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赴英國倫敦大學亞非學院進修專題報告：

非洲民主化對我國邦交之影響

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職 稱：二等秘書回部辦事

姓 名：范光復

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附錄：辛巴威民主化之研究（Democratization in Zimbabwe：

The Rise and Fall of Robert Mugabe）

非洲民主化對我國邦交之影響

一、摘要

一九九一年蘇聯瓦解，冷戰結束，對非洲國家而言實乃空前之變局，因國際關注焦點集中至東歐地區之重建，對非洲之援助大幅縮減，使許多久賴外援維持生存之政權頓失所倚，陷入危機。九〇年代，新自由主義（Neo-Liberalism）思潮在國際間抬頭，「政治民主化、經濟自由化」之主張沛然莫之能禦，世界銀行、國際貨幣基金等國際建設性融資援助機構在此一思潮影響下，以凍結貸款為手段，強迫非洲國家實行民主改革與經濟開放，對長久以來實行一黨專政或獨裁統治之非洲國家形成巨大壓力。面對此一變局，非洲國家政權或被迫開放政黨競爭、舉行多黨選舉，或被武裝行動推翻摧毀，民主化過程呈現高度多樣化。由於非洲各國現存之問題多屬多年沈痾，牽涉各國本身問題與國際環境等複雜因素，民主化以及政權轉換並不能使固有之問題獲得迅速解決，惟民主化仍屬非洲國家無可規避之考驗。外界對非洲國家之民主化不應抱持過高之期望，應協助非洲國家建立可永續經營之經濟發展模式，方為消滅非洲貧窮落後根本之計。

二、歷史回顧

非洲是一幅員遼闊且呈現多樣面貌之古老大陸，共有五十三個國家（不包括尚未獲國際承認之「撒哈拉阿拉伯民主共和國」及「索馬利蘭共和國」）。除了埃及、衣索匹亞、利比亞等少數古老王國外，均為「新興國家」，多於一九六〇年後始獲得獨立國家地位。

非洲本身各部份相互之間差異甚大。北部非洲與撒哈拉沙漠以南非洲之間即存有一極為懸殊之文化差異。地理景觀與人文條件亦大不相同，例如面積鉅大之薩伊對照小土寡民之賽昔爾、盧安達、蒲隆地；或產油大國奈及利亞、安哥拉對照農業小國甘比亞、史瓦濟蘭等。再如政治穩定、經濟小康之波札納對照飽受戰火摧殘、經濟陷於崩潰之賴比瑞亞、獅子山、安哥拉、索馬利亞、蘇丹等均是。

然而，獨立之初，非洲各國間亦存有許多相似之處，這些共同特質也是諸多問題發生之根本原因。首先，非洲除了賴比瑞亞外，原均係歐洲國家之殖民地，臣服於英、法、葡、德、比、義、西等國之統治。殖民統治之歷史雖短，前後不到一百年時間，卻對非洲國家造成深遠之影響。殖民時代的有限基本建設與教育雖使非洲脫離原始部落社會狀態，得以與文明世界接軌；惟西方殖民國家所採之統治方式，亦使原

本不甚嚴重之族群意識與強人統治模式在非洲生根，成為發展上難以克服之障礙。殖民帝國之剝削政策更使非洲經濟過度依賴原料出口，完全沒有工業基礎，至今仍難以發展。其次，非洲國家獨立後，均試圖建立自己專屬的本質。獨立時彼等雖獲得國際承認取得國家地位，並成為聯合國之會員國；然而，種族、語言、發展程度不一之不同族群融合過程並未完成，衍生持續之內部衝突，對建設發展構成極大之障礙。第三，這些國家均甚貧窮，對國際市場抱持太多幻想與依賴，任何得自外界之援助，多迅速被國際價格波動抵消殆盡。許多國家領導人於是試圖將此一過度依賴某一農、礦產品之經濟模式予以轉型。但工業化過程中，彼等均面臨技術、人力、進口機具成本、市場等無數問題。尤其重要的是，西方之工業化係發生於民主化之前，亦即在工人享有選舉權之前，社會已有充分的資源可以用來滿足勞工階級迫切之需要；而在非洲，此一緩衝時間並不存在，平等選舉權在獨立後立即、或與獨立同步取得，彼時穩健之經濟政策尚未成型，選民的期望卻被獨立鬥爭進行期間政客們所作之空頭承諾大幅抬高，遠遠超出任何政府能力所能承擔之範圍。第四，這些新生獨立國家並無文明之政治文化，不僅政治領袖

缺乏管理國家之知識，政府機關與團體組織、機構亦多虛弱無力。復因私營產業機構尚不健全，國家必須承擔企業之功能與角色，導致國營事業繁衍，官僚特權橫行，政治菁英貪污腐敗，與平民大眾之間漸行漸遠。最後，就國際層面而言，這些新興國家，無論外交或軍事，都無法與傳統國家相提並論；直至七〇年代少數國家之經濟纔因石油之發現而稍具規模，並在外交上獲得可以使力之槓桿。

純就政治而言，脫離殖民統治後之非洲國家或多或少均經歷了以下數項共同之遭遇：（一）政治權力集中於單一政黨，人治色彩濃厚，政局不穩定。（二）就業機會不足，城鄉發展差距甚大、區域失衡情形嚴重。（三）在私營產業機構尚未成型之情況下，甚多國家（坦桑尼亞係典型範例）採行不同型式之社會主義，以求迅速工業化，擺脫對農礦產品輸出之依賴，惟均徒勞無功，留下重重問題。尤其嚴重者，係在「國有化」政策陰影籠罩下，外國資金裹足不前，延誤經濟發展、產業升級之重要時機。（四）官僚系統膨脹，貪污腐化，冗員充斥，效率低落。（五）籠罩在軍事政變陰影之下，軍事強人紛紛奪權當政。（六）社會被部族、宗教、地域、階級等次族群意識交叉切割，難以凝聚共識致力發展

建設。(七) 刻意標榜獨立自主之外交政策，若干國家試圖組織區域性政治聯盟，冀望匯聚較強之對外討價還價實力，惟均未能實現，如塞內加爾與法屬蘇丹於一九五九年合組之馬利共和國即為一顯著之例證。「非洲團結組織」雖成立多年，惟就各方面功能而言均相當虛弱。冷戰時期許多國家紛紛向殖民舊主以外之來源尋求援助，終究無法改變經濟依賴外援之本質。(八) 貿易赤字龐大，外匯短缺，債台高築。許多政府靠舉債維持最基本之運作，國家預算泰半用於償付利息，使外匯短缺之問題益形嚴重，再加貿易逆差衝擊，形成惡性循環。

三、民主化之背景

八〇年代期間，尤其是八〇年代末期及九〇年代初期，

非洲政、經、社會均面臨重大變化，使後殖民時代「社會主義發展策略」與「一黨專政」等兩項政治特徵徹底改觀。持續之經濟危機與高失業率導致非洲國家面臨嚴重之社會問題，民眾對社會主義徹底絕望，轉向擁抱資本主義。八〇年代末期國際間盛行一項國家發展理論，即是：欲求經濟復甦，須先結束專制政權、消滅貪污無能與一黨專政；只有實行「多黨政治」一途能挽救非洲國家急遽下沉之經濟。在此思潮衝擊之下，要求進行政治、經濟改革之群眾運動在非洲各地此起彼落，示威遊行、國是會議相繼上演，主張舉行多黨選舉。西方國家及世界銀行則祭出「廉能政府」(Good Government)之大纛，堅持以「民主化」、「自由化」做為提供援助之條件。民主運動因有來自外部之鼓勵，迅速蔓延至整個非洲。九〇年代初期，多黨憲政體制尚僅見於波札那、甘比亞、塞內加爾、辛巴威等四個撒哈拉沙漠以南之國家。殆至九〇 - 九一年間，民主運動已在許多「一黨專政」國家生根萌芽，包括安哥拉、喀麥隆、維德角、象牙海岸、加彭、莫三比克、聖多美普林西比、尚比亞等由文人統治之國家，以及貝南、布吉那法索、剛果、幾內亞、幾內亞比索、馬達加斯加、馬利、獅子山、多哥及薩伊等軍事政權統治下之國

家。大多數國家領導人不願朝政治多元化轉向，卻不得不向高漲之民意屈服。衣索匹亞與索馬利亞兩國游擊隊於一九九一年分別驅逐惡名昭彰之孟吉斯圖（Mengistu）、席艾巴瑞（Siad Barry）軍事政權；貝南之科瑞寇（Mathieu Kerekou）與尚比亞之卡翁達（Kenneth Kaunda）亦相繼在大選中落敗，分別開啟了法語及英語非洲政治改革之洪閘。一九九五年九月薩伊因欠薪引發軍人暴動，比利時及法國均派遣軍隊前往護僑，狡猾之莫布度（Sese Seko Moputo）幾經掙扎纔僥倖過關。類似情形亦在多哥、加彭、喀麥隆及查德等國發生。巨大之民意壓力迫使眾多非洲國家上演民主改革之戲碼，城市居民久經一黨專政、獨裁統治下經濟蕭條、貪污、低效率所苦，受到東歐變局之啟示，要求變革之決心尤其堅定。

民主運動蓬勃發展之第二個原因是西方國家以及世銀等國際援助機構之態度。彼等均明白表示：未來將依據「良善管理」（Good Governance）以及「尊重人權」之表現來決定援助分配。「世銀」於一九八九年十一月份報告中發表「非洲從危機邁進可持續之成長」專文，討論「管理危機」，明言除非政府效率有顯著之改善，否則不會提供援助。一九九〇年美國駐肯亞大使 Smith Hempstone 曾表示，美國國會裡

有一股強大的壓力，要求將經濟援助集中提供給那些努力提倡民主機制、保障人權、實行多黨政治之國家。法國總統密特朗、英國外長赫德、海外合作部部長琳達裘克（Linda Chalker）等亦相繼發出相似之訊息，裘克宣稱英國將把「良善管理」標準納入援助之主要考量。「良善管理」之制式內涵即為：多元化的決策機制、良好可行的經濟與社會政策 – 包括尊重市場機能與私營產業部門、公平公開的司法體系、經由「自由而公平選舉」（Free and Fair Election）產生之國會、以及合理之國防支出等。

四、民主化之結果

世銀、國際貨幣基金與西方提供援助之國家要求非洲國家政府依照「良善管理」原則進行「結構重整」，採取「機

關瘦身、裁減冗員、公營事業民營化、取消補貼」等具體措施減低財政赤字。非洲國家領導人在巨大壓力下面臨兩項選擇，一是拒絕世銀條件，放棄西方援助，賴己力求生存；另一則是對世銀條件照單全收，實行政治、經濟改革。接受世銀條件之具體措施即是裁員以及取消對糧食、教育、醫療等之補貼，最大受害者係勞工與基層民眾。在民怨沸騰之下，還須履行世銀另一要求，舉行「自由而公平之選舉」。是以許多國家領導人在接受與拒絕之間掙扎，蓋不論接受與否，均需付出慘痛代價，無異於政權生死存亡之爭。若干非洲國家政治元老在掌權數十年後，即因應付不了此一變局而在大選中落敗下台。善於玩弄策略之政客則求變圖存，在絕境中苦思對策，其中不乏絕處逢生、僥倖過關者。

象牙海岸一九九〇年大選顯示，執政當局極易操縱規則，使反對黨無法構成威脅。塞內加爾亦有類似的情形，一九七六與一九八一年塞國憲法兩度修訂，反對黨被允許在一九七八、一九八三及一九八八年大選中挑戰執政黨，然而，每次選舉結果均仍為執政黨所勝。執政之「社會黨」（Parti Socialiste）操縱遊戲規則，不准反對黨合組聯盟，本身又有整個政府機器做後盾，方便汲取行政資源收買回教長老。塞

國因國家體制與社會現狀之間存有嚴重之落差，政府無法控制花生及其他主要經濟作物市場；而這些回教長老卻仍能對地下市場行使傳統之影響力，遂能發揮關鍵之作用。九〇年代以來之民主化浪潮促成許多非洲國家反對黨之茁壯，這些反對黨的存在與參選可激勵執政黨奮發振作。然而，依據喀麥隆、象牙海岸、加彭、塞內加爾、肯亞等國經驗，原執政黨不難繼續支配政局。最獨特之一例則係奈及利亞一九九三年總統大選，軍事強人巴班基達（Ibrahim Babangida）竟悍然宣佈 Moshood Abiola 當選無效，並指定 Ernest Adegunle Shonekan 主持過度政府，最後政權為另一軍事強人 Abacha 所奪，奈國再次陷入軍權統治，直至二〇〇〇年。

許多政權固然成功地化解了國內要求變革之壓力，然而貝南、尚比亞、維德角等國卻呈現著不同的發展，因為這些國家政權都獲得和平轉移。之前，除模里西斯外，政權轉移鮮少透過票箱實現。連波札那此一享有高度言論集會自由、並且舉行自由而公平選舉的國家，執政黨之優勢地位亦從未被嚴重挑戰過。大多數非洲國家之民主程度仍遠不及波札那，選戰優勢多被執政黨或其領導人壟斷，如同象牙海岸一九九〇年選舉一般。惟波札那、模里西斯、甘比亞等國能夠

長期維持民主體制，以及迄二〇〇〇年為止，除了少數特例，非洲大多數國家已實現自由而開放之選舉，在在顯示民主政治已在非洲邁開一大步。值得注意的是政黨政治對促進非洲國家內部整合之幫助不大，甚至可能妨害整合。因為許多政黨為求勝選不惜煽動族群意識製造分化，馬拉威即是一例。一九九四年總統及國會議員選舉結果顯示區域與族群勢力仍為左右馬國政治發展之關鍵因素。

五、我對非洲民主化應有之認識

(一) 我對非洲國家之民主化應樂觀其成表示歡迎，並量力而為提供協助：

非洲各國九〇年代以來之民主化，多屬威權體制、強人統治在後冷戰時期難以為繼所引發之權力競逐。因各國歷史背景與政治、經濟環境不同，民主化過程與所締造之新秩序

亦均各具特點。政權因反對黨獲得廣泛支持贏得大選而和平轉移者約佔半數，原執政黨能繼續執政者多因策略奏效，或是反對勢力整合失敗，彼此之間相互牽制抵消，而予執政黨分化、可乘之機。惟亦有甚多國家在獨裁強人垮台後，群強交戰爭奪國家控制權，全國幾乎陷入無政府狀態。非洲國家內戰多非單純因素所致，除了對國家控制權之競爭外，亦牽涉族群間之利益衝突以及鄰近國家之歷史恩怨、各國領導人私人利益打算等因素。安哥拉、索馬利亞、賴比瑞亞、獅子山、盧安達、剛果等國之內戰即是如此。以賴比瑞亞內戰為例，美國因專注於波灣戰爭，無暇顧及冷戰時期盟友 - 殘忍腐敗惡名昭彰之杜伊政權，當泰勒（Charles Taylor）在象牙海岸、布吉納法索等法語系國家支持下，率領 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 於極短時間內以破竹之勢橫掃賴比瑞亞，即將攻陷首都蒙羅維亞之際，奈及利亞為首之西非經濟共同體（ECOWAS）各國，因不願見法語系大國支持之泰勒得逞，並覬覦賴國鑽石、鐵礦、橡膠等利益，遂在美國支持下，共同派兵組成「西非監察團」（ECOMOG - ECOWAS Monitoring Group）進軍賴國，在蒙羅維亞樹立 Amos Sawyer 傀儡臨時政府，並在泰勒佔領區內分別支持不

同勢力組成游擊隊與泰勒激戰，阻止泰勒統一賴國，各方武力多達七支，賴比瑞亞遂陷入軍閥混戰之局面，時間長達七年，兵疲馬困、生靈塗炭。最後在國際多邊調停下，交戰各派同意在國際監督下舉行大選。泰勒因握有雄厚資源，志在必得；賴國人民擔憂泰勒落選戰事再起，而做了風險較小之選擇，泰勒終於贏得大選。賴比瑞亞內戰顯示在政局長久渾沌不明情形下，各交戰團體對外關係各行其是，使外界無所適從，增加互動之難度。鑒於非洲國家政權轉換模式之高度多樣化，外界甚難歸納總結其發展趨勢。對非洲國家之民主化我應採取樂觀其成，量力而為之態度。考慮比照歐美日等國，提供經費或技術協助非洲國家辦理「自由而公平」之選舉。

（二）民主化無法解決非洲國家嚴重之政、經、社會問題：

非洲國家民主化的結果未必能落實民主政治，亦無法解決政治、經濟、社會等根本問題。造成非洲國家貧窮、落後之根本原因錯綜複雜，主要可歸因於非洲國家之政治文化與國際環境兩方面因素。

就前者而言，非洲古老部族社會與殖民統治共同塑造了一項獨特之政治文化。在古老部族社會，群體高度依賴強而

有力領袖之領導與保護。殖民時期英、法等主要殖民宗主為便利統治，採取「以夷治夷」、「分而治之」之策略，刻意區分、強調各部族之本質，復授與各地酋長分派公差勤務、收稅、仲裁糾紛等權力，這些地方強人在與殖民官員勾結下迅速累積龐大之黨羽與勢力，社會上遂形成「大人」與「小孩」（Big men & Small boys，非洲說法）兩個不平等而分明之階級，各項利益為菁英階級牢牢盤據。獨立成為主權國家後，情況依舊，掌控政權成為獲取資源利益之唯一途徑，「公職」成為酬庸支持、籠絡異己之工具，菁英份子依存於政治強人之下，結黨營私、貪贓舞弊成為政治之常態。在社會公義蕩然無存之環境下，基層民眾缺乏奮鬥之誘因，群體生產力無法充分激發，建設發展自然難達理想之成果。

大部分非洲國家對外貿易係以原料出口為主，占非洲總出口百分之六十；一般開發中國家約為百分之三十三，相較之下，非洲經濟對原料出口之依賴過重。國際價格波動常對非洲經濟造成重大衝擊。許多政府表面上理由為促進工業發展，實際上則是為了便利利益輸送或安撫城市地區菁英階級，多對主要經濟作物採取壓低價格或課以沉重稅捐之政策，嚴重扼殺農業生產力。農業占非洲就業人口百分之七

十，國民總生產（GNP）百分之三十五，遭到嚴重扭曲之農業政策使許多非洲國家喪失經濟發展之穩健基礎。另一方面則以公營方式進行工業化，設立許多不符成本效益、效率低落、冗員充斥之公營事業機構。經濟在兩頭損耗下日益虛弱，外匯極度匱乏，產業無法升級，外資裹足不前。大多非洲國家即是在此一惡性循環模式下陷入經濟停滯之絕境。世銀以「自由化」、「裁撤冗員」、「開放市場」等項做為提供貸款之先決條件，惟參証諸多案例，效果並不理想，許多國家經濟非但未能起死回生，反而陷入更深之政治危機。由於傳統政治文化根深蒂固，以酬庸、收買等手段鞏固政權之模式短期內難望改觀，非洲國家勢需經歷更長一段調適期、更多次淬鍊，纔有可能實現藉由選票催化合理政策、建立廉能政府之理想民主機制。

再就國際因素而言，非洲之地理位置，除索馬利亞外，未曾在國際戰略上發揮關鍵之影響力，因此既使在冷戰時期，亦多未能獲得強權之重視。雖然部分非洲國家之社會主義色彩曾引起美國之憂慮，惟在非洲，美蘇兩強僅曾在索馬利亞、安哥拉等少數地區較勁，卻未曾認真協助非洲國家進行建設，對非洲之投入遠不及對其他地區。而非洲與先進國

家之關係，因在獨立之初，英、法兩國對原殖民地均作了形式上之結盟安排，原英國殖民地組成「大英國協」(the British Commonwealth of Nations)，法國殖民地組成「大共和」(Le Grand Republique)及「西非法郎」共同貨幣區，這些前殖民地國家自然在政治、經濟等各方面與前殖民宗主維持著較密切之關係，尤其法國與其舊殖民地均訂有「安全防禦條約」，可以隨時派兵前往該等國家。無怪乎七〇年代奈及利亞內戰爆發時，當時美國國務卿魯斯克(Dean Rusk)竟表示那是英國的事，不需美國插手。而非洲國家則始終認為西方對其行使殖民剝削數百年(從白人抵達非洲之時起算)，即使彼等獨立後，西方工業化國家仍以剝削之價格與關稅障礙等方式自非洲榨取原料、資源，並認為這才是今日非洲貧窮飢餓等一切問題的根本原因，要求西方必需以更積極之態度「贖罪」。雖然此一論點刻意規避非洲本身文化因素之影響，卻不無幾分道理。當代「全球系統理論」(World-System Theory)大師華勒斯坦(Immanuel Wallestein)即堅信非洲在全球系統中屬於「邊緣地帶」，被西方資本主義社會所代表的「核心」藉由不公平條件汲取勞務、資源，永難有翻身機會。華氏深受馬克斯理論之影響，其見解雖遭到主流理論家嚴厲批

判，惟證諸近半世紀以來，非洲與西方關係之發展以及非洲國家今日之處境，華氏之言誠值吾人深思。

(三) 對非洲之援助，必須以協助建立可永續經營之經濟發展模式為主：

非洲國家外債沈重，依據世銀二〇〇〇年統計，全球計有四十個重債貧窮國家 (H I P C s)，非洲即占了三十三國。撒哈拉沙漠以南非洲國家外債總額美金二千三百〇一億三千二百萬元，其中規模較大者如奈及利亞占三百〇三億一千五百萬美元，南非占二百四十七億一千一百萬美元，剛果民主共和國 (前薩伊) 占一百二十九億二千九百萬美元，象牙海岸占一百四十八億五千二百萬美元；規模較小者如塞內加爾占三十八億六千一百萬美元，馬拉威占二十四億四千四百萬美元，布吉納法索占十三億九千九百萬美元，查德占十億九千一百萬美元，甘比亞占四億七千七百萬美元。這些國家每年償付外債利息支出遠超過世銀所訂應低於總預算百分之十之標準，少許之經濟成長均被外債利息負擔抵消。在全球邁入二十一世紀之時，非洲各國變得比六〇年代獨立時更窮，平均每人 GDP 較十年前降低了百分之十二，平均所得

比十年前減少五分之一，目前仍有二億四千萬居民每日生活開支不及一美元。發自非洲國家以及世界各地人權機構、非政府組織，呼籲取消非洲外債之呼聲日益增高。西方債權國對此項主張之主要考量則為，勾銷舊債能否解除非洲國家經濟停滯之危機，蓋非洲國家貿易額佔全球貿易總額之比例仍小，進口約佔全球總額百分之二·三七，出口額約佔全球百分之二·四三；非洲五十三國貿易總額僅略與我國之貿易額相當，在貿易份量微不足道之情形下，如何促使經濟成長？惟鑒於沈重之外債已使大部分非洲國家經濟難以為繼，世銀及國際貨幣基金爰著手推動減債計畫，以二十二個債務最沈重國家（十八個為非洲國家）為目標，預訂在二〇〇一年結束前減債約三百四十億美元，取消彼等一半至三分之二債務，並呼籲各債權國採取相同步驟，減免非洲國家債務。

鑒於非洲各國外債金額均高達數十億至數百億美元，除美、日、德、法等富有國家外，沒有其他任何國家有能力單獨為非洲大多數單一國家解決債務問題。對非洲國家之援助必須針對各國主客觀條件，協助建立可永續經營之經濟發展模式（sustainable development）方為根本之計。

(四) 非洲國家必須面對來自彼此間以及其他開發中國家之挑戰：

隨著冷戰結束，非洲原即不被十分重視之戰略地位更加滑落。由於國際焦點轉向東歐，大筆西方資金亦隨之投入東歐地區，對非洲之援助則大部分流向南非，使其他非洲國家在接受資金援助上大受冷落。非洲新一代領袖，以南非總統 Tabo Mbeki 為首，有感於非洲在國際體系中之邊緣化，提出「非洲復興」(African Renaissance) 之構想，呼籲非洲國家之間加強團結合作共同對外，在國際間爭得較高地位。此一構想就非洲國家而言固屬知恥知病、發憤圖強之舉，惟非洲各國內部問題重重，仍亟待解決，進行跨國合作向其他開發中國家挑戰談何容易，此當係十年、二十年後之課題。目前非洲各國面臨的是彼此間相互競爭之局面，起步早、政局穩定、生產力高者纔能夠爭取到外來投資，落後者日後追趕必將十分吃力。當前非洲發展之最大障礙當屬中共，以一九九六年為例，工業化國家在南半球投資總額為一千二百九十億美元，其中新加坡獲九十四億美元、印尼八十億、馬來西亞五十億，撒哈拉以南非洲國家（不含南非）總共僅獲得五十億美元，其中奈及利亞獲十七億，佔去百分之四十七、安哥

拉獲二億九千萬、迦納獲二億六千萬，其他國家則均微不足道。而中共吸收之資金則高達四百二十億美元，嚴重壓縮其他開發中國家，尤其是非洲國家之生存空間。中共深知此一情勢不利其與非洲國家未來關係之維持，爰有「二〇〇〇年中非合作論壇」會議之召開，宣佈免除非洲最不發達國家一百億人民幣債務，及其他一系列援助、合作計畫。

(五) 加強對非投資及開放市場係我國當前及未來與非洲國家關係發展之重點：

非洲國家在經歷長期經濟衰退之痛後，向西方世界喊出「以投資取代援助」，作為長期開發策略。因此，增加對非投資、加強雙邊貿易纔是最受歡迎的有效援助方式。過去在非洲投資均遭遇政局不穩、官員貪污索賄、智慧財產權缺乏保障以及公共設施品質低劣等障礙，近年來，情形雖與理想相距仍遠，卻無可否認已有相當程度之改善。世銀非洲地區副總裁 Callisto Madavo 指出，非洲地區平均投資報酬率約為百分之二十五至三十，高出世界平均之投資報酬率百分之十六至十八甚多。多年的孤立，使基礎建設之經營在非洲仍有極大發展空間，電訊、營建、煉油、採礦、食品加工、工

具機製造等項均有極佳之發展前景。此外，對非洲開放市場，儘量減少關稅及其他貿易障礙亦屬重要。歐洲聯盟與非洲、加勒比海、大洋洲國家訂有「洛梅公約」，該等國家銷往歐洲之產品均享有關稅與配額等優惠待遇，對改善經濟助益甚大，甚值有意對非洲國家伸出援手之國家參考。

一九九七年我國與非洲貿易額為 39.98 億美元，僅佔我國貿易總額 2364.9 億元之 1.69%，比重甚低，集中度亦高。對非出口總額 15.28 億美元中，出口至南非即佔 7.6 億，佔了將近五成，出口埃及 2.25 億，又佔了另外的 14.7%，其他主要出口市場有奈及利亞、模里西斯、賴比瑞亞及摩洛哥等，此等國家即佔我對非出口總額 80% 以上。進口集中度則更為明顯，一九九七年自非洲進口 24.7 億美元，其中自南非進口 10.2 億，佔 41.3%，自奈及利亞進口 5.27 億，自剛果進口 3.99 億，三國合計就佔了我自非洲進口總額的 78.8%。其他重要進口來源國還有安哥拉、尚比亞、埃及及喀麥隆等，這幾國合計就佔我國自非洲進口總額的九成以上。我應儘速發現我與非洲各國經濟互補位置之所在，在比較利益原則下，鼓勵對該等國家投資，優先對彼等開放市場，並力求與非洲各部份關係之均衡發展，方為我與非洲國家關係發展可

長可久之道。

六、結論

非洲大部分國家目前在政治、經濟以及社會等各方面仍面臨許多問題，並非短時期內能夠克服與解決，但經歷九〇年代民主化洗禮後，大多國家均已能透過選舉方式達成政權和平轉移。雖然民主之實質仍距合格之標準甚遠，諸多違反人權之事實仍存在，但與過去比較，情形已有許多改善，國會多已能發揮較大之影響力，反對黨之角色份量亦均已普遍加重，能對執政黨及其政策產生相當程度之監督與制衡。值得注意的是在民主化過程中，「公民社會」(Civil Society)發揮了可觀之影響力，尤其是工會組織(Trade Unions)扮演了舉足輕重之角色，主要政黨多以工會組織為基礎，其領導人，例如尚

比亞總統 Frederick Chiluba、馬拉威總統 Bakili Muluzi、辛巴威主要反對黨 MDC (The Movement for Democratic Change) 領導人 Morgan Tsvangirai 等，亦多係工會領袖出身。未來非洲國家政權未必能依「責任政治」之常規，以選民利益為決策之優先考量，但在「民主化」口號下，維持「政黨競爭」之形式則係必需遵守之基本規範，多元化之政治參與乃係必然之發展趨勢。

非洲之發展與建設目前已遙遙落於世界其他地區之后，如何加速推動經濟發展儘速擺脫貧窮仍是非洲國家目前面臨之最大挑戰。「民主化」將使非洲國家政權在推動發展建設過程中必需更加重視民意反應，對外關係爰將以爭取援助、鞏固政權為最高考量。非洲國家之民主化，為我與彼等之合作提供了更多之機會與可能，卻也同時添增了無窮之變數與挑戰。未來我勢需對非洲友邦作更多之付出與協助，針對「全球化」下之新國際秩序，以創造「共同利益」為目標，建立「互利互惠」之合作關係。

**DEMOCRATIZATION IN ZIMBABWE:
THE RISE AND FALL OF ROBERT MUGABE**

Guang-Fu Fan

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**School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London**

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Abstract

When it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a comparatively well-developed economic base which had been established by the former Rhodesian regime under years of international sanction. Unfortunately, the over-manned and inefficient ZANU-PF government, under the leadership of President Robert Mugabe, had taken insensible policies which led to economic stagnation. The government initiated the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in an attempt to revive the economy. The oligarchic nature of the government and its rampant corruption made the SAP ineffective and deepened people's suffering. A newly launched opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, gained momentum at this juncture and formed a strong challenge to Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Mugabe and his Lieutenants use old skill to

intimidate people and rig the elections. Although survived, his credibility has been worn out.

Democratization in Zimbabwe: The Rise And Fall of Robert Mugabe

By GUANG-FU FAN

1. Introduction

Zimbabwe achieved its independence in 1980 after several decades of nationalist struggle against settler rule. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and its leader, Robert Mugabe, won an overwhelming victory, with 63% of the common roll vote, over Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union – Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF) and several other parties in the first parliamentary election in 1980 and have dominated the government since then. In the first post-independence election in July 1985, ZANU-PF won overwhelmingly again except in ZAPU’s Matabeleland stronghold. Although ZANU-PF went on to win the elections of 1990 and 1995, these victories were

characterized by fairly low turnout, repeated allegations on the part of the opposition and harsh criticism by international monitors of violence and intimidation. In the latest election in June 2000, ZANU-PF was for the first time heavily contested by the newly formed opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The latter won 57 of the 120 seats in the parliament even under an extremely violent and threatening campaign that was apparently carefully organized by ZANU. There is no controversy except as to the number of Zimbabweans who wish Robert Mugabe to leave office. In view of the growing problems, including a deteriorating economic situation and rampant corruption in Zimbabwe, the continued drop in support for Robert Mugabe seems unavoidable. This dissertation will seek to explain why this is the case and how this situation has developed. How has Robert Mugabe managed to lose political popularity so drastically? Has this been the result simply of miscalculation and misgovernment on his part, or has he been to some extent the victim of circumstances and dynamics beyond his control?

2. The First Decade After Independence

2.1 Dilemmas at Independence

Politics

Since the years of struggle against Rhodesia, ZANU-PF's leadership has been fractured by disagreement on the strategy of the struggle, caused by a large generation gap and differences in ideology. Robert Mugabe came to a position of prominence by gradually winning the approval of guerrilla fighters, who were suspicious of most prominent position holders; but he had to establish and maintain his position after 1976 with the help of alliances and in the face of leadership conflicts between 'generations'. In a sense, even after independence, he was simply the foremost member of a group – a figured head who was not necessarily in total command of a party that contained many elements. Therefore, his

status depended on the continued approval from a variety of political factions. Mugabe's situation was in marked contrast to the uncontested position and dominating practice that Joshua Nkomo had been able to assert in ZAPU-PF.¹ Mugabe has encountered challenges from influential people, such as Eddison Zvobgo and Hebert Ushwokunz. The challenge was against his authority rather than against any particular programme. For example, immediately after independence Edgar Tekere, then Minister of Manpower Development and Planning, opposed Mugabe's decision to invite Joshua Nkomo and some ZAPU members into the cabinet. It is this sense of crisis that lead Mugabe to offer government offices to members from various factions in exchange for their support and to maintain his leadership as well as his own status. In order to destroy ZAPU, he tried to woo senior members from ZAPU into the new ruling establishment. Mugabe also selected white commercial farmer tycoon Denis Norman and two other members of Ian Smith's and Abel Muzorewa's administrations to display his intention to keep a broad-fronted image.² The emergence of the Ndebele as a force within ZANU has contributed to a hierarchy dominated by power struggles between the

¹ Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*, Pinter Publishers 1989, p. 82

Zezeru, Karanga and Manyika sub-groups of the Shona language group that also provide distinct regional identities. Regional barons competed with each other to sustain their local base and to gain the spoils. Mugabe has cleverly manoeuvred different factions into his network and has therefore been able to maintain tension among them to his benefit.³ This shrewdness was to backfire later.

The cabinet consisted of a varied mixture of ZANU activists. At the leadership level, the party consisted of various generations of people with different political experiences. Some were regarded as radical, others as conservative. Few elements in the leadership had any coherent plans for a programme of social and economic change when they took power.⁴ This was to be a critical factor. Opinion was divided between ‘technocrats’ (headed by the Minister of Finance, Bernard Chidzero) and the Marxist-Leninist ‘ideologues’ (especially Mugabe). The ‘technocrats’ themselves, including the leadership in the central bank, were not always in agreement.⁵

As far as the state was concerned, as Jeffrey Herbst indicated, ZANU-

² Africa Confidential, Vol. 23 No. 11, 26 May 1982

³ Stoneman & Cliffe, 1989, pp. 80-86; Africa Confidential, Vol. 31 No. 25, 21 Dec. 1990

⁴ Stoneman & Cliffe, Zimbabwe, pp. 35-36

⁵ Carlyn Jenkins, “The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe” in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35,4 (1997), p. 590

PF took over a bruised but not defeated settler state, which contained powerful anachronistic elements that were either hostile or at least not sympathetic to the new leadership. For instance, of the 10,570 'established officers' in the civil service in 1980, only 3,368 were Africans, and none of these held positions above the senior administrative level. The new notional leaders constantly expressed concern that the civil service hierarchy might 'hijack' policy, and perhaps even become an 'invisible Cabinet'.⁶

Economy

When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, it inherited one of the most unbalanced distributions of wealth in the world. The three per cent of the population who were white earned about sixty per cent of total wages and salaries, representing about thirty six per cent of gross domestic income and commanding nearly two-thirds of national income, whilst the remaining ninety seven percent had at most the remaining third. In terms of ownership of wealth, whites had exclusive ownership of almost half the land (two-thirds of the best land), and owned nearly all of

⁶ Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, Univ. of California Press 1990, p. 30

the capital in industry and mining. On the other hand, the economy at independence displayed some strong features: foreign debt was low and the balance of payments was in surplus; the economy was not overly dependent on either agriculture or mining, with the manufacturing industry contributing over a quarter of GDP. This industry had benefited from forced growth under sanctions and had become well-diversified. It included black Africa's only integrated iron and steel plant and the nucleus of a capital-goods sector, thus making it the most substantial in black-ruled Africa. Consequently exports were fairly well balanced: about 40% each from mining and agriculture, manufactured goods, still effected by sanctions, at twenty per cent.⁷

Threats From South Africa

ZANU's overwhelming victory in 1980 destroyed South Africa's regional strategy. Economically strong, Zimbabwe is the keystone of apartheid policy in Southern Africa. The very policy of reconciliation was a serious threat to Pretoria because it permitted so many whites in Zimbabwe to continue to live in peace in Zimbabwe. The whites in

⁷ Stoneman & Cliff, *Zimbabwe*, 1989, p. 42

Zimbabwe were Pretoria's most useful weapon against Mugabe's government. The close links between the South African and Rhodesian militaries and security services meant that South Africa was able to recruit a significant number of agents and place them in high positions in Zimbabwe.⁸ Zimbabwean leaders were aware that South Africa was able to exert political and military influence in Zimbabwe as they had done in Mozambique and Angola.

2.2 Reconciliation and The Accusation of 'Neo-colonialism'

Just as a complete military victory in the liberation war would cost thousands of African lives and result in the large-scale destruction of the country's infrastructure and industry, too quick a transformation of the socio-economic structure and too radical a redistribution of wealth would disastrously effect the country's economy. When Zimbabwean leaders decided to accept the Lancaster House Constitution, they bore in mind that no drastic changes would occur after independence.

The Lancaster House constitution committed the Zimbabweans to a 'willing-seller, willing-buyer' basis and compensation of property-owners

⁸ Stoneman C. (ed.), *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, Macmillan, 1988, p. 32

in foreign exchange for any compulsory purchase of assets by the government. Quite simply, this meant that whites and foreign investors would continue owning a half or more of the economy – most of the productive land, nearly all the mines, and nearly all the manufacturing industry and businesses. Indeed, Zimbabwe has carried out just a minimum programme of social restructuring, limited to a very partial land redistribution from whites to blacks after independence. As resettlement for the majority began to be perceived as unlikely, disillusionment with independence grew and blacks began to squat on white land again. Many analyses simply dismissed the Marxist pretensions of the ruling party, categorizing the state in independent Zimbabwe as ‘neo-colonial’ and in the hands of a petty-bourgeois class. For example, Andre Astrow stated in 1983:

"After several years of independence, little meaningful change has actually taken place, while significant tensions have emerged between the Mugabe government and the African people. Today the state apparatus has remained virtually intact and the basic economic structure of the country unchanged. While the white settlers have seen most of their privileges preserved, African workers who have gone on strike, and landless African peasants squatting on ‘white’ land, have been repeatedly faced with

severe repression by the ZANU (PF) government.⁹ The ZANU (PF) leadership was not content merely to stick closely by the compromise made at Lancaster House. Mugabe and his aides went out of their way to gain the support of imperialist countries and establish conditions conducive to capitalist development. They praised British imperialism as a progressive force and encouraged Britain to play an even more active role in Zimbabwe.¹⁰ "

Even without the constitutional provision, it is unlikely that Zimbabwe would have seized foreign capital assets because such an action would have meant alienation from the West and, therefore, the loss of a good part of the aid that the country had received since independence: approximately \$2,700 million had been committed by aid donors, almost all of them Western countries, up to 1986. This aid, especially the commodity import programmes which provide vitally-needed foreign exchange for imported inputs, is an important element of the government's economic plans. Indeed, Zimbabwe used its scrupulous adherence to the Lancaster House Constitution as a tactic to gain more aid. Many Zimbabweans who had received advanced technical training abroad, such as Bernard Chidzero, undoubtedly stressed the importance

⁹ Andre Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution Lost Its Way?* Zed Press 1983, p. 1

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161

of good relations with the West.

2.3 What Did The Government Do?

Excessive Social Welfare

Astrow's verdict was not entirely accurate. After 1980, Zimbabwe embarked on a massive programme to increase social services, particularly health and education. An effective democratization of educational opportunity at all levels was achieved within two years of independence. Free primary schooling was introduced, and enrollment of all levels of schools increased dramatically. Teachers' salaries, which took about eighty per cent of the education budget, were paid centrally by government, even in private schools. The expansion required a huge increase in the number of teachers; thus between 1979 and 1985, the number of teachers tripled. This expansion was of course extremely costly. State capital expenditure averaged about Z\$18 million a year between 1980 and 1985, as compared to Z\$8.9 million in 1979/80.¹¹

A policy of free health care for all people (and their families) earning

¹¹ Stoneman C. & Cliffe L. Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, p.169

less than Z\$150 per month (at the time the minimum wage was set at Z\$70 per month) was initiated in September 1980. Provincial and district hospitals were upgraded, and by January 1987, 224 rural health centres had been completed. Programmes of immunization, disease control, improved nutrition and improved hygiene were implemented. The number of doctors and nurses in government service rose substantially. The cost of the changes was considerable and aggravated the growing budget deficit. Government health expenditure rose 27.5% in real terms in 1980/1 and a further 47% in 1981/2.¹²

Expansion of the Public Sector

Steps to Africanize the public service were taken. The Civil service was expanded to allow admission of more blacks and waited for the white civil servants to retire or resign. The number of civil servants was thus increased from 40,000 to 100,000 to allow blacks entry into the state apparatus.¹³ By mid-1981 the percentage of blacks among public service officers had reached 59% (more than double the percentage in early 1980); but not enough blacks had yet acquired the managerial,

¹² Ibid., pp. 173-4.

¹³ EIU, Country Profile 1999-2000

technical and artisan skills possessed by whites who left the country. Over 30,000 guerrillas were absorbed into a new Zimbabwean army which also included selected former members of the Rhodesian Security Forces. Both central and local governmental budgets and capital loan accounts, plus the public enterprise, were responsible for some 40% of total expenditures in the overall economy – proportionately larger than for most developed countries and perhaps twice the average for developing countries.

Since the new national leaders constantly worried that the civil service hierarchy might hijack policy, they advocated greater public ownership as a way to assert their control over economy. The most important initiative by the government was state participation in production, distribution and allied services. It created the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe to control multinational companies. Other parastatals were also created to enable the government to assert its influence and control over economy. These included the Zimbabwe Mining and Tourist Development Corporations, Zimbabwe Development Corporation, Cold Storage Commission, Agricultural Marketing Authority, Grain Marketing Board, Dairy Marketing Board, and Cotton

Marketing Board. The government also purchased private companies on an ad hoc basis, primarily to reduce South African influence in the economy and to keep failing industries from going bankrupt. Warnings concerning the dangers of parastatals were ignored by Zimbabwe's leaders, and parastatals were established with full vigour with the excuse that "the situation is different here". Almost immediately, the new public enterprises started to incur significant losses, and a large number of allegations began to circulate concerning incompetence and corruption.¹⁴

Growth of Patronage And ZANU-ising Of Key Institutions

Since independence, there has been notable inclination of patronage. Mugabe's powers of prime ministerial patronage were underlined when the number of ministers and deputy ministers swelled to fifty four in a parliament containing only eighty black MPs, while the Prime Minister's own office grew to embrace a deputy premier, four ministers of state (including defense and security) and two further deputy ministers. In the rural areas the 45 district administrators (replacing the old white

¹⁴ Herbst, J., "Political Impediments to Economic Rationality", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27, 1 (1989), pp. 76-77

district commissioners, all of whom have been eased out) were generally regarded, and in most cases (except in Matabeleland) welcomed, as agents of ZANU-PF. The new local government promotion officers were all ex-guerrillas. Local government transport was often used for party functions, while district administrators were expected to help organize fund-raising for the ZANU-PF party headquarters to be built in Harare. The radio, TV and press were increasingly ZANU(PF)-oriented for the appointments of nearly all the new heads of departments.¹⁵ The power of ZANU-PF patronage was widely felt. Some senior party figures advocated that trading licences should not be granted to members of opposition parties. Most companies donated towards the party headquarters' building fund.

2.4 The Motives And Effectiveness

Trap of Socialism

The new government created a Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) to consider new foreign-investment proposals before 1989. The FIC was composed of all the ministries dealing with economic affairs. It was

¹⁵ Africa Confidential, Vol. 23 No. 11, 26 May 1982

not clear what the Foreign Investment Committee took into account when reviewing the proposals, but it appears that the government required the investment to become a net foreign-exchange earner within one year. In addition, the FIC and the government generally considered the proposals' potential to increase jobs, transfer technology, open new markets for exports and promote industrial development in the rural areas. Owing to the government's information demands, the number of committees and people involved and sheer inefficiency, it took six months to a year, and occasionally as long as two years, for a definite decision to be made on an investment proposal.¹⁶ The Foreign Investment Committee's approach towards new investment was perceived as highly obstructive by those in the private sector. Its vague procedures, exceedingly long period of consideration, and seemingly negative attitude towards potential new investment deterred potential foreign investors from coming to Zimbabwe. However, the government, even after several years of experience with the FIC, refused to change the Committee's basic operating procedures.

In addition, given the country's foreign-exchange problems and its history of suspending remittances, the signing of 'Investment Guarantee

¹⁶ Herbst J., *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, University of California Press, 1990, p. 124

Agreement' became very relevant for new investors. Many potential Western investors insisted on such an agreement being in place before they considered investing. However, Zimbabwe consistently refused to sign such agreements, despite lobbying by foreign companies and the United States and other countries. It was argued that such agreements were not necessary because Zimbabwe's constitution protected private investment, and Zimbabwe's leaders regarded it as an infringement on their sovereignty. Officials in the government suggested that avowedly socialist Zimbabwe did not want to appear to be signing an apparently capitalist document. In view of the lack of foreign investment, many officials would have liked Zimbabwe to reconsider such a stance, but it was still frequently reiterated by more radical members of the Cabinet. The government's highly publicized refusal made these agreements a benchmark of Zimbabwe's refusal to collaborate with international capital.¹⁷

Exploring why the government has been unwilling and unable to reduce the barriers to new foreign investment is useful in understanding the political impediment to economic rationality in Zimbabwe's policies.

¹⁷ Herbst, 1990, p. 131

In his studies on the political economy of underdevelopment in Ghana, Richard Jeffries indicates that many post-colonial African governments which adopted a neo-Marxist perspective, deemed international capitalism as ‘Imperialism’, and attributed to it the ruin of their economy and the catastrophic fall in living standards of the mass of their people.¹⁸

The Zimbabwean government, to some extent, has been misled by the same false conclusion. ZANU-PF had designated itself as a ‘Marxist-Leninist’ party. Since independence the more radical faction of the government lost out in many policy battles: the Constitution made many concessions to whites; land was not seized, and existing companies have not been nationalized. Multinational corporations were a vivid emblem of the continuing capitalist nature of the White-dominated economy because they had the potential to develop an alternative political power base, which was very threatening to a regime unsure of its own power. Therefore, the government’s highest priority, particularly in its rhetoric, was to curtail the scope of existing foreign investment and implement measures to increase the level of state involvement in the economy. However, the government was faced with severe constraints, as

¹⁸ Richard Jeffries , “Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana”, *African Affairs*, July 1982, pp.307-317.

previously illustrated, in pursuing this goal. Hindering new foreign investment, therefore, was a way of placating the radical segment of the Cabinet with an important symbolic gesture, because the left-wing ministers were particularly concerned about Zimbabwe's relations with multinational capital. Several officials, and to some extent Robert Mugabe himself, lashed out against those who wanted more foreign investment, saying that greater multinational participation would further decrease Zimbabwe's control over its own resources. For instance, Mugabe once said in parliament:

"I do not know whether our honourable members and other party stalwarts in ZAPU who constantly cry for foreign investment have ever stopped to think about the state of ownership at present. Who owns what in this country? More investment capital means more ownership of our resources.¹⁹"

In fact, as Jeffries illustrates, it is very misleading to attribute economic underdevelopment or the associated phenomena of escalating governmental corruption and monopolistic profiteering to the interests of international capitalism. Furthermore, opposition to foreign capital investment or to participation in the world market does not help to solve

¹⁹ Herbst, 1990, p. 127.

the problem at all. Jeffries argues thus, if a new government is to begin the process of resuscitating the economy and improving the welfare of her people on a long-term basis, it will have to take measures which ‘go directly against the grain of radical neo-Marxist thinking’, such as normalizing the distorted value of the currency, working towards a general liberalization of the economy and dismantling most of the public sector. Jeffries raised Ivory Coast as an example: the post-colonial government of Ivory Coast welcomed foreign investment in manufacturing; consequently, it has been developing her GNP per capita, including both agriculture and manufacturing, at a significant rate by any criteria. It, of course, is not saying that if Zimbabwe welcomed foreign investment as Ivory Coast did, it would definitely have successfully developed a prosperous economy. In addition to a correct policy, efficient management and coordination with existing industries are also extremely important. But the failure of a neo-Marxist perspective in realizing the relations between inward capital flows and resulting outward flow of interest and profit, has led to the serious underestimation of potential ‘complementarity’ between foreign capital investment and local economic development. The fact is that many African countries are

seriously underdeveloped not because they have been invaded by foreign capital but on the contrary, because they have been starved of such capital.²⁰ There has been no case which shows that successful development can be achieved without the supplement of foreign capital.

Robert Mugabe and many members of the leadership are not necessarily unaware of these realities, and their approach in dealing with economic difficulties has often been flexible. However, their major concern seemed to be elsewhere. Perhaps maintaining power and avoiding any powerful challenge to their leadership has been more important to them than economic development. The government has used its harsh policies against new investment to prove its socialist credentials and to demonstrate that some of the rhetoric from the liberation struggle has carried over into actual policy. By venting so much rhetorical hostility on potential new investors, the socialist government has been able to live with the current level of foreign penetration and placate the more radical members of the Cabinet.²¹ As a result, high wages, low prices, protection for lazy workers, low profits and high taxation offered new investors a near certainty that they won't

²⁰ Jeffries, 1982, p. 310

²¹ Ibid, p. 137

make money. Investors were bluntly told that they should not expect to get rich, and the legislation told them that the government had every intention of interfering with everything they did. Given a system which produced 100,000 secondary school leavers, and providing only 10,000-20,000 new jobs per-year, such an attitude towards investment is undoubtedly equal to committing suicide.²²

Economic Rationality Was Impeded by Political Rationality

Prior to majority rule, Rhodesian whites were leading a Western lifestyle through a system termed by Herbst 'Socialism-for-Whites' which exploited the 95% of the population which was black.²³ It is unrealistic in an absolute sense that the new government should attempt to extend to the whole population an immediate ambitious social welfare. In particular, the government was very reluctant to promote economic growth – best exemplified in the area of foreign investment. This does not suggest that in order to pursue economic development, the welfare of the black majority could be ignored, but emphasizes that the result of doing something beyond government's financial capacity could be disastrous. There have been many examples where the welfare of the

²² Stoneman & Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, p.172

²³ Herbst, 1990, pp. 228

people has been enhanced by gradual steps without stressing the finance too much, such as post-colonial Ivory Coast during 1970s. But why did the Zimbabwean new regime try to implement a rapid welfare policy? If it really cared about the genuine improvement of people's standard of living in the long term, it should have taken a more economically responsible approach. Robert Bates' 'rational choice' theory is helpful in understanding the government's calculations. Bates argues that African states tax agricultural producers through low prices in order to shift resources from the agrarian sector to industry, to increase government revenue and to mollify urban consumers who demand low food prices.²⁴ Although low food prices can be disastrous in the long term, they help to meet the public sector's perceived development needs, its revenue imperative and the government's desire to control the politically-active urban population. In addition, governments try to increase food supplies not by raising prices but by costly and inefficient state-run agricultural projects and subsidies for farm inputs because these approaches create patronage, profit opportunities for government supporters and generate rents which politicians and officials can

²⁴ Bates, R.H., *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, Univ. of California Press, 1981, p. 4

appropriate for themselves or use as patronage.²⁵ Therefore these policies are rational for those in power, even though they appear to be irrational from the point of view of the people's collective welfare.

Although Bates model fails to account for the Zimbabwean government's eagerness to reach self-sufficient food supplies to avoid dependence on South Africa, it helps us to understand the motive for the less sensible policies adopted by the government. As Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg indicated in 1982, authoritarianism in Africa has facilitated neither legal-rational bureaucratic consolidation nor modern capitalism, but has given rise to patrimonial prebendal or personalistic forms of rule that undermine the rational policies and predictability needed for long-term development.²⁶ Certain groups and individuals within agriculture, business, and among workers have been singled out for special treatment on the calculation that they have been useful in building a coalition of political support for the country's rulers. As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, to guarantee control of the state, it was necessary to secure rural votes. Demographic facts meant that rural voters were of great importance, not least since black urbanization rates were low. At

²⁵ Leys, S., *The Rise & Fall Of Development Theory*, Indiana Univ. Press, 1996, pp. 88-89.

²⁶ Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Univ. of California

independence, an estimated 25% of the total population (only 16.8% of black people) was living in urban areas. This ratio increased to 28% by 1990. Even dependency ratios were higher in the rural areas, maintaining their support is vital for any government. The war was fought in the countryside, which is where Mugabe concentrated on building his support-base.²⁷

New elite was not committed to reform

Lavish social welfare became essential particularly as senior officials and party members were leading a luxurious life-style. The national monthly minimum wage of Z\$65 compared with a cabinet minister's annual salary of Z\$80,000 was indeed too humble and needed to be supplemented by intensive social services.²⁸

Most senior officials sent their children to private schools. Nearly all lived in the plush of the former white suburbs. Professional elite, produced by the comparatively large private sector in Zimbabwe, also tended to move into former white suburbs and adopted the lifestyles that

Press, 1982, p. 38

²⁷ Carolyn Jenkins, "The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 35, no.4, 1997, p. 580

²⁸ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 23 No. 11, 26 May 1982

characterized these enclaves. Public-sector salaries, although high, were insufficient to enable top civil servants to keep up with the conspicuous consumption of their professional black neighbours. The result was an early rush of cases of fraud and corruption, which surfaced in the mid-1980s. Leaders appeared to be unconstrained by any principles in their conduct; political office was extensively used for private benefit, and public administration became a system of patronage. Frequently, resources intended for the poor were appropriated for personal gain. For example, at least half the ministers and deputy-ministers were in breach of the leadership code which was promulgated by the government in 1984 to restrain corruption by placing a limit on the acquisition of wealth by political leaders. Several ministers close to Mugabe were granted leases to state farms, some of which had been intended for resettlement.²⁹ Mugabe usually allowed the due process of law, but frequently granted an official pardon to those convicted. For example, one minister of state, who had been found guilty of perjury, subornation and selling a motor vehicle at above the controlled price (the so called “Willowgate” scandal), was fined Z\$150,000 (US\$68,000) and sentenced to nine months in jail

²⁹ Africa Confidential, Vol. 26 No. 7, 27 March 1985

but President Mugabe granted official pardon to him almost immediately, ostensibly because of his public contrition.³⁰ No wonder Herbst commented:

"The Mugabe government's approach to serving its supporters is not very different from that of previous regimes; the major difference is in the size and the nature of the new government's constituency. Therein lies the problem not only for the transition to 'socialism' but for the government's entire macroeconomic strategy."³¹

It is arguably true that the acquisition of assets by the political elite reduced sharply the incentive for direct or fiscal redistribution, and contributed to the development strategy that explicitly encourages private wealth accumulation. Such development has generated resentment among those who have not yet benefited economically from the transition to majority rule, although the government is not unpopular enough to encourage a large swing in support of the new anti-corruption party.

The economically irresponsible extension of agricultural services, health, education, pricing policies for communal farmers, and the provision of food aid even in non-drought years, if disadvantageous to the collective welfare in the long term is at least helpful in pleasing the rural

³⁰ EIU, 1898 No. 2, p. 10; No. 4, p.8

³¹ Herbst, 1990, p.227.

voters. This strategy contributed to future economic problems by generating large deficits, which needed to be financed, with both inflationary and crowding-out effects and with external debt implications.³²

³² Jenkins, 1997, p. 575.

3 A New Decade of No Change

3.1 A Critical Juncture: The Adoption of The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

The Need to Adopt the ESAP

When Zimbabwe adopted Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990, the country was not in a crisis. Growth was positive, and the external debt service ratio had fallen to around 23% from the 34 – 40% range in the middle of the 1980s. The economy was far from being in dire straits.³³ There has been very strong criticism from different sources on the decision of the imposition of ESAP in Zimbabwe. Bernard Chidzero, Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development was identified as the one who collaborated with the World Bank and who pushed for the programme, and President Mugabe was thought to have been marginalized because the Bank could not tolerate that Zimbabwe had made progress by using the very policies the Bank wanted to abolish.³⁴ In fact such an observation failed to locate

³³ Jenkins, 1997, p. 597

³⁴ Susan George & Fabrizio Sabelli, *Faith and Credit*, 1994, pp. 65-66

the root of the problem and was very misleading. Indeed, as previously noted, Zimbabwe's government has often been described as one divided between 'technocrats' in charge of the economic ministries, and Marxist-Leninist 'ideologues'. In fact, support for Marxist-Leninist ideology has always been rather shallow among Zimbabwe's new political elite, and for the purpose of understanding the politics of structural adjustment it is not helpful to put the technocrats on one side and the supposed ideologues on the other. The debate between import-substitution and an open economy divides the 'technocrats' among themselves, since it involves complex pragmatic considerations as to prospects on the world market, competitiveness of local industry against potential imports, availability of investment finance, and a host of things. In 1987-88, a large number of technocrats sided with the 'ideologues' in calling for continued and increased 'self-reliance'. For those who accused the World Bank of pressing Zimbabwe to adopt ESAP, it is perhaps necessary to have a look at Zimbabwe's severe economic problems when this decision was made.

Economic Stagnation

Ten years after independence Zimbabwe was faced with serious economic problems: a desperate foreign exchange shortage, high unemployment and low investment. Ministers, including Mugabe, like to blame the cost of the war in Mozambique, and hence South Africa. Chidzero more accurately sees the main reasons as high inflation and debt, with low commodity prices and falling aid and fresh loan.³⁵ High unemployment was an effect of low investment. Beside elements such as: lazy workers, extensive government interfering, high wages and high tax, corruption etc, it is arguably true that low investment was caused mainly by high inflation, high interest rates and shortage of foreign exchange. They were outcomes of high budget deficit resulted from unconstrained expenditures. Since independence, public spending rose from about 40% to 50% of GDP within ten years. High defence, health, education and social welfare policies contributed to excessive increases in government spending. For example, after 1980 the addition of communal farmers to the marketing arrangement added enormously to costs of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). By the early 1990s the deficit of the GMB alone amounted to 5% of GDP, and in total,

³⁵ Africa Confidential, Vol. 28 No. 17, 13 March 1987

government spending on subsidies has been larger than the wage bill for most years since the mid-1980s. The financing of budget deficits, which averaged 10% of GDP during the 1980s, contributed to macro-economic difficulties. Financing the equivalent of 10% of GDP each year not only had damaging effects on investment and consumption, the debt-servicing problem also increased cumulatively.³⁶ The reluctance of foreign investors to inject capital into the economy meant that aid had to be sought to provide foreign exchange for external debt services. The Zimbabwe government borrowed large sums at commercial rates on foreign markets in expectation of receipts of aid. The foreign debt mushroomed rapidly.³⁷ In domestic finance, the government was consuming 37.6% of the already extremely limited pool of national savings. As a result, the government crowded out other potential investors, companies were unable to expand and thereby offer employment to the ever-larger number of school leavers. In 1984, investments in fixed assets and the manufacturing sector were only 38.6 and 50%, respectively, of what they had been ten years previously. Almost all the decline in gross capital formation was borne by investment

³⁶ Jenkins, 1997, p. 593

³⁷ Ibid., p. 597

in equipment, plant and machinery, which were deemed most essential for increases in employment. The number of unemployment was around one million, nearly as many as with jobs in the commercial and industrial sector. Some 100,000 youngsters joined the job market every year, while even in the best of years, only 25,000 – 35,000 new jobs were created. The prospect of so many educated youths with great expectations entering what was already a highly unequal society, and having such few chances of employment, was clearly a frightening future. Indeed, Chidzero argued that the prospect of so many unemployment school-leavers, ‘with the intellectual equipment but without jobs and unable to find a role to play in the economy, strikes at the very heart of society’.³⁸ There were many educated Zimbabweans who were jobless and angry. Thus students at the University of Zimbabwe and Harare Polytechnic, who were in the forefront of the struggle against corruption, expressed the views of an important section of society. While making the connection between the fiscal deficit and the limited opportunities for employment, Chidzero warned in 1987 that ‘This level of public borrowing is unsustainable, it is ruinous’.³⁹

³⁸ Herbst, 1989, pp. 70

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 72-73

In brief, key problems have been (a) a persistently high budget deficit, averaging 10% of GDP; (b) the channelling of a large share of savings – around 20 % of GDP – into government debt; (c) strict foreign exchange rationing which reduced private investment to levels below those needed for replacement; and (d) consequence of new employment opportunity in the commercial and industrial sector. Unless effective measures were taken to reduce the budget deficit it seemed unlikely that Zimbabwe would be able to initiate a genuine programme of structural change in the economy.

Indeed, when ESAP was initiated, the situation in Zimbabwe was not as bad as many African countries which collapsed, but it was at least in a condition unlikely to be maintained for long if significant improvements were not made. In particular, following the end of the Cold War, a new international environment was lying ahead. International donors would be more difficult to persuade by using unchanged contexts. As Donal B. Cruise O'Brien indicates, 'it is a costly political style to sustain the state by a process of coalition building'. Kenneth Kaunda's downfall in 1991 came when he was faced with the bill but had run out of all possible

means of corruption.⁴⁰ In order to avoid the same fate as Kaunda, something needed to be done.

Simply, capital needed elsewhere for investment was extracted to finance the wage bill for large numbers of highly-paid but essentially parasitic, bureaucratic and party or military personnel, 'such functionaries derive additional revenue, in many cases probably the bulk of it, from various forms of corruption and embezzlement'.⁴¹ No capital was available for investment; therefore, not enough jobs were created. That was the main reason for Zimbabwe's deteriorating economy. If the economy was to be activated, fiscal deficit must be reduced. To reduce the deficit, the axe will have to fall on health, education and most importantly, defence, to sack many superfluous staff in the civil service and parastatals, and slim down the army.

After all, the five-year trade liberalization package prepared by the government in conjunction with the World Bank, was launched from October 1990. The focus of the programme, in addition to an intensive export drive, was a drastic cut in central government spending through major reductions in subsidies to parastatals from Z\$650 mm (US\$202

⁴⁰ Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "Does Democracy Need an Opposition Party?", (mimeo)

⁴¹ Jeffries, 1982, pp. 314-5

mm) in 1990/1 to Z\$40 mm (US\$1.3 mm) in 1994/5, a proposed early reduction in the civil services by 25% before eventually halving its size, 30% of imports were on open general import license (OGIL), import tariffs were rationalized in the range of 10 to 30%, the budget for education was cut from ten to 8.7% of GDP, and food subsidies were removed. The result should have been a reduction in the budget deficit from 10 to 5% of GDP. Other controls were to be removed from interest rates, investment approval, prices and labour.⁴²

3.2 Suffering without progress – a half-implemented SAP

As had been foreseen, ESAP bit heavily on the urban labour and rural peasants. Since October 1990, the Zimbabwean dollar had depreciated 23% within one year. Zimbabwe's per head income had been reduced from more than \$600 one month to about \$350, moving the country from the middle income to the lower income category.⁴³ The deregulation of price controls, and the abolition of subsidies had a strong impact on both urban and rural areas. Cooking oil, margarine, sugar, bread, maize meal, electricity, water and transport prices had more than tripled. In

⁴² EIU Country Report No. 2 1991, p. 12; No. 3, p. 12

⁴³ EIU Country Report No. 1 1992, p. 14

November 1991 it was announced that from January 1992, urban primary schools would no longer be free. A fee of \$12 per year would be introduced for parents who on average earn less than \$80 a month. In rural schools primary education remained free and secondary school fees were kept \$30 a year, while those in urban centers were increased by 150%. With urban families having to pay school fees as well as paying for school uniforms and school supplies, an estimated 500,000 children of 2.3m at primary school level were expected to drop out.⁴⁴ The health budget was cut. A 1993 UNICEF study noted that the quality of Zimbabwe's health services had fallen by 30% from before 1990.⁴⁵ According to a poverty assessment survey by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare in 1995, about 62% of all Zimbabweans were living in households with income per person below a level sufficient to provide basic needs, with about 46% living below the food poverty line, that is they were not able to meet basic nutritional requirements. Poverty was lowest in urban provinces, affecting 55% of households in Bulawayo and 56% in Harare, while Manicaland was the

⁴⁴ African Contemporary Record Vol. XXIII 1990-92, b738

⁴⁵ Mlambo, A.S., The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme - The Case of Zimbabwe, 1990-1995, Univ. of Zimbabwe Publications, pp. 83-87

worst hit province with 75% of households falling in this category.⁴⁶

There had been strong accusations blaming the structural adjustment for pushing the poor into severe hardship. Susan George stated:

"Everyone affiliated with a non-government organization in contact with poorer people or concerned about the environment in adjusting countries says that adjustment is an unmitigated social and ecological disaster. Popular movements in both North and South have been campaigning for years to force the Bank and the IMF to change policies that 'undermine the well being of families, food producers, workers and the natural environment, as well as the viability of fragile democracies'."⁴⁷

Criticism of the SAP by its opponents in the university and trade unions and dissatisfaction among its supporters had increased. The three opposition MPs had called for a referendum to renew or remove ZANU-PF's mandate, on the grounds that it was pursuing policies opposite to those on which it was elected.⁴⁸ Chidzero defended the SAP as 'a cure for economic ills and not a disease'.⁴⁹ Indeed, the country's sick economy resulted from the government's irresponsible policies and poor management that made people suffer. Structural adjustment is strong

⁴⁶ EIU., No. 3, 1996, p. 10

⁴⁷ George & Sabelli, 1994, p. 59

⁴⁸ EIU, No. 2, 1992, p. 10

⁴⁹ Ibid., No. 1, 1992, p. 15

medicine, and side effects are inevitable with strong medicines. To attribute the austerity to SAP is putting the cart in front of the horse. The most important question is whether the illness has been cured. If the answer is negative, then it is necessary to find out the reasons. It must be noted that a severe drought happened in 1992, agricultural output was less than normal years by half. The drought was combined with some mistakes by the government in reforming the Grain Marketing Board. Thus, the country had to import huge amount of food in 1992 and 1993. This had added extra difficulties to the implementation of SAP. However, it is by no means right to say the drought is responsible for all the failure. For many observers, although the drought's contribution to the derailment of the reform programme cannot be ignored, it is the government's unexplained delays in implementing certain reforms, such as reducing the civil service, introducing new export and investment incentives and opening up the economy to more imports that were the main factors.⁵⁰

Superficial Reform in the Civil Service

⁵⁰ EIU., 2nd 1993, p. 12

As pointed out previously, the fundamental problem in Zimbabwe is high spending on social welfares, over-manned civil services, parastatals and army. The government has removed price control, food subsidies, cancelled free health care and free education. But the main targets, reductions in the size of the civil service, and the commercialization of parastatals have not been met. There has been a report that since the programme started in 1991 the number of civil servants has risen a further 10,000 to 191,479.⁵¹ The government set a target of 25,000 cuts in the civil service by the end of 1995, but only 11,000 cuts had been made, less than half of the target. In July 1992, the number of ministers fell from 26 to 18. Several ministries were abolished. The cuts, however, solved little. The opposition parties and the independent press alleged that ministries still existed solely to provide employment for senior politicians whom President Mugabe could not afford to sack.⁵² In 1996, following the death of Finance Minister, Ariston Chambati, the cabinet was reshuffled again. The government was once again enlarged, boasting a total of 49 members, including 27 ministers.⁵³ Obviously, Mugabe continued to dominate the political scene in Zimbabwe through

⁵¹ EIU., 4th 1992, p. 14

⁵² EIU., 4th 1992,p. 8

patronage.

In 1997, the salaries of the President, vice-President, cabinet ministers and MPs were raised significantly.⁵⁴ After a large strike by a wide range of civil servants, a 20% increase was eventually rewarded.⁵⁵ On the other hand, the government put a stop on ministerial spending. It was reported that police telephones were cut off in March 1996, and many government vehicles were grounded for lack of fuel.⁵⁶ But most of these savings only tackled the surface of the problems. Even many civil servants were made redundant, solving only 10% of the problem. For example, half of the 6,000 civil service which the government claimed to have cut in 1995 are cleaning staff, security guards and cooks, rather than underemployed officials. The salary of most of those made redundant was only one-fifth that of officials, therefore, savings were minimal. Hardship had been concentrated on the poor and the removal of necessary services had caused lots of inconvenience, thus raising extra costs.⁵⁷ When the civil servants strike happened in September 1996, the government arrested and then released strike leaders, fired and then

⁵³ Ibid. 3rd 1996, p. 7

⁵⁴ Ibid. 1st 1996, p. 10

⁵⁵ Ibid. 4th 1994, p. 10

⁵⁶ Ibid. 3rd 1996, p. 12

⁵⁷ Ibid, 3rd 1996, p. 12

rehired strikers, and finally yielded to wage demands. Within one month, there was a sale of “surplus” Mercedes cars to senior civil servants at a fraction of their true value, following the purchase of 48 top-of-the-range new Mercedes Benz cars for the use of visiting dignitaries.⁵⁸

Ever-growing Defence Expenditure

In 1992, the government promoted 9.5% rise in the defence allocation in the budget. Although salaries increased at below the rate of inflation, it was granted at a time when the urban labourers and rural peasants were suffering from the contracting policies. The overblown defence budget was a major cause of the total budget deficit, and defence spending ran at almost double the level recommended by the United Nations and International Monetary Fund, which suggested a ceiling of 2.5% of GDP.⁵⁹ The World Bank’s World Development Report 1992 disclosed that Zimbabwe had the third highest defence budget in Africa, after South Africa and Libya, accounting for 16.5% of the budget in 1990. The armed forces numbered 54, 600 in 1991, over three times the African

⁵⁸ Ibid. 1st 1997, p. 10

⁵⁹ Africa Confidential, Vol. 35 No. 16, 12 August 1994

average per head of population.⁶⁰ Mugabe announced in August 1994 that some 3,000 officers would be retired but he declined to give a time scale. In fact, the size of army didn't shrink, it expanded further. The military and intelligence top brass were too closely integrated into ZANU-PF's structure and were privy to decision making at the highest level. In addition, they enjoyed large salary packages and business privileges into business through state-owned companies. Senior officers pocketed much of the earnings from international operations.⁶¹ Two French Cougar helicopters were delivered in October 1994 for Mugabe's electioneering purposes. They were only part of a major contract with France which will include six helicopters, armoured vehicles and as many as 400 troop transporters, totaling US\$1,1bn over several years.⁶² This spending made the commitments to cut defence expenditure below 12% of the budget impossible. The reason given by the Zimbabwe National Army for these huge purchases was that it urgently needed the equipment when it participated in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN, which it claimed were highly lucrative. Jackson and Rosberg's observation of 1982 about relationship between rulers and the military of

⁶⁰ EIU., 4th 1992, p.10

⁶¹ Africa Confidential, Vol. 35 No. 16, 12 August 1994

African countries has been verified by Zimbabwe's case. They noted that:

Personal rulers do not escape from an inherent characteristic of personal rule – that is, its vulnerability to, or dependency on, the wills, wiles, and abilities of others. This characteristic is nowhere more evident than in relations of the ruler to the military. Africa's rulers require the cooperation of the military to remain in power.⁶³

Reluctance to Give up Parastatals

Most of the parastatals have increased tariffs and prices in an attempt to raise revenue, but have done little to increase efficiency or reduce operating costs.⁶⁴ But Zimbabwe's nine parastatals incurred losses of Z\$1.5bn in 1994, up from Z\$336m the year before. About Z\$1bn of this total was incurred by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and related to food imports and production incentives in the aftermath of the drought.⁶⁵

Even after some market-oriented reforms, the GMB had to work with state-regulated prices, buy grain from small, isolated farms and act as the sole authorized importer and exporter of grain. It was also paid by the

⁶² EIU., 1st 1995, p. 10

⁶³ Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Univ. of California Press 1982, p. 26

⁶⁴ EIU., 1st 1994, p. 14

state for holding a strategic stock of 936,000 tones of grain which was supposed to even out the supplies between bad and good harvests. Because of this 'social role', the GMB was not to be restructured, like other state companies, into a free-standing enterprise but remained a parastatal under ministerial control. Market-oriented efficiency and social objectives did not always meet. For instance, the Board decided to cut cost by closing some loss-making depots, but after touring rural areas, Mugabe reopened the depots, insisting that they had not been built with GMB money.⁶⁶ Such a case reflected the problems created by the clash between efficiency concerns and political considerations.

Within Zimbabwe there was widespread agreement that the deficit could only be lowered by tackling the loss-making parastatals because other expenditures such as defence, debt services, education or health were less flexible to change. In 1989, Air Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation, the Railway, and the Conference Centre had to be subsidized by as much as \$632 million, equivalent to approximately 14% of the national budget, or 50% of the current deficit. In addition to direct subsidies, the government had guaranteed \$2, 000 million of their

⁶⁵ EIU., 4th 1994, p. 12

⁶⁶ Africa Confidential, 37, 6, March 1996

total debts, equivalent to 16% of the GDP.⁶⁷ The government established the Commission of Inquiry into Parastatals in 1986 to investigate Air Zimbabwe, the National Railways, and the Iron and Steel Corporation. According to the commission's report: the inability of these three enterprises to conduct their business operations efficiently stemmed mainly from sheer incompetence. Several of the most important parastatals had suffered not only from a general lack of efficiency in conducting their operations, but also from a sense of passiveness to pursuing profit, because they knew that the government would fund their deficit. Massive mismanagement and corruption in parastatals had been exposed, but the network of political and tribal allegiances ensured that, whatever other recommendations were accepted, the responsible personnel were rarely sacked, let alone prosecuted. After more and more ministers had been appointed into the boards of parastatals, political imperatives made overall economic performance of parastatals unlikely to improve.⁶⁸ As in many African countries, the patronage function of parastatals in Zimbabwe had made the reform totally ineffective. Privatization was not even an option, simply because

⁶⁷ Herbst, 1989, p.73

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 80

political leaders were not willing to give up this tool of buying and controlling supporters.

3.3. The Corruption and Government Excesses Undermined the SAP

In fact the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme was not an easy task, especially the enhancement of administrative efficiency. As Jeffries indicates: it is a lengthy and arduous business simply to construct an accurate list of those on the government payroll and to reduce overmanning, let alone to deal with the opposition and obstruction from vested interests. It had been compared to 'wading in porridge'.⁶⁹ Desperately needed is a relatively non-corrupt, economically responsible and effectively reforming regime. With commitment, even the improvement is limited, it will be understood. Jerry Rawlings' victory in the Ghanaian election of 1992 was such a case. Although 'the Economic Recovery Programme had admittedly produced only marginal improvements in real incomes for the mass of the urban population, there was nevertheless considerable optimism that the sacrifices and hard work

⁶⁹ Jeffries, "The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Government in Africa", *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1993), p. 27

of recent years would soon be rewarded'.⁷⁰ So Ghanaian people gave him their mandate.

There is no reason to think that Zimbabwean people will not be as sensible as Ghanaian if Mugabe presents such commitment. However, the Zimbabwean implementation of SAP not only saw the government's tardiness and lack of commitment in tailoring the army, civil service, parastatals, and reducing expenditures; but also, arguably worse than inefficiency, the spread of corruption. The chairman of the parliamentary accounts committee stated in 1993 that: "corruption has become so pervasive and civil servants so venal and rapacious that urgent action is needed".⁷¹ But if those who are very close to the President are involved, to request probity from those less privileged is nothing more than a wishful thinking. As to corruption, the irregularity on the construction of Harare new airport terminal was the most evident case.

The Scandal on The New Airport Terminal Bid

In October 1996, the cabinet agreed to award the contract to build the new Harare International Airport to an unknown bidder AHT (Air

⁷⁰ Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992", *African Affairs* (1993), 92, p.362

⁷¹ EIU, 1st 1994, p. 8

Harbour Technology) at a much more expensive rate and revoked an original contract won by a French company. AHT is known to be linked to Leo Mugabe, president Mugabe's nephew, and is owned by Yani Amani of Cyprus, who has cultivated an extensive network of contacts among politicians and businessmen in Zimbabwe.⁷² Leo Mugabe was also involved in the commercial activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This will be discussed later in Part Five.

Luxurious Wedding And House Fund Scandal

The President married his former secretary in August 1996. The wedding was described as "royal". More than 5,000 VIP guests and some 15,000 ordinary guests were invited. The cost of the wedding was said to be more than US\$ 600,000. The next year, there was a disclosure that the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing had diverted funds from the "Pay for Your House" scheme for low-cost housing provision to build a 30-room mansion in Harare for the President's new wife at a cost of some US\$550,000 despite the availability of six other presidential residences. The housing finance

⁷² EIU, 1st 1996, p. 10

scheme – a US programme – was intended to help house the urban poor who earned less than Z\$1,200 (US\$106) a month. The fund was also “borrowed” by the President’s sister, Bridget – Leo Mugabe’s mother; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Staley Mudenge; the Police commissioner, Augustine Chihuri; the Director of the Central Intelligence; the Director of information; and numerous other senior officials.⁷³ With the President leading by example, ministers felt more comfortable with abusing privileges. Irregularities went out of control, and invoked great trouble.

Exploitation of The War Veterans’ Compensation Fund

The independent MP, Margaret Dongo, exposed in April 1997 that 46 senior officials and members of the government had been awarded the bulk of funds intended to compensate war veterans for injuries suffered during the war of independence. Many of the beneficiaries of the War Veterans’ Compensation Fund had not been combatants, but were in exile in Europe or Northern America, “where they had suffered mental stress or trauma”. For example, the Minister of Local Government, John Nkomo;

⁷³ EIU, 4th 1996, 1st & 3rd, 1997

former Minister of Information; and a MP had received different sum of compensation.⁷⁴ Compared with other corruption, this case was minor, but because war veterans' interests was infringed, the issue developed into a crisis that led to the high rise of budget deficit and the drastic drop of Mugabe's credibility.

Richard Jeffries argues that the development of more efficient and more autonomous state machine is an important precondition for economic development. The over-ambitious expansion in numbers of personnel and range of functions and the particular kinds of economic intervention were the main reasons for the declining inefficiency of African governmental bureaucracy.⁷⁵ If it is combined with the participation of government leaders in various illegal forms of self-enrichment, the result is the further destruction of officials' sense of duty and to erosion of the public's respect for government regulations. The adoption of SAP is likely to produce only very limited economic improvement in the absence of the rebuilding of effective administrative institutions.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, Zimbabwe has been exactly such a case.

⁷⁴ EIU., 3rd 1997, p. 9

⁷⁵ Jeffries, R., "The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Government in Africa", *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol 31, No 1 (March 1993), p. 21-23

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24

The over-manned and inefficient government exhausted resources for development and growth, and encouraged corruption. When ministers, senior officials and party leaders were accumulating substantial personal fortunes from corruption, the wage and salary levels of the large majority of officials fell drastically behind the rate of inflation. Morale and discipline declined accordingly. 'Continuing indiscipline means that liberalizing decrees are not actually implemented – officials continue to tie up would-be investors in red tape'.⁷⁷

Jackson and Rosberg also indicated that:

"Personal rulers ensure power by a system of patron-client ties that facilitate mutual assistance and support. The government has become the main dispenser of patronage and is perceived as such. The interest in patronage resources is directed specifically at persons with power, positions, and influence in the ruling councils of the state – that is, officeholders in the cabinet, the party, the army, the civil service, and parastatal organizations."⁷⁸

Owing to the patron-client nature of the ZANU-PF government, the exploitation of ministerial, parastatal, and company positions for personal gain is rife in a system that is becoming increasingly corrupt. Five years

⁷⁷ Jeffries, 1993, p. 25

⁷⁸ Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Univ. of California

after the trade liberalization package was presented, neither the economic goals nor the political aspirations have been realized.

3.4 Shortcomings of The Programme

Of course it is not objective enough to say that the World Bank is absolutely right in managing the programme in Zimbabwe. One obvious blind spot is that the plan pays scant attention to the wider region. The region's investment rules have been transformed by a new free trade-pact between South Africa and the European Union, and the Southern African Development Community free-trade protocol, starting in January 1999. Industrial investors in the area targeted South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, which may all benefit from the EU trade deal. Increasingly, Zimbabwe's attraction to investors is confined to agriculture – horticulture, coffee, tea, cotton, sugar and livestock – and some minerals. Manufacturing has been sidelined; its share of gross domestic product was down to 14% in 1998 from 25% in the early 1990s.⁷⁹ In addition, the high debt service remitted to the Bank has also

Press 1982, pp. 38-47

⁷⁹ African Confidential, Vol. 40 No. 16, 16 August 1999

been much criticized. It was reported that Zimbabwe paid US\$50 000 an hour to its foreign creditors.⁸⁰ But even without these mistakes, the fundamental structural problem of overmanning, inefficiency and corruption would still strangle the whole project.

By 1995 nearly two-thirds of the population was living under the level of poverty. Real wages had fallen by 40% and inflation had averaged 25% a year since the economic reform started.⁸¹ Unemployment rates shot to 50%, 62% of households had insufficient income to meet basic needs, with the ratio reaching 75% in the Midlands province.⁸² Although ZANU-PF once again won the general election without challenge from a strong opposition, the low 20% turn-out in the by-elections and local elections had shown people's discontent.

⁸⁰ George & Sabelli, 1994, p. 66

⁸¹ EIU., 3rd 1996, p. 10; Africa Confidential, Vol. 38 No. 15, 18 July 1997

4. The Signs of Downfall

4.1 Irresponsible Concession to The War Veterans

The corrupt handling of the War Veterans' Compensation Fund has resulted in a serious outcome. After five months of steadily growing protest by war veterans, and a meeting between veterans' representative and Mugabe, the government was finally forced to promise payments to all veterans. Monthly pensions of Z\$2,000 (US\$160) have been granted, which is almost equal to the monthly wage of an industrial worker; while gratuities of Z\$50,000 will be paid to each veteran. In addition, the government promised to extend free education and health services to war veterans, their wives and children. The total cost of the package for 70,000 war veterans would amount to Z\$3.5bn (US\$260mn). Mugabe's concession has had serious consequences for the effort to improve

⁸² EIU., 4th 1996, p. 12

budgetary balances. The 1997/98 budget originally targeted a deficit of 8.9% of GDP, a figure deemed acceptable by the World Bank, which moved to release US\$62.5mn in balance-of-payments support for Zimbabwe. The Bank soon cancelled this sum when the government decided to release compensation packages, because the target deficit has grown to 12% of GDP and the government needed to resort to increased local borrowing and money emission, as well as taxes. In fact, the veterans had already had their claims met in full after independence from the demobilization directorate, as well as from the Zimbabwe Project Trust. According to the Director's records, 41,000 former fighters received a grant of Z\$185 a month for two years. The disabled had been examined and awarded pensions that were still being paid. No other group had received greater assistance than veterans. All the trouble was caused by the government extending compensation funds to the victims of "psychological" injury in order to benefit the ruling ZANU-PF politicians. Obviously, the government still maintained a loose fiscal policy, in order to preserve the political status quo by keeping vested interests satisfied. Attaining budgetary targets still does not seem to be a

strong priority for the Mugabe administration.⁸³ In view of the role the war veterans have played in the strategy of violence and intimidation by the government during election since independence, it is not at all strange that the government gave such big concessions to them.

In order to raise funds to finance the war veterans' gratuities, the government eventually raised taxes in December 1997, including a "war veterans' levy" of 5% on income tax, a rise in sales tax from 15% to 17.5%, and increases in petrol and electricity prices.⁸⁴ The result was the most widespread strike in the country's history in December 1997 and followed two national strikes organized by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Faced with more national strikes, Mugabe met with union leaders in January 1998, and finally agreed to scrape all the new taxes introduced in November 1997. However, the inflation rate rose, and unions kept on requesting wage increases. An uneasy atmosphere spread rapidly throughout society.

4.2 Land Resettlement: A Smoke Screen And Election Gimmick

After being forced to concede to the war veterans' pension demands,

⁸³ EIU., 4th 1997 pp. 6-7

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1st 1998, p. 14

Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF tried to regain the political initiative by pressing ahead with the compulsory acquisition of 1800 farms without compensation. Land was one of the key issues over which the war against Rhodesian rule was fought. At independence, Mugabe's ZANU-PF government promised massive land redistribution but after a flurry in the early years, redistribution from white to black farmers has lagged. Despite its goal of resettling 162,000 families in the first five years, the government has relocated only 70,000 families since 1980. The government has blamed its failure to introduce sweeping land reform on the Lancaster House independence settlement. In fact, there is a significant amount of unused or underused land in Zimbabwe that can serve as something of a buffer between white agriculture and the government's resettlement programme.⁸⁵ It has been clear that there is insufficient political will, inadequate expertise and almost no availability of resources for the programme to resettle families at a rate significantly faster than it had been.⁸⁶ In addition, the government and commercial farmers were increasingly finding common ground. It was disclosed in April 1994 that ninety farms had been leased under a 'tenant resettlement

⁸⁵ Stoneman, *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, 1988, p. 50

⁸⁶ Herbst, 1990, p. 54

scheme'. State land earmarked for resettlement by peasant families from overcrowded areas was being diverted to prominent individuals as a reward for political favours. Many beneficiaries of this scheme were senior party officials, civil servants, military officers and Central Intelligence Organization officers.⁸⁷ No fewer than 17 ministers are members of the white-dominated Commercial Farmers' Union.

During the campaigns of every election since 1990, Mugabe and other ZANU-PF officials repeatedly promised a renewed drive for land reform. But after the election victory, no substantial progress had been made. After the veterans' pension storm, Mubabe has once again stepped up his rhetoric against white farmers, touring every province in the country, and threatening to change the constitution in whatever way was necessary to expropriate their land, saying that: "we are going to take the land and we are not going to pay a cent for the soil. However, if Britain wanted compensation they should give us the money and we would pass it on to their children."⁸⁸ But the British government reaffirmed that no money would be provided except for sales by willing sellers to willing buyers.

Despite Mugabe's failure to persuade the UK to take responsibility for

⁸⁷ Africa Confidential, Vol 35 No 14, 15 July 1994

⁸⁸ EIU., 4th 1997, pp. 9-10

the compensation of expropriated white commercial farmers, a list of 1,480 commercial farms designated for acquisition was published. Many of the farms on the list were highly efficient, utilizing their land resources fully and were single holdings constituting their owners' only source of income. None of the hundreds of farms owned by party officials, ministers and other government supporters were designated. While Mugabe continued to insist that the government would "not pay a cent" for the land, no provision was made for the estimated 100,000 current workers and their families, altogether about 700,000 people, and no fund was set aside for developing the land for resettlement.⁸⁹ Since June 1998, thousands of peasants from communal areas occupied white-owned farms claiming that the properties were rightfully theirs. After weeks of occupation, the peasants accepted the government's promises of resettlement and moved back to communal areas. Virtually every incident followed the same scenario.

It needs to be noted that although regarded by many as the country's most emotive issue, the importance of land has declined since 1980s. With half the population under fifteen, employment has become the

⁸⁹ EIU., 1st 1998, p. 12

central issue. The population is increasing at just under 3% per year, which makes ‘the right to land’ a barely political slogan.⁹⁰ As pointed out by the Chavunduka Inquiry into agriculture, “one of the best investments a communal farmer can make is to educate his family so that they can obtain urban employment”. Mugabe has been rhetorically militant on the land issue for at least a decade, using it to divert attention from government failings, especially before elections. The promise of a new resettlement programme is in part aimed at shoring up the party’s support base in the rural areas.⁹¹ Land has proved a helpful tool for ZANU-PF.

⁹⁰ Africa Confidential, Vol. 35 No. 14, 15 July 1994

⁹¹ Africa Confidential, Vol. 30 No. 19, 22 September 1989

5. The Straw That Crushes The Camel's Back

– The War in Congo-Kinshasa

Zimbabwe is a pivotal state in the sub-region, and it sees itself as such. It, therefore, has played important roles in Front Line States (FLS), in Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), undertaking responsibility for regional food security. Mugabe has been active in international politics. He was the chairman of the Non-Alignment Movement from 1986 to 1989, and he is current chairman of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). To be active in international affairs is not incompatible with being an effective ruler. But it is absurd for a ruler to pursue international advancement at the cost of his own people.

When Mugabe sent the Zimbabwean army to Mozambique in 1983, there was much criticism and complaint among Zimbabweans because it

drained the resources urgently needed for development. Criticism became stronger especially when the Zimbabwean army switched from protecting the Beira Corridor to attacking Mozambique rebels; and senior officers got involved in the moneymaking business in Mozambique. However, Mugabe had strong enough reason. The strategic importance of Beira Corridor to the Zimbabwean economy and the security of the eastern territory justified this military action. But Mugabe did confuse Zimbabweans when he decided to send troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to help the embattled Congolese president, Laurent Kabila, whose troops were fighting off an incursion led by rebels with the support from Uganda and Rwanda. The intervention, supported by a majority of SADC leaders, has given Mugabe the high profile he has been looking for. Since 1994, Nelson Mandela has overshadowed Mugabe in the region.

According to estimates, there are over 13,000 Zimbabwean soldiers in DRC, costs Zimbabwe US\$ 3 million a month. The budget deficit of 1999 was over 12% of GDP. The inflation rate reached 70%. The governmental debt of over Z\$200 billion has exceeded GDP. On February 2000, many filling stations in Harare ran out of petrol and diesel

because the state-owned oil procurement company, National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, failed to pay debt owed to South Africa oil companies.⁹² At the same time, the Zimbabwean government placed orders for 12 Chinese F7 combat jets (US\$98 million), six to nine second hand Russian Mi-24 combat helicopters and cluster bombs from the UK for the use in Congo.⁹³

Many explanations for Mugabe's decision have not been persuasive. There has been little history of interaction with the DRC. The two countries do not share a border, civil War in Congo does not threaten Zimbabwe's security in any way. It has been said that Mugabe feels a special kinship with Kabila, as both support the 1960s brand of African nationalism, including Socialist rhetoric, the one-party state system and the discouragement of any dissent. It sounds reasonable, but less convincing than another reason, Mugabe, ministers and senior military officers have benefited from military sales and mining in DRC through the state-owned Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) and a Zimbabwean firm, Ridgepoint, whose owner Billy Rautenbach is close to Mugabe and ZANU-PF. In addition, a London-based Oryx Diamonds company

⁹² Africa Research Bulletin, Vol 37 No 1, January 16th – February 15th 2000, p.14209

⁹³ EIU., 1st 1999, p. 12

organizes a profit-sharing arrangement with the private Zimbabwean company Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimate) of which Zimbabwe Defence Force Commander Lieutenant Vitalis Musungwa Gava Zvinavashe is a director. It was reported that Kabila's regime granted Oryx rights worth over US\$ 1 billion to exploit the diamond concessions. 50% goes to Zimbabwe's Osleg and its sub-company Cosleg. Through partnership with Congo's Comiex, Cosleg gets preferential access to mineral, timber and other natural resources in Congo.⁹⁴

With regard to individuals, Vitalis Zvinavashe's family firm, Zvinavashe Transport, won a contract with Zimbabwe Defence Industries to ship military supplies to Congo. The general's younger brother owns a firm which won an order for exports to the Congo.⁹⁵

The reason for military intervention in the Congo is crystal clear – the personal interests of a few people have urged the intervention. It seemed to be an enterprising idea to go abroad to seek benefits when domestically generated funds are simply not enough. Laurent Kabila did pay for the assistance, but the pay goes into personal pockets, and the cost is met by sky-rocketing inflation and fuel shortages.

⁹⁴ Africa Confidential., Vol. 41 No. 11, 26 May 2000

⁹⁵ Africa Confidential., Vol. 39 No. 21, 23 October 1998

Sending troops to the Congo has upset the pace of the SAP. The IMF and the World Bank have delayed the disbursement of stand-by facilities. Riots ensued when the prices of petrol and diesel were increased by 67% on 31 October 1999.

6. The Rise of Opposition Parties And The Chaos Before The Parliamentary Elections

6.1 Long Absence of Significant Opposition Parties

Many factors have constrained the growth of a significant opposition party in Zimbabwe after its independence in 1981. First is the structure of ethnic factions. Over seventy per cent of the Zimbabwean population belongs to the Shona tribe. The other main tribe is Ndebele, accounting for more than 20% of the population. During the years of resistance against minority rule, the ZANU increasingly became the focus of the Shona majority's aspirations, whilst ZAPU retained the loyalty of most Ndebele. After independence, leaders of the Ndebele-based ZAPU were co-opted by Mugabe and lost the opportunity to develop into a significant party.

Second, the ZANU-PF and Mugabe have concentrated in maintaining support of the Shonas by adopting “Shona-priority” policies. The Extension of excessive welfare – agricultural services, pricing policies for communal farmers and the provision of food aid – has effectively consolidated support from rural areas. Given such a strategy of “buying support”, it has been very difficult for opposition to develop. Most importantly, ZANU-PF has also resorted to violence and intimidation, which was implemented by war veterans and other agents to threaten people who supported the opposition parties.

Even though ZANU-PF has done so much to prevent the growth of any opposition, numerous parties and alliances have been created. Most of the political figures who have tried to challenge Mugabe and ZANU-PF have been ex-members (or ex-ministers) of ZANU, such as Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU-Ndonga), Edgar Tekere (Zimbabwe Unity Movement) and Magaret Dongo (independent). They were either thought to be politically inept or having nothing to offer the electorate, and seen as unable to offer a credible alternative to ZANU-PF. They did not have the capability to build a national image and channel popular anti-government sentiment into the ballot box. Their influence hardly

extended beyond their local bases.

6.2 The Rise of The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)

The deteriorating economic situation and rising corruption had deepened Zimbabweans' grievances. The concession towards war veterans' requests to grant them gratuities, and the military involvement in the Congo have further drained the government's resources. As a result, popular opposition to the government has grown, providing new momentum to induce opposition parties.

Having led three successful national strikes in 1998, the ZCTU consolidated its position as the leading opposition force. In fact, the ZCTU had challenged ZANU-PF's labour policy since 1990. Its credit had been accumulated gradually among labourers. Morgan Tsvangirai, the Secretary General, had been instrumental in transforming the ZCTU from an organization aligned with the government to a movement that wields considerable power.⁹⁶ The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formally launched by the ZCTU on September 11th 1999 to

⁹⁶ EIU., 2nd 1999, p.9

challenge Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF in the parliamentary elections of 2000. The new party, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, calls for greater accountability, an end to corruption and responsible management of the economy.⁹⁷

Other parties had also reorganized themselves, such as the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD), United Parties, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to meet the parliamentary elections. However, most of these parties are headed by old faces, such as Margaret Dongo, Bishop Abel Muzarewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. It would have been naïve to expect that they could make much significant impact.

6.3 The Constitutional Referendum

Under growing pressure, Mugabe moved ahead to hold a referendum on the government-sponsored draft constitution on February 12th to 13th, 2000. The draft constitution would have allowed Mugabe to retain most of his powers, rule for two more five-year terms and permit the government to seize land owned by white descendants without paying

⁹⁷ Ibid., 4th 1999, p. 10

compensation.

Mugabe was defeated in the referendum. The result showed a split electorate – the 54.5% no vote came mainly from urban areas, while 45.3% of the mainly rural population said yes. In Harare and Bulawayo, Mugabe suffered a crushing 75% rejection.⁹⁸

But according to the result of a national opinion survey carried out in Zimbabwe by the Helen Suzman Foundation in January and February, among 1,000 rural and 900 urban households, 65% wanted Mugabe to step down right away; 69% said they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the government; only 35% wanted ZANU-PF to continue in power; and 68% lacked confidence that the government was telling the truth. The survey was held at exactly the same time as the constitutional referendum, and it casts doubt on the validity of the referendum result, which showed for lower levels of anti-government feeling. It looked very much as if Mugabe's government had rigged the referendum, yet still lost it.⁹⁹ The message delivered from the result was clear – the President and his party had simply worn out their welcome.

⁹⁸ Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 37 No. 2, February 2000, p. 13855

⁹⁹ R W Johnson, "Terrorists don't change their spots", New Statesman, 19 June 2000, p. 23

6.4 The Orchestrated Turmoil

In mid-February, shortly after Mugabe's defeat in the constitutional referendum, war veterans began invading white-owned farms and claiming them as their own. By the end of March 2000, more than five hundred commercial farms had been seized. Mugabe declared publicly on March 2nd that the government "would not interfere".¹⁰⁰ According to Gemini News, Mugabe said "they (the squatters) were just demonstrating their greatest disappointment that there was a 'no' vote".¹⁰¹ Throughout the period before the general election which took place on 24th to 25th June 2000, ZANU-PF's agents went out to beat up and threaten those who supported MDC and force people to vote for ZANU-PF candidates.

Given the violence and intimidation orchestrated by ZANU-PF, which resulted in at least twenty six people dead, most of them opposition supporters, the MDC still captured 57 seats in 120 parliament election districts, deprived ZANU-PF of a two-thirds majority in the legislature, and became a powerful opposition force. Mugabe's Minister of Home Affairs, the Justice Minister and the Mine and Environment Minister all lost their seats in parliament. It was seen as a Pyrrhic victory for

¹⁰⁰ Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 37 No. 2, February-March 2000, p. 14245

¹⁰¹ Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 37 No. 3, March 2000, p. 13902

Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The British government declared on June 27th that it would withhold thirty-six million pounds earmarked for land reform in Zimbabwe unless Mugabe pursued national reconciliation after his narrow election victory. Foreign Minister Secretary Robin Cook lauded Zimbabwean voters for courage in voting strongly for opposition candidates despite “two months of intimidation and gerrymandering.”¹⁰² Until four or five years ago, Mugabe’s government was still regarded by international press as respectable. After the elections of 2000, the international community’s attitude towards Mugabe’s regime will never be the same again and the opposition might receive the support it deserves. The emergence of a organized and truly national opposition party will hopefully provide checks and balances in a political system which was in short of such limits for too long.

¹⁰² Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 37 No. 6, June 2000, p. 13997

7. Conclusion

Zimbabwe has been practicing constitutional rules. The President is elected once every six years, whilst members of parliament once every five years. However, the presidential power conferred by the constitution, in particular, the right to appoint thirty MPs in a 150-member parliament is indeed too immense. In addition, the government has indulged in violence and intimidation to win elections. Therefore, it would be very misleading to indicate it as a democratic system.

In Part Two, I have explained that after independence, Mugabe and his government had been caught by the trap of socialism, trying to control the economy by too many regulations; thus not only scaring away potential investment, delaying development, but also over expanding the bureaucracy, leading to declining efficiency and corruption. In order to guarantee its rule, Mugabe's government initiated excessive welfare to woo support from the rural peasantry, resulting in a huge budget deficit.

This strategy contributed to economic stagnation. So when the country entered into the second decade after independence, Mugabe was faced with a difficult choice – to cut government employment at the risk of political unpopularity, or to allow the economy to decline further at the cost of even greater long-term unpopularity.

Why didn't Mugabe take unpopular measures as some authoritarian rulers did in the long-term interests of the society? As Part Two of this dissertation illustrates, ZANU-PF is a party based upon an alliance of a variety of regional ethnic groups, they competed with each other to safeguard their own interests. Mugabe co-opted powerful members of different groups into the government and needed to play them against each other for his benefit. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that, to certain extent, he was not willing to insist on the policies he preferred at the risk of losing such a cultivated balance. For example, he had to give up the idea of a one-party state when it encountered disagreement among his old guard comrades. But in view of the insignificant impact of the separation of Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo from the party, the influence of ZANU old guard seemed to be negligible. Even if he sacked those incompetent and corrupt ministers, his status would not have

been undermined. But he did not do that. Furthermore, as I point out in Part Three, he did not cut the over expanded civil service and army, and reform the parastatals. Partly because he thought he could maintain leadership and his own position by continued manipulation of patron-clientelism and a gang of oligarchy, and partly because the deepening corruption had complicated the situation in which he was especially involved.

Land resettlement is the issue Mugabe has talked about most frequently. He blamed the Lancaster House Constitution and blamed British government for its refusal to fund the resettlement. But at the same time, there had been millions of hectares of government-owned arable land left underutilized, and ministers used privilege to hijack farms designated for resettlement. After being defeated in the constitutional referendum, he encouraged war veterans to invade commercial farms and terrorize MCD supporters. Was this what the majority of the Zimbabweans really wanted? In an interview during the chaotic period, one farm invader said:

“I want to share this land with these whites who live here. I would like to see whites and blacks working together. That would be nice. We cannot raise up Zimbabwe

without the white people. We were people who did not know much. We can learn from whites. Maybe when we are farming we can ask them and they can help us.”¹⁰³

On the other hand, one white commercial farmer said:

“We’re an agriculturally based economy. The resettlement must not interfere with the basis of production. I am just the custodian of this land and it burns me up to see productive land become unproductive. I want to see farms taken over and see the land remain productive. If you can demonstrate success, then the willingness to make land available would increase.”¹⁰⁴

Obviously, there was considerable room to promote cooperation between the white and the black Zimbabweans. But Muagabe and his government simply sat the time out and misled the public to believe that it was the squatters who upset the order. So, was Mugabe suffering from a dynamic beyond his control? My answer is no. It was he who manipulated the situation.

Jeffrey Herbst observed in 1990 that “unlike most revolutionaries who came to power, Robert Mugabe has both the temperament and the intellect to lead his country successfully in peacetime.”¹⁰⁵ But why did Mugabe fail to use this endowment to lead? My conclusion is that he

¹⁰³ The Gurdian, 25 March 2000

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

has been too much afraid of losing power. As he shouted in Shona at his rallies: “By my ghost, I will never allow anyone else to rule this country”.¹⁰⁶ Christopher Clapham said many years ago, “Control of the state is too appealing to be abandoned”.¹⁰⁷ The desire to retain power simply prevailed over the rationality. Zimbabweans voted the MDC not because they were sure that the new party could provide them a brighter future but because they had been fed up with Mugabe and his entourage. By employing terrorism, ZANU-PF won parliamentary elections of 2000. But many more challenges are lying ahead to test Mugabe’s durability.

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg indicated in 1982:

“In African countries governance is more a matter of seamanship and less one of navigation – that is, staying afloat rather than going somewhere. With a few notable exceptions, there is little governmental or even public organizational rationality in African states.”¹⁰⁸

It is not clear whether Zimbabwe will be able to find a way out of this crisis in the near future. But up to date, Mugabe and his team are still struggling desperately to stay afloat rather than going somewhere.

¹⁰⁵ Herbst, 1990, p. 234

¹⁰⁶ Johnson R. W., “Terrorists don’t change their spots”, *New Statesman*, 19 June 2000, p. 23

¹⁰⁷ Jeffries R., “The Ghanaian Elections of 1996”, *African Affairs* (1998), 97, p. 207

¹⁰⁸ Jackson R.H. & Rosberg C.G., *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, University of California Press, 1982, p. 18

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