization in the PRC should be recognized as an important component of the United States' Taiwan policy. The only way out of this mess is for China to follow Taiwan down the path of prosperity and democracy. This is one reason why Taiwan supports China's entry into the World Trade Organization and has asked the U.S. to grant permanent normal trading status to the PRC. ^[28]

One China Policy

The U.S. commitment to "One China" policy in the past agreed rhetorically with the commitments to "One China" of both Beijing and Taipei. Consequently, the U.S. commitment was not seen as tilting toward either of the contending parties. Each interpreted the meanings of "One China" differently, but the U.S. government did not take sides in the dispute. ^[29]

Careful word choice matters because U.S. leaders have been duped into becoming Beijing's pawns in its war of words with Taiwan. A seemingly innocuous statement like "the United States has a one-China policy" is taken by Beijing as U.S. recognition of Beijing's claim that Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China. Beijing then uses the "one-China" policy to protest defensive arms sales to Taiwan and to isolate Taiwan internationally. Alone and overwhelmed, Taiwan is then expected to negotiate unification with China. (Indeed, one China Policy is different from one China principle.)

Regrettably, President Clinton has gone beyond using Beijing's "one-China" slogan to adopt significant

elements of its "one-China" policy. On June 30, 1998, while in Shanghai, the President said, "we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any international organization for which statehood is a requirement." These "three no's" have always been Beijing's policy, but no U.S. President had ever publicly endorsed them, much less on Chinese soil. In the White Paper, China gleefully cites the President's concession as an implicit endorsement of its "one-China" policy. The Clinton Administration claimed that the President's statement in Shanghai was nothing new and no big deal. But it obviously mattered to Beijing.^[30]

But within the framework of the One China policy the United States can and should take additional actions to avoid conflicts between the PRC and Taiwan that would catch the United States in the middle. The U.S. should emphasize that neither Beijing (through force) nor Taipei (through a unilateral pursuit of independence) should try to change the status quo.^[31]

Dialogue between cross strait

Susan L. Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, indicated that, to help develop peaceful and productive relations, the Clinton administration has encouraged both sides to reopen dialogue by delivering the same messages to both sides. But the U.S. has not pressured either side to negotiate, nor has the U.S. offered to mediate. The U.S. does not believe greater involvement on the U.S. part would be helpful or serve U.S. interests. There is no direct role for the U.S. in resolving Taiwan's future. But that does not mean that the U.S. will be inactive. The U.S. will continue to encourage Taipei and Beijing to return to active and direct dialogue.^[32]

Peaceful resolution

As for American policy, the United States should credibly reiterate its commitment to a "peaceful resolution" of cross-strait issues^[33].

The President must make up for his Shanghai "three no's" mistake by reassuring Taiwan publicly that America has not adopted Beijing's position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, will not withhold needed defensive arms, and will not pressure Taipei to enter into negotiations with Beijing. President Ronald Reagan's "six assurances" to Taiwan in 1982 should be his guide.^[34]

From the signing of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué until the mid-1990s, American policy was that the United States would be satisfied by any resolution of the status of Taiwan that was acceptable to people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, so long as the resolution was achieved peacefully. American policy sought to deter each side from taking actions to resolve the situation in a way not acceptable to the other. This policy was frustrating to Beijing because it prevented the use of China's military and diplomatic advantages to preempt a resolution of the Taiwan problem. Since 1995-1996, however, because Washington has become concerned that Beijing is losing its patience, it has shifted its policy emphasis toward reassuring Beijing. In effect, it has come to see peaceful resolution as resolution on terms that will satisfy Beijing and has tried to push Taiwan to start talking about solutions^[35].

As for American policy, the United States should credibly reiterate its commitment to a "peaceful resolution" of cross-strait issues, ..., get both the PRC and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization where they can establish new channels of communication, and not complicate matters further for the new administrations that are to come both in Taipei and Washington.^[36]

The Assent of Taiwan People

Enshrine "the assent of the Taiwan people" as a key tenet of U.S. policy. On March 8, President Clinton declared that "the issues between Beijing and Taipei must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan." This important acknowledgement of Taiwan's democratic success should remain a key pillar of U.S. policy.^[37]

Channels for Encouraging Dialogues: Track Two

The dangers inherent in the situation were clearly revealed in the events of 1995-96. The future status of Taiwan still stands as the single most important, most difficult, and most dangerous issue in U.S.-China relations and there are as yet few signs that the PRC and Taiwan, even after a resumption of their quasi-official dialogue broken off in the aftermath of the crisis, are close to a mutual accommodation that would provide a basis for a new kind of political relationship that would reassociate Taiwan with the mainland on terms acceptable to both.^[38]

What follows is a brief encapsulation of the four major topics that were touched upon in each of the five sessions: interpreting the "one China" principle; Taiwan's international space; economic linkages between Taiwan and the PRC; and the role of the U.S. in the cross-strait relationship. A fifth issue, the military balance across the Strait, is included in the summary of the August 1999 Roundtable. The synopses include comments made in the presentations, during the discussions, and over coffee breaks and sidebars.^[39]

It is for this reason that private organizations such as the National Committee on American Foreign Policy can be quite helpful. The Committee has been sponsoring a Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations for the past three years. We believe that the NCAFP, as well as other private organizations and individuals in the United States, can play an important role in facilitating dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, and in encouraging some kind of modus vivendi between them. The participants in the NCAFP's roundtable have been a small group of scholars, former government officials, and influential individuals from the United States, China and Taiwan. There have been four meetings of the roundtable, all in New York City, and the fifth meeting took place in June 1999.^[40]

In sum, the roundtables have sought to encourage frank exchanges among the participants and to provide a sheltered arena in which ideas can be aired and through which trust can be nurtured. The NCAFP has no illusions about the difficulties involved in finding solutions to the problems and it may not even be possible to find such solutions, but we believe that the act of seeking common ground is itself constructive and that such a dialogue is bound to clarify the situation and to keep all three sides well informed about the perspectives of the other two. We also believe that the roundtable proceedings are taken very seriously by all three governments and we have been told by one high-ranking American official that the NCAFP roundtable is "the most important (unofficial) forum for cross-strait dialogue."^[41]

The other group's initial discussions in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies identified nine key events and trends that deserved analysis:^[42]

- Indicators that the PRC was preparing for an invasion of Taiwan (PRC initiator)
- A decision by Taiwan to develop weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical,

- or biological) (Taiwan initiator)
- US decides to sell theater missile defense systems to Taiwan (US initiator--but trend in PRC missile deployments also a factor)
- PRC announcement of a timetable for reunification (PRC initiator)
- Economic meltdown/chaos in mainland China (PRC initiator)
- Trend towards "creeping independence" for Taiwan (Taiwan initiator)
- Trend toward overt American support for Taiwan (including both US actions and perceptions in Taiwan and mainland China)
- Trend toward increasing "Taiwan identity" and indefinite delay of reunification (Taiwan initiator)
- Trends in overall military balance across the Taiwan strait (All three parties involved)

William J. Perry is the important person on such a Track II effort.

"On January 1997, under the sponsorship of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, I led a delegation to Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taipei. The U.S. delegation was chosen to emphasize former policy makers, rather than China experts. It included Brent Scowcroft, Gen. Shalikshvili, Adm. Hays, Ash Carter, Bob Blackwill, and Mike Lampton. We met with leaders from both China and Taiwan, including the presidents, the defense ministers, the foreign ministers, and the chiefs of general staff. Interestingly, this is the first time that Brent Scowcroft, Gen. Shalikshvili, or I had been able to meet with senior Taiwanese officials, which illustrates the advantage of Track II dialogue in dealing with cross-Straits issues. In our meeting with Jiang Ze Min, he asked that we pass on a message to Lee Teng Hui, saying that he was ready to restart the cross-Strait dialogue, and I believe that this unofficial communication channel played a role in restarting the dialogue. Jiang Ze Min also said that he wanted to continue this Track II dialogue, and assigned his old mentor, Wang Dao Han, to head future Chinese delegations. As a result, we had a follow-on meeting with the Chinese delegation under Mr. Wang last week, sponsored by the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, and hosted by the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu. On this meeting, the original team was joined by some China scholars, including Mike Oksenberg, John Lewis, and Jan Berris. This was a productive meeting, and led to an invitation by the Chinese for a follow-on meeting next March in Shanghai."^[43]

In William J. Perry's opinion, it is useful to have a Track two channel to improve the topics.^[44]

1. **Increase in Cross-Strait Contact:** The two parties should come to agreement on ways to increase cross-Strait intercourse in areas such as business and cultural contacts, communications and transport links, anti-drug, anti-smuggling, anticrime, customs cooperation, and air traffic control. The early establishment of direct flights between the mainland and Taiwan would be a good start.
2. **Agreement on Degree of "International Space" for Taiwan:** The two should come to agreement on a practical and appropriate measure of "international space" for Taiwan, between the extremes of diplomatic recognition still sought on some occasions by Taipei and the tendency to total isolation of Taiwan sometimes exhibited by Beijing. In particular, a formula should be explored whereby Taipei is represented in a wide range of intergovernmental organizations where statehood is not required for membership, on the basis of "China, Taipei," as has been adopted successfully in the Asian Development Bank and Olympic Games. A reasonable beginning would be for Beijing to relax its opposition to financial contribution by Taiwan to the Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO). Participation in KEDO would not constitute diplomatic recognition, but it would give Taiwan an opportunity to play a role as an economy in a regional non-proliferation effort. The two sides should also begin to come to agreement on Taipei's participation in international economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the World Bank.
3. **Development of Confidence Building Measures:** Confidence building measures between Taiwan's

and the PRC's militaries should be developed with some sense of urgency. As it presently stands, in the event of a crisis the two sides have no means of communicating with one another. Development of contacts and confidence building measures can reduce tension levels and provide a means for averting a crisis and avoiding dangerous miscalculations.

Another Track two is American Assembly^[45]. At the close of their deliberations, the participants in this Assembly reviewed and approved as a group the following statement. This statement represents general agreement; however, no one was asked to sign it. Furthermore, it should be understood that not everyone agreed with all of it. Among the policy-relevant questions addressed by this America

Assembly were:^[46]

China and Taiwan

What might lead to conflict: Taiwan independence?

U.S. encouragement to Taiwan independence?

Chinese impatience?

How can the United States maintain good relations with Taiwan (and Tibet) while reducing risks of conflict?

Among the specific joint recommendations of American and Taiwanese participants are the following:
[47]

1. Taiwan should unilaterally adopt "reassuring measures" that would give evidence of good intentions without requiring bilateral agreement. It should initiate greater cross-Strait exchange and low-level bilateral talks.
2. Both Taiwan and the PRC should set aside the sovereignty issue for now in favor of easing tension and building a more cooperative relationship. Both sides should be scrupulous in avoiding sovereignty-related language in their negotiations.
3. The United States should orient its military policy in the region toward achieving balance in its relations with Taiwan and the PRC, avoiding a "zero sum game" mentality.
4. The US should join Taiwan in supporting a regional mechanism to ease the credit crunch in the region and promote financial stability in the wake of the Asian economic crisis, supplemental to the International Monetary Fund. Most importantly, it should redouble efforts to expedite the admission of both the PRC and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization, preferably before the end of the year, to promote integration of China and Taiwan into the world economy, and strengthen ties across the Taiwan Strait.

Encouraging Specific Agreements: Interim Agreement

Harry Harding, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, advocated a vocabulary of "modus vivendi" in April 1999 in Taipei. This is based on the twin premises that a final resolution of the Taiwan question is premature, but that an arms race in the region should be avoided. This modus vivendi could involve explicit agreements between Taiwan and the Mainland China. It is more likely, however, that it would entail more informal arrangements and understandings between the two sides. This idea is far more plausible than both sides making pledges

that they might not be able to keep. A *modus vivendi* could include the following elements.^[48]

1. A set of mutual reassurances, such that the mainland would commit itself not to use force against Taiwan as long as Taiwan did not declare independence, and that Taiwan would commit itself not to declare independence unilaterally as long as the mainland did not use force.
2. More extensive cross-Strait economic and cultural ties, including the establishment of **direct communications and transportation links and the relaxation of barriers to trade and investment.**

At first, the principal purpose of such dialogue would simply be to exchange views on cross-Strait relations so as to enhance mutual understanding. Over time, the dialogue would evolve to explore the feasibility of eventual unification, including the preconditions that would have to be met for an agreement and the various formulas that might ultimately prove mutually acceptable.^[49] Harry Harding considers the possible role of interim arrangements in evolving Taiwan Strait frameworks. He begins with three assumptions: The current situation in the Taiwan Strait remains unstable; a final resolution of the Taiwan question is inconceivable in the short to medium term; therefore, some kind of interim arrangements should be seriously explored. The purpose of these arrangements is not to freeze the status quo but to make a highly dynamic situation more stable. "Serious dilemmas" encompassed in five dimensions that interim arrangements might be expected to address are described in detail: mutual reassurances regarding issues of greatest concern, development of cross-strait dialogue, expansion of cross-strait economic and cultural ties, expansion of Taiwan's role in the international community, and military confidence-building measures.^[50]

Stanley O. Roth (Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of State) said that on March 24, 1999. "Using a phrase that has garnered much favor in Washington of late, I could imagine that "out of the box" thinking within this dialogue might contribute to interim agreements, perhaps in combination with specific confidence building measures, on any number of difficult topics. But, as the U.S. has steadfastly held, we will avoid interfering as the two sides pursue peaceful resolution of differences because it is only the participants on both sides of the strait that can craft the specific solutions which balance their interests while addressing their most pressing concerns."^[51] It seems that U.S. government wants both side to have interim agreements in the future. Indeed, as Richard C. Bush points out "encouraging the resumption of a substantive and constructive dialogue without pressuring Taiwan to negotiate or serving as a mediator between Taipei and Beijing"^[52].

Conclusions

The single most important threat to American national security interests that is now clearly visible is the unstable and potentially explosive relationship between China and Taiwan.^[53] In the short term, the cross-strait relations may be unstable. But in the long term, the cross-strait relations may be stable if it has dialogue in both sides.

Regarding the U.S. role in cross-strait relations, Washington's anchor interest centers on maintaining an equilibrium of confidence so those on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can determine the pace and scope of their mutual interaction peacefully. Equilibrium of confidence includes: ^[54]

- Each side has the defensive capabilities and thereby the minimal sense of security necessary to enter cross-strait dialogue free of intimidation or coercion;
- Both sides feel confident the U.S. is taking an even-handed approach toward the other;
- Neither side feels the U.S. is pressuring it into negotiations; and
- Any arrangements concluded are mutually acceptable to both sides.

In this confrontation, let Mainland China take over Taiwan with independence ambition. Not only will a democratic Taiwan disappear, but also the economic interests of the U.S. in the entire Asia region would be seriously damaged. There would no longer be any credibility of the U.S. in its Asia Allies. The U.S. Congress might have disagreement. For the U.S., each above scenario would create a dilemma and conflicts with U.S. national interests. The best way for the U.S. is to keep the "dynamic status quo." Under the principle of peaceful resolution, the U.S. used to warning Mainland China not to use force, and discouraging Taiwan from seeking independence. The issues between Beijing and Taipei must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.

The reason is that the coerced incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC would damage, even destroy, the U.S. strategic position in Asia. This position rests on America's credibility as a guarantor of the regional peace. The United States is formally allied with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines and is informally committed to the other major Southeast Asian nations, especially in maritime South-east Asia, to guarantee regional security and stability. America's ability to keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait is essential to its credibility as the guarantor of Japanese and Korean security and to its role as the overseer of peace in the region as a whole. Were the United States to stand idly by while the PRC coerced Taiwan, others in the region would conclude that U.S.

determination had declined.^[55]

The PRC expressed its willingness to return to the 1992 compromise; to wit, under the "principle of one China," Beijing was prepared to negotiate any issue with Taipei as long as both sides agree to talk as equals, recognize that China and Taiwan constitute one China, and are sincerely committed to resolving the divided China problem. But it is important that what is the meaning of "One China Principle."

In the meantime, first, there has been a consistent tendency to turn to the US, Taiwan's sole remaining security patron, for enhanced guarantees. Such assurances have usually been forthcoming, but have typically been stinting and ambiguous. Second, economically the island has moved not only toward the mainland but toward ever increasing globalization, with a high proportion of foreign investment and a trade dependency ratio of well over 100 percent. While this has turned out to be extraordinarily foresightful economically, the political calculus was to give the international bourgeoisie a stake in the island's future; whether there has been any tangible payoff is hard to say, particularly since the "China [mainland] market" became a factor in world trade. Third, the island has turned toward increasing

democratization and populist mobilization in an effort to enhance political legitimacy.^[56]

For Taiwan, it is time to discuss three direct lines and the policy of *jieji yongren*. Mainland China, which insists on the "one China" principle as the basis for any cross-strait "three direct links," has on the face of it been throwing cold water on the move which Taiwan is set to begin the little three lines at the beginning of next year. The Taiwan government is willing "to do anything that is beneficial to improved cross-strait ties," including allowing proposed visits to the mainland by opposition lawmakers.

For China, the aim is simple: to prevent Taiwan's independence and all policies that promote it. For Taiwan, the question is more complicated, involving efforts to increase its international status, preserve its prosperity and nurture its fledgling democracy. For the US, relations between China and Taiwan pose a dilemma that reaches to the heart of its Asian posture. While US policy should be cautious and

even-handed, Washington should not assume that unification is the only possible future.^[57]

For U.S., they should try to be a balancer and a facilitator, not a mediator or a negotiator, on Cross-Strait issues. The two sides should be encouraged to resume their dialogue. The most important U.S. interest in this complex Cross-Strait relationship is to ensure that the resolution of the differences between the PRC and Taiwan is both mutually acceptable and peaceful. The United States should not seek to mediate the dispute between China and Taiwan or to broker some grand solution that is not realistic given the absence of trust between the two sides. Nor should the United States stand by passively in a situation that involves substantial U.S. interests. Instead, it should continue quietly to encourage the continuation of Cross-Strait dialogue; the acceleration of trade, investment, and cultural exchanges; and the signing of a number of agreements on such matters as illegal immigration, hijacking, and agricultural cooperation. The United States should also encourage the establishment of a military buffer zone between Taiwan and the PRC where incidents in the air and at sea could be avoided.

For the more, track two is helpful in the discussion of both sides. We need new thinking of some kind "interim agreements" to make sure the *dynamic status quo* is stable. Even we can discuss the "One China Principle" in the future. Step-by-step negotiations to advance a cross-strait dialogue can be achieved as follows. First, both regimes should make the April 1993 Singapore agreement the basis for a new beginning. They can refer to Wang Daohan and Tang Shubei's one-China principle to be equal partners in a discussion to share the sovereignty of China. Before they address that issue, however, some confidence-building measures should take place. Both sides should instruct SEF and ARATS to meet and begin negotiating the three functional issues (fishing rights, highjacking, and smuggling) which had been the subject of their meetings before January 1995. If both sides can agree on those three functional issues, Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu could meet in Taiwan and Wang could pay his respects to the new president and vice president of the ROC regime.^[58] Finally, the United States should continue to make clear to the PRC that it has a substantial interest in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the Cross-Strait issue.^[59]

♦ Lee Ming-Yi is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, National Sun Yat-Sen University. The author wants to thank all who had discussions with him and presented new ideas. Particular thanks go to Andrew J. Nathan, Ramon H. Myers, Lowell Dittmer, Robert L. Suettinger, Stephen J. Yates, Ralph N. Clough, David M. Lampton, Samantha F. Ravich, Harry Harding, Gerrit W. Gong, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Jerome A. Cohen, Suzanne Ogden, Robert Ross, William C. Kirby, Bruce J. Dickson, David Shambaugh, Larry M. Wortzel, Kenneth Allen, Robert Sutter, David Brown, Michael Y. Warder, John L. Holden and many others. The author was a visiting scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University from June to December 2000.

[1] Andrew J. Nathan, "The Impact of Chen Shui-bian's Election on Cross-Strait Relations," *Taiwan's Presidential Election 2000*. Washington: CSIS published, 2000.

[2] The so called "functional issues" including the repatriation of hijackers, the settlement of fishing disputes, the repatriation of illegal immigrants, the simplification of entry and exit for officials of the two associations, protection of Taiwan businessmen, cross-strait scientific and technological exchanges, cooperation on crime control, judicial cooperation, and intellectual property rights protection. Meanwhile, SEF and ARATS officials agreed to meet on August 29, 1993, in Beijing to discuss the issues of airplane hijacking, smuggling in the Taiwan Strait, and jurisdictional rights of fishing fleets. Further meetings on November 2, 1993, at Xiamen; on December 19, 1993, in Taipei; on March 25, 1994, in Beijing; on July 30, 1994, in Taipei; on December 22, 1994, in Nanjing; and finally on January 22, 1995, in Beijing paved the way for agreements on airplane hijacking and smuggling, with the fishing jurisdiction problem still to be negotiated.

[3] The original statement is: "As a result of a series of actions taken by Taiwan that are destructive to cross-Strait relations, the atmosphere for staging the second Koo-Wang Talks and associated preparatory consultations has been seriously affected. We have no choice but to postpone these preparatory consultations and talks. We will write you again at an appropriate time."

- [4] Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The Divided China Problem: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution*, Stanford University, Hoover Institution, 2000, No.101.
- [5] Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, 2000, by The Center for Strategic and International Studies .
- [6] Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China, October 2000, WWW URL: www.mac.gov.tw
- [7] Andrew J. Nathan, "The Impact of Chen Shui-bian's Election on Cross-Strait Relations", *op.cit.*
- [8] Donald S. Zagoria, "The National Committee on American Foreign Policy's Project on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations", International Conference on United States -Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act, April 9 - 10, 1999.
- [9] Lowell Dittme, "Taiwan Strait Policy And The Millennial Elections." Lowell Dittmer sent the article for me by Email.
- [10] White Paper, February 21, 2000, "This is by no means directed against Taiwan compatriots, but against the scheme to create an "independent Taiwan" and against the foreign forces interfering in the reunification of China, and is intended as a necessary safeguard for the striving for peaceful reunification."
- [11] Robert L. Suettinger, "The Taiwan Dilemma: Time for a Change in the U.S. Approach?" Conference on U.S.-China Relations Since the Cold War, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 9, 2000
- [12] Stephen J. Yates, "Toward a Cross-Strait Relationship that Promotes Peace, Prosperity, and Freedom on Both Sides", conference paper, February 28, 2000, in Taipei.
- [13] Ibid.
- [14] Ibid.
- [15] The Chinese government's declaration in 1979 on implementing the principle of peaceful reunification was based on the premise that the Taiwan authorities at that time upheld the principle that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China. Meanwhile, the Chinese government took into account the fact that the U.S. government, which for many years had supported the Taiwan authorities, had accepted that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the only legitimate government of China, and saw this acknowledgment as being beneficial to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.
- [16] President Chen's 520 Inaugural Speech: "Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era".
- [17] (CNA)Taipei, May 17, 2000.
- [18] President Chen's 520 Inaugural Speech .
- [19] Jiann-fa Yan, "1992 Consensus and Its Contextual Connotations", Peace Forum, Taipei, Taiwan.
- [20] Andrew J. Nathan, "The Impact of Chen Shui-bian's Election on Cross-Strait Relations", *op.cit.*
- [21] William J. Perry, "The Future of U.S.-China Engagement", American Assembly, San Francisco, July 11, 1998
- [22] Ralph N. Clough, *Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?* (USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1999), p.113.
- [23] Winston Lord, "U.S. Role in the China-Taiwan Relationship", National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, August, 2000.
- [24] Richard C. Bush, "*Taiwan's Presidential Election 2000*". Washington: CSIS published, 2000
- [25] American Foreign Policy Interests, June 1999.
- [26] <http://www.dsis.org.tw/database/sino-us/china/d1-6e.htm>
- [27] William J. Perry, *op.cit.*
- [28] Greg May, "REALITY CHECK: Chen Shui-bian's Bottom Line", DC: Nixon Center .
- [29] Ralph N. Clough, "Managing the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan Relationship," American Foreign Policy Interests, December 1999.
- [30] Stephen J. Yates, "China's Taiwan White Paper Power Play" The Heritage Foundation.
- [31] William J. Perry, *op.cit.*
- [32] Susan L. Shirk, "*The United States and Taiwan*", Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, May 20, 1998. (Susan Shirk was Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State from July 1997 - July 2000).
- [33] David M. Lampton, "REALITY CHECK: China's White Paper is Counterproductive", DC: Nixon Center
- [34] Stephen J. Yates, "China's Taiwan White Paper Power Play" *op.cit.*

- [35] Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy", *op.cit.*
- [36] David M. Lampton, "China's White Paper is Counterproductive", DC, Nixon Center.
- [37] *Some call it the fourth pillar.*
- [38] Donald S. Zagoria, *op.cit.*
- [39] Samantha F. Ravich, "Examining Trends of Convergence and Divergence across the Taiwan Strait: NCAFP's Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy And Cross-Strait Relations", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, December 1999.
- [40] Donald S. Zagoria, *op.cit.*
- [41] *Ibid.*
- [42] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, *Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait.*
- [43] William J. Perry, *op.cit.*
- [44] *Ibid.*
- [45] *The American Assembly was founded in 1950 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower while he was President of Columbia University, with its home, Arden House, donated by Ambassador Averell Harriman and Roland Harriman. Since its establishment, The Assembly has exerted an important bipartisan influence on the deliberation of key foreign and domestic policies. The Assembly determined that, at the end of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first, one of the most important issues confronting American citizens is their relationship with East Asia, and most notably the peoples of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. The 23 million people of Taiwan play an important role in East Asia and America has important economic, cultural, security, and other interests engaged with the island. Further, the world community stands to gain greatly from productive interaction with Taiwan's talented people. More to the point, the Taiwan Strait is one of the few places in the world where the United States could find itself involved in major conflict.*
- [46] *The American Assembly "China/U.S. Relation in the Twenty-First Century: Fostering Cooperation, Preventing Conflict". Nov. 14 to 17, 1996. New York.*
- [47] *Ibid.*
- [48] Harry Harding. "Toward a Modus Vivendi in the Taiwan Strait", the lecture on "U.S. Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years After the Taiwan Relations Act", Taipei. R.O.C., April 9-10, 1999.
- [49] *Ibid.*
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THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE

Positions of CCP, KMT and DPP

XU SHIQUAN

The crux of the cross-strait relationship since Mr. Lee Teng-hui came to power in 1988 has been the one-China principle. It became more so after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the local election in Taiwan on March 18, 2000. Therefore, it is important to understand the basic positions and their evolutions on this principle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the ruling party of China's mainland, the Kuomintang (KMT), which was the ruling party in Taiwan for over 50 years until the March election, and the DPP. This short paper tries to provide you with the origin of the one-China principle, historical reviews of the positions and their evolutions of the three parties on the issue. Hopefully, this would provide you with the background to the dispute among the three parties and some information for exploring ways and means for a solution, even if a *modus vivendi*, of the problem. As the People's First Party (PFP) in Taiwan came into being only 4 months ago and its mainland policy is similar to that of the KMT under Mr. Lien Chan, the paper will not deal with PFP's position.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE

The Chinese government white paper, "The one-China Principle and

the Taiwan Issue". released on February 21, 2000, points out: "The One-China Principle has evolved in the course of the Chinese people's just struggle to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its basis, both de facto and de jure, is unshakable."

The most crucial event that the Taiwan issue could be attributed to in contemporary history was the Shimonoseki Treaty imposed on the Qing government by Japan in 1895 through an aggressive war. However, Japan's 50-year occupation of Taiwan finally came to the end also as a result of war, the Japanese defeat in the Second World War. In December 1941, following the Pearl Harbor Incident, the Chinese government declared war against Japan and proclaimed that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Shimonoseki Treaty, had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration issued by the Chinese, U.S. and British governments stipulated that Japan should return to China all the territories it had seized from the Chinese, including northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago. The Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and Britain in 1945 (later adhered to by the Soviet Union) stipulated that "the term of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In August that year, Japan declared surrender and promised in its instrument of surrender that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25, 1945,

the Chinese government recovered Taiwan and Penghu Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan. This episode of history shows clearly that Taiwan has since 1945 returned to China both de facto and de jure. According to the norms of international law, war makes the treaties signed among belligerent countries invalid. China's declaration of war against Japan naturally made invalid the Shimonoseki Treaty and thus the legal basis of Japanese occupation of Taiwan ceased to exist. The Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, international treaties bearing full effectiveness of international law, affirmed that Taiwan had returned to China.

The United States played an important part in the formulation of the Cairo Declaration, and on the question of returning Taiwan back to China, President Roosevelt held identical positions with China and made a positive contribution. From that time till 1951 when the Korean War broke out, the United States administration basically maintained Roosevelt's policy towards Taiwan. However, there also were strong undercurrents to betray this policy as the Cold War unfolded and the Chinese civil war raged on in favor of a victory of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1947 when the "February 28 Incident" erupted, the U.S. Consulate-General in Taipei proposed in a report immediate intervention in the name of the U.S. or the United Nations. To justify this intervention, it alleged that "legally, Japan still retains Taiwan's

sovereignty.” With Taiwan’s status as such, “direct intervention” was “appropriate”.¹ The report was approved by the then American Ambassador to China Mr. Leighton Stuard and was sent to the State Department. In 1949, when it became apparent that the KMT regime of Chiang Kai-shek would soon collapse, the National Security Council of the United States worked out a report on January 19, aiming at preventing the “fall” of Taiwan into the hands of the Chinese Communists. “The Draft Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa”, numbered NSC37-1, further elaborated the allegations of the Stuard report that Taiwan’s status was “undecided”. It claimed that “Taiwan is part of the Japanese Empire, its final status is to be decided by a peace treaty” (between China and Japan).² It went even further by saying that China had only “de facto” occupation of Taiwan, denying China’s de jure sovereignty over the island. Around that time, the U.S. also attempted to put Taiwan into trusteeship of the U.N. On December 8, 1949, the KMT regime retreated from the mainland and moved its “government” to Taiwan. As a result, there happened a heated debate in the U.S. over its China policy. On January 5, 1950, President Truman made an important statement in which he reiterated American adherence to the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation and said that the United States had no ambition of seizing Taiwan or any

¹ Su Ge: American China Policy and the Taiwan Issue (苏格: 美国对华政策与台湾问题). p. 79

² Su Ge: “American China Policy and the Taiwan Issue”. p. 92

other piece of Chinese territory. It had no intention to obtain special interests or rights in Taiwan, or to establish military base. Neither would the U.S. attempt to use her armed forces to intervene in the Chinese civil war. The U.S. would not follow a path that would involve her into the war. This is the policy of “waiting for the dust to be settled down” as some people call it. Nevertheless, this waiting period proved to be very short. Less than 6 months later, the Korean War broke out. For the U.S. policy makers, the Taiwan “dust” finally settled down. On June 27, President Truman made it public that he had ordered the 7th Fleet of the U.S. to sail into the Taiwan Strait. He also officially proclaimed the U.S. position that “Taiwan’s status is yet to be determined”, adding that it could only be determined by a peace treaty with Japan or a resolution of the U.N. It is important to give a review over the evolution of U.S. policy towards Taiwan during and after the 2nd World War, as it planted the seed of the present conflict over the one-China principle across the Taiwan Strait and to a lesser extent, internationally. In particular, the position that “Taiwan’s status is yet to be determined” has been taken by the DPP, the splittist forces in Taiwan and their international supporters as the “theoretical basis” for separating Taiwan from China.

THE CCP POSITION ON THE ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE

The Chinese Communist Party, since the founding of the People’s

Republic of China in October 1949, has always upheld the one China policy. It has never waived. However, It has adjusted its policy on the settlement of the Taiwan issue as the objective situation changes. The evolution of its policy can be divided into 3 periods. The first period was between 1949 and 1955. The second period was between 1956 and 1979 and the third period started from 1979 to right now.

The Period of Liberation of Taiwan by Force (1949-1955). In the last quarter of 1948, the Chinese civil war made a decisive turn. Over 470,000 KMT troops were put out of action during the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign in northeast China. The balance of power between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese Communist Party and KMT troops tilted for the first time in favor of the PLA. In the following months, the PLA stormed forward in various battlefronts and a final victory was in sight. Taiwan would obviously become the last stronghold of the KMT regime. Under such circumstances, the Xinhua (New China) News Agency in Yanan issued on March 15, 1949 an editorial entitled "The Chinese People Must Liberate Taiwan". This was the first time that the phrase "liberation of Taiwan" appeared. On December 8, 1949, the KMT regime officially moved its "government" from Kuangzhou (Canton) to Taipei. On December 31 the same year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued "The Declaration to the Frontline Fighters and the Entire Nation ". It emphasized that the

most important task facing the Chinese people was “to liberate Taiwan and accomplish the cause of unification of China.” For this end, various preparations were made in 1950. A Frontline Command was set up with General Su Yu (粟裕) as the Commander-in-Chief. Communist Party cadres who fled Taiwan to the mainland during the “228 Incident” and PLA soldiers with Taiwanese origin were recruited into a training corps to prepare administrative staff for a liberated Taiwan. A concrete plan of operation was also formulated. However, the flare-up of the Korean War interrupted the launching of the attack.³

To liberate Taiwan by force was the natural consequence of the continuing process of the civil war. And the political and military environment at that time did not allow the newly born PRC to settle the Taiwan issue by peaceful means. In June 1950, U.S. sent its 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait following the eruption of the Korean War. Subsequently, the U.S. set up an embassy in Taipei, markedly increased its military and economic aides to Taiwan and concluded a joint defense accord with Taiwan on December 2, 1954. Nevertheless, with the signing of the truce agreement in Korea in 1953 and the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement at the Geneva Conference on Vietnam in 1954, the situation in the Far East actually began to relax. This provided the ground for China to adjust its policy towards the settlement of the Taiwan issue.

³ Tong Xiaopeng: *Forty Years of Winds and Rains* (董小强: 风雨四十年), vol. 2, p.272

The Period of Liberation of Taiwan by Peaceful Means (1955-1979). After the Geneva Conference, Premier Zhou Enlai who led the Chinese delegation to the conference, pointed out that the success of the Geneva Conference had proved that international disputes could be settled through peaceful consultations. Basing on this analysis and understanding of the international situation, the central authority of the Chinese Communist Party, in a written comment on a report on the guidelines for a public awareness campaign on the liberation of Taiwan in July 1954, instructed that “pending a U.S. participation in the war, the method of diplomatic struggle should be used.”⁴ In April 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai led the Chinese delegation to take part in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Before its departure, Chairman Mao Zedong instructed Premier Zhou “to let known, if a proper opportunity occurs, the possibility of peacefully liberate Taiwan under the condition that the U.S. pulls out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.”⁵ At the Bandung Conference, Premier Zhou seized an opportunity and expounded the position of the Chinese government on the Taiwan question. He said: “The liberation of Taiwan is an internal affair of China. The U.S. occupation of Taiwan and as a result the tension in the Taiwan Strait area is an international issue between China and the U.S. These two questions should not be mixed together.” He also said: “The Chinese

⁴ The monthly magazine: Cross-Strait Relations (两岸关系), January issue, 2000, p. 5

⁵ Tong Xiaopeng: Forty Years of Winds and Rains, vol. 2, p. 273

people and the American people are friendly. The Chinese people do not want to fight with the U.S. The Chinese government is willing to sit down with the U.S. government to negotiate and to discuss the question of relaxation of the situation in the Far East, particularly the relaxation of the tension in the Taiwan Strait area.” Subsequently, under the good offices of the British government, China and U.S., starting from August 1955 till February 1970, had 136 rounds of ambassadorial talks with Taiwan as the core issue. Although the talks yielded little results, they however provided a positive atmosphere for the exploration of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem. During this period, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai encouraged covert contacts between Taiwan and the mainland and secret emissaries traveled to and fro across the Strait, carrying messages or oral suggestions on the possible “third cooperation” between the KMT and CCP.⁶ At the early years of the sixties, Mao Zedong put forward, on different occasions, concrete proposals for the reunification between the mainland and Taiwan and Premier Zhou summed them up as the policy of “One Headline and Four Items ” (一纲四目). The headline was that Taiwan had to be reunified with the rest of China. The four items were: (1) After Taiwan had been reunified with the motherland, except that foreign affairs would be handled by the central government in a unified way, Chiang Kai-shek would be empowered to handle military,

⁶ The first CCP-KMT cooperation took place during the North Expedition War (1924-1927) and the second one was during the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945)—the author

administrative and personnel affairs. (2) All the deficit occurred in military, administrative expenditure and economic construction in Taiwan would be covered by the central government. (At that time, Taiwan had an annual budget deficit of 800 million U.S. dollars and Mao Zedong said that the central government would pay for that.) (3) The social reform in Taiwan could be postponed until conditions were ripe and would proceed only with the respect to Chiang Kai-shek's opinion and after consultations with him. (4) Both sides should pledge not to send spies to the others side. Mao Zedong said that the mainland would not send "red spies" to Taiwan and Taiwan would not send "white spies" to the mainland. Neither side would do anything that would undermine the unity of the other side. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other top mainland leaders assured Chiang Kai-shek that so long as the Taiwanese authorities would hold up Taiwan and prevent Taiwan from being taken away from China, the mainland would not change this policy.⁷ In 1966, the Cultural Revolution broke out and contacts across the Strait came to a halt. But CCP's basic policy towards Taiwan remained unchanged. The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 and establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. in 1979 opened an entirely new horizon for the settlement of the Taiwan question and the CCP's Taiwan policy entered accordingly into its third period.

⁷ Tong Xiaopeng: *Forty Years of Winds and Rains*, vol. 2, p. 276, 277

The Period of Peaceful Reunification and One Country Two Systems (1979--). On January 1, 1979, the same day when China and the U.S. established diplomatic relations, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) issued the "Message to Taiwan Compatriots" (告台湾同胞书), pointing out that "the Taiwan authorities have always stood firm on the one-China position and opposed the independence of Taiwan. This is our common stand and our basis for cooperation." Proceeding from this "common stand" and "basis for cooperation", the message did not use the term "liberation of Taiwan" for the first time in mainland's official documents concerning the Taiwan question. Instead, it proposed, also for the first time, concrete measures for the realization of peaceful reunification. These measures were:

- (1) To put an end to "the state of military hostility through talks between the government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwanese authorities;"
- (2) To realize as soon as possible direct mail, trade, air and shipping services across the Strait (three direct links);
- (3) To pin hopes on Taiwanese compatriots as well as on the Taiwanese authorities for the reunification of the country.

These proposals have ever since remained to be the basic policies of the mainland for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue.

On October 1, 1981, Marshal Ye Jianying, the NPC Chairman, further

elaborated on mainland's policy for the realization of peaceful reunification with Taiwan known as Ye Jianying's Nine-Point Proposal (叶九条). The proposal furnished a number of fresh ideas including talks between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT "on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will cooperate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national unification;" after the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces; Personages of the Taiwanese authorities and different circles of life can be appointed to leading posts in national political institutions and to participate in the running of the country.

From the NPC message to Marshal Ye's nine points, the new policy of "peaceful reunification and one country two systems" were formulating in accordance with the changing situation China's mainland faced, reflecting the strategic ideas of Mr. Deng Xiaoping in handling both internal and external affairs. On June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping in a talk with an American professor with Chinese origin, put forward his well-know six-point proposal (邓六条) which laid down the basic principles of the policy of "peaceful reunification and one country two systems". The six points are:

- (1) The crux of the Taiwan question is the reunification of the motherland. Peaceful reunification has become the common

language of the CCP and KMT, thus constituting the basis for a third cooperation between the two parties.

- (2) While adhering to one China, the mainland and Taiwan could pursue different political systems. However, internationally, the People's Republic of China is the sole representative of China.
- (3) The mainland does not agree to "total autonomy" for Taiwan because that would mean "two Chinas".
- (4) After reunification, Taiwan, as a special administrative region, will follow a system different from the mainland. Taiwan will maintain its judicial discretion and legislative power. Its court of final appeal does not need to be in Beijing. Taiwan will also have its own armed forces so long as they do not pose a threat to the mainland. The mainland will not send troops nor administrative personnel to Taiwan and Taiwan's partisan, political and military affairs will be handled by the Taiwanese themselves. In the central government, posts will be reserved for Taiwan.
- (5) Peaceful reunification does not mean the annexation of Taiwan by the mainland nor vice versa. The so-called "reunification of China under the Three Peoples' Doctrine" (三民主义) is unrealistic.
- (6) The appropriate way for the realization of peaceful reunification is to hold CCP-KMT talks on equal footing, not between the

central government and a local authority, bringing about the third cooperation between the two parties. The talks brook no foreign interference.⁸

Deng's Six-Point Proposal constitutes the fundamental principles of the policy of "peaceful reunification and one country two systems". Yet, as the cross-strait relations and the international situation developed and, in particular, taking into account of the views and opinions of the Taiwanese compatriots, Jiang Zemin, CCP General-Secretary, announced his eight-point proposal on January 30, 1995. The basic ideas of the Jiang's Eight-Point Proposal (江八点) are as follows:

- (1) Adherence to one-China principle is the basis and premise for the realization of peaceful reunification of China.
- (2) The negotiation on China's peaceful reunification will be conducted step by step. For the first step, the two sides across the Strait could negotiate on officially ending hostility.
- (3) The mainland will do its utmost to accomplish peaceful reunification, but at the same time does not undertake to renounce the use of force.
- (4) In face of the 21st century, the economic exchange and cooperation across the Strait should be greatly promoted.
- (5) Compatriots on both sides of the Strait jointly inherit and

⁸ Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council: China's Taiwan Question (中国台湾问题), p. 68

develop the fine traditions of the Chinese culture.

- (6) More hope will be pinned on the Taiwanese compatriots, while still pinning hope on the Taiwanese authorities.
- (7) Under the one-China principle, representatives from all parties and circles of life in Taiwan will be welcome to exchange views with the mainland on cross-strait relations and peaceful reunification.
- (8) On the basis of one China, leaders of the two sides across the Strait will visit each other in their proper capacities.⁹

Jiang's Eight-Point Proposal is the application and development of Deng's Six-Point Proposal under new circumstances and will remain mainland's guiding principles in dealing with the cross-strait relationship before the country is finally reunified.

THE KMT'S POSITION ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE.

Kuomintang's stance with regard to the one China principle can also be divided into three periods: the Chiang Kai-shek—Chiang Jing-guo (two Chiangs) period, the Lee Teng-hui period and the Lien Chan period.

The Two Chiangs period (1949-1988). Chiang Kai-shek's retreat from the mainland to Taiwan did not change the nature of the conflict between the KMT and CCP. The civil war was still going on, only with an added dimension, namely which side represented China, the "ROC" or

⁹ China's Taiwan Question, p. 90-94

the newly born PRC, or a “dispute over legally constituted authority” (法统之爭). Chiang Kai-shek strongly opposed “two Chinas”, “one China, one Taiwan”, “Taiwan independence” and the proposition that “the status of Taiwan is yet to be determined”. His policy was “opposition to Communism and restoration of the country” (反共復國). This policy was supported by the “three-no principle” towards the mainland, namely “no contact, no negotiation and no compromise” (不接觸、不談判、不妥協). Chiang Jing-guo carried on his father’s policy, insisting on the one China position. However, during the last years of his rule, he noticeably modified the “three-no principle”. On July 2, 1987, he lifted the ban on visits by Taiwan residents to their relatives on the mainland and on the 15th of the same month, officially abrogated the 39-year long “marshal law”.

The Lee Teng-hui period (1988-May 20, 2000). This period can be subdivided into three stages: 1988 to 1994, 1995 to 1999 and after 1999.

When Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Jing-guo on January 13, 1988 at the latter’s sudden death, he was extremely precarious in face of an imminent power struggle. In order to facilitate his succession, he inherited whole sale Chiang Jing-guo’s mainland policy, adhering to Chiang’s one China position. The 13th National Congress of the KMT convened in July 1988, passed a resolution entitled “The Mainland Policy of the Kuomintang of China at Present Stage”. The resolution stated:

“Our mainland policy should reflect the Party’s consistent spirit of ‘standing on Taiwan, setting our eyes on the mainland and keeping in our heart the whole of China’” (立足台湾、放眼大陆、胸怀全中国). Speaking at the celebration ceremony marking the “constitution” day on December 25, 1988, Lee Teng-hui said himself: “There is only one China and it bounds to be reunited under a free and democratic system.” In February 1991, the “National Unification Council” in Taiwan formulated the “National Unification Guidelines” (国统纲领), the opening sentence of which reads: “The unification of China aims at striving for national prosperity and strength as well as long-term development of the nation, that is also the common desire of all the Chinese including those overseas.” Soon after these guidelines were adopted, on December 10, the 5th DPP National Congress included the “Taiwan independence” article into its constitution. On December 15, Lee Teng-hui expressed “sadness and regret” at that and reiterated that “there is only one China” and “all our efforts, without exception, are aimed at the future and development of the entire nation under the condition of one China.”¹⁰ However, as Lee Teng-hui consolidated himself in power, his true intentions on cross-strait relations gradually showed off.

The official document that could serve as an indicator to this change was the position paper released by Taiwan’s “Mainland Affairs Council”

¹⁰ United Press Daily (Taiwan), October 16, 1991

(MAC) on July 5, 1994, entitled “An explanation of Cross-Strait Relationship” (台海两岸关系说明书). The paper alleged: “In dealing with cross-strait relations, the two sides neither belong to a state to state relationship, nor do they handle them as general, pure domestic affairs.” The paper repeated Lee Teng-hui’s definition of the political identification of the two sides across the Strait as “two equal political entities” and gave the meaning of “political entity” as “a state, a government or a political organization.” It is apparent that what the paper advocated was in fact Lee Teng-hui’s “state to state” theory and from that time on, Lee Teng-hui preached more and more openly his line of separation only in short of amending the “constitution”. On April 8, 1995, Lee Teng-hui delivered a speech at the “National Unification Council”, known as Lee’s Six-Point Proposal (李六条) in response to Jiang’s Eight-Point Proposal. He said that since 1949, “Taiwan and the mainland have been governed by two mutually exclusive political entities, constituting a situation where the two sides across the Strait have been under separation and different jurisdictions.” In July 1996, Taiwan’s “foreign ministry” published a position paper called “The ROC Participation in the United Nations” which betrayed the one China principle in clearer terms: “China is a neutral, historical, cultural and geographical term.” “Only after the two sides across the Strait being unified, would there be a true one China.” Finally, on July 9, 1999, Lee Teng-hui, in an interview with a

correspondent of the German Radio, put forward the “special state to state theory”, seriously damaging the basis for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. On March 24, 2000, Lee Teng-hui was forced to give up his Chairmanship of the KMT as emotional KMT veterans protested against him in front of his office soon after the election result was announced. KMT’s history turned to a new page.

Mr. Lien Chan who took over from Lee Teng-hui was officially elected Chairman of the KMT on June 17, 2000. So far Lien Chan has yet specifically expounded his policy on cross-strait relations. People still regard his election platform, the so-called Lien’s ten-point proposal (连十条) as the KMT’s new approach, to differentiate from Lee Teng-hui’s. Speaking to a KMT task force group on mainland affairs on February 17, 2000, Lien said that if the mainland would agree to his proposals “without any preconditions”, he would endeavor to take cross-strait relations to the medium term as laid out in the Guideline for National Unification (meaning the setting up of channels for official communication and the opening of the three direct links). His ten-point proposal is roughly the following:

- (1) With Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan as the starting point, leaders across the Strait should meet as soon as possible so as to reach a consensus on the Straits peace and to proceed further to arrange routine cross-strait summits.

- (2) The two sides establish official channels of communication to deal with problems and to carry out cooperation in a more direct and more efficient way.
- (3) The cross-strait trade and economic relations should be reviewed in accordance with the rules of WTO so as to relax restrictions on cross-strait trade and investment and to negotiate on the opening of direct mail, trade, air and shipping links.
- (4) The functions of the “off-shore shipping center” in Taiwan should be expanded with the establishment of a special cross-strait trade and economic zone. Priorities should be given to consultations on the opening of trade and shipping links between Kinmen, Matsu and the coastal areas of the mainland and as a further step, on the establishment of a peace zone between Kinmen, Matsu and Fujian (province).
- (5) An active dialogue should be conducted across the Strait with regard to the participation in international organizations and activities with joint and mutual efforts.
- (6) The two sides start consultations on the establishment of military confidence-building mechanism, on the exchange of visits by military personnel, on mutual notice, verification of military exercises and exchange of observers, as well as on the establishment of a “hot line” between the leaders of the two

sides.

- (7) A peace agreement across the Strait should be concluded in order to put an official end to the state of hostility, to create a Taiwan Strait peace zone.
- (8) The two sides exchange their experiences in democratic and economic construction.
- (9) The two sides improve the order of cross-strait exchange, carry out consultations on the problems derived from the exchange and set up a system to settle them.
- (10) The two sides protect the interests of Taiwanese merchants and promote the conclusion of an investment protection agreement.

11

DPP'S POSITION ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE

The ideas of “independence of Taiwan” smoldered and developed among some Chinese intellectuals in the United States, Japan and Taiwan during late fifties and early sixties. In April 1958, Mr. Li Thianhok (李文福) published an article in the American magazine “Foreign Affairs” (Vol.36, No.3) entitled “The China Impasse. A Formosan View”. The article advanced almost all the basic “theories” of the DPP, namely “Taiwan’s status is yet to be determined”, “Taiwan’s nationhood”, “self-determination for Taiwan” and so on. In September 1964, Mr. Peng

¹¹ Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 17, 2000.

Ming-min, the “political godfather” of DPP, published the “Declaration to the Taiwanese People on Self-Survival” together with two of his students from the Faculty of Political Science of Taiwan University. The declaration advocated in a systematic way “one China, one Taiwan” and “new nation, new government and new constitution”.¹² However, at the time when the DPP was founded in 1986, it pledged loyalty to the “ROC Constitution”. It was not for unification of the country, yet it neither embraced “Taiwan independence”. Its party constitution went only so far as saying that “the future of Taiwan should be decided by all the people resident in Taiwan.” The DPP as an “independence” party is characterized by two well-known resolutions, the “417 (April 17) Resolution” (417 决议文) and the “1007 (October 7) Resolution” (1007 决议文), and the “Taiwan Independence Party Constitution” (台独党纲).

Soon after the DPP was founded on September 28, 1986, a debate unfolded within the party on whether the DPP should put into its constitution a clause stipulating that “people have the freedom of advocating Taiwan independence.” At the first provisional meeting of the Second National Congress of the DPP convened on April 17, 1988, a resolution was adopted after heated discussion and hard bargaining. The resolution asserted among other things that “Taiwan’s sovereignty is independent,” “Taiwan does not belong to the People’s Republic of China,

¹² Liu Jin-cai: *Analysis of DPP’s Mainland Policy* (柳金财: 民进党大陆政策剖析), p. 42-43 & note 37

the capital of which is Beijing.” The “417 Resolution” marked an important turning point in DPP’s policy evolution over the one-China principle.

At the second plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Fourth National Congress in 1990, the “1007 Resolution” was passed. It stipulated that “Our country’s (Taiwan’s) sovereignty does not cover China’s mainland and Outer Mongolia.” On October 13, 1991 at the Fifth National Congress, the “Taiwan Independence Party Constitution” was adopted, setting the goal of the DPP at “establishing a sovereign, independent and self-governing Republic of Taiwan.”

Ever since its adoption, the “independence constitution” has been an issue of controversy within the DPP, as it has restricted its popular base within the 20% or so voters who are for immediate or future independence of Taiwan. That is why the DPP could not achieve a breakthrough in major elections and Chen Shui-bian only got 39.3% of the ballots in the March election. So when Chen Shui-bian was selected as the DPP candidate for the election, he manoeuvred to modify the pro-independence image of the DPP. On May 8, 1999, the second national party representatives’ conference of the 8th National Congress of the DPP adopted the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” (台湾前途决议文). Avoiding using the term of “establishing the Republic of Taiwan”, the resolution alleged that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country.

Any change concerning the present state of independence must be decided through a referendum by all residents in Taiwan.” The rewording of DPP’s pro-independence stance however failed to alleviate general public’s concern that a DPP regime might provoke a cross-strait conflict. Public opinion polls showed that 27% of the voters regarded the cross-strait relations as their utmost concern, ranking second only to the “black-gold” problem (31%). In fact, this was also a grave concern of the international community. To garner more votes and appease the international opinion, Chen Shui-bian on January 30, 2000, made a speech in which he put forward his seven-point proposal (陈七条). The seven points are:

- (1) Adherence to the principle of “sincere reconciliation, positive cooperation and eternal peace.”
- (2) Taiwan has already become an independent and sovereign country, so there is no need to take up the question of whether Taiwan is independent, nor the question of putting the “state to state theory” into the Constitution.
- (3) To promote an over-all normalization of cross-strait relations and the establishment an all-embracing mechanism of interaction.
- (4) Under the pre-condition of peaceful settlement and equal treatment, dialogue and consultation could be held on any issue.
- (5) Taiwan is willing to play an active role in helping China

modernize and democratize.

- (6) Taking the WTO as the model, the two sides across the Strait should seek to participate in the international community on equal footing for coexistence and co-prosperity.
- (7) To actively promote mutual visits by leaders across the Straits so as to build up mutual confidence and to increase mutual understanding.¹³

Despite the “soft” tone and “conciliatory” gesture of his seven-point proposal, Chen stubbornly refused to come to term with the one-China principle. He “tried to create a theory of passive independent conditions”, as the director general of the KMT’s Mainland Affairs Department Mr. Chang Jung-kung commented.¹⁴ Perhaps because of being passive, Chen’s seven points evoked an attack by the English daily “Taipei Times”. In an editorial on January 31, 2000, the paper said that Chen’s “apparent abrogation yesterday of the DPP’s long-standing claim to seek formal independence for Taiwan is outrageous.”

After he won the March 18 election, Chen has been walking on a tight rope over cross-strait relations, trying to avoid antagonizing at the same time the 60% Taiwanese who did not vote for him, the international community, the mainland and the fundamentalists inside the DPP. One can find this dilemma in his main remarks on cross-strait relations so far:

¹³ United Press Daily. January 31. 2000

¹⁴ Taipei Times. January 31. 2000

“Most people in Taiwan cannot accept the ‘one country, two systems’ model for unification, but the determination to seek peace will not be discarded.” “We insist that our authority and sovereignty should be forever protected, and peace across the Taiwan Strait is our mission and destiny.” (Speech at the press conference after announcing he’s won the election, March 18, 2000)

“While upholding the principles of democracy and parity, building upon existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a ‘future China.’” (May 20 inauguration speech)

“The one-China issue was discussed (in 1992), but no consensus was reached. We proposed that , if there is to be a consensus, then it should be that each side could have its own interpretation of ‘one China.’ If we are to say that there was an agreement, then it was that we agreed to disagree.” (Speech at his first press conference after being in office for one month, June 20, 2000)

“The new government is willing to accept a consensus reached by (Taiwan’s) Straits Exchange Foundation and (Beijing’s) Association for Relations Across Taiwan Strait (ARATS) on ‘one China with individual interpretations. But Mainland China does not recognize it by insisting on another ‘one China’ policy.” (A talk with members of Asian Foundation

delegation, June 27, 2000) ¹⁵

From the above review of the positions and their evolutions of the CCP, the KMT and the DPP on the one-China principle, one could perhaps have a clearer impression of the origin, the main points of dispute among the three parties. While realizing that the cross-strait dispute is a long-standing, complex and difficult one, the paper hopes all the same that some overlapping areas could be found so as to explore the possibility of a solution. A shortcut to find the key to the deadlock is perhaps a consensus on the controversy over whether there was and what was the 1992 consensus between SEF and ARATS. In the author's opinion, this is the nearest point where the two sides across the Strait could possibly meet. The author will deal with it in another paper.

(End)

July 22, 2000

¹⁵ Taipei Times, January 29, 2000

POSSIBLE KEY TO DEADLOCK OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

XU SHIQUAN

The one-China principle is where the cross-strait relationship has landed itself in a deadlock at present. China's mainland has always been insisting on the principle and regards it as the basis and pre-condition for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. In Taiwan, despite the fact that the Taiwanese authorities under Mr. Lee Teng-hui tried to deviate from the principle, noticeably the "state to state theory", yet no Taiwanese law whatsoever indicates that there are "two Chinas" and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is no longer intact. In the past 50 years when the Kuomintang (KMT) was in power in Taiwan, the cross-strait relations were practically conducted within the framework of one China. The consensus reached between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) of the mainland laid the foundation for 17 rounds of authorized talks between the two organizations and numerous contacts. Those talks and contacts were highlighted by the Singapore and Shanghai meetings between Mr. Wang Daohan and Mr. Koo Chen-fu in 1993 and 1998 respectively. However, the 1992 consensus became a matter of controversy between Mr. Lee Teng-hui and the mainland as the former

tried to break up the one-China framework after 1994. Until the March election, the KMT authorities in Taiwan had insisted that the consensus was “one China with respective interpretations.” The mainland on the other hand has always upheld that the 1992 consensus is that the two sides agreed to verbally express the common position of adhering to the one-China principle and did not touch on the differences over the political meaning of one China. The new Taiwanese authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), simply deny that there ever was a consensus. In spite of this controversy, the author believes that the nearest point where the two sides could find a mutually acceptable formula is the 1992 consensus. To explain why, let me give the background to what SEF and ARATS really reached in 1992 and where the present gap could be bridged.

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN 1992. The first non-official yet authorized contact across the Strait took place on April 29, 1991 when Mr. Chen Chang-wen, secretary-general of the newly founded SEF called on officials of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the mainland in Beijing. With the setting up of ARATS on December 16, 1991, the two organizations soon started talks and consultations on verification of documents and other “civil and functional ” matters. Nevertheless, it was soon discovered that a political obstacle had to be removed before any agreement could be reached. The two sides had to agree that these “civil and functional”

matters were domestic ones of China, hence the one-China principle. The two sides then deplored ways to settle the problem. According to Mr. Sun Yafu, ARATS Vice President and a chief negotiator of the mainland during the 17 rounds of ARATS and SEF talks, after the Beijing working session in March 1992, ARATS suggested to SEF that matters discussed by the two organizations were Chinese domestic affairs. Those matters should be settled through consultations under the principle of one China. During consultations on functional matters, so long as the two sides across the Strait express their basic position of adhering to the one-China principle, the political meaning of “one China” might not be discussed. As to the way to express the one-China principle, the two sides could fully discuss it and ARATS was willing to listen to the views and opinions of SEF. During the working session held in Hong Kong on October 28-30, 1992, the two sides, with respective authorizations, put forward altogether 13 versions of a statement to express their positions on the one-China principle. At first, ARATS and SEF both gave five versions, but they could not reach agreement. Then SEF advanced 3 more revised versions for ARATS to consider. ARATS favored the third revised version, namely: “In the process of striving for national unification by the two sides across the Strait, though both insist on the principle of one China, their understandings of the meaning of one China are different.”¹

¹ An interview with Mr. Sun Yafu by the author, July 2000 and China Times (Taiwan), June 22, 2000.

In the following contacts between ARATS and SEF, ARATS agreed to SEF's suggestion that the two sides "orally express their respective positions on the one-China principle." On November 3, 1992, SEF distributed a press release in which it said: "This foundation, with the consent of the institution in charge, can accept respective expressions (of one-China principle) through making oral statements. As to the concrete contents of the oral statement, our side's statement will be based on the National Unification Guidelines and the resolution adopted by the National Unification Council on August 1, 1992."

The relevant parts of the National Unification Guidelines with regard to the one-China principle are:

"The unification of China aims at striving for national prosperity and strength as well as long-term development of the nation, that is also the common desire of all the Chinese including those overseas." (Part 1: Preface)

"The mainland and Taiwan are both Chinese territories and the promotion of national unification should be the common responsibility of the Chinese." (Part 2: Principles, Article 1)

The relevant parts of the August 1 resolution of the National Unification Council are:

"The two sides across the Strait both insist on 'one-China' principle. But the meanings accorded to it by the two sides are different. The

Chinese Communist authorities uphold that the 'one China' is the 'People's Republic of China' and after future unification, Taiwan will become a 'special administrative region' under its jurisdiction. Our side upholds that the 'one China' is the Republic of China, existing since its founding in 1912 till now. Its sovereignty extends to the whole of China but its jurisdiction at present covers only Taiwan, Penghu Archipelago, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is certainly part of China, the mainland however is also part of China." (Article 1)

"Since 1949, China has been in a state of temporary division with two political entities governing the two sides across the Strait respectively. This is an objective fact and any proposition seeking unification should not neglect the existence of this fact." (Article 2)

On November 16, 1992, ARATS sent a letter to SEF in response to the latter's press release. The letter notified SEF of ARATS' oral statement on the one-China principle. It reads: "Both sides across the Strait insist on the one-China principle and exert efforts to seek national reunification. However, the political meaning of 'one China' will not be touched upon in the course of consultations on functional matters." The letter was attached with the above-mentioned third revised version of the one-China principle by SEF. That meant that ARATS acknowledged the wording of SEF's oral statement. The Taiwanese newspaper "China Times Express", an evening belonging to the China Times group,

reported the details of the exchange of letters between ARATS and SEF in its front page on November 17, 1992.

WHAT WAS THE 1992 CONSENSUS. From the above review of what happened during the talks between ARATS and SEF in 1992, one can find that there were both agreements and differences. The major agreement was that both sides upheld the one-China principle and the subjects they discussed, namely verification of documents and compensation of lost registered mails, “are matters of the Chinese across the Strait.”² The differences were of two folds:

First, the two sides disagreed on the political meaning of the one-China. SEF’s position was that by one China, Taiwan meant the ROC while the mainland meant the PRC and the two sides across the Strait were “two political entities.” ARATS insisted on not touching on the question of which side represented the one-China and never accepted the “two political entities” definition.

Second, SEF insisted on expressing its interpretation of one China while ARATS persisted in its position of not referring to the political meaning of one China during consultations on functional matters. It obviously favored a certain degree of ambiguity so that the two sides could bypass the difference and proceed with their consultations.

The differences were finally dealt with by ARATS and SEF through

² SEF letter to ARATS numbered 海交陸（台）字第 81-10457 号。

the above-mentioned exchange of letters, acknowledging each other's positions. The two sides confirmed each other's oral statements of the one-China principle. SEF made it clear that its interpretation of one China was based on the National Unification Guidelines and the August 1, 1992 resolution of the National Unification Council. ARATS gave no interpretation of one China. The two sides then stopped tangling over the political meaning of one China and moved forward with their consultations.

A POSSIBLE KEY TO THE PRESENT DEADLOCK OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS. It is obvious that there was an consensus in 1992, otherwise there would have not been possible for ARATS and SEF to proceed with their talks and reach agreements on the registration of marriages and on how to pay for lost registered mails across the Strait. Neither would have it been possible for Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu to meet in Singapore in 1993. ARATS and SEF had no difference over the one-China principle. The difference was not whether there was one China or "two Chinas", rather it was that SEF insisted on giving its interpretation while ARATS preferred not to refer to it in cross-strait talks. Another important fact worth noticing is that SEF's interpretation of one China has a definite content, namely the propositions stipulated in the National Unification Guidelines and the August 1, 1992 resolution of the National Unification Council. It is not as

alleged by some people in Taiwan that the consensus in 1992, if there was any, was that each side was free to give its interpretations.

So, despite the differences between ARATS and SEF in 1992, the common position on one China made it possible for the two sides to reach a consensus or in fact a compromise. The dispute over which side represents China, or the dispute over “legally constituted authority”, has never been an insurmountable obstacle as far as the mainland is concerned. During the Chiang Kai-shek-Chiang Jing-guo period, the dispute was already there, but it did not prevent the two sides from upholding the common ground of the one-China principle. This is exactly the reason why ARATS has always preferred not to refer to the political meaning of one China, a concession it could afford to make. Such being the case, a key to the present deadlock in cross-strait relations could be found if the two sides would go back to the 1992 consensus. One of the “arguments” of the new Taiwanese authorities for refusing to accept the one-China principle is that if they did so they would accept PRC as the sole representative of China. This is misleading. In an interview with a group of Taiwanese journalists on July 13 this year, Vice Premier Chian Qichen was quoted by Taiwan’s Central New Agency as saying that one China was not a question of “either this or that” and one should not swerve around which was the one-China, PRC or Roc.³ The mainland

³ Central Daily News (Taiwan) July 14, 2000

position remains that between the two sides across the Strait, the mainland, as an concession, would not refer to the political meaning of one China. This position is reflected in the two official mainland versions of the one-China principle. They are:

“Before the reunification, in handling matters across the Strait, in particular in cross-strait talks, adherence to the one-China principle is to insist on that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is part of China and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is inseparable.” (Speech by Vice Premier Qian Qichen on the third anniversary of the publication of Jiang Zemin’s 8-point proposal, January 26, 1998)

“There is only one China in the world. Taiwan is part of China. At present, she is not yet reunified. The two sides (across the Strait) should exert common efforts and under the one-China principle hold consultations on equal footing, jointly discussing the reunification (of the country). The sovereignty and territorial integrity is inseparable and Taiwan’s political identity should be discussed under the premise of one China. ” (Talk by Wang Daohan with Koo Chen-fu in Shanghai on October 14, 1998. The so-called 86-character formula)

If the new Taiwanese authorities would give up their attempts to utilize the difference over the political meaning of one China to obstruct the resumption of cross-strait contacts, there would be the possibility for the two sides to go back to the 1992 consensus and to break the present

deadlock. During a recent seminar among some Taiwanese and mainland scholars, a “16-character formula” was more or less agreed upon as the basis for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue: reopen dialogue by taking one China as the common principle while reserving the difference over the meaning of it (一个中国、共同原则、内涵存异、重开对话). This formula takes into account the possibly acceptable bottom lines of the two sides across the Strait and if both sides have the political will, it could serve as a key to the present deadlock. However, the new Taiwanese authorities have so far only paid lip service to the improvement of cross-strait relations. They obviously lack the political will to do it with concrete actions.

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Examining Trends of Convergence and Divergence Across the Taiwan Strait: The NCAFP's Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations

Samantha F. Ravich

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) initiated its Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations in June 1997 as an informal dialogue among a small group of representatives from the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and the United States. The purpose of the Roundtable was to discuss critical Cross-Strait issues in a quiet, off-the-record, congenial setting. The setting of the Roundtable was designed to contrast favorably with the political reality across the Taiwan Strait. Barely a year after the PRC fired missiles toward Taiwan followed by the U.S. deployment of two aircraft-carrier battle groups, tensions between Beijing and Taipei were still running high.

The genesis of the Roundtable began in the summer of 1996 when the NCAFP led a mission to Beijing and returned to New York convinced that a track II dialogue, bringing together representatives from the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan, was imperative. At the time a significant segment of the U.S. policymaking community was encouraging the United States to take a more active role in fostering direct dialogue between Taiwan and the PRC. Given the stated policies of the United States — that the matter is to be decided by the Chinese on either side of the Strait — as well as the deep, historically rooted suspicions about foreign interference in internal Chinese affairs, U.S. officials believed it would be destabilizing to try formally to mediate between Beijing and Taipei. Consequently, the NCAFP created a track II forum in which a small group of academics and experts from the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan could examine the obstacles to and the potential for a Beijing-Taipei accommodation. To

this closed door, off-the-record set of meetings high-ranking U.S. government and military officials were invited to furnish insight into American policy toward the Taiwan Strait.

The following account provides a brief summary of the events and perceptions that shaped each of the five Roundtable meetings held between June 1997 and August 1999 as well as an overview of the opinions and perspectives presented at the meetings. Particular attention has been directed toward discerning trends that point toward the convergence and the divergence of interests between the PRC and Taiwan.¹

Historical Variables

Although Roundtable participants have discussed current events and the hurdles and obstacles that block the path of accommodation across the Strait, the contemporary relationship between Taiwan and the PRC reflects differences in perceptions over issues of sovereignty and self-identification. In the five Roundtables that have been held by the NCAFP, historical events and memories have hung over the proceedings like ghosts unwilling to depart from their mortal coils. Although often left unstated, the history of the sovereignty of Taiwan has never been far from the discussion. Because the facts as well as the implications of this history have affected the ability of the sides to reach a peaceful settlement, those roots warrant a brief exploration.

In what can be identified as the prehistory of the Taiwan Strait relationship, five events in particular are worth examining. Those events are the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895; the massacre at

Nanking in 1937; the personal history of Lee Teng-hui; the Sino-American relationship in the months preceding the outbreak of the Korean War; and the peace treaty with Japan signed in 1951.² Those five events have been selected not only because they shed light on the current crisis but because they have played a significant role in shaping the perceptions and the attitudes of the citizenry of the mainland and Taiwan from two standpoints: how each side views itself as well as how each side chooses to interact with the other. Memories of the events surrounding the outbreak of the Korean conflict and the legalities of the Japanese surrender of Taiwan shape current U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait and PRC perceptions of the role that the United States plays in the triangular relationship.

A sixth element — the movement of Taiwan toward democracy — has also played a large part in shaping societal perceptions, which, in turn, have influenced the relationship among Taiwan, the PRC, and the United States. Consequently, a short discussion of Taiwan's efforts to achieve liberalization is also included.

The Prehistory of Cross-Strait Relations

The original settlers of Taiwan are thought to have come from the South Pacific, although emigrants from Fujian Province on the mainland comprised a majority of the population in the early seventeenth century. In 1662 loyalists to the Ming Dynasty ousted the Dutch from the island and proclaimed it to be a tribute to the emperor — a form of loose control that existed on the island throughout the next two hundred years. Residents from Taiwan traveled to the mainland bringing tribute to the emperor and goods to trade. In all likelihood, merchants viewed the tribute as the price of admission to the lucrative market.

During the 1800s the Manchu Dynasty tried frequently and without much success to bring the island under formal control. Their intention was to compel both the aboriginal inhabitants as well as the Chinese who had fled the mainland to pay

proper tribute. Domination by the Manchus was never achieved, leading frustrated officials on the mainland to complain about Taiwan that "Every three years [there is] an uprising, every five years a rebellion."

By the late nineteenth century, China, Japan, and Russia were vying to exercise control over Northeast Asia. As a result, in 1887, in an attempt to thwart the hegemonic intentions of the Japanese, the Manchu imperial authorities officially declared Taiwan a province of China. Although China and Japan reached an accord in the mid-1880s that provided for mutual troop withdrawals from Korea, when a revolution broke out in Korea in 1894, both Japan and China sent troops back into the disputed territory. The Sino-Japanese War that ensued lasted throughout 1894 and 1895 until the superior Japanese forces crushed the Chinese military and forced a complete surrender. In the ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki, Korea was declared independent, and Taiwan and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan.

From the mid-1890s to 1945, Taiwan remained a colony of Japan. For most of that period, China remained a sovereign nation. In the early 1930s, however, the mainland was invaded by the Japanese. One of the most infamous events of the Japanese occupation was the massacre of Nanking. On November 11, 1937, after securing Shanghai, the Japanese Imperial Army moved toward Nanking, the new Chinese capital, which it captured in mid-December. During the next six weeks, an estimated 300,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed in the city, and more than 20,000 women were raped. Although the Japanese government held tight control over information, news of the massacre eventually leaked out and horrified the world. The extent of the brutality left indelible scars that have shaped both Chinese relations with Japan as well as the national consciousness of China. To many Chinese the atrocities that they suffered at the hands of the Japanese were further links in a string of violations committed against them by outsiders.³

While the Chinese on the mainland felt the full brutality of the Japanese Army, residents of Taiwan

lived out the war in a different manner. Although their rule was harsh, the Japanese colonialists developed the infrastructure, rail, and road system as well as the educational system on Taiwan to levels almost comparable with Japan's. Nonetheless, by the end of the war, the island was in economic chaos. Resources were depleted during the war, and the island was subjected to heavy U.S. bombing that destroyed three quarters of the industrial base, two thirds of the utilities, and one half of the transportation network.⁴ Despite their situation, most Taiwanese did not harbor animosities toward the Japanese similar to those developed by the Chinese from the mainland.

At first the people of Taiwan greeted enthusiastically the arrival of the Nationalists (the Kuomintang [KMT]) on the island in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war. They hoped that after decades of rule by outsiders, Chinese would finally govern Chinese and that the people of Taiwan would govern themselves. Unity between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese, however, did not materialize. The Taiwanese were shocked at the illiteracy and the corruptibility of their mainland brethren. Initial Taiwanese enthusiasm for KMT rule faded as soon as the native population recognized the cultural gulf that existed between themselves and the mainlanders. Bitterness at the KMT's corrupt and harsh rule led to an islandwide revolt in 1947. It was put down brutally by the KMT military. In what came to be known as the 2-28 Incident, close to 20,000 Taiwanese civilians were slaughtered. As the rape of Nanking had shaped the historical consciousness of a segment of the population of China, the 2-28 Incident scarred a generation of Taiwanese who came to distrust the Nationalists (and, by extension, the rulers of the mainland) as people separate and different.

One Taiwanese who was shaped by these events was Lee Teng-hui, the current president of Taiwan. Born on the island of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui was admitted to Kyoto Imperial University in Japan in 1940, becoming one of a very small number of Chinese allowed to receive higher education in Japan during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. Although he returned home

after the war to study at National Taiwan University, he never lost his contacts with the Japanese. Lee has even asserted that his Japanese language skills are as good as his Chinese. This diversity of experience and memory should not be underestimated when analyzing the relationship between Lee and Beijing. In Taiwan people refer to a peculiar political condition known as the "Lee Teng-hui" complex. Shelley Rigger writes that this complex "refers to the nearly inexplicable fondness many Taiwanese feel for the president [and] even among ardent DPP supporters, Lee enjoys a certain reluctant affection."⁵

Aside from holding him in esteem as the first Taiwanese to achieve high office, many Taiwanese credit Lee with bringing democracy to Taiwan. Perhaps more important, Lee has been hailed for standing up to a bullying Communist Chinese government. Understanding that Lee's antipathy toward the government of Beijing stems in part from the cultural differences he perceives between Taiwan and the PRC is an important variable that analysts should include when they try to assess the state of Cross-Strait relations. Undoubtedly the verbal brickbats lobbed between Taipei and Beijing reflect a personal dimension. For example, when Lee captured 54 percent of the vote in Taiwan's first direct presidential election in March 1996, it was seen in Taiwan as a personal victory for Lee and as a mandate given to him to negotiate with Beijing in the manner he saw fit on trade, communications, and reunification.

A good case can be made that Beijing has its own version of the "Lee Teng-hui complex." Since Lee ascended to the presidency and began to project a personality that reflects his sense of personal grievances, Beijing has been quick to point out that he has escalated tensions across the Strait.⁶ There is little doubt, however, that Lee Teng-hui also manipulates this sentiment to his advantage, provoking the authorities in Beijing to overreact and appear to be the brutal, parochial mainlanders he first met in the late 1940s when he returned from Japan.

The fourth historical event that must be factored into an analysis of the current Cross-Strait

relationship is the evolution of the official U.S. position on the status of Taiwan, which developed during 1949 and 1950. In October 1949 when the Communists declared the creation of the People's Republic of China, they asserted that it included the "province" of Taiwan to which the defeated Nationalists had fled months before and where they had set up a government in exile as they prepared for what they expected to be the imminent invasion of the island by PRC forces. Of the U.S. position toward Taiwan at the time, Robert Sutter, current national intelligence officer, has written that "[al]though some U.S. strategic planners and other policymakers did not wish to see Taiwan fall into Communist hands in 1949, the Truman administration decided to acquiesce in an anticipated Chinese Communist attack against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. . . ."⁷

In actuality, the U.S. position in early 1950 stated unambiguously that the conflict between the PRC and Taiwan was a civil war and that the United States would not use "its armed forces to interfere" in the situation. The Truman administration's official statement was that the "United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."⁸ The U.S. position changed rapidly when the Korean War broke out. According to a statement made by President Truman on July 27, 1950, the "attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa [Taiwan] by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific. . . ." The statement concluded that the "determination of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peaceful settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."⁹

The ambiguity of the U.S. position toward Taiwan intensified when the peace treaty with Japan was finally signed in September 1951. According to the terms of the treaty, Japan renounced all territorial claims to Taiwan.

Although the allied powers allowed Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist (KMT) government to accept Japan's surrender of the island, there was no mention in the treaty of whose territory Taiwan had become. As a consequence, Taiwan's status at the time was undetermined and remained so in the eyes of U.S. policymakers for many years.

The events of the second half of the 1990s should be placed in a historical continuum that reflects the context of this set of personal and cultural memories and experiences. When Taiwan pushes for further separation from the mainland, it is not only trying to reassert what it sees as its historical birthright but is also trying to enshrine and draw distinctions between its culture and experiences and those of the Chinese in the PRC. As has been evident in the NCAFP Roundtables, many of the participants from Taiwan have asserted that although they are kin of the Chinese across the Strait, their experiences and historical memories have created a cultural divide much larger than the one hundred miles of water in the Taiwan Strait might indicate. Some of the participants from Taiwan anticipate that the gap will only get wider.

Although the participants from the PRC emphasize similarities between the two people, they acknowledge that Taiwan has developed a sense of self distinct from the PRC. Within this framework, they are quick to point out, there is room under the "One-China" umbrella (an umbrella that the United States has promised to uphold) for such differences to exist and to flourish. One participant during the July 1998 meeting quoted Mr. Wang Daohan, chairman of the PRC's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), as saying that "the Chinese people from the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao should make joint efforts to create a new China. The mainland and Taiwan, different but harmonious, will serve as a window and a bridge to each other. Both sides should respect historical experiences, respect different ways of life, and respect each other's interest." The uncertainty of whether that window can be opened or that bridge built remains.

Taiwan's Transition to Political Liberalization

The sixth event — the democratization of Taiwan — is a subject on which numerous books and treatises have been written. A brief discourse on the political evolution of Taiwan between 1986 and 1988 is needed in order to place the five Roundtables in proper perspective, for it is the experience of the process and the actualization of democracy that create both the sharpest points of divergence in the Cross-Strait relationship as well as the brightest hope for an eventual peaceful settlement between Taiwan and the PRC.

It should be noted that when the United States broke off official relations with Taiwan in favor of the PRC in 1979, Taiwan was not the market democracy it is today. Instead, the party structure sanctioned an authoritarian regime crafted on the same lines as the Leninist government in Beijing. Although American goodwill still existed for the descendants of Chiang Kai-shek, who had fought with the United States against Japanese fascism, there was a significant divide between the two countries with respect to civil rights and political liberties. That began to change in the second half of the 1980s.

From March 29 through March 31, 1986, in a series of speeches to the KMT elite and rank and file, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced that he had established a committee to evaluate major government policy reforms. The reforms to be studied included the lifting of martial law, an end to the ban on opposition political parties, and reform of the national legislature and local government system. During the next two years the reforms were instituted. In September 1986 the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was formed. Martial law was abolished on July 15, 1987, and in January 1989 a law was passed forcing into retirement those KMT members chosen as legislators in 1947 when the KMT was still based on the mainland. As Michael Ying-mao Kau writes, "the impact of democratization on Taiwan's policy toward the mainland is most far-reaching. To begin with, democratization

has set the stage for various political forces to bring out into the open the fundamental issues of Taiwan's national identity and its long-term implications for independence or unification. Taiwan's democratization also has contributed to the opening of a new era of pragmatic economic and societal interactions with the mainland. The continuous expansion of trade, investment, and social contacts of the last decade did relax some tension and advanced mutual interest across the Taiwan Strait."¹⁰

Two other implications of Taiwan's democratization should be considered. The first is that when it instituted democracy, Taiwan became a model for those on the mainland who hoped to enshrine political liberties in the PRC. It was hoped that in the long term, democratic values might become a bridge for reaching an accommodation between the two sides. Unfortunately, in the short term, Taiwan's democratization became a further area of contention across the Strait, a further point of divergence between the two people.

The second implication of Taiwan's democratization involves its relations with the United States. As mentioned previously, although the citizenry of the United States held a residual amount of goodwill toward Taiwan throughout the 1960s and 1970s, few admired the country's political system. That attitude changed in the late 1980s. Taiwan's movement toward economic and political liberalization gave rise to a feeling of *simpatico*. To many Americans, the story of Taiwan was almost an "American tale." It was a country that had pulled itself up by its bootstraps, admitted its mistakes and misdeeds, and chosen a path toward glory. Admiration for Taiwan's achievements reached beyond the halls of Congress and into the heart of America. But this new respect created problems for the "One-China" policy pursued by the United States. The assertion that there is "one China of which Taiwan is a part" was easier to accept when the governments of Taipei and Beijing possessed many of the same characteristics.¹¹

Those six factors or historical experiences have created a complicated web of relationships across the Strait that affects the way each side deals with

the United States. For example, the divergence of memory accumulated by the people of Taiwan and the PRC together with the personal history of Lee Teng-hui had a direct bearing on the events that occurred in the campaign for the first direct election of Taiwan's president in 1996 and pointed to the need to form the NCAFP Roundtable.

Taiwan's 1996 Presidential Election

The yearlong campaign for Taiwan's first direct presidential election plunged Cross-Strait relations to their lowest point in many decades and created a situation that almost brought the United States and China into direct military confrontation. Even before the PRC conducted missile exercises across the Strait in 1995-1996, each side contemplated how the election would affect its long-term ambition vis-à-vis the other. For Taiwan, the election was proof that it had severed its authoritarian roots and embraced freedom and democracy. The election also increased feelings of pride and nationalism and deepened bitterness that stemmed from people's awareness that despite the island's transition to a liberal democracy, they were still threatened by military force from the PRC and prohibited from expanding their international space. For Beijing, the election represented Taiwan's further estrangement from the "One-China" principle and raised the distinct possibility that Lee Teng-hui would remain in office for another term, a distasteful prospect to Beijing.

On January 30, 1995, to counter the trends perceived by the PRC, President Jiang Zemin gave a speech in which he laid out eight fundamental points on which the Cross-Strait relationship should be based. His points are listed below.

1. Adherence to the principle of "One China" is the basis of and the premise for peaceful reunification. We must firmly oppose any words or actions aimed at creating an "independent Taiwan," which would split the country and rule into separate regimes or create "Two Chinas" over a certain period of time.

2. We do not challenge the development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and other countries. We oppose, however, Taiwan's activities to "expand its living space internationally" or to seek to create "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan."

3. On the premise that there is only one China, we are prepared to talk with the Taiwan authorities about any matter, including the form that official negotiations should take, a form that will be acceptable to both sides. On this basis the two sides should jointly undertake to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and map out plans for the future development of their relations.¹²

4. Our refusal to undertake to give up the use of force is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China's reunification and to bring about the "independence of Taiwan."

5. Great efforts should be made to expand economic exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. We will encourage industrialists and businessmen from Taiwan to invest in the mainland. We wish to speed up postal, air, and shipping services links.

6. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should inherit and carry forward the fine traditions of Chinese culture.

7. All the twenty-one million compatriots in Taiwan, whether born there or in other provinces, are Chinese. We should respect their life style and their wish to be the masters of our country and protect all their legitimate rights and interests. All parties in all circles in Taiwan are welcome to exchange views with us on relations between the two sides and on peaceful reunification.

8. Leaders of the Taiwan authorities are welcome to pay visits in appropriate capacities. We are also ready to accept invitations from the Taiwan side to visit Taiwan. We can discuss state affairs or exchange ideas on certain other questions first.

In response to Jiang's eight points, Lee Teng-hui, in a major address on April 8, 1995, asserted that reunification with the mainland was impossible even to consider as long as Beijing maintained its threat to retake Taiwan by force and sought to isolate the island internationally.¹³ Lee also made a point of referring to the "Republic of China" as a "sovereign state," despite the fact that he had rejected the notion of independence for the island. Nine days after Lee's speech, Taiwan commemorated the one hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Scholars throughout Taiwan debated whether China, under the provisions of the treaty, had ceded Taiwan in perpetuity. If so, then regardless of the claims of Mainland China, Taiwan's sovereignty was granted in 1895 and again in 1945 when Japan surrendered. Discussions of such fine points as well as the political rhetoric of the presidential campaign sidelined any progress that could have been made from a discussion of Jiang's eight points.

Tension between the PRC and Taiwan escalated in June 1995 when Lee visited his alma mater, Cornell University, and made a highly political speech there. China was incensed and characterized the visit as a plot to promote Taiwan's independence. Beijing's ARATS postponed the second round of high-level talks scheduled to be held with Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in July in Beijing. The downward spiral intensified when China launched a series of missile tests over the East China Sea between July 21 and July 28. Six missiles landed approximately six miles north of Taiwan, arousing fear and sending the Taipei stock market into a nosedive. The PRC followed with a second wave of missile tests. Taiwan called the exercises an unfriendly and irresponsible move. Its stock markets fell even lower. On November 27, 1995, five days before Taiwan's parliamentary elections, China broadcast television pictures of the PRC test-firing surface-to-air missiles. Despite the fact that Taiwanese politicians across the political spectrum pleaded with the citizenry not to cave in to pressure from Beijing, Taiwan's New party, seen as the most conciliatory

toward the PRC, tripled its seats in parliament.

The new year of 1996 did not ring in auspiciously for Cross-Strait relations. Troop movements within the PRC were reported, and from March 8 through March 15, China conducted a round of military exercises and launched missile tests in the waters north and south of Taiwan and shelled live ammunition in sea and air maneuvers off coastal areas stretching from Xiamen, Fujian Province, to Shantou, Guangdong Province. PRC official statements asserted that there was no reason for the people of Taiwan to panic over the tests but affirmed that they should be prepared for a "real disaster" in the event they supported independence for the island.

On March 11, 1996, the United States ordered the aircraft carrier *Nimitz* and its support ships to join the carrier *Independence* and its group in heading to the Taiwan Strait. Assuming that it had made its point and fearing a direct confrontation with the United States, the PRC backed down from its saber rattling. On March 23 Lee Teng-hui won the presidential election. In his inauguration speech of May 20, 1996, Lee stated that the sides should end hostilities and that the PRC must recognize that the two entities belong to separate jurisdictions. Lee was careful not to mention "One China" but made a point of arguing that this election proved that "two sovereign states" exist.

In the remainder of the year, tensions gradually deflated. Both the United States and the PRC engaged in an active campaign to repair the damaged bilateral relationship. In December 1996 China's Defense Minister Chi Haotian visited the United States in an effort to promote military-to-military engagement.¹⁴ Unfortunately, in a chain of events that has become familiar during the last decade, when Taiwan feels threatened by improvements in Sino-U.S. relations, it steps up its own quest for international legitimacy. In December 1996, the KMT and the DPP agreed to abolish Taiwan's Provincial Legislature and the position of provincial governor. Symbolically as well as legalistically, Taiwan was removing itself as a province of China.

The Roundtables

The First Roundtable: June 1997

The year 1997 began with preparations for the return of Hong Kong, the first jewel in what Beijing hoped would be a triple crown (Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). The PRC conceived of the reversion of Hong Kong as a way to operationalize the "one country, two systems" procedure and show the world that this was a reasonable method to use in order to incorporate Taiwan.

It was not surprising that Taiwan was becoming increasingly uncomfortable as preparations for the handover proceeded. As a result, the KMT began to promote a new interpretation of the "One China" principle as "One China, two governments." In response, the PRC began to recraft its own policies to prevent any further movements by Taiwan toward independence or a furthering of its international space. The recognition that each side held a bargaining chip (if the PRC would allow Taiwan greater international space, then perhaps Taiwan would renounce independence) led several U.S. scholars to produce a flurry of policy papers on Cross-Strait relations.¹⁵

Within this environment, which could be characterized as "cautiously optimistic," the first NCAFP Roundtable was held in June 1997 in New York City. Because it was the first of the series, much of the initial session was dedicated to finding an acceptable title for the endeavor. It was a learning experience for those not skilled in the art of interpretation within the context of the Cross-Strait relationship. Participants from Taiwan wanted the official title of the Roundtable to include the word *Taiwan*. One even suggested that *the Republic of China* be considered. The PRC participants, aware that their future attendance could be compromised by such an addition, suggested that the discussion of Cross-Strait relations be subsumed within a broader discussion of U.S.-PRC issues. It was not surprising that the guests from Taiwan found this unacceptable. After much debate, all finally agreed on the title

"Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations." Although this exchange can be seen as trivial and trite, it demonstrated the depth of emotions that can be evoked by the issue of sovereignty. In addition, it showed how semantics serve both to damn and to enhance the possibility of finding a peaceful solution across the Strait. Although a small minority of the participants from Taiwan tried to push for the inclusion of *the Republic of China*, most argued for the inclusion of some reference to Taiwan. When PRC participants presented their bargaining position as including the term PRC, both sides eventually made a concession and accepted "China" as the operative term. Reflecting the state of Cross-Strait relations at the time, each side at the Roundtable was confident enough of its position to accept the word *China* as a replacement for *Taiwan* or *the PRC*.

The Roundtable format calls for the presentation of a paper followed by a moderated discussion of four major topics that have been addressed in each of the five sessions: Interpreting the "One China" Principle; Taiwan's International Space; Economic Linkages Between Taiwan and the PRC; and the Role of the United States in the Cross-Strait Relationship. A discussion of the fifth issue, the Military Balance Across the Strait, is included in the summary of the August 1999 Roundtable. The synopses include comments made during the presentations, discussions, coffee breaks, and sidebars. In keeping with the rules of the Roundtable, names are not associated with comments.

1. Interpreting the "One China" Principle: Participants from the PRC stressed that the "one country, two systems" formula was flexible and that the terms offered to Hong Kong need not be the same as those offered to Taiwan. Recognizing that Hong Kong's reunification with the mainland was less than a month away, scholars from both sides were eager to discuss how the Hong Kong model would or would not be applicable to Taiwan. Within this discussion one participant from Taiwan questioned whether the PRC could accept a "shared or divided sovereignty" within the "One China" doctrine. A

participant from the PRC responded that Taiwan's acceptance of the "One China" principle would facilitate the discussion of all topics.

2. Taiwan's International Space: Participants from the PRC, still smarting over Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to Cornell, asserted that it was imperative to find a formula whereby Taiwan could engage in "unofficial economic and cultural relations" while halting its "pragmatic diplomacy." PRC scholars were quite candid in stating that Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy" exacerbated tensions across the Strait. They stated that Beijing viewed such travel as his attempt to force the permanent separation of Taiwan. A participant from Taiwan responded that if Taiwan were allowed to join a variety of international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, there would be more room to negotiate an acceptable formula for diplomatic space.

3. Economic Linkages Between Taiwan and the PRC: On the economic front, which the PRC identified as the most likely to increase trust between the two sides and reduce the likelihood of hostilities, the participants from Taiwan questioned whether Taiwan was becoming overdependent on the mainland. Although some did not agree with Lee's policy of "no haste, go slow," which capped certain Taiwanese investments in the PRC, most voiced concern about the possibility of the "Finlandization" of the Taiwanese economy.

4. The Role of the United States in the Cross-Strait Relationship: Neither side wished to criticize U.S. policy (a stance that may have reflected the uncertainty of the participants at this initial meeting), although a participant from the PRC stressed that the United States should be more careful about visits by top leaders from Taiwan, an obvious reference to the Lee visit. An American participant wondered whether the United States should become more active in promoting dialogue. In one of the few instances of a meeting of the minds between the PRC and Taiwan, the American's idea evoked strong opposition.

As the first Roundtable concluded, there was a general sense that the discussions had been fruitful and that each side had become more familiar with the concerns and frustrations of the other. All agreed that to provide greater insight into the Taiwanese political process, the Roundtable should invite a representative of the DPP to attend the next session.

The reversion of Hong Kong to the mainland occurred in the immediate aftermath of the first Roundtable. Aside from the torrential, nonstop rains that plagued the official ceremonies, the inaugural event turned out well. Beijing stepped up its promotional campaign by asserting that Hong Kong could serve as the model for future reunifications. Taipei moved quickly to refute any such suggestions. In July 1997 Chang King-yuh, chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, said there were four prerequisites for unification: (1) Mainland China must respect the reality that the Republic of China (ROC) exists; (2) The security of Taiwan is guaranteed; (3) the two sides can coexist in international organizations; and (4) Mainland China renounces the use of force.

The Second Roundtable: January 1998

In October 1996 President Clinton and President Jiang held their first summit. Sino-U.S. relations seemed to be steadying after the near confrontation of forces in 1996. In November 1997 Taiwan's Democratic Progressive party won a majority of the local elections. Analysts were divided in their judgments of whether the results were a referendum on Taiwan's stance on independence; a reaction to Taiwanese insecurity over the perceived improvement in ties between China and the United States; or simply a vote against the claimed corruption and ineffectual leadership of the KMT. Contrary to preelection predictions, the PRC responded to the election results by inviting the twenty-three newly elected local officials to visit the Chinese mainland.

In December 1997 Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council published a five-point proposal on how to

resume the Cross-Strait dialogue that was halted in the aftermath of Lee's 1995 visit to Cornell: (1) There needed to be an initial meeting at the deputy level to prepare for the next round of discussions; (2) Political issues could be discussed only under the framework of "One China, two entities"; (3) The PRC must be willing to give Taiwan more international space; (4) The PRC must recognize that the DPP is now an actor vested in the process; (5) Nongovernmental interaction will have to play a role in the dialogue.

Building on these small steps, the second Roundtable, like the first, was held in an atmosphere of "cautious optimism."

1. Interpreting the "One China" Principle: Discussion of the concept of "One China" and what can be subsumed under that category continued where it had left off six months earlier. One PRC participant said that talks between the sides should be resumed and that the PRC was willing to discuss ending the hostilities across the Strait as long as Taiwan continued to accept the "One China" principle. In response, a participant from Taiwan said that this was acceptable as long as "One China" meant two political entities. Such a formulation was not discussed in such explicit terms during the first Roundtable held in June of 1997. In retrospect, this statement might have reflected the formulation of a new definition by Taiwan. After all, the Taipei authorities had begun to use such phrases as "the Republic of China on Taiwan" and "a staged Two Chinas policy under the eventual goal of national reunification." One PRC participant, perhaps unaware of this new formulation, said that the definition of the "One China" principle was open to discussion. From his statement it appeared that the participant was willing to glide over the specifics in order to move the dialogue ahead. Members of the Taiwan contingent, however, remained uncomfortable with this obfuscation and pushed for clarity. One participant from Taiwan said that the PRC must recognize that China is divided into two separate political entities. Another participant, however, asked whether the PRC would

consider the idea of confederation or commonwealth under the umbrella of "One China." There was no response to this query from the PRC side, although it had been iterated and reiterated that under the "One China" principle all issues could be discussed.

2. Taiwan's International Space: In an interesting contrast to the first Roundtable in which the issue of international space was discussed at length, less attention was paid at the second session to the competition between the PRC and Taiwan for international recognition.

3. Economic Linkages Between Taiwan and the PRC: Unlike the first Roundtable in which there was a general sense among the participants from Taiwan that Lee's "go slow" policy might have some merit, vocal opposition to the policy was expressed by some of the participants. Despite some disagreement with Lee's policies, most of the participants from Taiwan agreed that Beijing was only making matters worse by employing personal attacks against Lee. The PRC's vitriol had created a feeling among many Taiwanese that they must "protect" Lee. In addition, it was noted, a hardening of the personal animosity Lee felt toward Beijing would only make accommodation less likely.

4. The Role of the United States in the Cross-Strait Relationship: One American participant praised the PRC's invitation to the newly elected DPP officials to visit the mainland and suggested that it was a sign that the PRC was willing to soften its rhetoric against Taiwan. Furthermore, the participant said, it was important for Taiwan to understand that the island does not have a blank check from the United States. In a sidebar conversation among various participants from the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States, it was suggested by an American that only two of the three sides involved in the 1995-1996 crisis "got the point." The PRC realized it had made a terrific blunder in trying to harass the Taiwanese and influence the electoral process, and the U.S. Congress got the

wake-up call telling them that because the situation across the Strait was much too explosive, they should not add political rhetoric to the mix. In addition, many in Congress perceived that some in Taiwan were trying to manipulate them. The participant concluded that the one side that did not seem to be heeding the warnings was Taiwan. Unfortunately, many on the island saw the reaction of the United States as the assertion of its commitment to defend Taiwan under all circumstances. The reaction by the Taiwanese participants to the analysis made by the American participant was that the Cross-Strait relationship would not be improved if Taiwan perceived a strengthening of the U.S.-PRC relationship at Taiwan's expense. Later, during the formal session, a Taiwanese participant who had been privy to the sidebar conversation remarked that the United States should make it clear that it will not accept a Taiwanese declaration of independence, preventing the formation of a misperception that recent moves by the United States had helped to shore up proindependence forces on the island and could have led to a genuine crisis.

As the Roundtable ended, one American suggested the possibility that miscalculation of one sort or another could be catastrophic. Consequently, it was important not to drift along with the status quo. The participant then suggested that the two sides reach an "interim arrangement" to govern Cross-Strait relations for fifty years. At the conclusion of that interim period, formal talks about political unification would begin. For the fifty-year period, Taiwan would forswear a formal declaration of independence, and the PRC would forswear the use of force. Reaction to the proposal was mixed. One PRC participant agreed that the status quo holds danger and urged that the dialogue be resumed but cautioned that "like a parent that is able to discipline a child with the threat of a raised hand," the PRC must be able to threaten force. Despite points of divergence among the participants, they attributed the positive mood that had developed to the realization that the Wang-Koo dialogue was getting back on track.

The Third Roundtable: July 1998

The second Clinton-Jiang summit was held between June 25 and July 3, 1998. During his China trip, President Clinton visited five mainland cities. On June 30, while participating in a roundtable seminar on "Constructing China for the 21st Century" in Shanghai, Clinton talked about the three noes (no support for Taiwan's independence; no support for "Two Chinas" or "One China, one Taiwan"; and no support for Taiwan's admission to international organizations in which statehood is requisite for membership). The perception was beginning to solidify in Taiwan that U.S. policy toward the Cross-Strait relationship had tipped in favor of Beijing.

On July 1, 1998, the DPP's Standing Committee issued a seven-point statement that included assertions that Taiwan was already independent and sovereign; any attempt to change Taiwan's de facto sovereignty should be agreed on and realized only in a referendum conducted of Taiwan's people; the DPP would continue to promote "joining the UN movement"; and because Taiwan was not part of the PRC, the "one country, two systems" approach could not be applied to Taiwan. As one of the participants observed, the DPP "was seeking to recast itself as a status quo party by redefining sovereignty as status quo independence. It was trying to alleviate people's fears by toning down its insistence on an aggressive and proactive plebiscite."

1. Interpreting the "One China" Principle: Despite some positive movements during the previous six months, the atmosphere in the room was more tense than it had been at the previous two meetings. The participants from Taiwan were disturbed by President Clinton's recent recitation of the "three noes." Most of the participants from Taiwan expressed the judgment that the triangular relationship among the United States, Taiwan, and the PRC had become skewed toward the U.S.-PRC alignment. They were particularly upset that President Clinton had given into the PRC on the issue of Taiwan's ability to enter

international organizations. One participant affirmed the belief that this violated a promise made by the United States in 1994 to help Taiwan enter such organizations.¹⁶ Most of the participants from Taiwan expressed the belief that Taiwan felt as if it were on unstable ground and therefore would have to reassert its identity as a consequence of the Clinton-Jiang summit.

Participants from the PRC and the United States stressed that good PRC-U.S. relations were good for the Cross-Strait situation. Even when a PRC participant promoted the view that China had become confident since the summit and was now in a position to become "a softball rather than a hardball player," the participants from Taiwan remained highly agitated. As an example of this new attitude, one PRC participant said there was a "big need" to clarify the "One China" concept to make it more inclusive. Both during the formal sessions and the sidebars, participants from Taiwan conveyed their sense that Taiwan was losing out as a result of the recent warming of Sino-U.S. relations. A participant from the PRC responded that U.S. efforts may be doomed to failure, for when the Sino-U.S. relationship is going well, Taiwan feels the need to cause trouble in order to be noticed and when the Sino-U.S. relationship is troubled, China acts as if it lacks the incentive or the room to maneuver on the Taiwan issue.

2. Taiwan's International Space: Despite what was said at the sidebar, in the formal discussion the PRC participants were clearly emboldened by President Clinton's three noes. Their statements regarding Taiwan's international space epitomized that attitude. Their position on the issue was harder than that expressed in previous Roundtables. One participant from the PRC said that Taiwan's position was deteriorating and predicted that the PRC would become more aggressive in promoting its relations with countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. When pushed by the Americans on whether the PRC would display some of its "softball techniques" and allow Taiwan to participate in the International Monetary Fund without full membership, the PRC participant said a

less controversial intergovernmental organization than the IMF would have to be found.

3. Economic Linkages Between Taiwan and the PRC: In an interesting intimation that the DPP was moving away from its confrontational approach to Cross-Strait relations, a Taiwanese participant stressed that the DPP appreciated that the PRC was a growing market for Taiwan businesses and realized that as a consequence Taiwan must pay more attention to the needs of the Taiwan business community. Nevertheless, before deregulating Cross-Strait economic exchanges, Taiwan needed to ensure that it would not be put in a position to become overly dependent on the mainland. As they indicated in the second Roundtable, participants from Taiwan stressed that pressures from Taiwanese business interests to move away from Lee's "avoid haste, be patient" policy were intensifying. In a sidebar an American participant remarked that although Jiang is relatively uninterested in economic issues, he knows that such issues provide the key to getting Taiwan to the table. If, in contrast, Taiwan thought that third-tier issues such as fishing and hijacking could be the focus of talks, it underestimated Beijing's desire for reunification.

4. The Role of the United States in the Cross-Strait Relationship: The tenor of this Roundtable was influenced not only by President Clinton's three noes but by former Defense Secretary William Perry's trip to the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. On that trip Perry stressed that the United States wished to see dialogue resume and that the United States was committed to a peaceful resolution and would accept any outcome accepted by both sides. He shared his impression that Beijing seemed willing to start talks where they had left off in 1995 and declared that Taiwan should understand that March 1996 was not a blank check.

The third Roundtable concluded with suggestions that "small steps" toward confidence-building measures (CBMs) be taken. Such measures could include cooperation among think tanks, coopera-

tion in the field of economics and science, more exchanges on the ministerial level, and a relaxation of trade restrictions. The suggestion was made but not accepted that the two militaries study military CBMs to reduce the chances of accidental conflict. Some of the Taiwanese participants seemed loath to include participation by the military establishment in what was a diplomatic/political effort.

The Fourth Roundtable: January 1999

From October 14 through October 19, 1998, Taiwan's SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu visited the PRC to meet with his counterpart, ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan. At the conclusion of their meetings, the two sides issued a four-point statement: (1) Enhance the dialogue to resume systematic discussion. (2) Promote exchanges of visits between SEF-ARATS staff at various levels. (3) Promote mutual assistance for cases arising from exchanges. (4) Arrange a visit to Taiwan for Wang Daohan at an appropriate time.

In December 1998, in a reversal of the previous election, the KMT scored a large victory over the DPP. Unlike the earlier election in which there was some question about whether the electorate had voted for the DPP because they wanted to send a message to Beijing about greater autonomy or because they were sick of the corrupt KMT, in this election, most analysts agreed, the vote was for a more stable Cross-Strait relationship.

Considering the positive atmosphere that surrounded the resumption of official talks between the PRC and Taiwan in October 1998, it was surprising that the fourth Roundtable began with a bitter discussion over Taiwan's international space. In part this stemmed from recent speeches by President Lee and Taipei Mayor Ma Yong-jeou in which the term "new Taiwanese" was used. Many of the participants from Taiwan saw the phrase as a way to eradicate distinctions between mainlanders and Taiwanese — a purely domestic issue. To a person, though, the PRC side believed that the term was being used by Lee as another weapon in his arsenal to push for greater independence.

A hardening of attitudes among the participants from Taiwan was exemplified by a statement made during a presentation. The participant stressed the following points.

1. Taiwan would not accept the "so-called One China principle." There were two Chinas, one in the PRC and one in Taiwan. Taiwan would, however, discuss with the PRC ideas about "confederation" or "commonwealth" provided that provision was made for treating Taiwan as an equal entity.

2. If Taiwan accepted Beijing's One-China principle, it would lose its own identity.

3. The Republic of China on Taiwan has "no obligation" to unify with the mainland. It has the right to decide its own future.

4. Taiwan does not trust the PRC. Among several reasons mentioned was the PRC's past behavior toward Tibet.

5. Taiwan urged the PRC to try to understand why the Taiwanese did not want to reunify now.

6. The United States should develop parallel policies toward the PRC and Taiwan. The United States misunderstood Taiwan; part of the reason was the absence of official dialogue.

7. The PRC's "one country-two systems" formula was "nonsense" to Taiwan, and the idea of equating Taiwan with Hong Kong and Macao was inappropriate.

8. There is no consensus now in Taiwan regarding theater missile defense, but Taiwan would keep its options open.

9. Taiwan would continue to emphasize the importance of democracy and democratization in its relations with the PRC.

The above statement evoked disquietude among participants from both the PRC and the United

States. In a sidebar that occurred shortly afterward, one member of the PRC contingent remarked that Taiwan was obviously becoming much harder to deal with and that the United States must recognize this and work to ensure that Taiwan did not do anything foolish. A participant from Taiwan remarked that if this Roundtable was going to accomplish anything, positions must be stated truthfully.

1. Interpreting the "One China" Principle: In contrast with the attitudes expressed at earlier meetings, participants from the PRC were less willing to discuss other options that could be considered under the umbrella of the "One China" policy. One participant, however, did say that forces still exist that would allow Taiwan to leave the interpretation of "One China" for the future as long as the overall concept was accepted. This position did not seem to reflect the general belief, however, and another PRC participant said that there was growing concern about trends toward independence on Taiwan and that if China didn't do something, "somebody would take Taiwan away."

2. Taiwan's International Space: Despite the progress implicit in the Koo Chen Fu visit in October 1998, the Taiwanese participants voiced their disappointment with Beijing's conclusion that the reduction of Taiwan's "international space" was an inevitable trend of history. Another participant asserted that Beijing had stepped up its efforts to strangle Taiwan diplomatically and that in that atmosphere it was impossible for Taiwan to trust that the mainland had the island's best interests at heart despite what it claimed. The Taiwanese stated that the perception was growing among them that the PRC was using great power diplomacy to compel Taiwan to negotiate. In a sidebar discussion a participant from Taiwan explained that whenever the PRC resorted to those tactics, it reinforced Taiwan's perception that time was not on its side in the long term. From that perspective it appeared that the PRC would only get stronger and be able to use its power more effectively. As a result, Taiwan must solidify its position of sovereignty while it still could.

3. Economic Linkages Between Taiwan and the PRC: In the preceding three meetings, there had been a steady increase in efforts made by the participants of the PRC to establish three links (trade, shipping, post and telecommunications). The effects of the financial crisis, although affecting Taiwan and the PRC less than other East Asian nations, continued to hamper Cross-Strait relations. Taiwan's exports had declined by 9.4 percent since 1998, and its GDP growth rate had slowed by 1.8 percent. Similarly, the PRC suffered a sharp drop in its exports to the region, although its exports to America's robust economy had compensated for the loss. Trade across the Strait declined 3.9 percent in the first nine months of 1998 compared to the same period in 1997. Despite these hits to their economies, the PRC and Taiwan continued to cooperate, most noticeably in labor-intensive industries, chemicals and energy, and building components. As of September 1998, one fifth of the seven hundred companies listed on the Taiwan stock exchange held investments in the PRC.

4. The Role of the United States in the Cross-Strait Relationship: Unlike the third meeting, in which there was more of a meeting of the minds of the participants from the PRC and the United States regarding the need to keep the "One China" policy on track, in the fourth meeting the participants from the PRC stressed their belief that Washington was pursuing a policy of a "no independence, no reunification" status quo in order to check the growth of China. Such a belief was backed up by recent arms sales to Taiwan and the visit to Taiwan by Secretary of Energy Richardson. A few of the Americans reasserted the proposal for an interim political understanding that would reduce Beijing's fears of independence while reassuring Taiwan that it would not be attacked and would not be prevented from playing a dignified role in the global community.

At the end of the fourth meeting, an American participant asked both sides to consider the following confidence-building measures (CBMs) and be prepared to discuss their practicality at the next

meeting. The CBMs included discussing how to implement the three links: sponsoring Taiwan's entry into international organizations as a "customs territory"; and military-to-military exchanges. Another participant suggested that more thought be given to maintaining a "dynamic status quo." Seven months later, the Roundtable found itself struggling to get back to any type of status quo.

The Fifth Roundtable: August 1999

The August 1999 Roundtable on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations was the fifth in a projected series of eight meetings sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The August meeting, originally scheduled for June, was delayed because of the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the strained condition of U.S.-China relations that resulted from that event.

Both Cross-Strait relations and the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangular relationship had altered dramatically in the seven months that had elapsed since the conclusion of the January 1999 Roundtable. At that time there was an improvement in the atmosphere of Cross-Strait relations that had come about as a result of the resumption of quasi-official talks between the PRC and Taiwan in October 1998 as well as residual goodwill from President Clinton's trip to China the previous summer (June 25-July 3, 1998). Since the Fourth Roundtable in January, five issues had become problematic, shaking the foundation of the Cross-Strait relationship.

1. Human Rights: In March 1999 the U.S. House of Representatives joined the Senate in unanimously calling on the Clinton administration to back a UN resolution condemning PRC human rights abuses.

2. Allegations of Chinese spying and the improper transfer of Chinese technology: In March 1999, *The New York Times* published an extensive expose about PRC espionage. The allegation was that from the mid-1980s highly classified technological data from the Los Alamos

National Laboratory in New Mexico had been transferred to the PRC. Of particular concern was the allegation that information regarding America's most advanced miniature warhead, the W-88, had been turned over to the Chinese. Following on the heels of that report was the release on May 25, 1999, of the congressional report about the investigation of transfers of sensitive technology to the PRC. The commission, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), found that the Chinese theft of U.S. secrets had harmed national security.

3. China's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO): In April 1999 President Clinton refused to strike a deal on the terms needed for Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization. The President demanded that China do more to protect U.S. steel and textile companies and further open its market to American financial service firms. Coincident with Premier Zhu Rongji's trip to the United States, the refusal by the Clinton administration to conclude a deal on WTO (as well as the premature posting of the terms offered by the Chinese on an official U.S. government website) added strains on an already troubled U.S.-China relationship. Although President Clinton's advisers asserted that the go-slow policy of April would pay off by getting better terms for the Chinese and allowing more time for the deal to generate support in Congress, events that transpired during the next two months proved those calculations incorrect.

4. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade: On May 7, 1999, the PRC embassy in Belgrade was destroyed by laser-guided bombs launched by an American B-2 bomber. Three Chinese were killed in the attack. Beijing refused to accept the official American apology that the bombing was accidental, having been caused by the mistaken use of outdated maps. Four days of heated protests and attacks against the U.S. embassy and American consulates throughout China followed. In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, the PRC halted all diplomatic, military, academic, and person-to-person contact with the United States.

5. Lee Teng-hui's statement: On July 9, 1999, in response to a question posed by a German reporter, President Lee of Taiwan described his country's relations with China as a "special state-to-state relationship." Reacting to Lee's statement, the government of the United States released a volley of ambiguous signals. On the one hand, the D.C. representative of the American Institute in Taiwan was dispatched to Taipei to voice administration displeasure at Lee Teng-hui, and several other U.S. officials, including Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, who was sent to Beijing, used every available forum to proclaim that the United States still adhered to the "One China" principle. On the other hand, the U.S. Congress began to debate the merits of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, a bill that reflected an attempt to rectify a perceived deficiency in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship: the inability "over the long term to counter and deter potential aggression against Taiwan by the People's Republic of China."

Whether "the two states theory" was a divergence from Taiwan's past policy was debatable. In response to a statement made by Jiang Zemin at an APEC summit in November 1993 in Seattle that "Taiwan is a province of the PRC," Taiwan's Economic Minister PK Chiang formally stated that the "Republic of China (Taipei) was founded in 1912 as a sovereign, independent nation and the PRC (Beijing) was established in 1949 and calls itself a sovereign nation. As such there clearly are two separate nonsubordinate sovereign nations in the international community which have their own sovereignty and their own set of diplomatic ties. . . ." John J. Tkacik, Jr., editor of *The Taiwan Weekly Business Bulletin*, found that a Lexis-Nexus search of Lee Teng-hui's speeches and interviews yielded more than one thousand "hits" since 1993 for the terms "Taiwan" and "sovereign political entity."

In sum, between the end of the January 1999 meeting and the beginning of the August 1999 meeting of the Roundtable, bilateral relations between the PRC and Taiwan as well as the PRC and the United States had plummeted.

1. Interpreting the "One China" Principle: One Taiwanese participant, who reflected the government position, said that he believed that Beijing had consistently delayed ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan's visit to Taiwan because Beijing wanted to connect the visit with the return of Macao to China at the end of 1999 and the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1999. In the context of those events, Beijing believed it could push Taiwan toward engaging in political talks solely revolving around the issue of reunification. In the eyes of Taiwan, Beijing used the "One China" policy to frame discussions in which Beijing assumed the role of the central government and relegated Taipei to the status of a local government. It was as a result of that perception that President Lee judged that he needed to adjust Taiwan's stated policy toward the mainland from "equal political entities" to that of "special state-to-state ties." The participant did acknowledge, however, that an element of domestic politics had played into Lee's calculus for making the July 9 statement. Lee wanted to sharpen the focus of the election campaign on Cross-Strait issues. The participant concluded by citing poll figures that suggested that the majority of the population in Taiwan supported the special state-to-state basis cited by President Lee for Cross-Strait relations. Also reflecting the position of the KMT, one participant stressed that Lee's remarks did nothing more than clarify an existing fact and did not exclude the goal of the future unification of a new, democratic China. He added that even though Taiwan's position was that Taiwan must be treated as a state, the idea of entering into negotiations for a future united China had not been categorically rejected. Nevertheless, Lee's statement was needed to correct the mischaracterization of Taiwan by the PRC as a "renegade province."

A Taiwanese participant from the DPP explained that the DPP now officially used the national title of the Republic of China and had written this title into the DPP platform for the first time. He added that Lee's statement was highly praised by the DPP and served as a point of convergence for the parties. Formal independence

was unnecessary, he asserted, because Taiwan was already independent. Consequently, there was no need to change the status quo; there was only the need to preserve it. Regarding Cross-Strait issues, the main point of divergence between the KMT and the DPP was the DPP's rejection of the KMT's position that there would be "One China." The DPP accepted only that there might be "One China." The participant outlined three advantages that would accrue to Taiwan's government if it replaced the "One China" formula with the "special relationship" formula: (1) the "One China" term is deliberately misunderstood by the PRC to constitute a single entity and as a consequence causes confusion in the international community; (2) "One China" is only one of the elements in the "special relationship"; and (3) "One China" is only one possible outcome. The phrase "One China" limited the exploration of other scenarios such as commonwealth. Most of the Taiwanese participants agreed that after the elections, the new president of Taiwan would find it difficult to draw back from "state-to-state" relations.

All the participants from the PRC agreed that Lee's statement of July 9 seriously damaged the Cross-Strait relationship. One participant argued that the statement undermined the basis on which the policy of the peaceful reunification of China rested. He added that this was a very dangerous time because "One China" was not only the basis for a stable, peaceful situation across the Strait, but it was also the basis for a peaceful situation across the entire Asia-Pacific region. He asked the participants to reflect on the situation of Asia pre-1971 and concluded that the "One China" principle had helped to stabilize the region. Consequently, the PRC had to understand why Lee wanted to destabilize the region by changing the status quo. The PRC believed that there were three reasons for the issuance of the statement: (1) Lee wished to derail the Wang-Koo meeting after receiving intense pressure from different quarters in Taiwan to engage in substantive dialogue with Beijing. In particular, the business community in Taiwan was pushing for the opening of the three direct links, an outcome that Lee was against; (2)

Lee hoped to manipulate domestic politics to ensure that his mainland policy would be carried on past his own tenure in office; and (3) Lee believed that the United States would support him in his statement, given the low point of Sino-U.S. relations at the moment. All the PRC participants agreed that because of Lee Teng-hui's statement of July 9, Mr. Wang Daohan could not visit Taiwan. One participant said that "while the welcoming banner was still out for Mr. Wang, the bridge had been washed away." Another participant said that the PRC was wary that over time there would be a gradual, albeit tacit, approval of "state-to-state" relations and that in the coming months Lee would take "three steps forward, one step back." He added that the political will in Taiwan to "drift away" seemed to be growing and concluded that the United States should recommend that Lee talk less.

An American participant asserted that both Beijing and Taipei had recently taken actions that created imbalances in the relationships. The PRC had pressed for political negotiations, leading the Taiwanese to believe that they would assume the subordinate position in the Wang-Koo dialogue. Taiwan, feeling pressured by the United States to consider the idea of "interim agreements," released the "state-to-state" formula as a reaction to pressure. One possible motive behind Lee's statement was to level the playing field in any negotiations with the Chinese as well as to demonstrate to the international community that Taiwan was not part of the PRC.

2. Taiwan's International Space: One Taiwanese participant summed up the emotional pressure felt by the people of Taiwan to push for increased respect from China and the international community. He remarked that Taiwan had been driven into a corner by a PRC that set unrealistic preconditions and anticipated conclusions before negotiations. He added that Beijing must recognize that if the only choice for Taiwan was war or surrender, Taiwan would go to war. An American asserted that Beijing's impatience had led in part to the current crisis. If Beijing had tried to forge

new links with Taiwan through agreements on fisheries, immigration, smuggling, hijacking, and other functional issues, the PRC could have made great strides toward steering the conversation to more "political issues" by diminishing the mistrust that had built up between the two sides. Blame for the current tension, however, also resided with Taipei inasmuch as Lee's statement had forced a stripping away of ambiguity and an intensification of the rivalry of both sides for the support of the United States.

3. Economic Linkages Between Taiwan and the PRC: In contrast to the tense atmosphere surrounding other issues, most of the participants seemed relieved to point to a different atmosphere — a silver lining — pervading certain economic relations. The American contingent pointed out that economic factors may be closing the gap across the Strait. After Lee's July 9 statement, Taiwan's stock market dropped 14 percent, and Shanghai's B-share market fell 8.8 percent. When uncertainty across the Strait had wreaked havoc on Taiwan's exchange on previous occasions, Beijing remained relatively untouched. Since July 9, 1999, that was no longer the case. In a sidebar a participant from Taiwan pointed out that economic interdependence was a sword that cut both ways. Just as it brought people together, it frightened many on the island by convincing them that they would become dependent on the mainland for their future growth and prosperity. Back in the formal discussion, all participants stressed the need for further economic links. One participant from Taiwan proposed that a direct air link be established. Taiwan's planes could fly first, he suggested, and China's companies could jointly share profits as a result. If Taiwan felt that a high degree of security and mutual trust had developed, Taiwan could then allow China's planes to make direct flights to Taiwan.

4. The Role of the United States in the Cross-Strait Relationship: In marked contrast to the First Roundtable in 1997, in which both sides were reluctant to criticize American actions or policies directly, in the Fifth Roundtable almost every

problem encountered during the last seven months was laid at the feet of Washington, so much so that in a sidebar an American quipped that criticism of Washington may be the one thing that can bring Taipei and Beijing together. During the session a participant from Taiwan stated his belief that a consideration for Lee in deciding to release the "state-to-state" statement was the perception that the Clinton administration had gradually shifted its policy in favor of siding with the PRC in the Cross-Strait dispute. As an illustration of that shift, he cited the fact that Washington was pushing Taipei to accept interim agreements in which political negotiations would be unavoidable. The participant believed that the United States was shifting from a policy of ambiguity to one of clarity and embracing the mainland's position.

A participant from the PRC responded that American domestic politics had led the United States to push a double standard, one in which China was pressured to renounce the use of force on the Taiwan issue while the United States retained its expressed right to "protect" Taiwan. In fact, the United States added insult to injury by seeking to expand this "right" through the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. Another PRC participant emphasized that recent problems in the Sino-U.S. relationship led Beijing to reassess America's policies toward Asia. He said that although the two countries shared much, motivating both sides to forge a cooperative relationship, U.S. actions during the past year had led China to conclude that there are forces in the United States that wish to prevent China from becoming a peer in the next century. To some degree, he added, the United States, by wrongly accusing China of threatening Taiwan's safety and security, had led Lee to believe that it would back him in his bid for separatism. The participant acknowledged, however, that many people in the United States still opposed Lee's new formulation based on the following five concerns: (1) Politicians in Taiwan manipulate the United States on Cross-Strait issues and then leave the Americans to clean up the mess; (2) Taiwan produced the two-state theory without consultation with the United States in

an effort to trap the United States into tacitly supporting the statement; (3) The two-state theory added to the strains already evident in the Sino-U.S. relationship; (4) Lee's statement made it more difficult for Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan and for the United States to propose a solution involving an "interim agreement"; and (5) the new formulation destabilized the region to a great extent. Despite those concerns, the United States pushed China to renounce force and sold five hundred fifty million dollars of weaponry to Taiwan, suggesting that the forces in the United States that wish to give tacit approval to Lee's statement were becoming more influential.¹⁸

An American participant presented his view that the United States had entered into an extremely awkward position vis-à-vis Cross-Strait relations. In the past the U.S. commitment to a "One China" policy essentially converged with Beijing's and Taipei's adherence to a "One China" policy. As a result, the United States could comfortably assert that it was not tilting to one side and hence not interfering. Such ambiguity during the last twenty years had led to a steady improvement in both Cross-Strait relations and the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship in general. Another participant from the United States asserted that Lee's statement interrupted positive momentum in the triangular relationship. The U.S. approach since the statement had involved calming tensions and salvaging the dialogue. Although America's "One China" policy remained unchanged, the times had changed. As a result, although it was still not appropriate for the United States to mediate between the PRC and Taiwan, the United States had to remain active in the relationship to maintain the peace and security of the region.

5. The Military Balance Across the Strait: An American participant stressed that the utility of force was increasing for the PRC because the "One China" doctrine was eroding. Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, Taiwan was "not worth taking and China couldn't take it anyway." The situation was different now. Options were increasing both politically and militarily.¹⁹ He added that

three competing doctrines now existed. Kosovo taught the PRC (and, more to the point, the People's Liberation Army [PLA]) that an opposing force cannot give the United States time to build up its power. Preemption is the only chance to fight against the United States. Taiwan learned that its best chances depend on bringing the United States into the fight as soon as possible. The United States, however, hardened its doctrine into noninterference. If it does conclude that interference is required, however, it will be accomplished by distance. Those competing trends may lead to a "first-class arms race" in East Asia. The participant said that he could not overstate the potential for miscalculation in the short term. Another American participant said that impatience over finding a solution is rising in all three capitals. The search for a solution, however, could be destabilizing because the political realities of the moment militate against the potential for a solution. Yet provocative actions continue to take place in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. In sum, for all its imperfections, the "One China" principle, which the United States and the rest of Asia want to maintain, is the safest course of action. It was generally agreed that the two sides needed to engage in military confidence-building measures such as reducing sorties, instituting "hot lines," defining the rules of engagement, defining the "center line," and publishing annual white papers in an attempt to increase transparency.

The Fifth Roundtable ended with the recognition that the situation across the Strait had become volatile and that future military and political dialogue was essential.

Conclusion

The Roundtable is a unique endeavor. It is one of the oldest and most respected of any track II efforts that deal with the Taiwan Strait. What sets it apart from other, sporadic efforts is the cohesion of the group members that developed over the course of two years. In the First Roundtable held in June 1997, few sidebar discussions were held

among participants from Taiwan and the PRC. Since that time, however, members from each contingent seek out the others during meals and coffee breaks. The level of trust that has developed is evident in the frankness of the conversations.

Unfortunately, despite the rise of personal goodwill among the participants, the positions of the sides remain far apart and in some cases seem to be moving away from convergence.

On political issues, the PRC is looking to March 2000 when a new president will take the helm in Taiwan and the situation across the Strait should improve markedly. The PRC hopes that when Lee Teng-hui leaves office, Taiwan will back away from his "state-to-state" statement. Consequently, the PRC foresees the imminent possibility of moving away from the sharp political divergences created by Lee during the last decade. The participants from Taiwan, however, made it clear, both in formal discussions and in sidebars, that none of the three potential candidates would step back from Lee's "state-to-state" statement. In candid exchanges with some of the younger participants, they expressed a great desire for more recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty. Hence the perspective from Taiwan is that the future will bring about more instances of political divergence.

The economic front holds the most promise for accommodation. The PRC emphasized that the Chinese on either side of the Strait have much to gain from further cooperation in the economic domain. Although many on the Taiwan side are concerned about overdependence, they too realize that Taiwan's future growth and prosperity depend on good economic relations with the PRC. In the short term, however, economic linkages also increased the awareness of many Taiwanese that the cultural gap between the two people is significant. Nonetheless, as was evident at the Roundtables, both sides were willing to talk about concrete steps that can be taken to improve economic dialogue, interaction, and cooperation.

Military trends are the most worrisome. Although the PRC recognizes that at the moment it cannot take Taiwan by force, it also knows that in terms of the military balance, time is on its side.

Hence irrespective of whether political convergence is reached in the future, military convergence remains a future option. Taiwan, while recognizing that the military balance may be shifting toward Beijing, believes that the United States will become more active in promoting the defense of the island. Whether this will be accomplished through more (and more advanced) arms sales, theater missile defense, or other provisions enacted through a Taiwan Enhancement-like bill, progress made by the PLA will galvanize Taiwan's friends in Congress to rectify perceived inadequacies in the TRA.

Such differences in perspectives, which have been increasing over the last two years, constitute a worrisome trend. As a result, the Roundtable continues to be important. It is committed to trying to find a way around, over, or through the many obstacles that bedevil the Cross-Strait relationship. All participants from all three sides recognize that the Roundtable provides a safe atmosphere to promote dialogue and perhaps assist in finding a path toward a peaceful resolution of the dangerous situation that now exists across the Taiwan Strait.

Notes

1. For an earlier discussion of the Roundtable, see Donald S. Zagoria, "National Committee on American Foreign Policy's Project on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, June 1999.
2. A broader discussion of the modern history of the Cross-Strait relationship as well as the U.S. involvement in it is not contained in this article but can be found in an earlier issue of *American Foreign Policy Interests*. See Samantha Ravich, "U.S. Policy Toward the Taiwan Strait: A Historical Perspective," April 1999.
3. Although certainly not in the same league as the rape of Nanking, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, many Chinese argue, will long be remembered as another such example of their mistreatment.
4. For a good discussion of the economic effects of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan, see Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," in *Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan*, ed. Walter Galenson (New York, 1979).
5. Shelley Rigger, "Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui Complex," *Current History*, September 1996.

6. Beijing's "Lee complex" was particularly evident when, in response to Lee's July 9, 1999, statement on "special state-to-state" relations, the PRC press compared Taiwan's president to a "dog in the water who must be beaten" and "a traitor who will be cursed for a thousand years."

7. Statement by Robert Sutter at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, "U.S.-Taiwan Policy Consultation 1994 Conference: Policy Development in Democracy: U.S.-ROC Relations Toward the Twenty-first Century," December 9-10, 1994.

8. "United States Policy Toward Formosa. Statement by President Truman." *Department of State Bulletin*. January 16, 1950, vol. 22.

9. "U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered into Supporting Action. Statement by President Truman." *Department of State Bulletin*. July 3, 1950, vol. 23.

10. Michael Ying-mao Kau, "Democratization in Taiwan and Its Impact on the Relationship to the Mainland." in *Chinese Divide*, ed. J. W. Wheeler (Indianapolis, 1996).

11. Despite those feelings of admiration, the American people continue to shy away from unambiguously declaring that the United States should come to the defense of Taiwan in the event of a dispute with China. In a recent Luce Foundation poll, only 35 percent of respondents answered affirmatively when asked whether the United States should come to the defense of Taiwan with military force if it were attacked by China. Fifty-two percent of the respondents disagreed, and 13 percent didn't know. In comparison, 52 percent of Americans thought that the United States should come to the defense of Japan with military force if it were attacked by China. ("Americans Look at Asia," A Potomac Associates Policy Perspective by William Watts, October 1999).

12. Jiang had made this point first at the 14th National Congress in October 1992.

13. These two issues, use of force and international space, became two of the three most contentious issues dealt with by the Roundtables. The third issue revolved around the conception of sovereignty.

14. Ironically, the visit that was characterized as a positive event in 1996 was recharacterized in the spring of 1999 during the investigation into Chinese espionage at national security labs. Chi's Pentagon-sponsored trip to the Sandia National Lab became a flashpoint in the inquiry when the Energy Department claimed it was not told in advance of the visit and that Chi's delegation was not given proper clearances.

15. For a solid characterization of the atmosphere during that period, see Robert Manning and Ronald Montaperto, "The People's Republic and Taiwan: Time for a New Cross-Strait Bargain." National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, February 1997.

16. The participant was mistaken in his belief. The actual promise by the United States was to help find ways for "Taiwan's voice to be heard" in organizations in which statehood is a requirement for entry.

17. In a poll commissioned by the Mainland Affairs Council and conducted by the China Credit Information Service in the aftermath of July 9, 44.8 percent of the respondents

considered themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese — up 7.9 percent from a poll in April.

18. Such perceptions have intensified since August. On September 3, 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji was quoted as saying that U.S. policies had encouraged Lee's July 9 statement and as a consequence, "sooner or later it will lead to an armed resolution of the question because the Chinese will become impatient." Jeremy Page, "China Says U.S. Making Taiwan War Inevitable," *Singapore Strait Times*, September 30, 1999.

19. To invade Taiwan, China would have to cross 120 miles of open sea, transport three divisions of 10,000 paratroopers, and land where there are few landing sites — a feat it cannot currently handle. (Richard Halloran, "The Balance of Power Remains in Taiwan's Favor," *International Herald Tribune*, September 7, 1999). If China tried to capture Matsu or Jinmen, Taiwan would have trouble providing air cover for the islands, which are closer to the shoreline of Fujian Province on the mainland than to the island of Taiwan. In recent statements, however, the United States has said it would see the invasion of the outlying islands as an invasion of Taiwan's soil. China has an estimated 200 M-9 missiles deployed against Taiwan. Even if all of them were fired, Taiwan would survive to retaliate, and once all of them were fired, it would take China almost twenty months to replicate that inventory. China could institute a blockade, disrupting trade routes, or pursue information warfare to which Taiwan may be particularly susceptible because in a population of twenty-one million, three out of four businesses use computers and four million Taiwanese subscribe to the Internet of Taiwan. China maintains an arsenal of about 400 warheads, about 250 "strategic weapons," including long-range land-based missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and about 150 "tactical" weapons (lower yield bombs for tactical aircraft, demolition munitions, and short-range missiles like the Dong Feng 15 (600 kilometer range, a.k.a. M-9) and 11 (300 kilometer range, a.k.a. M-11). Taiwan's defense minister has said that the M-9 and M-11 are nuclear capable and that the number of M-type missiles targeting Taiwan has increased from thirty to fifty to one hundred sixty to two hundred since 1996 (*The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 1999).

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